The past few decades have witnessed an enormous interest in the women’s movement and the ecology (or environmental) movement. Many feminists have argued that the goals of these two movements are mutually reinforcing and ultimately involve the development of worldviews and practices which are not based on models of domination. One of the first feminists to do so was Rosemary Radford Ruether who, in 1975, wrote in New Woman/New Earth:

Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be one of domination. They must unite the demands of the women’s movement with those of the ecological movement to envision a radical reshaping of the basic socioeconomic relations and the underlying values of this [modern industrial] society. (204)

Subsequent feminist writings by animal rights activists and ecological and other environmental feminists have reinforced Ruether’s basic point: There are important connections between feminism and environmentalism, an appreciation of which is essential for the success of the women’s and ecological movements.

Just what are some of the connections between “feminism and the environment” that have attracted the attention of ecological feminist philosophers? How has recognition of these connections affected and informed the philosophical perspectives of feminism and environmental issues?

In this introduction I attempt to answer these questions by doing three things. First, I identify some of the connections between the domination of women and the domination of nature which have been suggested in the scholarly ecofeminist philosophical literature. Second, I identify a range of ecological (“eco”) feminist
philosophical positions which have emerged, particularly in the field of environmental ethics, in an attempt to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the connections between feminism and the environment. Third, I suggest what the philosophical significance of this emerging literature is, not only for feminism and environmental philosophy but for mainstream philosophy as well. While no attempt is made to provide an exhaustive account, hopefully this overview highlights some of the relevant issues and acquaints the newcomer with the nature and range of philosophical positions on “feminism and the environment,” or ecological feminism.

A Characterization of Ecofeminism

Just as there is not one feminism, there is neither one ecofeminism nor one feminist philosophy. “Ecofeminism” is the name of a variety of different feminist perspectives on the nature of the connections between the domination of women (and other oppressed humans) and the domination of nature. “Ecofeminist philosophy” is the name of a diversity of philosophical approaches to the variety of different connections between feminism and the environment. These different perspectives reflect not only different feminist perspectives (e.g., liberal, traditional Marxist, radical, and socialist feminism); they also reflect different understandings of the nature, and solution to, pressing environmental problems (see Warren 1987). So, it is an open question of how many, which, and on what grounds any of the proposed ecofeminist philosophies are properly identified as ecofeminist positions. What one takes to be a genuine ecofeminist philosophical position will depend largely on how one conceptualizes both feminism and ecological feminism.

What all ecofeminist philosophers hold in common, however, is the view that there are important connections between the domination of women (and other human subordinates) and the domination of nature and that a failure to recognize these connections results in inadequate feminisms, environmentalism, and environmental philosophy. What the nature of these alleged connections is and which, if any, are accurate descriptions of the nature and root sources of the twin dominations of women and nature is largely what ecofeminist philosophers debate.

Some Alleged Connections between Feminism and the Environment

There are at least eight sorts of connections which ecofeminists have identified as important to understanding the connections between feminism and the environment. No attempt is made here to critically assess the claims made about these connections. Furthermore, these eight categories are not to be viewed as competing or mutually exclusive. Indeed, many of the important claims made about one kind of connection (e.g., conceptual and theoretical) often depend on insights gleaned from others (e.g., historical and empirical). The aim in this section is simply to present for consideration the various elements of the overall “feminism and the environment” picture.

1. Historical and causal. One sort of alleged connection between feminism and the environment discussed by ecological feminist philosophers is primarily historical. When historical data are used to generate theories concerning the sources of the twin dominations of women and nature, it is also causal. In fact, some feminists characterize ecofeminism in terms of just such historical and causal claims: “Ecofeminism is a recent development in feminist thought which argues that the current global environmental crisis is a predictable outcome of patriarchical culture (Salleh 1988, 138. n.1). What are some of these historical and causal claims?

