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INTRODUCTION

JOSEPH S. TULCHIN AND DIANA H. VARAT

In the past century, the dynamism of cities – that is, the concentration of political energy, economic activity, and social interactions within urban areas – has fulfilled the promise of a better life for millions of migrants worldwide. Yet, rapid urbanization in the 20th century has left millions of others on the fringes of urban society with little access to basic services, stable employment, or adequate housing. Political instability, urban mismanagement, and incomplete processes of decentralization pose significant barriers to the successful inclusion of the urban poor, and the extreme scale of urbanization expected in the coming decades threatens to destabilize urban regions around the world.

In the past ten years, the Comparative Urban Studies Project (CUSP) of the Woodrow Wilson Center has examined the notion of good urban governance as a means of dealing with the growth of cities. Following a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in December 2000, CUSP published a conference report entitled “Urban Governance around the World.” In that report, participants noted that the concept of governance calls attention to the importance of constructing new, more fluid interactions between citizens and their governments. Political participation, whether in the form of free elections, community-based organizations, or participatory budgeting, has become a central part of governance. However, good governance is not simply defined by the level of public participation but by the effectiveness of a city’s collective efforts to be economically productive, as well as both socially and ecologically sustainable.

At a workshop convened by the Comparative Urban Studies Project in December of 2001, participants reflected on a more than ten-year debate on improving urban governance. While it is precisely the innate dynamism of cities that makes them the engines of national economies and cultures, as well as the magnets for migration, poorly managed urban growth has dangerous consequences. The scale of urban growth expected in the coming years makes this challenge even more difficult because as cities grow, a
governance dilemma develops. The management of cities becomes an increasingly complex process as the number of local stakeholders swells. Improved urban governance, then, is rooted in the difficult balance between municipal and metropolitan planning, and precariously situated among competing agendas. Formulating the policies and conditions for more effective urban governance, and in turn, improved quality of life for urban residents, requires the coordination of municipal authorities in metropolitan governments. Delineating responsibilities among municipal and metropolitan bodies in a manner that prevents jurisdictional disputes and encourages policy coordination, then, becomes a significant challenge.

Improving urban governance in developing countries also requires that the democratic process involve an informed constituency. As political processes at the local level become more important, increased levels of political transparency and accountability become vital to the ability of a community to act on its own behalf. Yet, while the importance of greater community participation should not be understated, the proliferation of civil society groups in recent years should not be considered a sufficient product. That is, whether community organizations are truly able to represent the needs of the urban poor is still questionable. In the first section of this volume, Richard Stren and Ananya Roy address these issues as they examine the way that local stakeholders contribute to the formulation of urban policy.

In his paper on “Local Governance and the Development of Associational Life,” Richard Stren notes that with the weakening of the central state, the local has become especially important. Not only have local governments gained more responsibilities, but civil society groups at the local level have also gained more influence. Indeed, urban populations often confer a greater degree of faith in local institutions. Stren notes that the growth of civil society demonstrates a greater belief in the possibility of change and illustrates the energy potential of the urban arena. Stren also argues that improved urban governance rests on the unfortunate but often necessary role of civil society in keeping even local “authoritarianism at bay.” Yet, growth in civil society does not necessarily translate into greater equality or better living standards in cities. Instead, the productive dialogue among citizen’s groups and politicians should be viewed as the desired process and improved quality of life the desired outcome.

In the second chapter, Ananya Roy examines the nature of urban governance with global liberalization as a backdrop. Roy affirms that despite
the growth in civil society, current political structures offer urban populations little more power than they held previously. Traditional “modalities of discipline and control” persist despite the growth of nonstate actors. How, then, despite what many have considered to be progress in political activity from urban populations, will new forms of citizenship emerge? Will citizenship be dominated by market forces, by medieval structures or by the process of feminization?

The second section of this report confronts the linkages between the physical environment of the city and the quality of life for the urban poor. Current urban trends will test the sustainability of cities in the coming decades, both in the environmental sense and with respect to health. Growing desperation due to economic stagnation, the continuation of inadequate services, and the spread of disease make urban unrest probable in future years. Policymakers must consider urban policies in the long-term in light of the potential for social conflict. In chapter three, Ellen Brennan-Galvin discusses the importance of land use in defining the quality of life for residents. As the use of automobiles increases in developing countries, air pollution and subsequent health problems spread as well. The dangers of poorly managed growth become apparent through Brennan-Galvin’s discussion of current trends in China, citing dangerously high levels of both lead and carbon dioxide. Preparing for future population growth, in the cities of Asia and Africa especially, demands that planners and politicians devise holistic strategies for land use patterns, coordinating public transportation and the construction of roads.

For the urban poor, environmental degradation manifests itself most clearly through negative impacts on health. In María Elena Ducci’s paper on “Health, Habitat, and Urban Governance,” she reviews ten years of a project on health and habitat aimed at bridging the gap between the public health and urban planning fields. Ducci notes the importance of involving and energizing communities through the urgency of health issues. She advocates participatory action research projects with a health-and-habitat perspective to determine how communities themselves can confront health challenges. Ducci also notes the linkages between housing policies and health, citing the drastic effects of Chile’s public housing policies on the mental health of Chilean women in the last thirty years. The destruction of social networks as people are relocated, whether through public housing policies or the destruction of squatter settlements, destabilizes
urban communities. In order to create socially sustainable cities, urban policies must be attentive to indigenous networks and coping mechanisms.

In her paper on “Urban Health in the 21st Century: Challenges of Privatization, Participation, Individualism, and Citizenry,” Carolyn Stephens further examines the notion that poverty leads to social fragmentation through the unequal provision of health services. She argues that urbanization and globalization allow prosperity and poverty to exist side by side. As opposite ends of the spectrum live in closer proximity, the poor come to understand exactly what it is they are lacking. The potential for social violence given the context of pervasive urban poverty and the high profile of prosperity seems greater than ever before. In order to combat the widening disparity in wealth and to foster fuller citizenship for urban residents, Stephens argues that policies need to be situated within a paradigm of international urban solidarity.

In Latin America, where already seventy-five percent of the population lives in cities, Walter Flores notes that the danger of social violence is especially acute. Despite increased social and political participation in many Latin American countries, democratic rights, for the urban poor, remain a distant luxury. Maintaining urban stability depends upon the empowerment of urban populations. That is, informing the population of both their own rights and ways in which they can control their own health status is vital to improving the governance of health in developing cities. In addition, improving the institutional capabilities of health care providers in developing countries acts as both an economic stimulus and community energizer.

The provision of adequate health care services to the urban poor of developing countries requires the coordination of governmental priorities and community needs. Many have suggested that public-private partnerships can successfully bridge that gap. Yet, the impetus for improving health care services, and urban services in general, must be rooted in a communal vision to improve the urban environment and quality of life of urban residents. What remains to be seen is how the changes in political responsibilities and the expansion of civil society alter the notion of citizenship and empower urban communities enough to pressure local governments into action.

As decentralization has become the norm in many developing countries, local levels of government find themselves charged with greater responsibilities. Improving urban governance depends directly on the distribution of national and local responsibilities, whether with regard to health care,
employment training or tax collection. However, the degree to which financial resources match the devolution of responsibility has been a barrier to improved urban governance around the world. In the third section of this book, we take a closer look at the governance agenda of the future, with special emphasis on the devolution of power. In a discussion of the lessons learned over the last ten years, Aprodicio Laquian notes that although cities may not be replacing the nation-state as the central actors, they remain vital to the growth, stability, and sustainability of the nation-state. As such, a major contributor to the inability of cities to provide for their citizens is the cycle of corruption and subsequent distrust of political systems. To establish a system of democratic representation and genuine citizen’s rights, political bodies need to accommodate the changing needs of their constituents.

Improved urban governance requires good urban management and transparent, moral, and participatory political processes. Laquian especially advocates regional planning over local autonomy and decentralization, arguing that the trend towards decentralization is more ideological than based on proven efficiency. He argues that as the urban region comes to replace the city, metropolitan reform will have the greatest impact on improving the quality of life of the urban poor. Unfortunately, extreme levels of degrading environmental conditions, poorly coordinated transportation systems, and epidemics will probably be necessary to initiate change.

In chapter eight, Tim Campbell looks forward to ways decentralization can be reformed as an effective development tool. Selective and correctly timed devolution of power, he notes, can in fact be quite effective in improving local services and empowering the local citizenry. However, he affirms that local governments need to prepare for such responsibilities. Effective decentralization demands from the local governments the “readiness to undertake the new burdens of local autonomy.” What Campbell refers to as the “quiet revolution” can only come about if local leadership is supported with training, financial support, and longer political terms. Although the current process of decentralization limits fiscal corruption through shorter terms of office, unstable revenues, and clear restrictions on spending, in Campbell’s eyes, such political requirements only “propel the revolving door of municipal leadership and personnel,” thereby halting effectiveness and canceling out learning curves.

Additionally, improving the responsiveness of local governments is vital to gaining the trust of local constituencies. Oriol Nello, of Barcelona,
focuses on the role of government and the ways in which direct, but flexibly planned growth can improve a city. Nello introduces us to the recent growth of the city of Barcelona, examining local responses to current patterns of urban sprawl and functional specialization. Despite being one of Europe’s most densely populated cities, recent expansion into the outer rings of the city region has challenged traditional planning modes. Ensuring that growth is managed effectively in an effort to preclude social segregation is of the utmost importance. Barcelona’s municipal government has fought hard to preserve the compact, complex, and integrated city. For Nello, sprawl endangers the city’s core spirit, the “innovation, richness of uses, [and] capacity to compensate for inequalities” that has made cities the engines of nations throughout history.

In our work on urban governance over the last ten years, we have discovered a recurring tendency to devise regional solutions to urban problems. Mitigating jurisdictional frictions, then, is the first step to improving urban governance. Each level of government must have a clear mandate, with mechanisms for policy coordination, but with an eye toward limiting overlapping or conflicting responsibilities. In such a situation, if services are not being delivered in an adequate manner, the people have direct recourse and are able to hold a particular level of government accountable. Furthermore, civil society groups and individual citizens themselves should have avenues for voicing their needs to each level of government, through transparent electoral processes and when feasible, through participatory policy formulation.

Improving urban livelihoods requires not just water, sanitation, health care, or transportation, but all of these services combined. The need for inter-sectoral planning cannot be stressed enough, as displayed most clearly through examples where health practitioners and urban planners have failed to collaborate. Building healthy cities means building economically sound, environmentally safe cities whose inhabitants are able to access markets, rely on indigenous social networks, and express their political will. As shown through the growth of civil society in recent years, a potential wealth of energy on the part of the urban constituency exists in cities today. The true challenge to the future of democracy and to improving the quality of life for the urban poor is whether or not that energy is harnessed in a productive, organized, and democratic manner.
PART I

SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE IN THE URBAN MILLENNIUM
CHAPTER 1

Local Governance and the Development of Associational Life: An Exploration

RICHARD STREN
University of Toronto

For those of us interested in local politics, these are exciting times. In the late 1980s, it was possible for a leading student of urban development in the United States to proclaim that “the very heart and soul of local politics has surely died”; although this statement elicited various disclaimers, it was nevertheless an arguable proposition. By the beginning of the present decade, however, local politics (and local governance) had become one of the most lively and active platforms for the expression of a wide range of social issues. Surveys show that, while the general population in North America has become disenchanted with their national governments, trust and confidence in state and local governments has been positive and indeed, during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, rising sharply. And issues having to do with urban governance are among the central questions confronting countries in both the north and the south. In this chapter, I shall explore—for poor southern countries—some of the political and social trends that accompany the growing importance of local governance. The situation in poor countries has a number of distinct qualities to which our attention needs to be drawn.

Deconstruction of the State and Decentralization

The reasons behind this new popular (and scholarly) interest in local—and urban—politics and governance are undoubtedly complex. We can only suggest here some of the most apparent. In the first place, we must acknowledge the tendency toward a weakening (or lowering of the profile) of national state institutions. As the hegemonic position of the central state changes, and more important functions are taken up at other points of the
system, from the local to the international, interest crystallizes elsewhere. Although the national state is still central to economic, social, and even cultural life, its powers and functions have changed in complex ways. To Manuel Castells, “the nation-state is increasingly powerless in controlling monetary policy, deciding its budget, organizing production and trade, collecting its corporate taxes, and fulfilling its commitments to provide social benefits. In sum, it has lost most of its economic power, albeit it still has some regulatory capacity and relative control over its subjects.”\textsuperscript{5} Other commentators have developed different arguments to explain the relative weakening of the state; some of these writers claim that the state has willingly deserted many of its central economic and social policy functions, essentially for ideological reasons.\textsuperscript{6} The tendency to adopt “new public management” measures, which include the reduction in the size of government departments, privatizing or semi-privatizing a host of hitherto central government functions, and the adoption of business protocols of behavior and organization in public service agencies, are changing the traditional role of government. Domestic pressures in many countries are seriously questioning the balance between public and private and even between central and local allocation of functions.\textsuperscript{7} In this post-September 11 world, we may be seeing a movement back to a stronger role for the state in military, and perhaps also economic and even social policy matters.

Deconstruction of the state has been paralleled by widespread decentralization of powers from the national to the provincial (state) and local levels all around the world. As the political scientist James Manor points out, this process has taken place for many reasons:

*Decentralization has quietly become a fashion of our time. It is being considered or attempted in an astonishing diversity of developing and transitional countries...by solvent and insolvent regimes, by democracies (both mature and emergent) and autocracies, by regimes making the transition to democracy and by others seeking to avoid that transition, by regimes with various colonial inheritances and by those with none. It is being attempted where civil society is strong, and where it is weak. It appeals to people of the left, the center and the right, and to groups which disagree with each other on a number of other issues.*\textsuperscript{8}

The nature of these decentralization policies varies tremendously—from incremental changes in protocols of intergovernmental relations on
the one hand, to major constitutional amendments or even new constitutional dispensations on the other. The result of these policies is almost uniformly to invest local levels of governance with a new and more compelling importance. A number of major countries gave new constitutional powers to municipalities during this period. In Brazil, a new constitution in 1988 considerably increased the power of municipalities in relation to the states, assigning to them control of intra-city transport, preschool and elementary education, land use, preventive health care, and historical and cultural preservation. On the participatory side, municipalities in Brazil were given the right to establish councils of stakeholders (called in English, “municipal boards” or “community councils”). These bodies, established in most of the largest cities in the country, include non-elected representatives of community groups, and deal with such important matters as urban development, education, the environment, health, and sanitation.

In India, an important constitutional amendment in 1992 provided an illustrative list of functions that are henceforth considered appropriate for municipal government; among these functions are planning for economic and social development, urban poverty alleviation, and even urban forestry. The amendment also limited the degree to which state governments are able to suspend democratic local government (a practice that, until then, had frozen democratic local government in almost half of the largest cities in the country), provided for a revision of state-local fiscal relations, and required that no less than 33 percent of all elected local councillors be women. (We will discuss this amendment further below.)

The new South African constitution of 1996 devotes a whole chapter (Chapter 7, containing fourteen separate articles) to local government. Among other things, this chapter of the constitution states that the objects of local government (including municipal government) are “(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; (b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; (c) to promote social and economic development; (d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and (e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government” (Section 152). There are two clear messages in these reforms: first, that municipalities (and other local governments) are now expected to undertake and to finance a much wider and more inclusive range of services and other economic and social activities; and second,
that the “community” and important local stakeholder groups must be engaged in the local governance process.

In the Philippines, the Local Government Code of 1991 devolved significant powers from the national government to municipalities. At the urban level, the most important decentralized powers were health, social welfare, environmental protection, and local public works and highways. To administer these services, the code decentralized many categories of public servants to the local level; and to finance them, it added significant taxing powers to the four major categories of local authority (province, municipality, city, and barangay [village] levels). According to the code, local government units henceforth “shall enjoy meaningful and genuine local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.”

