His efforts to bring neoclassical metaphysics into dialogue with analytic philosophy have been largely ignored by analytic philosophers, regrettably, I believe, since much could be learned by such a dialogue. I would like to encourage such a dialogue by focusing on one aspect of Hartshorne’s metaphysics from the perspective of analytic philosophy. My procedure will be to examine the category of feeling, first by sketching briefly Hartshorne’s position that feeling is a metaphysical category. Before beginning a critical analysis of Hartshorne’s attempt to generalize feeling and establish it as a metaphysical category, we must get a fuller understanding of his view of metaphysics. Just what are metaphysical categories, and how are they developed? Charles Hartshorne: Neoclassical Metaphysics Charles Hartshorne was an intrepid defender of the claims of metaphysics in a century characterized by its anti-metaphysical genius. While many influential voices were explaining what speculative philosophy could not accomplish or even proclaiming an end to it, Hartshorne was trying to show what speculative philosophy could accomplish. Metaphysics, he asserted. Continue reading Hartshorne, Charles: Neoclassical Metaphysics. Charles Hartshorne in 20th Century Philosophy. Remove from this list. Hartshorne never considered the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory, which by virtue of quantum branching into conjunctively realized alternative space-times, denies Leibniz’s principle of contingency as exclusion of alternatives. (For a critique of the so-called actualist account of many-worlds ontology and defense of the coherence of process philosophy and quantum theory, see Shields 2008.) Hartshorne was cognizant of the prima facie tensions between relativity and big bang theory and his neoclassical metaphysics, and he offered plausible conciliatory suggestions: For example, consider his embrace of quantum physicist H. P. Stapp’s notion of a primordial, asymmetrically well-ordered sequence of events upon which space-time location is dependent.