The title of my paper already suggests that the problem of religion in relation to democracy may not be a real problem intrinsic to religion itself, but rather a problem linked to widespread secularist assumptions about religion, democracy and their relationships. At least in Europe, there is not much evidence today that it is religion per se which is problematic for European democracy, but rather it is the fact that it is taken for granted that a democracy must be secular that is, in my view, problematic and it is this that tends to turn religion into a problem.

In this article I would like to elaborate this argument in three steps. First, I will offer a schematic presentation of those assumptions or prejudices about the proper functioning of modern secular European democracy which I consider to be problematic. Second, I will contrast these mainly normative secularist assumptions with the empirical reality of European democracies, past and present. Finally, a look at contemporary debates in Europe in which religion has once again become a contentious issue reveals, in my view, that religion becomes problematic or is assumed to be a threat to democracy not so much because of the undemocratic character of particular religious practices and/or beliefs, but rather because of secularist assumptions about the proper place of religion in modern secular democratic societies.

Common secular narratives about religion and democracy in European history
The most frequently heard narrative, offered both as a genealogical explanation and as a normative justification for the secular character of European democracy,
has the following schematic structure. Once upon a time in medieval Europe there was, as is typical of pre-modern societies, a fusion of religion and politics. But this fusion, under the new conditions of religious diversity, extreme sectarianism and conflict created by the Protestant Reformation, led to the nasty, brutish and long-lasting religious wars of the early modern era that left European societies in ruin. The secularization of the state was the felicitous response to this catastrophic experience, which has apparently indelibly marked the collective memory of European societies. The Enlightenment did the rest. Modern Europeans learned to separate religion, politics and science. Most importantly, they learned to tame the religious passions and to dissipate obscurantist fanaticism by banishing religion to a protected private sphere, while establishing an open, liberal, secular public sphere where freedom of expression and public reason dominate. Those are the favourable secular foundations upon which democracy grows and thrives. As the tragic stories of violent religious conflicts around the world show, the unfortunate return of religion to the public sphere will need to be managed carefully if one is to avoid undermining those fragile foundations.

Thus runs the basic story of the modern separation of religion and politics. There are of course some more intricate and some more plain versions of the European story of secularization, but all of them present it as the great achievement of western secular modernity. The particular American version of the story, combining as it does a high wall of separation of church and state with an exceptionally vibrant religious society, complicated the western narrative somewhat. But one could always have recourse to the convenient trope of American ‘exceptionalism’ in order to bridge the dissonance. Until very recently, moreover, the story of secularization was embedded within an even broader narrative of general teleological processes of social modernization and progressive human development. The west simply showed the future to the rest of the world. Today, there is an increasing recognition that we may be entering a global ‘post-secular’ age and that, as Mark Lilla pointed out in the cover story of the *New York Times Magazine* in August 2007, ‘the great separation’ of religion and politics may be a rather unique and exceptional historical achievement, the more to be cherished and protected.¹

Although rather inaccurate as factual historical reconstruction, this basic narrative serves as one of the foundational myths of contemporary European identity.² It should be obvious that the story is indeed a historical myth. The religious wars of early modern Europe and particularly the Thirty Years War (1618–48) did not produce, at least not immediately, the secular state but rather the confessional one. The principle *cuius regio eius religio*, established first at the Peace of Augsburg and reiterated at the Treaty of Westphalia, is not the formative principle of the modern secular democratic state, but rather that of the modern
confessional territorial absolutist state. Nowhere in Europe did religious conflict lead to secularization, but rather to the confessionalization of the state and to the territorialization of religions and peoples. Moreover, this early modern dual pattern of confessionalization and territorialization was already well established before the religious wars and even before the Protestant Reformation. The Spanish Catholic state under the Catholic kings serves as the first paradigmatic model of state confessionalization and religious territorialization. The expulsion of Spanish Jews and Muslims who refused to convert to Catholicism is the logical consequence of such a dynamic of state formation. Ethno-religious cleansing, in this respect, stands at the very origin of the early modern European state. From such a perspective, the so-called ‘religious wars’ could more appropriately be called the wars of early modern European state formation. Religious minorities caught in the wrong confessional territory were offered not secular toleration, still less freedom of religion, but the ‘freedom’ to emigrate. The Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, with its multi-confessional Catholic, Protestant-Lutheran and Orthodox ruling aristocracies, offers the unique exception of a major early modern state that resisted the general European dynamic of confessionalization and offered refuge to religious minorities and radical sects from all over Europe, well before North America offered a safer haven.