And in Mexico, a number of constitutional changes beginning in the early 1980s and culminating in 1999 have strengthened municipalities and local governments. Based on an act of Congress in 1999, the latest change was a result of negotiations among the three major political parties. This revision of Article 115 (dealing with the status of municipalities) recognized local government as an essential level of Mexican government. It not only stated that local governments (municipios) would be governed by elected councils consisting of a President and a certain number of “aldermen” (regidores) and “trustees” (sindiccos) according to law, but it specified a list of functions and powers that are under their exclusive jurisdiction. Such functions cannot henceforth be limited by the state governments. These include the provision of drinking water and all related services, public lighting, cleaning and waste disposal, markets, police, streets and gardens, planning and land regulation, and other services that the municipalities judge is within their capacity to administer. They were further empowered to set tax rates, and to collect the revenues necessary to carry out these functions. Other significant countries with important decentralization legislation during the 1980s and 1990s include Bolivia, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Indonesia.

Democratization and the Politics of Elections: From National to Local

A third factor that has strengthened the impulse to a more focused interest on politics and governance at the local level is democratization. The increased importance of democratic forms and processes at the local level is
closely related to a worldwide “wave” of democratization from the late 1970s through the 1990s. A democracy in the twenty-first century may be understood as a system in which the “most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.” As such, democracy implies the concurrent existence of freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize and the active functioning of more than one major political party to give voters a choice of alternative leadership groups. Beginning in 1974 in Portugal, and eventually spreading outward, a wave of democratization engulfed more than thirty countries in both industrial and developing areas. During this period, regimes changed from authoritarian structures to democratic systems in 11 one-party systems, 7 regimes based on personal rulers, 16 regimes that had been under military control, and 1 regime (South Africa) that had been dominated by a racial oligarchy. For states with a population greater than one million, the years 1973–90 saw an increase in what could be classified as “democratic states” from 30 to 59, and a decrease in “nondemocratic states” from 92 to 71. During the early part of this period, the trend was particularly marked in Latin America, where “democratic transitions” took place in such major countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru; in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the transitional trend shifted to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This pattern continued during the 1990s, to the point that—calculating from a somewhat different framework—Freedom House could estimate that by 1999, 88 of the world’s 191 sovereign states could be considered as “free”—which meant “that they maintain a high degree of political and economic freedom and respect basic civil liberties.” A slightly higher number—117—could be considered valid electoral democracies, “based on a stringent standard requiring that all elected national authority must be the product of free and fair electoral processes.”

While overall trends have been encouraging, certain regions have lagged behind. The Middle East had only one “free” country out of 14; others have stagnated. In the latter category is Africa, which nevertheless witnessed such major events as the full democratization of South Africa in 1994, and the return to democracy of Nigeria in 1999. By the end of the decade, the Freedom House survey reported that of 53 African countries evaluated, 9 were “free” (that is, full electoral democracies), 21 were “partly free,” and 23 were “not free” (that is, authoritarian systems).
Seventeen (or about a third) were “electoral democracies.” Overall, these African figures showed little change over the course of the decade.

There is a very large literature (most of it written by political scientists) on “democratization,” “democratic transitions,” and even “democratic consolidation” in the developing world. This literature, which deals essentially with the “politics of elections,” is complemented by the efforts of a number of research institutions and NGOs to keep statistics on trends over time—as we have seen in the case of the Freedom House calculations above. Although there was a period—at least up to the mid-1980s in Latin America, for instance—when neighborhood political movements were studied as part of the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, the most influential writers on democracy have, over the last decade, concentrated on national rather than local patterns of politics. In national and comparative surveys, the relationship between national and local democratic development is rarely if ever explored. It is apparently assumed (if not discussed) that what is true nationally is also true locally. Indeed, local politics almost appears to be the forgotten child of the family of national-level institutions and political practices that are the most powerful initiators and indicators of political change. When all is said and done, these national-level trends appear to be the key data in which we should be interested.

But in many countries, an active local political system has proved more resilient than an active politics at the national level. Indeed, in a number of important cases, authoritarian governments at the national level coexisted with relatively democratic institutions at the local level. For example, during much of the period since 1966, when Nigeria has been under military rule, local government elections have taken place. Ecuador, which was under military rule from 1972 to 1978, maintained elected local governments during this time. And Brazil, which was ruled by a military regime between 1964 and 1985, maintained at least the formalities of municipal autonomy and retained municipal elections “with the exception of 201 municipalities that were either state capitals, national security zones, or mineral-producing areas, where executive heads were appointed by the military.” The logic behind this apparent contradiction in approaches between the national and local levels is that authoritarian governments are often prepared to support democratic institutions at the local level—when they have little power—in order to attempt to legitimize
their rule. However, when politics (for whatever reasons) becomes open and democratic at the national level, the culture of democracy is inconsistent with authoritarianism at the local level, because people tend to demand more access to political institutions at all levels.

Over the last decade, in Eastern Europe and Latin America in particular, elected municipal councils have proliferated over the political landscape, bringing new forms and styles of governance to a large segment of the population. According to one well-informed estimate, in Latin America “since the mid-1980s countries are not only selecting national leaders democratically, but are also choosing virtually every executive and legislative officer in the more than 13,000 units of state (that is, intermediate) and local governments. Moreover, electoral reforms—for instance, switching to uninominal elections and requiring candidates to publish intended spending programs during electoral campaigns—have been promulgated in a dozen countries and are under active consideration in many others. Electoral choice—together with widespread popular participation in decision making, planning, spending, and implementation of projects—amounts to a quiet revolution in local governance.” While before the 1980s most mayors in Latin America were appointed, now virtually all Latin American countries have elected mayors.

An important expansion of the local political arena has also taken place in the Indian subcontinent. As of the early 1990s, close to half of all municipal governments in India were under “supercession” by their state governments. In this situation, the state directly appointed all chief executives and the state governments managed the municipal governments’ finances. According to one observer, “[s]tate governments in India [had] used their powers of suspending or dissolving the municipal bodies too liberally, based mostly on political considerations but occasionally sometimes on technical-administrative grounds.” After many years of discussion, an amendment to the Constitution (known as the Constitution [Seventy-fourth] Amendment Act, 1992 on Municipalities, Government of India 1992) reorganized municipal fiscal relations and at the same time significantly weakened the controls over representative municipal councils that higher levels of government had exercised. (A parallel amendment dealt with rural councils, or panchayats.) Among the innovative elements of this amendment are the requirement for state governments to reconstitute representative municipal councils within six
months of their dissolution; the attribution to municipal governments of such tasks as poverty alleviation and planning for economic and social development; the setting up of finance commissions at the state level with the object of improving the financial position of the municipalities; and the requirement that one-third of all the seats in local bodies, including the positions of chairperson, be reserved for women. By the end of the decade, a prominent authority estimated that about one hundred thousand newly elected officials—many of them women—had entered the political system at the local level.21

**Civil Society and Associational Life**

If one important aspect of democratization is the new “politics of elections,” a second important aspect is the “politics of governance.” By governance we understand the “relationship between civil society and the state,”22 which can take place at any level of the system. Decentralization and democratization at the local level have been both encouraged and strengthened by a great deal of what a French author has called “social energy.”23 With respect to Ivoirian urbanization, for example, various observers24 have pointed out the level of imagination and social innovation that has for some time characterized the response of the population to the challenge of structural adjustment (including fewer available jobs in the formal economy, less public capital for housing and infrastructural investments) and the devaluation of the CFA franc. Some of the results of the imaginative response to the crisis have been the virtual ubiquity of households—and even individuals—holding several jobs (formal and informal) at the same time; the proliferation of small-scale commerce; and the relatively higher levels of success of female-headed households than male-headed households (among lower-income families).25 In Abidjan, the largest city (population 3.3 million), this has resulted in a rather less hospitable treatment of non-Ivoirians (who were always a large group in Abidjan society), but also a maintenance of average incomes at a higher level than in the rest of the country.26 According to Marc Le Pape, the insecurity of employment has led men to become almost as resourceful as women!27 Particularly important has been, as a result of the conjoncture, the degree to which homeowners have transformed their single-family dwellings into
housing with a multiplicity of commercial and residential uses. These demographic and economic innovations, under pressure of structural change, have resulted in complex new patterns which, in turn, have required more flexible and accommodating norms of regulation and urban management.

Two other African examples illustrate different aspects of this evolving new relationship between the local state and civil society. In a well-documented study of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, during the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Aili Mari Tripp shows how government policy was deeply affected by the decision of many women to resort to informal trading activities. As a result of the structural adjustment policies undertaken by the Tanzanian government—which had the effect of laying off many male workers and holding wages down in an inflationary economy—women began to undertake “income generating activities” on a massive scale. At first the government (including the central government as well as the municipality) tried to control and regulate this informal economy; abuses and unnecessary harassment were common, to the point that the government was becoming very unpopular. The privatization of many services, initially resisted by the government, was finally permitted. In the end, the municipality became more selective in its regulatory policies, and the central government was forced to reverse its long-standing policy that had restricted “leaders” and “public servants” from engaging in economic activities outside their formal employment. Tripp concludes that the informal economy and the associations tied to it “were mechanisms to assert self-governance and to challenge the top-down style of governing that treated ordinary people as though they did not have any wisdom to contribute to their own economic and political development.”

A second example concerns young people in Dakar, Senegal. In the early 1990s, four-fifths of the unemployed of the city who had never before worked were younger than thirty. “High unemployment rates profoundly affect the youth of Dakar and reinforce their status as dependents. [At the same time] newspapers not controlled by the government daily portray a state incapable of assuring a decent quality of life for its students or offering them work.” A coming together of two important categories of urban youth—the marginals and the students—in the highly charged political atmosphere of the capital city was a precondition of the Set/Setal
Richard Stren

movement of the late 1980s and 1990s. As Mamadou Diouf describes the movement, Set/Setal

is the mobilization of human effort for the purpose of cleansing in the sense of sanitation and hygiene, but also in the moral sense of the fight against corruption, prostitution, and delinquency. The movement's primary concern was to rehabilitate local surroundings and remove garbage and filth. It also undertook to embellish these sites, sometimes naming them, often marking them with steles [stones] and monuments to bear witness by recalling moments or figures from local history or appealing to the private memories of families or youth associations. Set/Setal is clearly a youth movement and a local movement (in opposition to national movements and even to parties and urban sections of parties), that is to say, one centered on the neighborhood. It is a specific response to the accelerated degradation of the urban infrastructure and to the virtual absence of residential garbage collection in the poorer districts.31

To the extent that the movement needed resources, the youth organized public music and dance parties, and solicited funds from passing motorists. The movement both reaffirmed the importance of the local, and resisted structural adjustment policies that had led to the deterioration of urban life.

In Latin America, “social energy” flowed from urban social movements active during the 1980s and early 1990s. Research evidence for the explosion of community-based and self-help groups during the 1980s is abundant. In Santiago, Chile, for example, a survey found that in the 1980s, 20 percent of the marginal urban population participated in popular organizations, one-third of which were involved with health problems. In the health area alone, there were some 673 “self-help health organizations” operating at the community level, including 201 soup kitchens, 20 community kitchens, 223 cooperative buying organizations, 67 family garden organizations, 25 community bakeries, and 137 health groups; these organizations had 12,956 active members. Most of the members, as well as the leaders and managers of these organizations, were women.32 In Chile during the 1980s, there were thousands of NGOs, many relying on external financing for their local operations.33 In Lima, Henry Dietz reports, “the urban lower classes…had over the years created elaborate and enduring self-help mechanisms for which many of them
contributed time, money, and effort. In the late 1980s Lima had an estimated eighteen hundred communal soup kitchens, serving approximately seventy thousand individuals daily, and some thirty-five hundred Vaso de Leche neighborhood committees delivering some 1 million glasses of milk a day in Lima.” Dietz argues that the number of kitchens may have doubled after the initial economic shocks of Fujimori’s adjustment policies in the early 1990s; in 1994, USAID estimated that, as an agency, it was feeding one in three Peruvians.34 Partly as a result of this massive self-help and NGO effort, it was argued, people did not systematically protest the economic policies of the government, even though they were initially very much affected by them.

In some countries, NGOs helped to maintain political pluralism; in others, they kept authoritarianism at bay. In Brazil beginning in the late 1970s, for example,

civil society breathed the air of the political “opening,” which heralded a return to democratic rule after twenty years of authoritarianism. Mobilization took root in the factories, but soon spread beyond the labour movement and political parties. In both poor neighbourhoods…and middle-class areas, the population organized to demand the right to basic services—water supply, sewerage, school facilities, health facilities, roads—and protested against ecological dangers, development plans which ignored residents’ interests, housing evictions and a host of other causes.35

The emergence of urban social movements in Mexico and Peru, involving in particular the mobilization and organization of low-income communities, predated the Brazilian awakening. But the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, and a growing concern over urban environmental risk—especially as a result of high levels of air pollution in the capital, led to a diverse range of protests and popular activity in the area of human settlements. As Latin America urbanized, the link between protests and organizational activity to secure land and improved urban services and demands for the reduction and control of air and water pollution in the cities became more pronounced. Both, in any case, were central to the democratization process in Latin America. A case in point of the relationship between environmental protest and democratization is Cubatão in southern Brazil, described in the late 1970s as the “valley of death” and
the “most polluted city in the world.” In Cubatão, water, air, and soil pollution caused by the effluents of a petrochemical complex had been causing severe health problems and birth defects among the city’s population. Once democratic governance was restored at the state and urban level, however, local social movements were able to work with elected officials and technical experts (with help from the World Bank) in order to significantly reduce pollution.36

Into the 1990s, there is abundant evidence that democratic initiatives at the local level (often strengthened by decentralization) were supported by, but also themselves led to, more activity on the part of local civil society groups. Here we are dealing with a phenomenon that Warren Magnusson refers to as a “search for political space.”37 This search is happening in many countries, both north and south, as national states divest themselves of certain powers and responsibilities, and either by direction or indirection create new political opportunities or points of access to power and resources in other parts of the system – be they at different levels of the governmental hierarchy, private agencies, public/private partnerships, or individual or group action.

The case of Africa is instructive. With the exception of South Africa and Botswana (considered “middle income countries” according to World Bank standards38), all sub-Saharan African countries are squarely within the low-income category. Although many have democratized both nationally and locally, and decentralization programs have been underway for some time, the level of resources available at the local level for basic urban services is minimal. Thus, for example, on a per-capita basis, recent UNCHS (Habitat) figures indicate that Abidjan disposes of a revenue quotient equivalent to $15.15 per person per year, Addis Ababa $36.21, Brazzaville (Congo) $.94, Nairobi $7.00, and Lagos $2.29. By contrast, New York City shows revenue per inhabitant of $3,962, Seattle $2,232, and Boston $2,668.39 As I have commented elsewhere,40 not only is the level of resources available to local governments almost negligible in many poor countries, but the proportional differences in overall municipal revenue and expenditure between rich and poor countries are much greater than are the proportional differences in per-capita income. Using earlier (1993) figures supplied by UNCHS for a sample of 237 cities around the world (of which 176 were listed in “developing” countries), the average per-capita revenue received by municipal governments in Africa was
$15.20, in Asia (Pacific) $248.60, in Latin America and the Caribbean $252.20, and in the industrialized world $2,763.30. The ratio between the lowest and the highest region is in the order of 1:182, while the ratio between per-capita income in sub-Saharan Africa and that of the “high income” countries based on World Development Report figures for 1993 is 1:44.41 In the very poorest countries, very few services can be supplied to urban dwellers by local governments, regardless of the degree or effectiveness of decentralization. The limited level of resources available at the local level on the part of the government poses very serious questions about the efficacy of the newly created local institutions.

**Decentralization and the Local Associational Response in a Poor Country: The Case of Khartoum, Sudan**

Under these circumstances, the responses of local civil society become absolutely crucial. As African cities—in spite of the fact that they are decentralizing and even (in many cases) democratizing at the municipal level—attempt to respond to growing populations and the insistent problems of water and sanitation, refuse collection, and transport, to say nothing of dealing with health, education, and housing problems, their cupboards are virtually bare. What appears to be happening is that all over the continent self-help and neighborhood groups are forming spontaneously to undertake local functions and even to generate and allocate resources that the state (or municipality) is incapable of dealing with. A study of “local-level authorities and local action” in Khartoum, Sudan, illustrates this point graphically.42 Partly because of famine and civil war elsewhere in the country, the population of Khartoum has increased dramatically over the past two decades. By 1993 it was estimated at 2.8 million, with a ten-year intercensal growth rate of 7.7 percent per annum—one of the highest in the world. During the 1990s, the Sudanese government experienced extreme economic hardship, combined with the fact that, for political reasons, it received little international assistance. Partly as a result, the government undertook an ambitious scheme to decentralize government structures, with the goal of mobilizing local resources and energies. Without going into all the major details of this complex scheme, suffice it to point out here that the country has been divided into states, provinces, localities (or local councils), and basic con-
ferences. At both the state and very local levels are elected bodies some of whose members are elected to a national assembly of the whole country. The localities—which include both elected representatives and civil servants seconded from state ministries—have the important responsibilities of service delivery (including education and public health), environmental protection, neighborhood policing and keeping order, and a number of other functions. At the very bottom, beneath the level of the conferences, are popular committees that monitor local government services and attempt to fill in with their voluntary efforts when the system does not provide.