Some ecofeminists (e.g., Spretnak 1990; Reisler 1988) trace the historical and causal connections to prototypical patterns of domination begun with the invasion of Indo-European societies by nomadic tribes from Eurasia about 4500 B.C. (Lahar 1991). Riane Eisler describes the time before these invasions as “matrifocal, matrilineal, peaceful agrarian era” Others (e.g., Griffin 1978; Plumwood 1991; Ruether 1975) focus on the historical role played by rationalism and important conceptual dualisms (discussed at 2, below) in classical Greek philosophy. Still other feminists (e.g., Merchant 1980, 1989; Shiva 1988) focus on cultural and scientific changes that occurred during the scientific revolution and sanctioned the exploitation of nature, unchecked commercial and industrial expansion, and the subordination of women.

What prompts and explains these alleged historical and causal connections between the domination of women and the domination of nature? What else was in place to permit and sanction these twin dominations? To answer these questions, ecofeminist philosophers have turned to the conceptual props which keep the historical dominations of women and nature in place.

2. Conceptual. Many ecofeminists and ecological feminist philosophers (e.g., Cheney 1987; Gray 1981; Griffin 1978; Y. King 1981, 1983, 1989a; Merchant 1980, 1990; Plumwood 1986, 1991; Ruether 1975; Salleh 1984; Warren 1987, 1988, 1990 [reprinted in this volume]) have argued that, ultimately, historical and causal links between the dominations of women and of nature are located in conceptual structures of domination and in the way women and nature have been conceptualized, particularly in the western intellectual tradition. Four such conceptual links have been suggested.

One account locates the conceptual basis of the twin dominations of women and nature in value dualisms, i.e., disjunctive pairs in which the disjuncts are seen as oppositional (rather than as complementary) and exclusive (rather than as inclusive), and value hierarchies, i.e., perceptions of diversity organized by a spatial Up-Down metaphor which attributes a higher value (status, prestige) to
that which is higher ("Up") (see Gray 1981; Griffin 1978, 1989a; Y. King 1981, 1983, 1990; Ruether 1975; Zimmerman 1987). Frequently cited examples of these hierarchically organized value dualisms include reason/emotion, mind/body, culture/nature, human/nature, and man/woman dichotomies. These theorists argue that whatever is (historically) associated with emotion, body, nature, and women is regarded as inferior to that which is (historically) associated with reason, mind, culture, human (i.e., male), and men. One role of feminism and environmental ethics, then, is to expose and dismantle these dualisms and to rethink and reconceive those mainstay philosophical notions (e.g., reason, rationality, knowledge, objectivity, the self as knower and moral agent) which rely on them.

A second, related account expands on the first by housing the value dualistic, value hierarchical chinking (described above) in larger, oppressive patriarchal conceptual frameworks—ones undergirding all social “isms” of domination,” e.g., racism, classism, heterosexism, sexism as well as “naturism,” or the unjustified domination of nonhuman nature (see Warren 1987, 1988, 1990). A conceptual framework is a socially constructed set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions that shape and reflect how one views oneself and others. It is oppressive when it explains, justifies, and maintains relationships of domination and subordination. An oppressive conceptual framework is patriarchal when it explains, justifies, and maintains the subordination of women by men. Oppressive and patriarchal conceptual frameworks are characterized not only by value dualisms and value hierarchies, but also by “power-over” conceptions of power and relationships of domination (Warren 1991) and by a “logic of domination,” i.e., a structure of argumentation which justifies subordination on the grounds that superiority justifies subordination (Warren 1987, 1990). On this view, it is oppressive and patriarchal conceptual frameworks (and the behaviors which they give rise to) which sanction, maintain, and perpetuate the twin dominations of women and nature. Revealing and overcoming oppressive and patriarchal conceptual frameworks as they are manifest in theories and practices regarding women and nature are important tasks of feminism, environmentalism, and environmental ethics.