The secularization of the European state would arrive, if at all, much later and would not necessarily always contribute to democratization, as the secularist Soviet-type regimes most clearly show. As often as not, it was actually religious groups and religious politics that contributed – at times paradoxically and unintentionally – to the democratization and secularization of politics in many European societies. Indeed, secularization and democratization are two dynamics which do not always go hand in hand. Sometimes one can find democratization without secularization, and very often one finds secularization without democratization, a dissociation that at the very least calls into question the premise that a secular state is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for democracy. But the purpose of my critical remarks is not to correct the historical record, still less to offer a more accurate historical reconstruction of the complex European developments. The purpose is rather to point out how, despite its obvious historical inaccuracy, this common narrative of European secularization is not only frequently repeated by European elites but appears to be deeply entrenched in the collective memory of ordinary people across all European societies.

It is indeed astounding to observe how widespread is the view throughout Europe that religion is intolerant and creates conflict. According to the 1998 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) public opinion survey, the overwhelming majority of Europeans, over two-thirds of the population in every
western European country, holds the view that religion is ‘intolerant’. Since people are unlikely to expressly recognize their own intolerance, one can assume that in expressing such an opinion Europeans are thinking of somebody else’s ‘religion’ or, alternatively, are presenting a selective retrospective memory of their own past religion, which they consider that they have fortunately outgrown. It is even more telling that a majority of the population in every western European country, with the significant exception of Norway and Sweden, shares the view that ‘religion creates conflict’. Interestingly enough, the Danes distinguish themselves clearly from their fellow Lutheran Scandinavians in both respects. They score higher than any other European country, as high as 86 per cent, on the view that religion creates conflict and score the second highest (79 per cent) after the Swiss (81 per cent) on the belief that religion is intolerant. Along with most other former communist countries, the Poles score well below the western European average on both issues, which is striking given the widespread perception of Polish Catholicism as ‘intolerant’ and the fact that religion in Poland has in fact been a source of conflict.

I will not try in this paper to make sense of some of the rather peculiar patterns: why the Danes, for instance, maintain such a negative view of religion, in spite of the fact that they combine one of the lowest rates of church attendance (only 2 per cent attend church regularly) with one of the highest rates of church affiliation in all of Europe (only 12 per cent declare no religious affiliation, a high level of membership affiliation in the Danish Lutheran church comparable to the levels of much more religious Catholic countries such as Poland, Portugal or Italy); or why the Swiss hold equally negative views, in spite of the fact that they evince relatively high levels of religious belief (73 per cent believe in God, a proportion well above the European median of 65 per cent), high levels of church attendance (64 per cent attend church regularly and only 5 per cent never attend, proportions comparable to the levels of more religious Catholic countries, such as Poland and Ireland), and high levels of confessional affiliation (only 9 per cent declare no religious affiliation). What would seem obvious is that such a widespread negative view of ‘religion’ as being ‘intolerant’ and conducive to conflict cannot possibly be grounded empirically in the collective historical experience of European societies in the 20th century or in the actual personal experience of most contemporary Europeans. It can plausibly be explained, however, as a secular construct that has the function of positively differentiating modern secular Europeans from ‘religious others’ – either from pre-modern religious Europeans or from contemporary non-European religious people, particularly Muslims. Most striking is the view of ‘religion’ in the abstract as the source of violent conflict, given the actual historical experience of
most European societies in the 20th century. "The European short century" from 1914 to 1989, using Eric Hobsbawm's apt characterization, was indeed one of the most violent, bloody and genocidal centuries in the history of humanity. But none of the century's horrible massacres can be said to have been caused by religious fanaticism and intolerance: neither the senseless slaughter of millions of young Europeans in the trenches of World War I; nor the countless millions of victims of Bolshevik and communist terror through revolution, civil war, collectivization campaigns, the Great Famine in Ukraine, the repeated cycles of Stalinist terror and the Gulag; nor the most unfathomable horror of all, the Nazi Holocaust and the global conflagration of World War II, culminating in the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All of these terrible conflicts were rather the product of modern secular ideologies.