Decentralization in itself, while beneficial as a general rule, is no panacea for ineffective government at other levels. Whereas the decentralization reform has in principle given power to the people at the neighborhood level, Gamal Hamid contends that “the system is overly ambitious, as it has delegated too many responsibilities to new, inexperienced institutions all at once. Most localities, for instance, lack trained staff and equipment, and some have very thin resource bases upon which to draw in the first place.” The funding of localities was further depleted in late 1999 when the president issued a decree restricting the ability of provinces and localities to impose certain local taxes, and again in 2000 with the replacement of most local taxes by a single value-added tax collected at the national level. Therefore, local resources are at an absolute minimum in Khartoum—a situation very similar to many other poor sub-Saharan African cities.

Given an almost total lack of government resources at the local level, people have had to rely on a well-developed system of mutual assistance, or nafeer. Three cases of local cooperation at the neighborhood level show how communities have tried to mobilize support in the virtual absence of government. In one case, a group of private landowners successfully combined their own resources with some resources advanced from the State Ministry of Engineering Affairs and its Water Corporation, in order to provide piped water to a large block of land with approximately one thousand low-density plots. In this case most of the landowners had retired from professional positions overseas, and could afford to pay the cost of a private water reticulation network, given some support from the government. In a second example, involving low- and medium-income residents of twenty houses on either side of a 200-meter long
street, the local community first cleaned, graded, and beautified their street, eventually constructing a small bridge over a drainage ditch in order to make their street more accessible during the rainy season. Here the community was energized in the first instance by an informal group of fifteen young men, who convinced the locality committee to lend them its grader; they then collected contributions to pay for fuel and reasonable financial rewards to the grader operators. One small success led to another. At no time did the formal (even very local) organs of government render more than minimal service, and the neighborhood committee gave only tacit approval. A final example involved the planned construction of a kindergarten in a public space that was being used as a park. The kindergarten was to be part of a building that also served as a community center. In this case, stalemate occurred because the community was divided between a local charitable association and the government-affiliated popular committee of the locality, and conflict between the two factions led to a halt in construction of the kindergarten. What these examples demonstrate is that an associational structure has been established at the local level in Khartoum that can both link neighborhoods to existing municipal and state institutions, and provide resources and services for the population when formal institutions, in spite of decentralization and legal responsibility, have no ability to act on their own. To the extent that the newly created decentralized institutions affected any of the outcomes in these cases, they did so either by inadvertence or lack of action.

Conclusions

We have considered here some of the factors that appear to be associated with a greater interest in, and emphasis on, politics and governance at the local level in the developing world. While the national state has foundered in a variety of ways, local governments have been invested with more constitutional powers over important functions, and local elective offices and democratic processes have expanded. Does all this constitute a revival of “local politics” in the classic sense of electoral activity? In the developed world, and some parts of the developing world where resources for local governments can provide at least a minimum of services, decentralization and democratization have attracted attention to local issues just as
global influences seem to be even more pervasive. But in very poor developing countries, local politics as electoral activity takes second place to the emergence everywhere of a politics of governance, involving an elaboration of associational and community forms of action in which the central operating motif is collective action to produce and maintain public goods. Decentralization and even democratization have little resonance when local institutions have so few resources that they cannot provide water, maintain roads and drains, or construct community facilities for their people. Under these conditions, “governance,” as a shared activity between civil society and government, is the essence of the local political experience. The trajectory of local politics in the poorest countries is likely, for some time to come, to reflect the initiatives and energies of civil society rather than the newly created, decentralized, and democratized municipal institutional forms.

NOTES


3 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King, eds., Why People Don’t Trust Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). A 1998 Gallup poll that asked Americans parallel questions concerning their confidence in the federal government to handle “domestic” (that is, national) problems and in the local government to handle “local” problems showed a disparity. Thus, 61 percent of the national sample reported that they had either “a great deal” or a “fair amount” of trust in the federal government, while 77 percent of the same sample reported “a great deal” or a “fair amount” of trust or confidence in their local government (George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 1999 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc. for the Gallup Organization, 2000), 49-51.


7 For Canada, see Janice Stein, The Cult of Efficiency (Toronto: House of Anansi, 2001).
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12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 26.


15 Ibid., 3.

16 Ibid., 8.


19 In Costa Rica, one of the few Latin American countries not to have changed the selection process for mayors (until 2001, municipal councillors have been elected, while the executive head of the municipality is a manager appointed by the municipal council), the year 2002 will see a shift to electing mayors all over the country.


22 Patricia McCarney, Mohamed Halfani, and Alfredo Rodriguez, “Towards an Understanding of Governance,” in Richard Stren and Judith Bell, eds., *Perspectives on the City* (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1995), 95.


26  Ibid.
27  Ibid.,149.
31  Ibid., 59.
42  Most of the material in this case study of Khartoum is taken from Gamal M. Hamid, “Local-Level Authorities and Local Action in Khartoum, Sudan,” in
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Seteney Shami, ed., *Capital Cities. Ethnographies of Urban Governance in the Middle East* (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 2001), 140-68.

43 Ibid., 151.

CHAPTER 2


ANANYA ROY
University of California at Berkeley

If the twentieth century was the century of the nation-state, then the twenty-first century has been launched with the hope that it will be the century of human initiative. The policy repertoire of the new millennium encompasses stories of associational life, images of decentralized governance, mandates of community will, and the ideals of “heroic entrepreneurship.”¹ In a world able to reimagine and remake itself, academic scholars and policymakers have become the organizers of democracy and governance, the purveyors of social energy.

And yet this is a century that is already marked by landscapes of ruin and rubble. The arch of violence stretches from New York to Kabul, challenging the most basic notions of cities and citizenship, of urban governance and urban order. But it has also become clear that the blinding horror of 9/11, the pit of destruction, has been present in other urban sites, in the routine ravages that have come to characterize so many corners of the world. These troubles then are not so much new as they are newly noticed.

Alongside the momentous eruptions that move at hyperspeed through circuits of global media, there is also the violence of everyday life, a structural horror that pervades the time-space economies of this interconnected world.² Recently, that systemic violence has been acutely evident in Argentina where for one electrifying moment the paradigm of liberalization revealed its depleted coffers and emptied-out promises. The American media celebrated the social energy of Argentinian citizens, the din of banging pots and pans in working class urban neighborhoods, the swell of hungry city dwellers as they raided supermarkets, and across from the Casa Rosada, written on the sidewalk these words: “We are going to keep on coming. Signed, the People.”³
But to what extent can this overflowing of urban neighborhoods, this spilling into and through the grand boulevards, be seen as protest, challenge, or revolution? Political observers note that amidst the ruins of neoliberal economics, Peronist populism is being steadily resurrected. “The people” occupy the public spaces of Argentinian cities, but it would be misleading to interpret their public presence as structural change just as it would be misplaced to interpret populism as democracy and political freedom. That urban social movements can coexist with semiauthoritarian or even fully authoritarian systems is not only historical lineage but also contemporary reality.4

Such issues greatly complicate any discussion of urban governance, of the “relationship between state and civil society.”5 Although governance can be seen as a shift, in both political structure and intellectual attention, from states to ensembles of state and nonstate actors, it clearly does not signal an end to “governmentality—that is, modalities of discipline and control.6 As has been variously argued, the paradigm of deregulation and privatization inaugurates new regimes of regulation.7 It is imperative then that governance be understood not so much as the dis-placement of power but rather its re-placement, its realignment, its reinforcement.

This in turn requires studying how the social energy of our times exists simultaneously with violent energies and social depletions, together creating an uneven geography that is not easily mapped onto the dualistic grid of development and underdevelopment, power and powerlessness, progress and backwardness. The sheer poverty of certain regions has unsettled the teleology of modernizing change, such that, as James Ferguson notes, for some, backwardness is not the past but rather the future, a betrayal in which the economic promises of modernization have been lost.8 Also betrayed are other guarantees: those that linked the free market to prosperity, and prosperity to democracy, and democracy to liberalism. The very discourse of globalization implies such a homogeneous world, a transparent and navigable truth-economy. The frictions of space and power have proven otherwise. My use of the term, liberalization, is meant to draw attention to an uneven and unevenly managed cartography, to the nonlinear pathways of change.

In this endeavor, I am often drawn to the landscape of ruins and rubble that mark the ending of Gabriel García Márquez’s novel, One Hundred Years of Solitude.9 In the closing scenes, García Márquez depicts how the
city of Macondo, once thriving with life, with an economy brought to it by the plantations of the banana company, lies deserted. In this silence remains Aureliano, descendant of a long line of Aurelianos, including the founder of the city. It is a city forgotten even by the birds, choked by heat and dust, where the train never stops, and where the only life is in the torrents of red ants that flow through the streets. It is amidst this solitude that Aureliano comes across the chronicles of Melquiades, an old and wise man who had lived when the city was founded. As he reads, Aureliano learns of his origin, he sees how the time and space of his life has been ordered, preordained by these aged chronicles. He comes to the part of the predictions that deals with the instant that he is living. He begins to decipher it as he lives it, as if he were looking into a speaking mirror. Before reaching the last line he has already understood that he will never leave that room, for it is foreseen that the city of mirrors (or mirages) will be exiled from the memory of men at the precise moment when he, Aureliano, will finish deciphering the parchments.

The challenge of our times is to decipher this moment as we live it but to reject the sentence of solitude and silence. For we must learn to speak without wiping out our cities and our cities of memory. In addition, we must learn to pay attention to the privileges of voice, to those whose voices are silenced by the chronicles of history. There cannot be a discussion of urban governance if not all can meaningfully participate in that discussion; there cannot be a celebration of social energy without a commitment to social justice. With this in mind, I will highlight three processes—the corporate paradigm of state practice, the feminization of policy, and the rise of illiberal democracy—as key determinants of both the trajectory of urban change as well as of the ability to participate in such change.

The Corporate Paradigm of State Practice

It is an obvious fact, but one worth stating, that at this moment of liberalization, despite the rhetoric of the end of the nation-state, it is more important than ever before to talk seriously about state power. The hollowing-out of the state, as Bob Jessop puts it, is not about reduced state capacity but rather about the ability of the state to reconfigure and rescale. In other words, the state is perhaps less visible but clearly not less powerful. The implications of disguised and deflected state power are far reaching.
A significant trend is the rise of the corporate paradigm as a model of state practice. In the United States, the Bush administration has put into place an MBA-style management, a form of governance that can be thought of as “America, Inc.” This pattern goes well beyond the privatization of state functions. Rather, it involves the modeling of public administration and public policy along the lines of the market. Such changes are amply evident in the recent restructuring of the American welfare state. The end of welfare has come not only through extreme localization and privatization, but also in the form of an aggressive market ideology that brutally implements participation in wage-earning capitalism. Here, social citizenship has become contingent upon the “work ethic” and poverty has been reinscribed as the behavioral failure to desire work. Through punitive regulations workfare thus seeks to enforce work. But this is work in the context of a violent economic restructuring that has scorched labor markets and has left the urban poor at the mercy of the market and now the market in the form of the state.

At the urban level, liberalization involves what David Harvey has designated as a shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. City managers are increasingly entrepreneurs, and, as in the case of Michael Bloomberg’s recent ascendancy to the mayoralty of New York, they are private entrepreneurs bringing with them corporate models of administration. Such patterns have also been evident in city-level appointments, particularly in the “housing czars” appointed to head various local housing authorities—Harry Spence of Boston, Vince Lane of Chicago—all market-styled men assuming public office to dismantle public programs such as public housing.

In other cases, a more subtle blurring of the boundaries between state and corporation is taking place, but with equally significant consequences for urban governance. In such state-market combinations, the rituals of the state are becoming the rituals of the market. This is particularly evident in postsocialist transitions, for it is here that the hybrid process of “market socialism” is evident.

Perhaps the most obvious example is postreform China where local states enter into joint ventures with foreign investors via nonmarket allocations of land to state-owned enterprises. It is thus that finance is constantly mobilized at the local level in China, making possible a new state-based entrepreneurial class as well as the renewal of urban infra-
structure.¹⁵ Such marketized rituals of state power have of course generated distinctive sociospatial inequalities. But they are constantly legitimized through new forms of hegemony. The research on China shows how the “iron rice bowl” is being replaced with a new icon: the rice bowl of youth.¹⁶ The postreform state makes its presence felt in the obvious urban spaces of production and social reproduction, as in the military’s role as a developer of upscale housing. But it is also present where it is least visible: in the seemingly state-free urban spaces of consumption; in the discotheques and karaoke bars that proliferate especially in the special economic zones like Shenzhen. It is here that desire is produced, desire for a mobile capitalism that spans the Greater China region and indeed the Pacific Rim. This “democracy of consumption” raises important issues about social and urban citizenship. A high-ranking Shenzhen official, interviewed by Aihwa Ong, said: “Let them [young people] have their desires! Just no more Tiananmens.”¹⁷

Calcutta, India, is another site of such emerging regimes of regulation. Here, the long-standing socialist democratic coalition, the Left Front, is intensely engaged in liberal restructuring, a perestroika of sorts that I like to think of as a “communism for the new millennium.”¹⁸ Much of this “new communism” has involved remapping Calcutta, as in the Left’s infamous action of evicting informal vendors from the city’s sidewalks. This brutal reversal of decades-long support of the informal sector was euphemistically titled “Operation Sunshine” and celebrated worldwide.

Such practices of liberalization are indeed common and widespread, an attempt to cleanse the city, often through the criminalization of the informal sector. But the real action in Calcutta is on its fringes, where city and countryside collide, where housing developments are emerging amidst the last paddy crop, and where there is a great deal of ambiguity regarding property rights. It is here that the marketized rituals of the state are most apparent, because the liberalizing communist state has emerged as the most important housing developer, evicting old squatter settlements. But it has done so by deploying some old socialist strategies, most notably the idea of vesting urban land for public purposes. In other instances, the state, through the more private arm of political parties, has encouraged the formation of middle-class informal subdivisions, thereby circumventing its own bans against the urbanization of agricul-
tural land. In many ways, such rural–urban interfaces are emerging as the territoriality of liberalization: in Calcutta, in the reformed ejidos outside Mexico City, in the agrarian periphery of Cairo. My concern then is with how the state as market generates specific dilemmas of equity and of governance. In Calcutta, as informal settlements are dismantled and scattered, the urban poor are rendered deeply vulnerable. And while the territorially flexible liberalizing state can aestheticize the city, it can do so only amidst unending legal and political challenges, an impasse in development that has made a mockery of urban governance.

There are also blatant instances of the corporation itself as state. For example, the Ogoniland region of Nigeria has long been notorious for a predatory capitalism, an unholy alliance between a parasitic centralized state and global oil corporations. More recently, these corporations have emerged as de facto states, doing the work that the Nigerian state has been historically unwilling and unable to do: building schools and roads, negotiating land rights, and fostering community groups. But the “Republic of Chevron” is a dismal place, where what is provided is meager, a travesty of the region’s natural resources, and provided above all in idioms of violence and corruption that are horrifying.

At the other end of the spectrum lies the town of Celebration, Florida, the Disney Corporation’s foray into urban development. The town promises a Mickey Mouse ideal of neighborly communities and carefully regulated environments. Such attempts to manufacture and sell urban community have always been good business, and it is now state business. But Celebration’s public sphere is in many ways an architecture of facades, rich in designed symbols, but empty of public process. In both Ogoniland and Celebration, two sites that could not be more apart, the rights of citizenship have been exchanged for the rights of the market; but as it turns out, the market honors no rights, not even the right to participate.