A third account locates the conceptual basis in sex-gender differences, particularly in differentiated personality formation or consciousness (see Cheney 1987; Gray 1981; Caldecott and Leland 1983; Salleh 1984). The claim is that female bodily experiences (e.g., of reproduction and childrearing), not female biology per se situate women differently with respect to nature than men. This difference is revealed in a different consciousness in women than men; it is rooted conceptually in “paradigms that are uncritically oriented to the dominant western masculine forms of experiencing the world: the analytic, non-related, delightfully called ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ approaches” (Salleh 1988, 130)—just the sort of value dualisms which are claimed (above) to separate and inferiorize what is historically female-gender identified. These socio-psycho-logical factors provide a conceptual link insofar as they are embedded in different conceptualization structures and strategies (different “ways of knowing”), coping strategies, and ways of relating to nature for women and men. A goal of feminism and environmental ethics, then, is to develop gender-sensitive language, theory, and practices which do not further the exploitative experiences and habits of dissociated, male-gender identified culture toward women and nature.

A fourth account draws on some of the historical connections mentioned earlier (at 1). It locates the conceptual link between feminism and the environment in the metaphors and models of mechanistic science which began during both the Enlightenment and pre-Enlightenment period (see Merchant 1980; Easlea 1981). The claim is that prior to the seventeenth century, nature was conceived on an organic model as a benevolent female, a nurturing mother; after the scientific revolution, nature was conceived on a mechanistic model as a (mere) machine, inert, dead. On both models, nature was female. The claim is that the move from the organic to the mechanistic model conceptually permitted and ethically justified the exploitation of the (female) earth by removing the sorts of barriers to such treatment that the metaphor of nature as a living organism previously prevented. The challenge to feminists, environmentalists, and environmental ethicists, then, is to overcome metaphors and models which feminize nature and naturalize women to the mutual detriment of both nature and women.

3. Empirical and experiential. Many ecofeminists and ecological feminist philosophers have documented empirical evidence linking feminism and the environment. Some point to various health and risk factors caused by the presence of low-level radiation, pesticides, toxics, and other pollutants and borne disproportionately by women and children (see Caldecott and Leland 1983; Diamond 1990; Kheel 1989; Philipose 1989). Others provide data to show that First World development policies foster practices regarding food, forests, and water which directly contribute to the inability of women to provide adequately for themselves and their families (e.g., Mies 1986; Salleh 1990; Shiva 1988; Warren 1988, 1989). Feminist animal-rights scholars argue that factory farming, animal experimentation, hunting, and meat eating are tied to patriarchal concepts and practices (Adams 1990, 1991; Collard with Conrucci 1988; Kheel 1985, 1987–88). Appeals to such empirical data are intended to document the very real, felt, lived connections between the dominations of women and nature and to motivate the need for feminist critical analysis of environmental concerns.

Some ecofeminists and ecofeminist philosophers cite experiential connections which honor and celebrate important cultural and spiritual ties of women and indigenous peoples to the earth (see Allen 1986, 1990; Bagby 1990; Doubiago 1990; LaChapelle 1978; Woman of Power 1988). Indeed, documenting such connections and making them integral to the project of “feminism and the environment” is often heralded as one of the most important contributions to
the creation of liberating, life-affirming, and post-patriarchal *worldviews* and earth-based spirituality or theology (see Christ 1990; McDaniels 1989, 1990; Ructher 1989; Spernak 1989a, 1990; Starhawk 1989, 1990). Appreciating these connections and understanding the "politics of women's spirituality" is viewed as an important aspect of feminism, *environmentalism*, and environmental ethics.

4. **Epistemological.** The various historical, conceptual, and empirical/experimental connections which have been claimed to link feminism and the environment (discussed at 1-3, above) have also motivated the need for different feminist environmental *epistemologies*. Typically these emerging epistemologies build on scholarship currently underway in feminist philosophy which challenges mainstream views of *reason*, rationality, knowledge, and the *nature* of the knower (see APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 1989; Jaggar and Bordo 1989; Code 1987; Garry and Pearsall 1989; Harding and Hintikka 1983). Douglas Buge, for instance, argues for a feminist environmental epistemology that builds on Lorraine Code's responsibilist epistemology (Buege 1991). As Val Plumwood suggests, if one mistakenly construes environmental philosophy as only or mainly concerned with ethics, one will neglect a key aspect of the overall problem which is concerned with the definition of the human self as separate from nature, the connection between this and the instrumental view of nature, and broader political aspects of the critique of *instrumentalism* (Plumwood 1991). A feminist environmental epistemology would address these political aspects of the human/nature dichotomy.