Yet contemporary Europeans obviously prefer to selectively forget the more inconvenient recent memories of secular ideological conflict and retrieve instead the long-forgotten memories of the religious wars of early modern Europe in order to make sense of the religious conflicts they see proliferating around the world today and increasingly threatening them. Rather than seeing the common structural contexts of modern state formation, inter-state geopolitical conflicts, modern nationalism and the political mobilization of ethno-cultural and religious identities – processes central to modern European history that became globalized through European colonial expansion – Europeans seem to prefer to attribute those conflicts to 'religion' – that is, to religious fundamentalism and to the fanaticism and intolerance which is supposedly intrinsic in 'pre-modern' religion, an atavistic residue which modern secular enlightened Europeans have fortunately left behind. One may suspect that the function of such a selective historical memory is to safeguard the perception of the progressive achievements of western secular modernity, offering a self-validating justification of the secular separation of religion and politics as the condition for modern liberal democratic politics, for global peace and for the protection of individual privatized religious freedom.

But how 'secular' are the European states? How tall and solid are the 'walls of separation' between national state and national church and between religion and politics across Europe? To what extent should one attribute the indisputable success of post-World War II western European democracies to the triumph of secularization over religion?

The secular reality of 'really existing' European democracies
France is the only western European state which is officially and proudly 'secu-
lar' – that is, which defines itself and its democracy as regulated by the principles
of laïcité. By contrast, there are several European countries with long-standing democracies which have maintained established churches. They include England and Scotland within the United Kingdom and all the Scandinavian Lutheran countries: Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland and, until the year 2000, Sweden. Of the new democracies, Greece has also maintained the establishment of the Greek Orthodox church. This means that, with the exception of the Catholic church, which has eschewed establishment in every recent (post-1974) transition to democracy in southern Europe (Portugal, Spain) and in eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia), every other major branch of Christianity (Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Orthodox) is officially established somewhere in Europe, without apparently jeopardizing democracy in those countries. Since, on the other hand, there are many historical examples of European states which were secular and non-democratic – the Soviet-type communist regimes being the most obvious case – one can safely conclude that the strict secular separation of church and state is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for democracy.

Indeed, one could advance the proposition that of the two clauses of the First Amendment, ‘free exercise’ of religion, rather than ‘no establishment’, is the one which appears to be a necessary condition for democracy. One cannot have democracy without freedom of religion. Indeed, ‘free exercise’ stands out as a normative democratic principle in itself. The ‘no-establishment’ principle, by contrast, is defensible and necessary only as a means to free exercise and to equal rights. Disestablishment becomes politically necessary for democracy wherever an established religion claims monopoly over the state territory, impedes the free exercise of religion, and undermines the equal rights of all citizens. This was the case with the Catholic church before it officially recognized the principle of ‘freedom of religion’ as an inalienable individual right. In other words, secularist principles per se may be defensible on instrumental grounds, as a means to the end of free exercise, but not as intrinsically liberal democratic principles in themselves.

Alfred Stepan has pointed out how the most important empirical analytical theories of democracy, from Robert Dahl to Juan Linz, do not include secularism or strict separation as one of the institutional requirements for democracy, as prominent normative liberal theories such as those of John Rawls or Bruce Ackerman tend to do. As an alternative to secularist principles or norms, Stepan has proposed the model of the ‘twin tolerations’, which he describes as ‘the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions’. Religious authorities must ‘tolerate’ the autonomy of democratically elected governments without claiming constitu-
tionally privileged prerogatives to mandate or to veto public policy. Democratic political institutions, in turn, must ‘tolerate’ the autonomy of religious individuals and groups not only to worship privately and in complete freedom, but also to advance publicly their values in civil society and to sponsor organizations and movements in political society, as long as they do not violate democratic rules and they adhere to the rule of law. Within this framework of mutual autonomy, Stepan concludes, ‘there can be an extraordinarily broad range of concrete patterns of religion–state relations in political systems that would meet our minimal definition of democracy.’