It is therefore imperative to pose critical questions of these new modes of urban governance. If this is an era marked by “the privatization of everything,” what is the space of the public? Who is allowed to participate in this new paradigm of state practice? Are those excluded from the market thereby excluded from the state as market?

In the American context, two trends are striking. The first is the criminalization of social groups who are unable to successfully participate in the market. From the draconian workfare requirements that Rudolph
Giulani’s New York applied to the homeless population to the quality-of-life tickets instituted by liberal San Francisco, city after city has sought to implement mean streets, producing what Don Mitchell has called “the annihilation of space by law.” Neil Smith characterizes this genre of urban policy as “revanchist”: a vengeful reaction that pervades an increasingly market-determined public policy.

The second is the articulation of compassionate conservatism as a legitimate policy response to social inequality. The disjunction between the structural realities of what Loïc Wacquant calls “advanced marginality,” a long-term and spatially concentrated form of poverty tied to advanced sectors of the economy, and this public rhetoric of volunteerism and moral goodwill could not be more stark. To borrow a line from the feminist debates about development, it could be argued that this is a bit like treating cancer with a Band-Aid. Compassionate conservatism masks the deepening inequalities of our current moment through the rhetoric of liberal freedoms, particularly the freedom to participate in the market. And in providing a moral salve for the harshness of the market regime, it hastens the neoliberal withdrawal of the state from social responsibilities.

Although this is not the appropriate forum for such a discussion, let me simply note that these trends of criminalizing the poor and advocating a voluntarist charity-based response to social injustices are not new. Their historical genealogies can be traced to the late nineteenth century and the rise of social reform movements as an attempt to regulate the perceived disorder of the modern city. That turn of the century continues to cast a long shadow on this one, replicated through repeating configurations of geopolitical power.

The Feminization of Poverty

It is now widely perceived that the solution to both the ills of the market and the failure of the state lies in the collective action of the poor. The enablement paradigm, which has gained great popularity, celebrates, and thereby advocates, modes of self-governance. My concern is with how this form of self-governance is in fact a specific type of governmentality, carrying within it distinctive practices of regulation and control.

In the broadest sense, I will argue that the discourse of enablement is deeply gendered, that gender has become the currency of certain gover-
nance models, and that such trends can be interpreted as the feminization of policy. I mean the term to encompass the following elements: the privatization of collective consumption; the incorporation of women and women’s issues into the policy agenda in ways that maintain gendered hierarchies and boundaries; and the concern with the moral-behavioral characteristics of target populations.

The neoliberal agenda has been implemented most brutally through state withdrawal from social programs of spending. It is not so much that states are spending less, but rather that they are spending less on policies that once sought to mitigate poverty and inequality. As the Anglo-American welfare state comes to be replaced by the warfare state, so in other world regions, structural adjustment has imposed a harsh regime of austerity. In turn, the poor, and particularly poor women, have been left to shoulder the burden of coping. Quite simply, the paradigm of self-help involves not only the older patterns of “sweat equity”—the unpaid, voluntary labor of the poor,30 but also now an unpaid “third shift” of community work for women.31 This feminization of collective consumption is acutely evident in informal settlements around the world. What at first glance seems to be a lively associational life rich with soup kitchens, social networks, and volunteerism often turns out to be bloody, hard work. Such is the case with Villa El Salvador, Peru, a settlement often touted as a model of self-management. But in the context of structural adjustment, as Alan García sought to negotiate the IMF’s strictures, the state resources available to the settlement were reduced to a trickle. A poignant documentary, City in the Sand, focuses on one of the settlement’s residents, Emerita.31 As the camera follows her around, in a single day, she volunteers in the government’s health clinic, supervises seven community kitchens run through the volunteer work of women, makes house visits, organizes mother’s knitting groups, all in addition to her wage-earning work as crochet seamstress.

Although such forms of self-help have been interpreted as entrepreneurship, there is little evidence to show that the informal sector bears the possibility of successful self-employment. Indeed, the research points to how global restructuring has been accompanied by intense downgrading and informalization, a feminization of work if you will.32 In this scheme of things, entrepreneurship rests not in the desperate struggles of the rural-urban poor but, as I have earlier argued, in the state as it remakes
itself in the market image of liberalization. The feminization of policy, by celebrating the collective action of women actors, can obscure the structural trends of the feminization of work and poverty.

The fact of participation, of participation in urban governance, has to be therefore seen in light of the terms of such participation. Let me take the liberty of returning to my Calcutta research. Here, squatter settlements fit the classic model of urban populism. Claims to shelter and services are negotiated in return for political loyalties. There is thus a great deal of political mobilization, including female participation in local politics and community development. But a closer look reveals some important gendered facts. For example, the realm of politics is deeply masculinized, dominated by a masculinist idiom that devalues women’s issues. Women participate not as workers or citizens, but instead as mothers and wives, a domestication that has far-reaching consequences, as in the lack of attention to the wage-earning work of women. Indeed, it is an enduring irony that despite twenty-five years of rule by a socialist coalition, women’s work continues to be privatized and feminized, excluded from the political and policy agenda. Entire occupations, for example, domestic service, have therefore been inscribed as mere extensions of women’s household work, unworthy of attention or concern.

It is thus that Cecile Jackson and Richard Palmer-Jones argue that the newly popular women-oriented policies can leave both gender and poverty untouched. For while the feminization of policy can get women actors to the table of governance it cannot challenge the inherently patriarchal and unequal rules of the game through which equity decisions are made.

However there is a curious way in which women actors are being welcomed to the policy table, and that is through moral-behavioral arguments. If, in the Anglo-American context, the urban poor are being criminalized as morally deviant and socially deficient, then the Third World poor woman is emerging as a symbol of unfatigued efficiency, unpaid efficiency if I may add. To her can be safely assigned the world’s problems: from managing the size of the population to the ecofeminist goal of saving the natural habitat to the Grameen Bank ideal of repaying microcredit loans. She embodies, it is believed, the moral psychology of social energy. But such definitions are as essentialist as those of earlier and parallel attempts to characterize the poor as tangled in a culture of pov-
The pendulum has swung but the poor, this time poor women, continue to be represented as essentially different, this time as self-sacrificing, altruistic actors. And they are thus damned to a fate of self-governance.

There are important linkages between the feminization of policy and the rescaling of state practice. The localization and privatization of the welfare state can be read as a distinctive process of feminization, one that shifts the locus of responsibility from the state to the household via the market. Similarly, there are significant interactions between the feminization of policy and the localization of development practices and discourses. The 1990s saw an uncanny convergence between the antidevelopment critics who defended the “local” against modernization and the premier development institutions, including the World Bank, that were advocating decentralization and localization. Here the local is resurrected as a site of governance, enablement, resistance, and revolution. For example, in a recent piece, Arturo Escobar argues against the “erasure of place.” While he calls for a “multiscale, network-oriented” strategy of localization, he continues to reify “local knowledge” as a “mode of place-based consciousness.” And too often women have been located in this utopian realm, as unique bearers of traditional knowledge. In the attempt to resist the erasure of place, the complex agency of women has been erased. As calls to defend the local are put forth, so the figure of the Woman is inscribed as the icon worth defending—mothers of the community, protectors of the home.

It is important to argue and act against this grain, to foster a mode of scale-jumping that matches the sociospatial dynamics of global capitalism. The restless reconfigurations of liberalization have to be met with equally restless politics and policy, forms that refuse to remain confined to single scales or domains of action. In the documentary, *City in the Sand*, the transformative moment is that at which the mother’s club, led by Emerita, articulates the wage-earning work of crochet-seamstressing not as mothers’ work but rather as globalized labor, implicated in a commodity chain that stretches from the intermediary in the rich suburbs of Lima to the buyers in Brazil to the European consumers a continent away.

**Medieval Modernity**

In recent policy debates, certain terms, such as governance or civil society or decentralization, have taken on normative meaning. In other words, they
are seen as ideals worthy of emulation. This conflation of governance with good governance,\textsuperscript{39} of civil society with empowerment, and of decentralization with democratization is both unproductive and dangerous.

It is tempting to think about globalization from below as an inherently progressive force. Such was the social energy that flowed onto the streets of Seattle, Prague, Genoa, and more recently, New York—the effort to reimagine the making of our world. The World Social Forum, held as the mirror image of the World Economic Forum, asked the global citizenry to think about equity as a key component of global governance. But, as Janet Abu-Lughod has argued, it is important not to confuse the form of civil society with its content.\textsuperscript{40} For alongside this vision of a liberal democratic world order, there are other calls for equity. In the interstices of the urban, these are the calls emanating from drug bosses, religious fundamentalists, and militias. These processes require attention, not as anomalous or deviant, but rather as fundamental to the new urban landscape. These actors require attention not as backward and uncivilized, but rather as fundamental to the modern world. They constitute an illiberal democracy and a medieval modernity. If these phrases sound oxymoronic, such is the challenge of these times.

In Latin America, the public spaces of informal settlements are being appropriated by the international drug trade. If in the 1970s, Janice Perlman and others undermined the myth of marginality, there is now talk of the “reality of marginality.”\textsuperscript{41} While Perlman argues that in the Rio favelas, drug bosses are not replacing the state as paternalistic service providers, other genres of research indicate that in some cases the drug bosses provide the only urban spaces of consumption for the favelados: a soccer stadium and funk bars\textsuperscript{42}—a medieval fiefdom regulated through the democracy of modern consumption.

In the Middle East, fundamentalist religious groups like the Islamic Jihad in Egypt or the Hezbollah in Lebanon wield control over significant informal parts of cities, mainly through the provision of basic services to the urban poor.\textsuperscript{43} In Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which stands condemned as a terrorist organization, is a crucially important provider of educational and health facilities.\textsuperscript{44} This populism, meted out in the idiom of religious and cultural fundamentalisms, is a far cry from the normative visions of liberal democracy that have come to be associated with the idea of urban governance.
It would be a grave mistake to read these trends as simply social disorganization and anarchy, or only in the newly coined vocabulary of terrorism. As Wacquant argues in relation to the American ghetto, disorganization is itself an institutional form, the characteristic of a sociospatial mechanism of ethnoracial closure and control.\textsuperscript{45} If the informal sector can be seen as structured through “extralegal” systems of regulation,\textsuperscript{46} then so can these new or newly noticed processes of medieval modernity be seen as modes of governance. They even possibly involve what Asef Bayat sees as the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” the terrain of political struggle and enfranchisement being carved out by a “deinstitutionalized and marginalized subaltern in Third World cities.”\textsuperscript{47}

None of this can be understood outside of globalization and liberalization. Structural adjustment promised the utopia of the market but left entire world regions at the mercy of the most vicious of fears and hatreds, reinforcing rather than challenging authoritarian, fascist, and fundamentalist regimes.

Within such contexts, decentralization has often meant a medieval carving up of territory, as in the imposition of sharia law by the Muslim elites of northern Nigeria. The move away from centralization, the end of a military dictatorship, all celebrated and feted, have brought a territorial fragmentation, with brutal justice being meted out in medieval ways.\textsuperscript{48} Perhaps the most heartbreaking irony of decentralization can be seen in settings such as Somalia and Afghanistan. In these regions, in the aftermath of American militarization, decentralization has become synonymous with rampaging warlords, clan warfare, and blood feuds.\textsuperscript{49} Here, citizenship comes to be dissociated from national territory and is instead articulated in a “honeycomb of jurisdictions,” in “an almost medieval body of overlapping, heterogeneous, nonuniform and increasingly private memberships.”\textsuperscript{50}

In drawing attention to these processes, I do not mean to condone the regimes that preceded the current governments in place. My critique does not imply a return to military dictatorship or overcentralized states. Rather, it is intended to draw attention to the nonlinear pathways through which the landscape of the world is being restructured, to how illiberal democracies and medieval modernities greatly complicate any discussion of urban governance.

It is thus more important than ever before to pay attention to the state. In closing, I want to return full circle to the first issue I raised: of the state
as a site of market power. The most recent research on India is provocative, for it shows how both market and state are steeped in communal and religious practices. Arjun Appadurai’s work on Bombay tracks the eviction of Muslim squatters and vendors, as local space is violently re-inscribed as Hindu. What seems to be gentrification is in fact communal violence. And in Calcutta, the reverse is at work: what at first glance seems to be a communal riot, the clash of Hindus and Muslims, turns out to be a land-grabbing exercise, as in the clearing of slums by landlords who are deploying religiously charged mobs. As the urban rituals of medieval modernity and of the free market coincide, so is the hegemony of the nation-state consolidated.

As a citizen of the new millennium, I want to imagine cities as sites of social citizenship and sturdy governance. The question remains: What kind of citizenship and governance? Marketized? Feminized? Medieval?

NOTES


4. This argument is forcefully made in Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

5. Governance is defined as this relationship by Patricia McCarney, Mohamed Halfani, and Alfredo Rodriguez, “Towards an Understanding of Governance,” in Richard Stren and Judith Bell, eds., Perspectives on the City (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1995), 93-141.


A full account of such processes is available in Jamie Peck, Workfare States (New York: Guilford Press, 2001).


For a discussion of Harry Spence’s role as head of the BHA, see Lawrence Vale, From the Puritans to the Projects (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); for a discussion of Vince Lane’s actions as CHA chief, see Matthew Murray, “Correction at Cabrini–Green: A Sociospatial Exercise of Power,” Environment and Planning D, 13 (1995): 311–27.


The Calcutta examples are based on my field research as documented in my forthcoming book, City Requiem, Calcutta: Gender and the Politics of Poverty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).


24 The phrase is from Watts, “Development II.”


36 Ibid., 153


41 The initial argument against the marginality thesis was made in Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). In a follow-up study, Perlman argues that the favelas are characterized by the reality of marginality; see Janice Perlman, “From the Myth of Marginality to the Reality of Marginality,” in Ananya Roy and Nezar AlSayyad, eds., Urban Informality in an Era of Liberalization: Transnational Perspectives (New York: Lexington Books, forthcoming).

42 Silvia Gumaeres, research for a M.Arch thesis, Department of Architecture, University of California, Berkeley.


48 A recent account of such applications of sharia can be found in Richard Dowden, “This Woman Has Been Sentenced to Death by Stoning,” New York Times Magazine, 27 January, 2002, 28.


PART II

PHYSICAL ENVIRONS OF A HEALTHY CITY
For the foreseeable future, virtually all of the world’s population growth will occur in urban areas. Between 2000 and 2030, urban population is expected to increase by 2.1 billion inhabitants, nearly as much as the 2.2 billion that will be added to the entire population of the world. Almost all of this growth will take place in low- and middle-income countries. Whereas urban growth rates are not unprecedented, what is unprecedented is the scale of urban growth. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, only one city in the world—Beijing—had more than one million inhabitants. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 16 cities of this size; by 1950, the number of million-plus cities had risen to 86. Today, there are 400 such cities and, by 2015, there will be some 150 more. Likewise, in 1950, there were only 8 cities in the world with five million or more inhabitants. Today, there are 39 and 16 have become megacities, surpassing the ten million mark; by 2015, there will be 57 five million-plus cities, 21 of which will have become megacities.1

Although the term “city” is still commonly used, the historic city has gradually faded away, and the “urban” has risen in its place. Indeed, in many parts of the world what we now refer to as the “city” can extend over hundreds and even thousands of square kilometers, housing many millions of people. In the search for “sustainability” in the twenty-first century, it is vital that these vast urbanized areas tackle both “green” and “brown” agendas. The impact of brown agenda issues—that is, environmental issues that have an immediate local impact—is often made worse by the density of both pollution sources and residents exposed to that pollution in the world’s large cities. The situation in many large cities in the developing world is extremely bleak, with health-threatening levels of air pollution, mountains of solid waste, a lack of clean water, and an
almost total absence of sanitation for the urban poor. Urban managers also have a major role to play in addressing the “green agenda” through helping to limit the consumption of nonrenewable resources. Indeed, a key issue in urban areas is the need to reduce the production of greenhouse gases. Cities are responsible for the majority of CO₂ production in the world, both through direct emissions from industry, heating, and vehicles, and from urban residents consuming manufactured products and electricity, which usually depend on the burning of fossil fuels.