Other ecofeminists appeal to the Critical Theory of I. Lorkheim (1974), Adorno (1973, 1974), Balbus (1982), and the Frankfurt circle, claiming that "their epistemology and substantive analysis both point to a convergence of feminist and ecological concerns, anticipating the more recent arrival of ecofeminism" (Salleh 1988, 131). For these feminists, Critical Theory provides a critique of the "nature versus culture" and an epistemological structure for critiquing the relationship between the domination of women and the domination of nature (see Salleh 1988; Mills 1987, 1991).

5. Symbolic. Many ecofeminists (see, e.g., Heresies #13; Bell 1988; Murphy 1980; Salleh 1988) explore the symbolic association and devaluation of women and nature that appears in art, literature, religion, and theology. Drawing on feminist literature (e.g., the literature of Atwood 1985; Bngby 1990; Corrigan and Hoppe 1989, 1990; Domingo 1990; Gearhart 1979; Kolodny 1975; LeGuin 1985, 1987, 1988; Oliver 1983; Piercy 1976; Rich 1986; Silko 1987; Zalaba 1988), some argue that patriarchal conceptions of nature and women have justified "a two-pronged rape and domination of the earth and the women who live on it" (Murphy 1988, 87), often using this as background for developing an ecofeminist literary theory (Murphy 1991). Others explore the potential of *(eco)feminism* for creating alternative languages (e.g., Daly 1978; Griffin 1978),

6. Ethical. Much of the ecological feminists' philosophical literature on feminism and the environment has linked the two ethically. The claim is that the interconnections among the conceptualizations and treatment of women, animals, and (the rest of) nonhuman nature require a feminist ethical analysis and response. Minimally, the goal of feminist *environmental* ethics is to develop theories and practices concerning humans and the natural environment which are not male-biased and which provide a guide to action in the preeminent present (see Warren 1990; Warren and Cheney 1991b). Since a discussion of ethical concerns is intimately tied with alleged theticalconnections between feminism and the environment, consider now the range of theoretical positions which have emerged.

7. Theoretical. The varieties of alleged connections between feminism and the environment (identified at 1-6, above) have generated different, sometimes competing, theoretical philosophical positions in all areas of feminist and environmental scholarship. *Nowhere is this more evident* that in the field of

Other ecofeminists explore the symbolic connections between sexist and naturist language, i.e., language which inferiorizes women and nonhuman nature. This may involve raising questions about whether the sex-gendered language used to describe "Mother nature" is, in Ynestra King's words, "potentially liberating or simply a rationale for the continued subordination of women" (King 1981, 12; see also Griscom 1981; Orten 1974; Roach 1991). It may involve establishing connections between the languages used to describe *women*, nature, and nuclear weaponry (see Adams 1990; Cohn 1989; Strange 1989). For instance, women are often described in animal terms (e.g., as cows, foxes, chicks, serpents, bitches, beavers, old bats, pussy-cats, cats, birdbrains, harebrains). Nature is often described in female and sexual terms: Nature is raped, mastered, conquered, controlled, mined. Her secrets are penetrated and her womb is put into the services of the "man of science." Virgin soil is tilled and land that lies fallow is "barren," useless. The claim is that language which so feminizes nature and naturalizes women describes, reflects, and perpetuates the domination and inferiorization of both by failing to see the extent to which the twin dominations of women and nature (including animals) are, in fact, culturally (and not merely figuratively) analogous (Adams 1990, 61). The development of feminist theory and praxis which does not perpetuate this language and the power-over systems of domination they reinforce is, therefore, a goal of feminist environmentalism2
environmental ethics. For reasons of space and audience, the discussion of “theoretical connections” is limited here to the field of environmental ethics.