This is precisely the case empirically across Europe. Between the two extremes of French laïcité and Nordic Lutheran establishment, there is a whole range of very diverse patterns of church–state relations, in education, media, health, social services, etc, which constitute very ‘unsecular’ entanglements, such as the consociational formula of pillarization in the Netherlands, or the corporatist official state recognition of the Protestant and Catholic churches in Germany (as well as of the Jewish community in some Länder). One could of course retort that European societies are de facto so secularized and, as a consequence, what remains of religion has become so temperate that both constitutional establishment and the various institutional church–state entanglements are as a matter of fact innocuous, if not completely irrelevant. But one should remember that the drastic secularization of most western European societies came after the consolidation of democracy, not before, and therefore it would be incongruent to present not just the secularization of the state and of politics but also the secularization of society as a condition for democracy.

In fact, at one time or another most continental European societies developed confessional religious parties which played a crucial role in the democratization of those societies. Even those confessional parties that initially emerged as anti-liberal parties and at least ideologically as anti-democratic – as was the case with most Catholic parties in the 19th century – ended up playing a very important role in the democratization of their societies. This is the paradox of Christian Democracy so well analysed by Stathis Kalyvas. Catholic political mobilization emerged almost everywhere as a counterrevolutionary reaction against liberalism and its anti-clerical assault on the Catholic church. Political and even social Catholicism was in many respects fundamentalist, intransigent and theocratic. Focusing on Catholic ideology and doctrine, one was bound to conclude that Catholicism and democracy were indeed antithetical and irreconcilable, as the liberal and Protestant anti-Catholic discourse was never tired of stressing throughout the 19th century. Yet, somehow, the dynamics of electoral competition led to the transformation of Catholic parties everywhere. Those
parties, in turn, by embracing democratic politics, made a fundamental contribution to the consolidation of democracy in their respective countries. With important variations, a similar story repeats itself in Germany, Austria, Holland, Belgium and Italy, the countries where Christian Democracy became dominant after World War II.

Let me quote Kalyvas’s conclusion at length, because it is poignantly relevant at a time when the alleged incompatibility of Islam and democracy and the supposedly anti-democratic nature of Muslim parties is so frequently and publicly debated:

Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties . . . were initially formed to subvert liberal democracies; both evolved into mass parties and decided to participate in the electoral process after painful and divisive debates. Their decision had tremendous consequences: both parties integrated masses of newly enfranchised voters into existing liberal parliamentary regimes, and both were deradicalised in the process, becoming part of the very institutions they initially rejected . . . Democracy in Europe was often expanded and consolidated by its enemies. This lesson should not be lost, especially among those studying the challenges facing democratic transition and consolidation in the contemporary world.¹²

It is also mostly forgotten that the initial project of a European Union was fundamentally a Christian-Democratic project, sanctioned by the Vatican, at a time of a general religious revival in post-World War II Europe, in the geopolitical context of the Cold War when the ‘free world’ and ‘Christian civilization’ had become synonymous. Indeed, ruling or prominent Christian Democrats in the six signatory countries to the Treaty of Rome – Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries – played a leading role in the initial process of European integration. But this is a history that secular Europeans, proud of having outgrown a religious past from which they feel liberated, would apparently prefer not to remember.

The return of religion to the European public sphere: contemporary debates

Although there is not much significant evidence of any kind of religious revival in Europe, religion has again become a contested public issue. It may be premature to speak of a post-secular Europe, but certainly one can sense a significant shift in the European zeitgeist. When, over a decade ago, I developed the thesis of the de-privatization of religion as a new global trend, it did not, at first, find much resonance in Europe. The privatization of religion was simply taken too much for granted both as a normal empirical fact and as the norm for modern European societies. The concept of modern public religion was still too dissonant and
religious revivals elsewhere could simply be explained or rather explained away as the rise of fundamentalism in not-yet-modern societies. But recently there has been a noticeable change in attitude and attention throughout Europe. Every other week one learns of a new major conference on religion such as the present one, or of the establishment of some newly funded research centre or research project on ‘religion and politics’ or ‘religion and violence’ or ‘interreligious dialogue’.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the resonance of the discourse of the clash of civilizations have certainly played an important role in focusing European attention on issues of religion. But it would be a big mistake to attribute this new attention solely or even mainly to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and to the threats and challenges which it poses to the west and particularly to Europe. Internal European transformations contribute to the new public interest in religion. General processes of globalization, the global growth of transnational migration and the very process of European integration are presenting crucial challenges not only to the European model of the national welfare state, but also to the different kinds of religious–secular and church–state settlements that the various European countries had achieved in post-World War II Europe.