**Changing Urban Structures**

In examining the linkages among population, urbanization, and the environment, it is not just the size of urban populations and the pace of urban growth, but the morphology of cities—the structure of urban areas—that is crucial to an understanding of environmental impacts. The structure of cities and patterns of land use are fundamentally shaped by transportation patterns. Whereas the history of cities dates back some seven to ten thousand years, for all but the last seventy-five years or so, land use and transportation were closely linked—first in the dense, mixed-use walking city, where limited transportation options and travel speeds ensured that urban land use remained closely integrated, and later in the public transportation city, where fixed train and tram systems also kept development closely tied to fairly narrow transportation corridors. The advent of the automobile, however, meant that, for the first time in history, houses and businesses could be located almost anywhere because personalized transportation could be used to join them together.² As the balance of power shifted away from centralized modes of organization, the transportation/land use connection was broken and automobile dependence became established.

It is interesting to speculate whether there were alternative paths that the form of the modern city could have taken. Certainly, the automobile had to have been adopted. However, the elimination of many alternative transportation modes such as trams in most U.S. cities and the accompanying physical changes in the form of cities was not predestined. As often was the case, Lewis Mumford was an unheeded prophet. In “The Highway and the City,” a brilliant 1958 essay that is unnerving to read because it is so insightful, yet was apparently so ineffective, he deplored the approval by the U.S. Congress of the interstate highway system and
argued that it would lead, paradoxically, to more traffic congestion and dysfunctional places that offered residents no alternative to the car.3

As cities were to discover, this came at great cost—the cost involved building an almost open-ended supply of transportation infrastructure to cater to exponential growth in the demand for travel. The process made huge impacts on the environment of cities, including the paving over of natural areas, loss of farmland, air pollution from increasingly difficult to control motor vehicles, and very large infrastructure costs (for water, sewage, roads, and so forth).4 Excessive automobile travel is now also a focus of attention globally due to its contribution to greenhouse gases.

If cities are the engines of economic growth in most developing countries, then urban transport is the oil that prevents the engine from seizing up.5 Unfortunately, deteriorating transport conditions associated with urban sprawl and increased motorization are already damaging the economies of many large cities throughout the developing world. Megacities have some of the worst problems of urban transport. As city size and, particularly, density increase, so typically do the average length of commute, the level of traffic congestion, and the environmental impacts of road traffic. Motor vehicle ownership and use is growing even faster than population in many of the world’s largest cities, where growth rates of 15 to 20 percent per annum are not uncommon. The average distance traveled per vehicle is also increasing in all but the largest, most congested cities.

A major impediment to the efficient working of the urban economies in large cities, particularly in the megacities, is the level of road traffic congestion. Rapidly growing cities are distinctive because they appear to have above average car ownership rates in relation to income. Indeed, a number of rapidly developing Southeast Asian cities have experienced much higher levels of private mobility than would be expected from their levels of wealth. A survey of thirty-seven cities conducted by Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy found, for example, that Kuala Lumpur, Surabaya, Jakarta, Bangkok, Seoul, Beijing, and Manila had only 12 percent of the average per capita gross regional product (GRP) of the more developed Asian cities—Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong—yet 108 percent as much vehicle use per capita.6

The large, developing country cities also tend to have below average proportions of land space devoted to traffic circulation. In major cities in Asia, for example, 10 to 12 percent of land space is typically devoted to all
forms of road rights, compared to 20 to 30 percent in U.S. cities. High rates of car ownership and limited space for cars lead to severe traffic congestion, which inhibits productivity. The growth of GDP in many large cities also is reduced by freight congestion, among other things. Moreover, all this is occurring despite the fact that motorization is still at a relatively early stage in most developing economies.

Traffic congestion also worsens the emissions of both local and global pollutants. It has been found that increasing the average speed of city traffic from 10 to 20 kilometers per hour could cut CO$_2$ emissions by nearly 40 percent. Recent World Bank estimates suggest that the total economic damage of air pollution is estimated to represent up to 10 percent of GDP in polluted cities such as Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. Moreover, vehicular emissions are highly damaging to health: suspended particulate matter from vehicle emissions causes respiratory problems and damages lung function; carbon monoxide affects people with chronic heart disease; sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides cause changes in lung function and contribute to acid rain; and high lead concentration retards the intellectual development of children.

Looking at the long-term dynamics of urban structure, as both city center congestion and incomes increase, people are willing to travel further to live where land is cheaper and home-based movement easier. The area of the city thereby increases. Paradoxically, to avoid road congestion, people move to locations in which they become increasingly dependent on the car. Similar considerations motivate businesses. In richer industrialized countries, urban sprawl is characterized by unbounded outward spread of development from the urban core, at low density, often “leapfrogging” areas of undeveloped land to enter new jurisdictions. When employment follows residential development, it creates the phenomenon of the edge city.

Sprawl generally increases the public and private costs of infrastructure per residence. In transport terms, it is generally agreed that it increases trip lengths—even when employment is also decentralized—and increases automobile dependency. Moreover, it fosters a spatial mismatch between the places of work and residence of the poor. However, there is also much evidence to show that, where individuals have been free to choose their residential location, suburbanization has continued as incomes increase, irrespective of land use planning policies.
THE CASE OF BANGKOK

Thailand has been a major success from a demographic point of view, having undergone a dramatic transition to low fertility over the past several decades. It is somewhat atypical in that it exhibits extreme demographic primacy; the capital city of Bangkok is forty times larger than the country’s second largest city.

In 1950, Bangkok had around 1.5 million inhabitants and was a relatively compact city. Today, there are well over 8 million inhabitants in Bangkok Metropolis (BMA) and 11.5 million in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR). However, the Extended Bangkok Region contains some 17.5 million inhabitants, and it is expected that it will contain nearly 24 million inhabitants by 2010 and be a multinodal region extending some 200 kilometers from the current core. Virtually all of the growth over the next decade will occur in suburban areas, particularly to the east.

Since World War II, the overall form of the Bangkok region has been dominantly shaped by road infrastructure. Road development accelerated rapidly in the 1950s, largely at the expense of the city’s canal system. Rice fields were rapidly urbanized. This marked the beginnings of the “superblock” type of haphazard suburban development, whereby developers were free to develop land how and where they pleased—a pattern that has continued to the present. Over the past several decades, Bangkok has experienced continuing urban sprawl, as the middle class, which ballooned during the prosperous years between 1984 and 1997, moved to the suburbs in search of more living space, larger lots, and lower community densities at affordable prices. Even today, the new controlled access and multilane radial and ring roads are encouraging further sprawl beyond the present built-up area as they open up new areas for housing and industrial development. Bangkok is now an urban region whose structure is in flux. It shares many of its change dynamics with other large urban regions, for example, suburbanization characterized by shopping malls, “big box” stores, and rapidly growing edge cities shaped by office and commercial complexes at major road expressway interchanges.

The Bangkok region’s traffic congestion is among the worst in the world, with weekday speeds of less than 10 kilometers per hour in the downtown area, which suffers badly from the absence of an appropriate
structure of local distribution capacity. After years of delays and false starts, Bangkok’s first mass transit system, the Sky Train, began operations in 1999. The system is unique in that it was privately financed. However, it has a number of disadvantages. Local residents find the fares steep compared to other transport modes (such as express boats, shared vans). The two lines currently serve only limited areas. Moreover, the system is of little use to a majority of commuters, since neither of the current routes extends out to the main residential areas and there is limited parking space near the stations. Construction of a commuter rail system that would have served the northern and eastern suburbs, the directions in which most suburban development is occurring, was abandoned when only about 25 percent completed because the developer had financial problems and disagreements with the national government.

Ridership on the Sky Train remains relatively low, servicing approximately two hundred thousand riders a day compared to the six hundred thousand forecast. Moreover, after it was completed, the municipal authorities decided that it was a mistake to have constructed an elevated structure, which creates a tunnel effect, trapping road-generated congestion below it; hence, any future lines will be constructed underground, which will be much more costly. In a cost-cutting measure that was shortsighted in light of Bangkok’s future ageing population, the Sky Train has no elevators and very few escalators. What is most ironic is that, even if all of the future lines on the drawing board were built, there would be fewer kilometers of track than the trams that were taken out of service fifty years ago.

In an effort to relieve congestion and reduce pollution, Bangkok has implemented a number of transport innovations, including contraflow bus lanes and replacing the old two-stroke gasoline powered “tuk-tuks” with LP-powered three wheelers. However, modes of transportation such as the cheaply available motorcycle taxis continue to be widely used and are estimated to emit more than ten times the amount of fine particulate matter per vehicle kilometer than a modern car, and only a little less than a light diesel truck. Regarding road construction, private finance has been mobilized in Bangkok for urban toll road construction; however, in some instances, the toll roads have generated extra traffic on the inadequate secondary road network, thereby increasing congestion and resultant air pollution.
The most serious environmental problem in the Bangkok region is air pollution, approximately 70 percent of which is a product of the city’s congested traffic. Indeed, whereas large stationary sources, often located at a distance from densely populated city centers, disperse into the higher layers of the atmosphere, vehicles emit near ground level in highly populated areas, thereby contributing more to human exposure than their share in total emissions loads would indicate. Of greatest concern is suspended particulate matter, which a recent World Bank study found to be higher inside houses in some areas of Bangkok than outside.16 Lead levels in the air are also of concern, particularly in the case of children. Overall, respiratory illness is about five times as prevalent in the Bangkok region as in rural areas of Thailand. Approximately half a million people in the Bangkok Metropolis suffer from respiratory problems, and respiratory disease in the urban areas is growing by 5 to 7 percent per annum.17 As Utis Kaothien and Douglas Webster note, about 70 to 80 percent of Bangkok residents could now be categorized as middle class.18 Their expectations are rising quickly and some wonder whether the costs of rapid economic growth have been worth it in terms of the negative externalities of some of the world’s worst traffic congestion and harmful levels of air pollution.

**Which Way Will China Go?**

On the transport front, China is confronting dilemmas that have plagued many countries before it, although with the added complexities of its huge population and the transition to a market economy. China has nearly one hundred cities of over one million inhabitants, and five of over five million, two of which (Beijing and Shanghai) are megacities.19 This creates a huge demand for efficient transport networks. Until 1978, China’s urban growth was carefully monitored and strictly controlled. Beginning in the 1980s, however, the establishment of special economic zones, fourteen coastal “open cities,” and China’s open-door policy attracted foreign investment that became a new driving force behind economic growth and urbanization.

As China’s cities grew, the government established a policy that public transport should be the country’s dominant transportation mode. However, due to the large capital investment and foreign exchange
required, authorities at the State Planning Committee were cautious in approving large-scale mass transit projects, with the result that only four cities—Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin—currently have metros. Instead, the government embarked upon development of the country’s trunk highway infrastructure. Highway construction continues to receive priority, particularly in the most rapidly developing regions such as Guangdong, where growth rates of total road traffic have averaged 20 to 30 percent per year since 1980 and where heavily congested roads are exacerbated by the mixed use by motor vehicles, tractors, bicycles, and pedestrians, without separation. In such areas, highways will play an increasingly large role in the future, because the fast-growing industries will need the speed, flexibility, and door-to-door delivery that only road transport can provide.

Substantial road building also was undertaken in all large Chinese cities during the 1990s, with investment for road infrastructure doubling in most large cities. In many cities, master plans have called for development of Beijing-style ring roads. Indeed, today, throughout China, many municipalities are implementing road plans that impose ring roads, grid, or other road networks over the urban structure in an attempt to improve accessibility within the urban area and to stimulate motorization. These roads demand considerable land space and change the relationship between activity centers and the roadways, much as they have in the United States. This stems from the fact that Chinese planners have closely emulated U.S. practices of road building.

Whereas road building in China has been expanding by 12 percent per annum in recent years, the vehicle population has been increasing by more than 15 percent per annum, mainly in urban areas. In 1979, only about 120,000 cars and trucks were produced by the Chinese automobile industry, and there were only a handful of privately owned vehicles on Chinese roads. Stimulated by a government policy to promote the development of the domestic automobile industry, China’s civil vehicle fleet increased from 8.2 million units in 1993 to more than 28.7 million in 1996. Private vehicles increased from 1.5 to 2.9 million, nearly doubling over the three-year period. (On a per-capita basis, China still has one of the lowest vehicle populations in the world—10 per thousand population as of 1999, compared to 73 per thousand in Thailand, 135 per thousand in Mexico, and 785 per thousand in the United States.) Many
analysts now put the proportion of vehicles sold for private use in China at about 50 percent, up from less than 10 percent a decade ago. The Chinese vehicle fleet is projected to reach seventy million motorcycles, thirty million trucks, and one hundred million cars by 2015 and the scope for further growth remains huge.\textsuperscript{27}

A major issue in China has been urban sprawl. With the increase in privately owned vehicles, whether for business or personal use, there is simultaneously a great pressure on land development to decentralize and move both housing and businesses to suburban rings.\textsuperscript{28} In the process, in large Chinese urban centers, enormous amounts of farmland have been converted to urban uses in such important agricultural areas as the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas. Using geographic information systems (GIS) and remote sensing technologies, S.G.O. Yeh and Xia Li confirmed that, in Dongguan, in Guangdong province, 35 percent of cropland was converted to urban uses between 1988 and 1993.\textsuperscript{29} The push for motorization is creating a demand for suburbanization in urban areas that will only grow with time. The crucial question is whether China can avoid the kind of sprawl and environmental damage that has been created in the United States.

The streets of Chinese cities are now suffering from severe traffic congestion, as economic growth and consumers’ demands push the increase of the vehicle population at a much faster rate than roads can be constructed. Many existing roads have already reached their maximum capacity and are saturated during long periods of each day. In cities such as Beijing, for example, the average velocity of vehicles on main roads at rush hour was only 13 to 19 kilometers per hour in 1998.\textsuperscript{30} The number of roads approaching saturation in Chinese cities will likely increase and the period of time when these roads will be overloaded will lengthen, which will result in more frequent and severe air quality problems in localized areas.

Most Chinese cities already have serious air pollution problems, particularly with suspended particulates and nitrogen oxides. Air concentrations of sulphur dioxide, mainly caused by the burning of coal, are nearly double the WHO standards. Average suspended particulates in Chinese cities were measured at 309 micrograms per cubic meter, well above the WHO standards of between 60 and 90 micrograms per cubic meter. In recent years, less than 1 percent of Chinese cities met
the first class national air quality standards. One of the challenges is that air quality monitoring data are limited in Chinese cities, especially in high traffic areas. From the data that are available, however, it is estimated that mobile sources are currently contributing 45 to 60 percent of NOx emissions and about 85 percent of the CO (carbon monoxide) emissions in typical Chinese cities; in Shanghai, for example, in 1996, of the total air pollution load in the downtown area, vehicles emitted 86 percent of the CO, 56 percent of the NOx, and 96 percent of the nonmethane hydrocarbons (NMHC); in Beijing in recent years, the NOx concentration shows a clear increasing trend. A growing number of Chinese cities are also being blanketed by photochemical smog, which not only obscures visibility, but also can be highly detrimental to human health. In regard to greenhouse gas emissions, China is now the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world (after the United States, which emits 20 percent of the total), and it is expected to pass the United States in twenty to twenty-five years.

The Chinese government has been enhancing its laws to improve environmental quality and to respond to the growing problem of air pollution. A white paper setting out the Chinese government’s response to the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 challenges the automobile-dependent transport model, arguing that the country cannot afford to import large quantities of oil and does not have enough land to provide highways, roads, or even parking lots. Chinese cities, it is argued, should rather be designed to meet the needs of bicycles and public transport.