In many respects, contemporary environmental ethics reflects the range of positions in contemporary normative philosophical ethics. The latter includes tradition consequentalist (e.g., ethical egoist, utilitarian) and nonconsequentialist or deontological (e.g., Kantian, rights-based, virtue-based) positions, as well as challenges to them by nontraditional (e.g., some feminist, existentialist, Marxist, Afrocenric) positions. Similarly with environmental ethics. There are consequentialist (e.g., eco-utilitarian, utilitarian-based animal liberation) and nonconsequentialist (e.g., human rights-based, rights-based animal liberation, land stewardship) positions that extend traditional ethical considerations to animals and the nonhuman environment. There also are nontraditional approaches (e.g., holistic Leopoldian land ethics, social ecology, deep ecology, ecological feminism). Ecofeminists and ecofeminist philosophers who address environmental issues can be found defending each of these sorts of positions.

By extension, there is not one ecofeminist philosophical ethic. Given the newness of ecofeminism as a theoretical position, the nature of ecofeminist ethics is still emerging. Among the most visible are feminist animal-rights positions (e.g., Adams 1988, 1991; Keele 1985; Slicer 1991) and feminist environmental ethics based on an ethic of care (e.g., Curtin 1991; see also R. King 1991), an ethic of respect (e.g., Westra 1989), themes in social ecology (e.g., Y. King 1981, 1983, 1989, 1990), and themes in bioregionalism (e.g., Cheney 1989b; Plant 1990). They all recognize important connections between the indefensible treatment of women and of nature, and they involve a commitment to developing ethics which are not male-biased. It remains an open question, then, of how many, which, and on what grounds any of the various positions in environmental ethics which acknowledge such feminist concerns are ecofeminist philosophical positions.

8. Political (Praxis). Françoise d'Eaubonne introduced the term “ecofeminisme” in 1974 to bring attention to women's potential for bringing about an ecological revolution (1974, 213–52). Ecofeminist and other feminist concerns for women and the environment have always grown out of pressing political and practical concerns. These range from issues of health concerning women and environmental health to development and technology, the treatment of animals, peace, and antinuclear and antimilitarism activism (see Griffin 1989b; Harris and King 1990; Lahar 1991; Spretnak 1989b). The varieties of feminist theoretical perspectives on the environment are properly seen as an attempt to take seriously the grassroots activism and political concerns by developing analyses of domination which explain, clarify, and guide that praxis (see The Ecofeminist Newsletter; Harris and King 1989; Y. King 1981, 1983, 1989, 1990; Spretnak 1989b; Warren 1991).

In the preceding I have identified eight sorts of connections alleged by ecofeminists and ecofeminist philosophers between feminism and the environment. I have indicated why and how, if indeed there are these connections, feminism, environmentalism, and environmental ethics will need to take them seriously. What are some of the implications of these connections for mainstream philosophy? I suggest a few here.

The conceptual links (given above at 2) suggest that philosophical conceptions of the self, knowledge and the “knower,” reason and rationality, objectivity, and “nature versus culture”-mainstay philosophical notions in ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, political philosophy—will need to be reconceived. The value dualisms which seem to pervade the western philosophical tradition since the early Greeks (e.g., reason/emotion, mind/body, culture/nature, human/nature) and the historical sex-gendered association of women with emotion, body, and nature will need to be examined for male-gender bias.