The process of European integration, the eastward expansion of the European Union (EU) and the drafting of a European constitution have posed fundamental questions about both national and European identities and the role of Christianity in both identities. What constitutes ‘Europe’? How and where should one draw the external territorial boundaries and the internal cultural boundaries of Europe? The most controversial, yet rarely openly confronted and therefore most anxiety-inducing issues are the potential integration of Turkey and the potential integration of non-European immigrants, who in most European countries happen to be overwhelmingly Muslim. But the eastward expansion of the EU, particularly the incorporation of an assertive Catholic Poland, and the debates over some kind of affirmation or recognition of the Christian heritage in the preamble of the new European constitution have also added unexpected ‘religious’ irritants to the debates over Europeanization.

While the threat of a Polish Catholic crusade to re-Christianize Europe awakens little fear among secular Europeans confident of their ability to assimilate Catholic Poland on their own terms, the prospect of Turkey joining the EU generates much greater anxieties among Europeans, Christian and post-Christian alike, but of a kind which cannot easily be verbalized, at least not publicly. The paradox and the quandary for modern secular Europeans – who have shed their traditional historical Christian identities in a rapid and drastic process of secularization that has coincided with the very success of the process of
European integration and who therefore identify European modernity with secularization – is that they observe with some apprehension the reverse process in Turkey. The more ‘modern’, or at least democratic, Turkish politics become, the more publicly Muslim and less secularist they also tend to become.

In its determination to join the EU, Turkey is adamantly staking its claim to be, or its right to become, a fully European country economically and politically, while simultaneously fashioning its own model of Muslim cultural modernity. It is this very claim to be simultaneously a modern European country and a culturally Muslim one that baffles European civilizational identities, secular and Christian alike. It contradicts both the definition of a Christian Europe and the definition of a secular Europe. Turkey’s claim to European membership becomes an irritant precisely because it forces Europeans to reflexively and openly confront the crisis in their own civilizational identity, at a moment when the EU is already reeling from a series of compounded economic, geopolitical and legitimation crises.

The spectre of millions of Turkish citizens already in Europe but not of Europe, many of them second-generation immigrants caught between an old country they have left behind and their European host societies unable or unwilling to fully assimilate them, only makes the problem the more visible. The question of the integration of Turkey in the EU is inevitably intertwined, implicitly if not explicitly, with the question of the failed integration of Muslim immigrants. The way in which Europe, in turn, resolves both questions will determine not only Europe’s civilizational identity but the role of Europe in the emerging global order.

What makes ‘the immigrant question’ particularly thorny in Europe, and inextricably entwined with ‘the Turkish question’, is the fact that in Europe immigration and Islam have been, until very recently at least, almost synonymous. This entails a superimposition of different dimensions of ‘otherness’ that exacerbates issues of boundaries, accommodation and incorporation. The immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic unprivileged ‘other’ all tend to coincide. Moreover, all those dimensions of ‘otherness’ now become superimposed upon Islam, so that Islam becomes the utterly ‘other’. Anti-immigrant xenophobic nativism, the conservative defence of Christian culture and civilization, secularist anti-religious prejudices, liberal-feminist critiques of Muslim patriarchal fundamentalism, fear of Islamist terrorist networks – all are being fused indiscriminately throughout Europe into a uniform anti-Muslim discourse which practically precludes the kind of mutual accommodation between immigrant groups and host societies that is necessary for successful immigrant incorporation.13

Finally, the debates over the new European constitution also revealed that religion has become a public contested issue across Europe. From a purely legal positivist point of view, modern constitutions do not need transcendent refer-
ences. But in so far as the main rationale and purpose of drafting a new European constitution appeared to be an extra-constitutional political one – namely to contribute to European social integration, to enhance a common European identity and to remedy the deficit in democratic legitimacy – such debate was inevitable in order to tackle issues of common European values and common European identities.