In some Chinese cities, bicycles still account for some 80 percent of local trips and are quite efficient. However, even in traditional cycling cities such as Guangzhou, those using nonmotorized transport are apparently doing so because there is no affordable alternative. A survey conducted in 1996 in five developing country cities, including Guangzhou, found that most bicycle users preferred the bicycle to the bus primarily because it was cheaper, but also because it was faster, more reliable, and more flexible in routing. The survey did suggest, however, that many would change to motorcycles were it not for the cost.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the provision of segregated cycling capacity was a standard design feature in new urban arterial roads in Chinese cities. Such attention to cyclists now appears to be declining. In Shanghai and Guangzhou, the development of nonmotorized vehicle
routes has been slow and piecemeal, with many proposals having been superseded by the pace of development. Moreover, it would appear that the development of segregated nonmotorized vehicle routes was seen by the authorities as a means of increasing the capacity and facilitating the operation of routes for motorized vehicles rather than providing safer and easier passage for nonmotorized vehicles. In Beijing, nonmotorized vehicles are increasingly being squeezed by automobile parking in physically segregated lanes and by the reallocation of space from wide nonmotorized vehicle lanes to through traffic lanes for motorized vehicles.\textsuperscript{35}

Public transport faces many obstacles in China. Even in cities with subways, not all of these subways have become the main means of public transport because of the high ticket prices. With the deepening of reform in the public transport industry, many large cities have begun to allow partial privatization of public buses; however, passenger flows have increased slowly and have even decreased in a few cities. In 1996, Beijing was the first municipality to adopt special public transport lanes and this model has been replicated in many other cities. However, despite such measures, the average speed of public vehicles has actually decreased, with the speed in rush hour on many routes approaching walking speed. In many Chinese cities, public buses continue to be the transport mode of last resort. Even the relatively poor prefer to take taxis, with adverse consequences on congestion, air pollution, and urban form.\textsuperscript{36}

China has moved rapidly and aggressively to implement an action plan strategy, supported by a World Bank loan, with the goal of assuring that air quality levels in China’s major cities meet the second class of national standards by 2010.\textsuperscript{37} What is striking has been the strong push by large municipal governments to implement these strategies ahead of schedule and at times adopt standards even stricter than those in the action plan.\textsuperscript{38} One area in which progress is being made is the removal of lead from fuel and conversion to cleaner fuels. Since China’s vehicle emission levels are comparable to those that existed in Europe and the United States in the late 1960s-early 1970s, policies will focus on fitting new vehicles with emission control devices, such as catalytic converters or particulate traps, and requiring such devices to be retrofitted to existing vehicles. Poor vehicle maintenance is a leading cause of mobile source pollution problems in Chinese cities; therefore, the government will mandate more rigorous inspection and maintenance programs. Another new policy
recently introduced by the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau will force the retirement of vehicles that have accumulated more than 500,000 kilometers. Beijing also plans to retrofit some fourteen thousand taxis to become dual fuel vehicles. No more buses with diesel engines will be purchased and new regulations will require that new buses and taxicabs be fueled by compressed natural gas.

Regarding specific measures to control the growth in personal transport, the municipal authorities in Shanghai began three years ago to auction car and motorcycle licenses in an effort to stem the tide of private vehicles flooding city streets. As an article in the International Herald Tribune noted, Shanghai tags have become one of the world’s most precious metals. At a recent auction, the minimum bid required to claim one of the 2,350 new plates soared to a record 17,800 yuan (about $2,150), worth far more, ounce for ounce, than gold. Whereas even the lowest priced new passenger car still exceeds a decade’s pay for a typical Chinese worker, annual household incomes in the major cities are passing the $4,000 milestone, regarded by manufacturers as a takeoff point for private auto consumption.

Other variables are facilitating the dramatic growth of motorization in China. Credit facilities and installment payments now being introduced by Chinese banks are expected to push forward the car-buying momentum. Moreover, competition among the global auto giants and China’s 120 domestic carmakers has led to price wars. Volkswagen has been operating in China for more than a decade and has a 50 percent market share; Ford and General Motors (which has plans to manufacture the Buick Regal), as well as Honda and Toyota, have formed joint ventures with state-run enterprises; Nissan plans to begin production in China next year. China’s entry into the WTO will also have an impact, as terms of China’s membership oblige the government to slash tariffs on auto imports over the next five years to less than 51 percent from 80 percent. It is predicted that total sales will reach 3.7 million by 2006, with passenger cars exceeding 1.2 million units. Within two decades or less, China is widely expected to emerge as the world’s largest car market. Given the rapid rate of motorization, China will face an uphill battle in improving environmental quality. There remain enormous problems in implementing strategies laid out in the action plan report and it is too early to judge whether a real transition to sustainability is under way.
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

In the international arena, there has been surprisingly little reference in environmental discourse to the role of cities in the future of the global environment. To date, sustainability has mostly been defined at the global and national levels and only recently has begun to be applied to cities. Much of the debate on sustainability has been through United Nations conferences and high-level international meetings, such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992). Although the principles of sustainability that were outlined in Agenda 21 can be applied to cities, guidance on how this can be done was not made clear. The International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) had very little focus on urban issues, whereas the Habitat Conference (Istanbul, 1996) had very little focus on population. Moreover, the biggest gap at the Habitat Conference was the lack of progress in operationalizing the notion of environmentally sustainable development. The goals outlined at the Millenium Summit (2000) contained only vague language regarding the environment (noting that it would be desirable to “integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes”). Likewise, the events leading up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD, Johannesburg, 2002) have focused to some extent on brown agenda issues, such as water and sanitation in urban areas, as well as on energy supply, mainly in rural areas, but have focused very little on the complex issues surrounding motorization and urban sprawl, with their concomitant negative health and environmental impacts. Of course, the controversy continues over such topics as optimal greenhouse gas reduction strategies, and the distribution of action between developed and developing countries. However a “business as usual” scenario for the transport sector, which is the likely outcome of WSSD, offers little prospect of relief.

THE ECO-CITY LITERATURE

Practitioners who have turned to various “eco-city” paradigms or movements for guidance in applying the concept of sustainability may find much inspiration but relatively little guidance. In fact, the literature on
sustainability and related themes has become so abundant that the problem is rather one of sorting through the many more or less overlapping approaches. At the risk of gross generalization, the eco-city literature almost universally vilifies the car, champions walking and cycling, and typically features case studies of successful examples of nonmotorized transit in medium-sized cities in developed countries (such as Holland or Australia). In one instance, Asian cities such as Bangkok and Jakarta, where motorized road transport is the major mode of movement, are accused of having adopted “inappropriate Western paradigms.” Still, just as much of the literature on sprawl in the United States overlooks the fact that most Americans like suburbs, studies have shown that Thais like suburbs, and demand is currently surging for single family detached houses, driven by mortgage rates at historic lows. Clearly, research needs to help policymakers better understand the determinants of this behavior (that is, the preference for suburbanization) and to help develop policy instruments that operate on travel choices in ways that respect individual preferences.

One problem is that, in the eco-city literature, examples from developing countries are few and far between. Among the developing countries, one hears mainly about Singapore, where very strong political action to limit the stock of cars to that deemed sustainable has been implemented through auctioning a controlled stock of certificates to purchase vehicles, as well as congestion pricing in the central business district and major freeway accesses (recently replaced by electronic road pricing). The other well-publicized example is Curitiba, Brazil, with its integrated land use and transportation policies, segregated bus lanes, and bus loading tubes (which were even shipped to New York in the mid-1990s in a demonstration project). Many other cities in the developing world have adopted successful (and sometimes not so successful) transport strategies and policies that need to be more widely known.

**THE DEBATE OVER SPRAWL**

The domestic debate over sprawl and its consequences in the United States—currently being played out in increasingly partisan (and sometimes acrimonious) terms on the internet, in academic journals, the popular press, and more than four hundred local ballot initiatives—is highly
relevant to the challenges being faced in many of the world’s megacities. Regardless of how the domestic sprawl debate evolves, it is likely to have significant impacts on strategies and policies adopted in large cities in the developing world, where decision-makers often emulate transport choices made in the United States. The phenomenon of sprawl is neither new, of course, nor uniquely American. Although sprawl is seldom defined with adequate rigor or consistency (reminiscent of Potter Stewarts’ famous remark about pornography: “I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it”), sprawl is now the all-purpose scapegoat for many of America’s urban discontents, and has even been blamed for the rise in obesity in Americans, who drive instead of walk.

Among the opponents of sprawl are members of the “smart growth” movement and the “New Urbanists” (a movement with a formal constitution founded by prominent architects including Peter Calthorpe, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Andres Duany). As Calthorpe sees it, sprawl matters. According to a poll conducted in 2000 by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism, urban sprawl was the most important local issue in the country—edging out more traditional issues such as crime, the economy, and even education. This distress with urban sprawl arises from a range of factors, from loss of open space and teenage alienation to traffic congestion and economic segregation, and from a lack of affordable housing to a lost sense of community.

Calthorpe argues that, whereas supporters of sprawl contend that everyone wants a detached home in the suburbs and that any form of growth management will frustrate this “natural” market, the range of choices offered by the market has yet to catch up with economic and demographic changes. The New Urbanists maintain that, “where choices are available—whether bungalows in walkable villages, town homes in real towns, lofts in vital urban neighborhoods, or affordable housing just about anywhere—the housing market responds enthusiastically. If more towns would allow the development of compact communities that offer urban amenities and street life, we might find that the market actually supports more density and housing diversity, not less.”

Regarding road building, those whom the New Urbanists term the “apologists for sprawl” contend that the traffic congestion problem could be solved by building more roads. The New Urbanists argue that this would only be a temporary fix. More roads lead inevitably to more auto-
mobile-oriented development, which consumes more open space and leads to more congestion. Likewise, whereas the “smart growth” movement strongly believes that new developments should be more “transit oriented,” with provision for light rail lines or bus routes, critics argue that light rail is slow and provides automobile-competitive trips to only a small part of an urban area; moreover, historic downtowns are no longer the dominant regional employment centers, and not just in the United States. The New Urbanists agree that transit alone will not solve the congestion problem; rather, the key is building more walkable environments, which not only reduce the necessity of using cars for local trips but also support the use of transit for longer trips:

*New Urbanism assumes that the future is not necessarily a linear extension of the past, that yesterday’s market is not necessarily tomorrow’s. The American Dream is changing. The issue is not density but design—the quality of place, its scale, mix and connections. The alternative to sprawl is not a forced march back to tenements but a range of unique places with various densities and in various locations—more choices for a diverse society.*

Critics argue that the New Urbanists are trying to reverse strong market-driven spatial forces, which include declining densities, continuing suburbanization and exurbanation of both jobs and people, decreasing numbers of jobs in the central business district, falling public transit ridership combined with stable personal travel times, and increasing suburbanization by modest-income households. They claim that the New Urbanists ignore powerful consumer preferences for single-family suburban homes, high levels of mobility achieved via driving, and inexpensive shopping at suburban malls and “big box” retailers. Peter Gordon and Harry Richardson claim, for example, that whereas the New Urbanists promote high-density living and design improvements in housing, landscape, and streets to promote “communitarianism” and non-motorized travel, they typically have ended up building high-income communities on peripheral greenfield sites: “Almost a cult, with its own gurus, New Urbanism suggests that by changing architectural styles, street layout and physical neighborhood characteristics, we can somehow change human behavior. We can solve all societal problems by changing the built environment.”
Such debates are not unique to the United States. In the UK, for example, there is a growing divide between the rural commons group, which abhors increasing density, and the urban commons group, which is attracted to increased density because it provides more urban diversity and more pedestrian-based environments. The difference between these various approaches to cities is becoming critical in urban policy debates. Environmentalists are at the center of most land use-oriented debates and are now in serious conflict in many cities regarding what should be done to make urban areas more ecologically sensitive and sustainable. Moreover, the debates have become highly personalized and emotional, highlighting the basic worldview differences at stake. The major problem in not resolving these conflicting views of reality is that it gives the impression to politicians and developers that the environment of cities is just a matter of personal taste.53

**The Way Forward**

The controversy over urban sprawl can be seen as a debate over two solutions from the past, a nineteenth-century solution and a twentieth-century one; that is, a debate over railroads and automobiles. As it is now the twenty-first century, surely there is a way to cut the Gordian knot and come up with something better.54 There is no “silver bullet” or universal blueprint for resolving transport-related problems in the world’s large cities. Clearly, there will be a need for short-term and longer-term policies and strategies, involving multiple approaches—embracing planning, public education, management, and technology.

Public education and involvement is clearly crucial. Local air pollution reduction relates by implication to global warming issues. Because interventions to reduce local levels of contaminants can be shown to be in the immediate self-interest of city residents, concentrating on exploiting the synergy between greenhouse gas reductions and local economic and environmental interests is likely to be the most productive strategic stance. In China, for example, as a growing number of cities are now routinely reporting their current air quality, citizen pressure has been building to push the government to take action to lower the pollution levels.

To accommodate the inevitable increase in automobile demand, governments will need to adopt appropriate traffic management measures,
including elimination of traffic bottlenecks, constructing limited-access commercial bypasses, high occupancy toll lanes, high occupancy vehicle lanes, computerized traffic signals, electronic road pricing, and so forth. In this regard, the rapid pace of development of intelligent traffic system technologies offers relatively poor countries the chance to leapfrog to the latest technology, just as some have done in telecommunications.

The United States, the European Union, and Japan are pursuing the best available technology for further reducing emissions from new vehicles, including the use of alternative fuels for very low emission or zero emission vehicles (as mandated in California). Although the rest of the world will probably adopt these standards and technologies some day, the issue for developing countries is how to phase in these measures cost-effectively. Likewise, revolutionary automobile technologies are on the horizon that are likely to reduce air pollution. Honda and Toyota, for example, are now marketing hybrid gasoline-electric vehicles that substantially increase gasoline mileage and reduce air pollution. A number of manufacturers are also working on fuel cell propulsion technology that would be nonpolluting. Pricing, however, is crucial; to date, electric/gas hybrid cars have been a commercial failure.

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR CHINA

Ironically, whereas the Chinese government for many years has viewed unchecked population growth as a serious threat to societal and ecological sustainability, the increasing consumption level of Chinese citizens is seen as beneficial. The Chinese population, and especially urban residents, is moving up the consumption ladder at a remarkable rate. Indeed, in recent years city planners, decision makers, and the public increasingly aspire to the Western urban lifestyle, including highways, low-density single family dwellings, cars, color television, air conditioning, and profligate water use.55

China faces many challenges as well as opportunities. At present, it is witnessing the most rapid development of road construction in the world. It is anticipated that it will take another twenty years of construction for China to complete its road network, at which time most of the industrialized countries will be utilizing intelligent transportation systems (ITS). China should strive to develop and coordinate both road infrastructure
and ITS simultaneously in order to enhance public transport efficiency and traffic safety and to mitigate the environmental impacts of transport.

While the Chinese leaders are faced with the daunting challenge of managing the explosive growth in expectations of its rapidly expanding population, they have an opportunity, possibly unique in the world, to chart an alternative path to facilitate the sustainability of its cities. Transportation is a crucial element in the process and China is still very near the starting point in establishing a nationwide transportation system. Unlike the United States, the choices it makes are not heavily encumbered by economic investments in preexisting infrastructure. It could choose to build a system from the ground up, using the latest propulsion technologies and fuels rather than merely replicating the oil-based model of the nineteenth century. In the grand scheme of Chinese history, there is still time.

In the United States, the automobile and oil industries exert phenomenal political and economic pressure with huge social consequences. China has not had that pressure—yet. China can learn from what the United States and other industrialized countries have done with their transportation systems to enhance the efficient mobility of their citizens but, equally important, China can learn from the mistakes. The vast economic and social costs to its people of unfettered road expansion can be avoided. But time is of the essence since the window of opportunity in China will not be open for very long. Once the infrastructure is in place, it will be nearly impossible to change.

**NOTES**

4 Newman and Kenworthy, *Sustainability and Cities*.
Ellen Brennan-Galvin

7 World Bank, _Cities on the Move_.
8 Ibid.
10 World Bank, _Cities on the Move_.
13 World Bank, _Cities on the Move_.
14 Webster, “Bangkok.”
15 World Bank, _Cities on the Move_.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Kaothien and Webster, “The Bangkok Region.”
19 United Nations, _World Population Prospects_.
24 Paaswell, “Transportation Infrastructure.”
25 Yin and Wang, “China’s Urban Environmental Sustainability.”
27 Yin and Wang, “China’s Urban Environmental Sustainability,” 165.
28 Paaswell, “Transportation Infrastructure.”
29 S.G.O. Yeh and Xia Li, “An Integrated Remote Sensing and GIS Approach in
In Search of Sustainable Cities


32 Yin and Wang, “China’s Urban Environmental Sustainability,” 168.

33 Yin and Wang, “China’s Urban Environmental Sustainability.”

34 World Bank, *Cities on the Move*.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Walsh, “Transportation and the Environment in China.”