The historical and empirical links (given at 1 and 3, above) suggest that social scientific data on women and the environment is relevant to the theoretical undertakings in many areas of philosophy. In ethics, for example, this data on women and nature raises issues of anthropocentric and androcentric bias. Can mainstream normative ethical theories generate an environmental ethic which is not male-biased? In epistemology, data on the “indigenous technical knowledge” (see Warren 1988) of women who globally constitute the main agricultural production force (e.g., at least 80 percent of the farmers in Africa are women) raises issues about women’s “epistemic privilege” about farming and forestry (see Warren 1988): If there is such privilege, does it generate the need for “feminist standpoint epistemologies,” as some feminists have claimed (see Garry and Pearsall 1989; Harding 1986; Harding and Hintikka 1983; Jaggar and Bordo 1989)? In metaphysics, data of the cross-cultural variability of “women-nature connections” raise issues about the concept of nature and the nature/cultural dichotomy. Is “nature” a given, a cross-cultural constant that stands in contrast to socially evolving and created “culture,” or is nature, like culture, a social construct? Even if there really are trees, rivers, and ecosystems, does the way nature is conceived and theorized about reflect historical, socioeconomic factors in much the same way that, according to many feminists, conceptions and theories about “humans” and “human nature” are constructed? In political philosophy, data about the inferior standards of living of women globally raise issues about political theories and theorizing. What roles do unequal distributions of power and privilege play in the maintenance of systems of domination over both women and nature? How do they affect the content and methodology of political theories and theorizing in the history of philosophy, data on the
historical inferiorization and associations of women and nature raise issues about the nature and substantive content of the philosophical theories advanced in any given time period: Do they inherit biases against women and nature which bear on the critical assessment of the theories themselves? lii philosophy of science, particularly philosophy of biology, the data raise issues about the relationships between feminism and science, particularly ecology. As Carolyn Merchant asks, “Is there a set of assumptions basic to the science of ecology that also holds implications for the status of women? Is there an ecological ethic that is also a feminist ethic?” (Merchant 1985, 229). Are there important parallels between contemporary feminist environmental ethics and ecosystems ecology which suggest ways in which they are engaged in mutually supportive projects (see Y. King 1989; Warren and Cheney 1991)? These are the sort of questions raised by a philosophical look at the significance of issues concerning “feminism and the environment.”

**Ecofeminist philosophy has certainly risen to the forefront of feminist and environmental concerns since the publication of the first journal issue devoted exclusively to ecofeminist philosophy: *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*, Special issue on Ecological Feminism (1991). This special issue was the first collection ever published of explicitly philosophical articles on ecological feminism. It broke new ground by inviting feminist philosophers to join ecofeminist scholars in the philosophical exploration of issues involving women and nonhuman nature (or “the environment”). Although the number of scholarly articles, anthologies, and books on ecological feminism has blossomed since then, this anthology, a revised and expanded version of that special issue, remains the first volume ever to offer distinctively feminist philosophical essays on ecofeminism.

The essays contained in this anthology vary both in perspectives and in subject matters. Some essays (e.g., Karen J. Warren’s, Deane Curtin’s, and Roger J. H. King’s) address the nature of a distinctively ecofeminist ethic and the role of patriarchal conceptual frameworks (e.g., Warren) in perpetuating the twin dominations of women and nature. Some (e.g., Stephanie Laharb and Chris Cuomo’s) address the grassroots origins and nature of a thoughtful ecofeminist practice or praxis. Some (e.g., Val Plumwood’s and Robert Sessions’s articles) focus on the now infamous “ecofeminism—deep ecology debate” in environmental philosophy. Others (e.g., Deborah Slicer’s, Carol J. Adams’s, Patricia Jagdowicz Mills’s, and Victoria Davion’s essays) address concrete issues around deep ecological treatment of animal rights and the omission of ecofeminist analyses of the domination of animals, abortion, and nuclear deterrence, respectively. Still others (e.g., Catherine Roach’s, Patrick D. Murphy’s, and Carol H. Cantrell’s essays) address issues of language and literary practice: Roach problematizes the environmental slogan “Love Your Mother”; Murphy uses the dialogics of Russian theorist Bakhtin to show the need for a mutually enhancing ecofeminist philosophy and literary theory; and Cantrell uses ecofeminist Susan Griffin’s classic book *Woman and Nature*: The Roaring Insider (1978) to show the formative role of language in establishing analogies between women and nature. Finally, the essay by Karen J. Warren and Jim Cheney addresses ten ways in which ecofeminism and the science of ecology are or could be engaged in complementary, supportive projects.