Who are we? Where do we come from? What constitutes our spiritual and moral heritage and the boundaries of our collective identities? How flexible internally and how open externally should those boundaries be? Addressing such complex questions through an open and public democratic European-wide debate would be under any circumstance an enormously complex task that would entail addressing and coming to terms with the many problematic and contradictory aspects of the European heritage in its intra-national, inter-European and global-colonial dimensions. But such a complex task is made more difficult by secularist prejudices that preclude not only a critical yet honest and reflexive assessment of the Judeo-Christian heritage, but even any public official reference to such a heritage, on the grounds that any reference to religion could be divisive and counterproductive, or would be exclusionist by ignoring the contributions of Islam to European civilization, or simply would violate modern secular postulates.

I am not trying to imply that the European constitution ought to make some reference either to some transcendent reality or to the Christian heritage. But one should certainly be honest and recognize that any genealogical reconstruction of the idea or social imaginaire of Europe that makes reference to Greco-Roman antiquity and the Enlightenment while erasing any memory of the role of medi eval Christendom in the very constitution of Europe as a civilization evinces either historical ignorance or repressive amnesia. The inability to openly recognize Christianity as one of the constitutive components of European cultural and political identity could also mean that Europeans are missing the historic opportunity to add a third important reconciliation to those already achieved between Protestants and Catholics and between warring European nation-states, by putting an end to the old battles over Enlightenment, religion and secularism. The perceived threat to secular identities and the biased overreaction in excluding any public reference to Christianity belie the self-serving secularist claims that only secular neutrality can guarantee individual freedoms and cultural pluralism. The quarrels provoked by the possible incorporation of some religious reference into the constitutional text would seem to indicate that secularist assumptions turn religion into a problem, and thus preclude the possibility of dealing with religious issues in a pragmatic sensible manner. To guarantee equal access to the...
European public sphere and undistorted communication between all its citizens—Christians, Muslims and Jews, atheists, agnostics and believers—the European Union would need to become not only post-Christian but also post-secular.

Let me conclude by simply reiterating that in my view ‘religion’ is not the problem or at least does not constitute a serious threat to European democracy. But the return of religion to the European public sphere as a contentious issue does constitute a challenge to European secularism and to European secular identities. It is hoped that European democracies find a way to deal sensibly and pragmatically with the new and unexpected challenge.

2 At a recent forum at the 2007 Salzburg Festival on ‘Paths and pitfalls of interfaith dialogue’, aimed at exploring practical ways of advancing peace and interreligious dialogue in the Middle East, the basic genealogical story of European secular democracy was repeatedly told with obvious didactic purposes by the organizers, Liz Mohn, vice-chair of the Bertelmann Stiftung, and Helga Rabl-Stadler, director of the Salzburg Festival, as well as by Joschka Fischer, the former German federal minister of foreign affairs.
3 See Peter van der Veer’s ‘The religious origins of democracy’ in this volume.
5 Greeley, op cit, p 56, table 4.1, ‘No religious affiliation’; pp 70–1, tables 4.8 and 4.9, ‘Church attendance’; and p.3, table 1.1, ‘Belief in God in Europe’.
7 Stepan, op cit, p 213.
8 Stepan, op cit, p 217.
9 John Madeley has developed a tripartite measure of church–state relations, which he calls the TAO of European management and regulation of religion–state relations by the use of Treasure (T: for financial and property connections), Authority (A: for the exercise of states’ powers of command) and Organization (O: for the effective intervention of state bodies in the religious sphere). According to his measurement, all European states score positively on at least one of these scales; most states score positively on two of them; and over one third (16 out of 45 states) score positively on all three. Madeley, John T, ‘Unequally yoked: the antinomies of church–state separation in Europe and the USA’, paper presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.
12 Kalyvas, op cit, p 284.
13 Note the similarities with the anti-Catholic discourse of the 19th century.
Focal Point: Post-secular Europe? Is religion a public or a private matter? Can there be such a thing as a European Islam? If so, what characterizes it? What role can religion -- or religions -- play when it comes to the emergence of a European solidarity? In a series of articles, Eurozine focuses on post-secular tendencies and religion(s) in the new Europe. The most controversial and anxiety-producing issues, which are rarely confronted openly, are the potential integration of Turkey and the potential integration of non-European immigrants, who in most European countries happen to be overwhelmingly Muslim. It is the interrelation between these phenomena that I would like to explore in this paper.