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


41 Ibid.

42 Newman and Kenworthy, *Sustainability and Cities*.


50 Calthorpe, “New Urbanism.”

51 Ibid.


55 Yin and Wang, “China’s Urban Environmental Sustainability.”
More than ten years of multidisciplinary research integrating health with social issues and the physical environment (habitat) have made me aware of the great wealth of innovative ways to handle urban problems. There are new ways to understand and address the realities of city life, and new tools to tackle problems. Herein lies the importance of efforts that join health and urban studies from the standpoint of physical, social, political, and economic conditions.¹

For several decades the field of urban planning recognized and integrated economic elements into proposals for the city that failed to consider the implications of urban health challenges. However, in the 1970s, the World Health Organization issued its declaration in Alma Ata calling for “Health for all by the year 2000,” marking a shift in the paradigm of health practitioners and urban planners. Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s, medical science continued to make major strides, positively impacting not only the life expectancy of the world's population, but also greatly improving the quality of life of urban inhabitants.

In a sense, however, medical science has reached its limits, at least in terms of generally improving people's health through traditional curative methods (medication, surgical interventions, and so on).² Health practitioners have begun to realize that to advance more swiftly in improving people's health, it is necessary to change behaviors and lifestyles. Furthermore, even in those cases in which medical science knows what needs to be done to address a serious health problem, at times the high cost of treatment places it out of reach of poorer segments of society. Many countries are so poor that they are unable to provide adequate medical treatment to most of their population. In such cases the participation of other sectors is fundamental. The health sector has been discovering the impor-
tant impact that lifestyle, housing, and the environment in which people live and work have on health; accordingly, it must work together with sectors such as planning, labor, housing, and education, among others.

From the standpoint of an urban planner, I have been surprised by what I call “the power of health.” Health is a fundamental issue for most of the world’s population, especially the poor. Subsequently, improving health conditions is a very powerful tool for making people take an interest in changing behaviors and accepting policies they think may have a positive impact on their health. Similarly, when people feel their health is threatened, they generally react against projects such as the siting of garbage dumps, hazardous factories, high-voltage antennas, and the like. Understanding people’s needs is fundamental for good planning and for designing adequate policies. As health is always high among priorities of the poor, it is important to integrate it into the planning process. In this regard, if governance is considered to be the relationship between the state and civil society, the relationship between governance and health and habitat is also fundamental.

By definition, projects based on a health-and-habitat approach work with the community and require support from the public sector for improving (urban) physical conditions and, thereby, health. Such multi-sectoral projects show people that they can improve their health and their children’s health through actions that have nothing to do with taking medicine or going to the doctor. These projects can serve as excellent examples of “good governance” in terms of helping people to participate in taking control of their own lives, which is essential for good health.

A good illustration of the relationship between health problems and other aspects of development, such as urban environment, socioeconomic conditions, and the like, was developed in an action-research project with a health-and-habitat approach realized between 1992 and 1997 in Villa Los Navíos, a poor neighborhood in the southern peripheral area of metropolitan Santiago, Chile. Villa Los Navíos was selected by the municipal officials as one of the most troubled sections of the municipality, with a concentration of health problems, overcrowding, violence, poverty, a lack of services, high morbidity rates and low attendance rates at medical facilities. The study showed that the local medical office detected a major public health problem involving women’s mental health. Our study found very high levels of mental health problems among the
women in the neighborhood, compared to data from other countries at that time. Even though the physical characteristics of Villa Los Navíos were much better than those of a traditional shantytown, the degree of mental health problems was much greater than in shantytowns of poorer countries in Latin America and Africa. In 1995 the WHO performed comparative studies in fifteen cities worldwide and found that Santiago had the worst levels of psychiatric disorders (see Table 1).

### Table 1. Prevalence of major psychiatric disorders in primary health care

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>(%) Current depression</th>
<th>(%) Generalized anxiety</th>
<th>(%) Alcohol dependence</th>
<th>(%) All mental disorders (according to CIDI*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ankara, Turkey</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens, Greece</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore, India</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin, Germany</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groningen, Netherlands</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibadan, Nigeria</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainz, Germany</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester, UK</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki, Japan</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, Brazil</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago, Chile</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle, USA</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai, China</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verona, Italy</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CIDI: Composite International Diagnostic Interview.

Villa Los Navíos is a project comprising 2,569 houses produced by the government through the Basic Housing Program (two-story townhouses), all identical, where the families own their housing. The outside appearance of such housing is much better than that of shantytowns in countries such as Ecuador, Mexico, or Colombia. Even so, the women suffer from high levels of depression and anxiety, as well as sexual dysfunctions. Our research showed that there were direct relationships between these health problems and the physical and social environment of the neighborhood.

One key factor in the high level of “mental distress” observed in women was the system used to assign the housing units. Chilean public housing policy has been most efficient with respect to the number of units delivered to the population, but for many years has failed to take account of preexisting social networks. When a family without housing applies to one of the programs offered by the ministry, it is entered on a list based on income, family size, and so on; the computerized system then assigns the beneficiaries who meet the requirements to a housing unit. However, the home may be located at the other end of the city, far from relatives and friends. This has led to a breakdown in support and solidarity networks, and those women who move to a new neighborhood, knowing anyone, in minimal housing units without enough space to develop their family life, can easily fall prey to depression and anxiety.

Frequent “sexual disorders” were also reported to the medical office, especially by women. Given the design and construction of the housing units—the houses are small and have thin walls—one can hear everything that goes on in the long line of rowhouses. The units have just two small bedrooms with very insubstantial partitions; accordingly, if a couple has adolescent children or another relative sharing the house, it is almost impossible to have any privacy. This issue was not even considered until a very successful Chilean film came out in 1999, “El chacotero sentimental” ("The Sentimental Joker"), which crudely presents the situation of couples in low-cost housing. Since the film and the WHO study, the issue of mental health as it relates to housing conditions has been given more serious consideration by the government. In addition, the lack of privacy for couples in public housing projects has become a regular issue for discussion in grassroots neighborhood organizations—there are at least one million units like this in the country (housing more than one-fourth of the population).
The youth and the elderly also suffer from problems relating to housing conditions. Several studies show the proliferation of gangs and violence in the “towns” or neighborhoods built by the government. Observing how youth live and relate to the rest of society opens doors for understanding their attitudes: the fact that the houses are too small for them to feel “at home” forces them into the street. To survive in the street it is almost essential to belong to a gang, the seedbed for the sale and consumption of drugs. In Chile, the numbers of elderly are growing, and the characteristics of public housing projects make it difficult for the elderly to live in them. There is not enough physical space to take in relatives from other generations, or to receive visits from family or friends. This is bringing about the destruction of the extended family, which, as several studies have shown, is the basis of the social capital that enables the poor to survive and reduces their vulnerability. This destruction of the extended family has yet to be identified as a problem by the authorities, and is not even seen in a negative light by people generally. We are working to promote a program to improve low-cost housing based on the re-generation of the extended family, joining and adapting the existing housing stock so as to make it possible for relatives from several generations to live together with common family spaces.

A different perspective, but very much on point as regards the relationship of health, habitat, and governance, comes from Africa. The proportion of the population infected with HIV is so high (up to 40 percent of the population in countries such as Uganda and Zambia) that this has a profound impact on any other development program. African countries will have a hard time confronting other development issues until they can control AIDS, and economic conditions do not seem very helpful in this regard.

In a meeting organized in 2000 by the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Center for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, “Forum on HIV/AIDS Orphans: Building an Urban Response to Protect Africa’s Future,” very moving accounts were given of the situation and how the AIDS pandemic is destroying lives, the economy, and even urban activities. It is estimated that Johannesburg will have two million street children (mostly AIDS orphans) by the year 2010. One researcher discussed the possibility of changing policy so that the government could produce a new type of public housing that would allow families to take care of and live with the
AIDS orphans from their own families, as extended families are still a fundamental basis of African societies. This is creative thinking, not only about a new kind of housing stock, but also about a new kind of society and urban form.

The Deputy Mayor of Lusaka, Zambia, in an informal talk at the same meeting, said that the most important urban problem at the moment was that they did not have enough cemeteries in which to bury their dead. His second concern was transportation to the cemeteries. As burial ceremonies are an essential part of their culture, people need to accompany their deceased to their last residence, yet most of them are so poor they cannot cover the costs entailed. Less than a year later, at another conference organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center in Uganda, health officials presented data proving that while AIDS has become the main health concern of the government, more people are now dying from malaria because public health money has been taken from malaria programs to fight AIDS. Furthermore, the money that comes to NGOs within Africa from external donors is simply insufficient given the magnitude of the problem.

It is important to explore further what the communities themselves can do to confront their own dire situation. As there is no possibility of obtaining sufficient resources to provide medical treatment to everyone affected, no doubt the approach based on prevention and health promotion that the WHO has been developing in recent decades should be bolstered. In this regard, participatory action research projects with a health-and-habitat perspective offer excellent prospects.

If we relate these very complicated health scenarios to urban planning and governance, it is time to ask ourselves: What type of governance and what type of government are needed to address such serious situations? What type of society do we need in order to move forward? The answer lies in a governance approach that holistically incorporates health into urban planning and the development process as a whole.

**Notes**

1. The pioneer in developing and promoting such studies since the 1980s was architect Jorge Enrique Hardoy, who had a fundamental impact on the field of urban research, not only for Latin America, but for the international community.

2. Of course, medicine continues to make important advances, which explain the steady increases in life expectancy.
3 The project was supported by a grant from IDRC (International Development Research Centre), Canada and part of the writing was allowed by a Fulbright Award at the University of Chicago, 1997. Different publications have been issued in Spanish and English, such as: Ducci, M. E., “Chile, the dark Side of a Successful Housing Policy”, 2000, chapter in Social Development in Latin America, J. Tulchin and A. Garland, editors, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ducci, M. E., “Salud mental femenina y trabajo comunitario en la periferia pobre de Santiago de Chile”, with Cecilia González, chapter in “Asentamientos humanos, pobreza y género”, PGU y MINVU-GTZ, M.E.Ducci, Viviana Fernández y Marisol Saborido, comp., 1996. Also Ducci, M. E., “Mental Health between Low-Income Urban Women: Case Studies from Bombay, India, Olinda, Brazil; and Santiago, Chile”, collaboration with Ilona Blue et. al., chapter in Urbanization and Mental Health in Developing Countries edited by Trudy Harpham & Ilona Blue, Avebury, London, 1995.


6 Oviedo, E. “Santiago, violencia, delitos e inseguridad,” CD, Instituto de Estudios Urbanos, PUC (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile), and SUR, Corporación de Estudios Sociales y de Educación, 2000. See also E. Oviedo and A. Rodríguez, Santiago una ciudad con temor, SUR; and PAHO, “Project ACTIVA. Normas culturales y actitudes hacia la violencia en el Gran Santiago,” 1997.

7 Comisión Nacional del Adulto Mayor (National Commission on Older Adults), Office of the Presidency, “Política Nacional del Adulto Mayor”, Chile, 1996.

8 Larissa Lomnitz, Como sobreviven los marginados (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1975). See also, Caroline O.N. Moser, 1996a, “Confronting Crisis, A Comparative Study of Household Responses to Poverty and Vulnerability in Four Poor Urban Communities,” World Bank, ESD Studies and Monographs Series No. 8.

Urban Health in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges of Privatization, Participation, Individualism, and Citizenry

CAROLYN STEPHENS
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine

INTRODUCTION: THE POLICY CONTEXT

Urbanization\(^1\) is now acknowledged to be one of the most important trends in recent human history—even by international agencies outside the traditional “urban” sphere.\(^2\) The majority of people will soon live in cities of countries formerly defined as “developing.” This alone makes “urban” health an international issue.\(^3\)

Another important element in this international context is that, despite enormous economic growth in the twentieth century, huge proportions of the world’s population still live in “poverty”\(^4\) and there is a controversial but general trend toward higher levels of social and income inequality.\(^5\) These trends in urbanization and inequality exist in a period of widespread political and environmental change, with so-called “good governance” being promoted internationally, and the rhetoric of “sustainability” touted routinely. Good governance is often constructed as a form of “restructuring” or rationalizing systems of service delivery or policy processes and with some form of citizen involvement in decisions concerning the social, physical, and political environment.\(^6\) Sustainability has been defined as the means of achieving the well-being of people today without compromising that of the people of the future.\(^7\) If evidence is to be believed, most towns and cities are neither sustainable nor well governed.

There is also a trend that could be described as “sociopolitical.” It is part of “globalization,” a concept often defined in economic terms, but which also encompasses paradoxical trends in both sociocultural integration and individualism.\(^8\) Thus, while globalization often signifies a level
of integration among people, places, and policies—loosely conceiving of a world as one giant global village, it also conceives of one giant urban community, because so many people now experience the same economic and ideological processes. This includes a drift toward individualism, which is linked, in part, to growing levels of economic and social insecurity and to a Western ideological emphasis on individual rights at the expense of collective rights and responsibilities. Writers from very different positions have characterized an international trend toward “social Darwinism,” in which individuals are encouraged to believe in “competition”—for survival and affluence—as a social norm, and urban centers are encouraged to believe that there are no alternatives to “competing” their peoples against others in a global investors’ marketplace. There is evidence of an expanding sense of “anomie” and “atomie” amongst large groups of urban people excluded from “winning” in this involuntary, unspoken race and a sense of winners and losers within every urban center internationally.

Internationally, up to 60 percent of urban people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America live in informal settlements with few opportunities and little chance of physical health. Furthermore, the rural poor rely increasingly on urban opportunities for their current and future needs. But there is another dimension of the sociopolitical trends affecting urban health: extremes of wealth and poverty now concentrate in towns and cities, bringing the images of unsustainable wealth alongside those of unmet basic needs. This confounds urban health goals by exacerbating the frustration of disadvantaged urban peoples and increasing the risks of social violence. Further, such images of excess consumption by some groups in cities compromise the future health of others—creating a model of aspiration pegged to overconsumption in almost every urban setting, and a First World/Third World dynamic in many cities. As Sophie Bessis puts it,
eracy, and thus constitute islands of the “South” in the heart of the “North.” Likewise, the narrow [stratum] of the privileged that one sees in many cities of the South, whose standard of living compares with that of their counterparts in the rich countries, forms an archipelago of the North in the midst of the mass misery of the South.14

Even the United States, the richest nation in the world, is not exempt from this blurring of North-South boundaries. The country is home to seven of the ten richest men on the planet and U.S citizens control US$ 2-3 trillion per year in foreign investments.15 Yet, the official poverty rate stands at 12 percent of the population, 12 percent of U.S. citizens are unemployed, and two million “losers” are in prison.16 This allows some analysts to question the entire urban and industrial paradigm as the model for “development” in terms of its benefits.17

**Urban Health: The Sublimely Simple and the Obviously Missed**

The complex urban processes of the twentieth century have extensive ramifications for health—some realized already and others still potential. These processes are not exclusive to, but are particularly important for, urban communities and their health through the ways in which urban life, more often than rural existence, is immediately linked to the dynamics of economic and political conditions. In urban areas almost all parts of life are linked to their cash economies—from the search for water, food, and shelter to the search for education, opportunities, and work. At a profound level, urban health is only achieved when needs for sufficient clean water, nutritionally adequate food, and safe shelter are met through access to adequately remunerative, safe employment. Adequate employment in turn is secured through access to education and social networks. When these needs are not fulfilled, ideally, health services intervene to ameliorate the transition from disease/ill health to death. All these needs operate within the dynamics of the urban economy and social structures.