As feminists, environmentalists, and philosophers continue to see that any analysis of what it is for humans to be ecological beings, what parameters constitute an appropriate human-nonhuman nature relationship, and the impact of the omission of gender as a category of analysis in contemporary discussions of environmental problems, a solid, critical ecological feminist philosophical scholarship will continue to be necessary. The articles in this anthology form an important and (as an outgrowth of the highly successful 1991 *Hypatia* volume) a historically unprecedented step in that direction.

**Conclusion**

The scholarship on the right alleged sorts of connections between feminism and the environment addressed by ecofeminists generally and ecofeminist philosophers in particular illustrates the importance of ecofeminist concerns about how one conceives feminism, environmentalism, and environmental philosophy. If one takes seriously alleged ecofeminist philosophical connections between feminism and the environment, the nature and scope of bona fide concerns in mainstream philosophy will be affected significantly. Presumably, signs of taking these issues seriously would be to revise the courses we teach and to rethink our scholarship accordingly. As with any attempt to incorporate the scholarship on women and feminism into our curricula and scholarship, such revising projects can be quite challenging. With regard to feminism and the environment, they also may be vital—not only for women, animals, and planet Earth, but for the development of worldviews and practices which are ecologically responsible and socially just for us all.

The 1990s have often been dubbed “The Decade of the Environment.” Certainly the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro during June 1992 brought the countries of the world together to ‘address such issues as biodiversity, global warming, acid rain, pollution, deforestation and desertification, species endangerment, preservation of wilderness, and energy consumption to international attention. Included among the various seminars and conferences—the Global Forum—that constituted satellite meetings to the Earth Summit was a special seminar, “Ecofeminism: Gender, Development, and the Environment,” hosted by the University of Rio de Janeiro. This satellite seminar focused explicitly on ecological feminism: It made visible crucial and often overlooked environmental concerns—the eight sorts of concerns discussed in this introduction—that ecofeminists think are necessary to any adequate environmental policy, theory, or philosophy.
As a participant in this satellite "Ecofeminism" seminar, it was readily apparent to me what impact this "gender invisibility" (or the invisibility of what women do) has in the analysis and practices of global environmental concerns. By publishing this book, I hope to provide one sort of remedy to this "invisibility," viz., to make ecofeminist issues philosophically significant, and to make ecofeminist philosophy a vital player on the field of feminist and environmental concerns. If this anthology does that, it will successfully call attention in an expressly philosophical way to the importance of ecofeminist insights to all aspects of feminist, philosophical, and environmental scholarship and practice.

NOTES


2. Indeed, just what the similarities and differences are between ecological feminism and "deep ecology," "social ecology," and "animal rights" positions in environmental ethics is an issue which receives considerable scholarly attention, particularly in the leading journal in the field. Environmental Ethics. The so-called debate between ecofeminism and deep ecology (the position advocated by Bill Devall and George Sessions (1985), Arne Naess (1973, 1986), and Warwick Fox (1985, 1989), to name a few) has probably received the most attention. The "debate" between them will undoubtedly continue. In his preface to the Spring 1989 issue of Environmental Ethics, marking the beginning of the journal's second decade, editor Eugene C. Hargrove committed the journal to providing a forum for that debate:

In the coming decade the journal can be expected to chart some new territory. Much attention is currently being given to deep ecology and ecofeminism and the various conflicts between the two, both as movements and as philosophies. Because deep ecologists and ecofeminists are as yet not even completely in agreement about what they are disagreeing about, this debate can be expected to be rather lengthy. (1989, 3)

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Wendell G. Bradley, is a retired professor of Human Ecology and author of 'The Gift of Morality'. Read more. 11 people found this helpful. In the twentieth century philosophy of mind became one of the central areas of philosophy in the English-speaking world, and so it remains. Questions such as the relationship between mind and brain, the nature of consciousness, and how we perceive the world, have come to be seen as crucial in understanding the world. These days, the predominant position in philosophy of mind aims at equating mental phenomena with operations of the brain, and explaining them all in scientific terms. Sometimes this project is called ‘cognitive science’, and it carries the implicit assumption that cognition occurs...