Despite decades of research documenting urban health needs and priorities, urban areas internationally remain the locus of some of the worst levels and patterns of complex infectious and chronic diseases and deaths.18 This crisis is worst in the cities and towns of low- and middle-
income countries. Inadequate living environments for the majority join with unhealthy work environments, through a combination of poor or absent services and dangerous polluting work—the so-called “double burden” on urban health in much of the world.19 Studies show that disadvantaged urban communities live in a poor sanitary environment resulting in high rates of mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases, but also that these same communities experience high rates of death from outcomes such as violence, traffic accidents, and cardiovascular disease. The rates are higher for poorer communities within cities, and poorer cities have worse health conditions than richer ones. But a crisis also prevails in urban centers in high-income countries—where air pollution from affluent car-owning lifestyles combines with affluent eating habits, and violence related to social fragmentation.20 A major crisis exists when pockets of urban wealth confront extensive urban deprivation—and city after city shows alarming increases in urban violence that is controversially linked to inequality.21 But, finally, the urban health crisis is related to a partial or sometimes total failure to build governance structures based on urban health in all its complexity.22 It also reflects the impacts of global processes and the race to pit urban peoples against each other in pursuit of survival for some and unsustainable economic development for others.

What is needed is an urban vision based explicitly on health and quality of life for urban people. What is going to achieve this?

Privatization:23 The Challenge for Urban Health

From the 1970s onward, one of the key “solutions” to the crisis in the fulfilment of urban needs has been the widespread policy of “restructuring” urban services—including the partial or complete privatization of water, solid waste management, roads, telecommunications, and, more recently, education and health services. The policy, first introduced in many countries of the South under the banner of “structural adjustment,” was gradually critiqued as evidence emerged of its growing negative impacts on vulnerable rural and urban communities.24 However, privatization has continued to be promoted with two key justifications: the extension of services to un- or under-served urban populations—a situation prevalent in most towns and cities in Africa and Asia, and the pursuit of greater efficiency in poorly run state services—the situation
prevalent in much of Latin America and in the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But privatization has also been justified as a post-hoc formalization of an extant informal policy—private providers already service most of the unmet needs of urban areas; formal advocacy of private sector involvement simply recognizes/legitimates a real situation.

Evidence of the impacts of privatization on urban services and on health is gradually accruing, as studies point to issues of focus and distribution, as well as costs of and access to services such as water, health, solid waste disposal, and telecommunications. As early as 1988, a study of the privatization of South African health services concluded that “it may exacerbate the urban-rural imbalance in health status and health services, promote growth of hospital-intensive curative services rather than needed expansion of community-centered preventive and primary care, and create financial barriers to access for low-income patients.” A Turkish study argued that, following the privatization of many sectors, “Infectious diseases including tuberculosis increased, nutrition worsened, occupational diseases and work accidents rose to be the highest in Europe.” Studies from Tanzania, Korea, China, Vietnam, and India suggest problems with location and costs of private services, ethics and skills of private practitioners, segregation of services, and the growth of elite “corporate” services. From water privatization, evidence has been gathered on the poor quality of water often provided by private wells or distributors and on the costs, access to, and gradual declines in local control over location and pricing of water supplies. Authors also highlight the complexity of foreign ownership of local services, pointing to issues of “denationalization” of public services as they move into the hands of foreign investors. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for urban health, analysts argue that privatization of essential services such as water, sanitation, and waste management leads to a fragmentation of service delivery and undermines protection of public health.

Despite concerns, privatization of urban services is now a policy pursued in most parts of the world. However, this is linked to another strong trend—increasing participation of people in service management and delivery. This generally, as in Tanzania for example, emphasizes local communities and NGOs, the formation of stakeholder funds and organizations, and the involvement of the private sector. It also raises a key
policy question in relation to governance: can participation provide ways to improve the health of urban people?

**Participation: The Strengthened Contract for Urban Health**

Participation of citizens in making decisions over their lives is a major element in a package of “good governance”—at least according to most current dogma. With gradual democratization in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the former Soviet Union and progressive decentralization in Europe, interesting experiences are emerging of the ways in which such increased participation can change urban lives. At one level, increased participation in identifying problems, the first stage of the policy process, can increase self-esteem of disenfranchised groups, reduce the sense of anomie, widen professional understanding, change agendas, and increase the capacity of people to negotiate for their rights. Studies have also shown diverse health benefits of more clear, transparent, and participatory approaches. These apply not just to changing the ways in which urban services are developed and delivered, but to the ways in which professionals understand and help address key health problems that communities face, such as urban violence, lack of access to health services, and support in post conflict situations. Many studies highlight the complex empowering role played by more active participation of disenfranchised or excluded groups in analysis of problems, in decisions, and in actions. This ranges from post conflict resolution in inner city Northern Ireland to improved bed net production in Benin to health service delivery in a Bombay basti (low-income settlement). Perhaps the final interesting benefit participation is seen to have is its impact on powerful groups—it can change professional values and views and can reduce clientelism by increasing transparency of decisions.

However, enhanced participation is not something that local governments will always be able to simply choose or ignore. New international and regional legislation is emerging under the banner of “environmental justice” pushing for increased access to information, decision-making, and the law. For example, European legislation pushed through by Eastern European NGOs shows great promise of enhancing local democratic processes and facilitating the rights of people to control over urban necessities such as water, transport, waste management, and housing. The
Aarhus Convention of 1998—to which all the states of the European Union are signatories—grants the public rights and imposes on governments and public authorities certain obligations. It recognizes “substantive” rights—“every person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being,” but its main pillars are three “enabling” rights: (1) the right to know—rights to environmental information; (2) the right to participate in decision-making processes—the right to be consulted and participate in proposals, plans, or activities; and (3) the right to access to justice—a guaranteed right to the enforcement of the above rights via access to courts or other independent bodies.

The convention also provides that national legislation not in line with the convention will need to be changed before a country can ratify it. This may not seem like urban law at the moment, nor like law that could benefit countries of the South, but it could provide an enabling framework for changing non-participative systems and offer a model broad enough to be used internationally. It is proving to be a challenge even to countries that believe they have a strong participative democracy; for example, UK ratification will mean having to review the Freedom of Information Act and, as a member of the European Union, the Directive on Freedom of Access to Environmental Information. Such new laws can be used internationally to challenge decisions on important urban services such as water, waste management, and transport, obligating more open information and decision-making processes.

Participation of citizens, particularly those who have been excluded from decisions routinely, is not a panacea for the problems of urban inequality and unsustainability, but it does open the doors of the policy process a little wider and allow a few more voices to be heard. When these voices are heard, it may be a little more difficult to privatize essential services without providing space at the table for the solutions local communities want for themselves.

But the final problem, one that this new rights-based agenda can only partially address, is that of the fundamental issues of urban anomie and atomie—an underlying cause of social unrest and urban violence. Such a sense of alienation can only be changed when the sense of citizenship and belonging is renewed. This is beyond simple solutions of material redistribution and relates more to the ways in which urban centers have to reinvent the concept of “citizen.”
CONCLUSION: IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUALISM

Perhaps the greatest challenge for healthy sustainable urban societies is not the existence of processes such as privatization, but the ways in which individualism facilitates the negative sides of such a trend and creates such feelings as anomie and atomie amongst “losers” in the urban race. Urban centers are fundamentally “public” spaces—with such densities of activity and population they cannot be otherwise. Thus, it is not just tragic but disastrous that cities are growing all over the world as segregated ghettos of rich and poor—where urban health is achieved by a tiny minority and is unachievable to a majority. These are cities where people are trying to pretend they do not have to be “citizens.” But if urban citizenry were renewed, a new discussion could begin. If all water is privatized into the hands of a local community of citizens in a town or city and they jointly decide to distribute it equitably, would this harm health or equity? Is not decentralized public local control and ownership more responsible? But if powerful groups in cities focus only on their own lives, and facilitate privatization to a transnational water company that then caters only to them—this, then, may harm equity and health.

Individualism is at the root of this trend to inequity and its effects cannot be easily addressed by enabling rights or increased participation. Urban health will be achieved with urban solidarity, and urban sustainability will be ensured if that solidarity is international and intergenerational.

NOTES


4 Defined internationally in differing ways but, as income poverty, usually taken to mean the proportion of population within a country living on less than $2 per day. “Half the world’s six billion people today live under $2 a day. Half of a far larger


23 Denoting broadly the shift of public goods and services (usually state-run) into private ownership, management, or control.


32 Makule, “Pollution of Water Sources.”


Good governance in health has been defined by the World Health Organization as “the enabled participation of those concerned in the formulation and deployment of policies, programmes and practices leading to equitable and sustainable health systems.” It is required if we are aiming to construct more egalitarian health systems that deliver effective care. Yet, most studies of governance in health only reveal the corruption in the health sector, providing evidence of the large misuse of resources and abuse of power, particularly at public hospitals. Governance also involves issues of management, staff development, communication, and social participation, yet there is still a void of in-depth studies on these issues.

Good governance in health is also affected by several factors that fall outside the health sector itself. This paper will briefly analyze three major factors within the urban context of Colombia and Central America that present serious challenges in this regard: local government, urban poverty, and violence.

**Local Government**
Most countries in Latin America have implemented processes of decentralization in the past fifteen years. The common justification for this has been that decentralization brings decision making closer to the population, and that local governments are better suited to understand the population’s needs and to provide responses. In countries where decentralization has been pursued to a greater degree (Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil), it has brought drastic changes, both positive and negative, for many local governments and actors in the health sector.
A major expectation was that local authorities’ responsiveness to public health outcomes would improve due to newly allocated resources from the central government. But experience so far has shown that having extra resources does not necessarily improve the overall performance of local governments in achieving public health goals. Local governments are still in great need of central support, particularly in relation to technical and managerial issues. After many years of highly centralized government, it was unrealistic to expect that local governments could be effective within the short span of five years. A longer period is therefore needed to see the full potential of decentralization to improve overall governance, including in the health sector.

It has also been difficult to make local governments accountable, as they are authorities in themselves. Self-regulation has not been the norm up to now, and civil society groups have had to play an important role in pressuring local governments to stop corruption and hold authorities accountable. However, little has been done due to the immunity and impunity exercised by authorities. A major study of people’s perceptions on governance issues found that the poor perceive that state institutions are usually not accountable, and when they are, it is only to the rich and powerful.

**Urban Poverty**

During the 1990s, poverty grew throughout Latin America. The urban poor population grew from 29 to 39 percent between 1970 and 1990, while rural poverty decreased from 67 to 61 percent. The major concentrations of poverty are now in urban areas. Urban poverty challenges governance in health in two interrelated ways: (1) the high number of urban poor have little or no protection from chronic and catastrophic illness (such as accidents, and cardiovascular and other debilitating diseases), and (2) the social exclusion associated with poverty compounds the feeling of being powerless to effect changes.

Latin America is characterized by a highly segmented health system that protects the needs of some and excludes others. At the end of the 1990s, it was estimated that about 70 percent of the poor in Latin America had no access to health care. Although most countries in the region have achieved important improvements in the delivery of basic services (immunization, antenatal care, child health) during the last decade, protection from chronic and catastrophic illness is still low. The
risk of being exposed to such illness is covered, in most cases, by health insurance, but this mechanism is nonetheless difficult for the urban poor to access. The lack of insurance leaves them with little chance to bear the economic cost associated with suffering chronic and catastrophic illnesses.

The concept of citizenship can help us to understand how the vicious cycle of poverty and social exclusion affects governance. This concept is based on the notion that there are civil, political, and social rights underpinning the relationship between the individual and the state and between the individual and society. Persons who are materially deprived or “poor” are also poor in citizenship, which can be understood as a lack of the material conditions (such as education, housing, employment) for the fulfillment of one’s rights, together with poor participation in society toward achieving common social goals. In other words, poverty affects both people’s ability to make themselves heard in society and their capacity to actively interact with other groups in society. A multi-country study of poor people’s perceptions of the causes and effects of poverty found that powerlessness was the major negative result of being poor. This perception was constant across study participants regardless of cultural or political contexts. Poor people also perceive themselves as lacking social capital.

It has been said that civil society together with an independent media are among the most important factors in promoting good governance. However, groups represented in civil society are usually traditional groups (labor unions, entrepreneurs) with well-defined individual interests that do not necessarily represent those of the urban poor. Who, then, should fight for the poor’s interests? One would expect that local governments would. However, there is evidence that local governments are lagging far behind in terms of representing the interests of the unprotected, especially indigenous population groups, which have strongly expressed their dissatisfaction in several Latin American countries.

**Violence**
The types of health problems faced in urban areas are becoming less and less related to infectious diseases. Epidemiological situations in most cities now show a clear pattern: a constant increase of noninfectious diseases as the main causes of morbidity and mortality, with cardiovascular diseases and violence at the top. Of the two, violence is the most worrisome. It is estimated that one out of every three families in the Latin American
region is the victim of a criminal aggression every year. On average there are thirty homicides per one hundred thousand inhabitants per year (higher in Central America, where the average is fifty-two homicides per year). This rate is six times higher than in countries considered moderately affected by criminality.

Different socioeconomic groups experience the effects of violence at varying degrees, with the poor often the hardest hit group. Political violence has been the main reason for migration from rural areas to cities in Central America and Colombia for the last twenty years. A recent study in poor urban cities in Guatemala found that the population perceives violence as the single most important problem they face. Violence also carries high economic costs. It is estimated that the losses in human capital due to violent events in the region reaches up to 5 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). Countries also allocate major resources to security and crime reduction: Colombia spends approximately 25 percent of GNP, Brazil 11 percent.

To exercise good governance, minimal conditions of social, political, and economic stability should be met. Violence is a destabilizer of government and its consequences penetrate deep into the social tissue. Violence is therefore the most serious threat to overall governance in the urban setting, and effective programs are needed to control its spread.

**Actions to Enhance Good Governance in Health**

In relation to the three factors addressed above, there are two key actions with a potential to improve governance in health: building institutional capacity and strengthening citizenship of the urban poor.

Capacity building relates to expanding and upgrading human and institutional capabilities in a specific context (program sector or organization), and a certain capacity must be achieved before an organization can become effectively and efficiently managed. Capacity building of local governments is therefore central to governance. Work in this area is already being pursued in many countries and supported by most international organizations. However, good laws do not necessarily lead to good health. This is why working only on institutional strengthening will not suffice. The reality in Latin America is that there are some politicians looking only to further their own interests and to benefit once
in power. The balance needed to achieve good governance, therefore, can only come from a population informed and educated about its own rights and responsibilities. Recent studies provide evidence that the existence of an informed public is highly correlated with reduction in both corrupt practices and governmental ineffectiveness.\(^2\)

Although experiences of social participation in the health sector are increasing in Latin America, few of those experiences have influenced key political decisions.\(^2\) A major challenge will be to strengthen citizenship among the poor to help them to exercise their demands for governance within the health sector.

**NOTES**


8 CEPAL, *Panorama Social de América Latina* (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 1994).


11 Ibid.

12 Narayan, et al., *Voices of the Poor*.


22 Moser and Mcilwaine, *Violence in a Post-Conflict Context*.

23 Londoño et al., *Asalto al Desarrollo*.


PART III

A NEW GOVERNANCE AGENDA?
If we are to believe some recent writings on urban governance, the nation-state is withering away. Some authors are claiming that major city-regions have become the main governance units for achieving socioeconomic development and providing livelihood, shelter, health, and various social services to urban citizens. To understand the functioning of the world economy, said John Friedmann, it is more instructive to consider what is happening in 30 or 40 quasi city-states rather than events in 185 or so nation-states. The former are important because they are “linked to each other in a global system of economic, social, and political relations.” They are “vital command centers, switching points, and global investment hubs through which the national economy is articulated—a network of city-regions that function as the new core areas of the world economy.”

Although the emergence of “global cities” can be seen as an exciting development in recent times, it may be a bit premature to write off the nation-state as the key actor in international development. The United Nations, after all, with its emphasis on national sovereignty, still plays a dominant role in world affairs. Unlike the city-state of Singapore, which became prosperous after seceding from the Federation of Malaya, most cities cannot divorce themselves from their hinterlands. In many developing countries, expanding megacities, especially if they function as national capitals, are extremely difficult to see without any reference to their national context. They are best analyzed in terms of their roles in the total development of the nation-state of which they form a significant part.

By the year 2020, the United Nations estimates that about 57 percent of the world’s population will be living in urban areas. At present, there are twenty-eight megacities with populations of more than eight million and fourteen of these are in Asia. They include a Tokyo of twenty million
people and a Shanghai of eighteen million. Although only about 3 percent of people currently live in megacities, these agglomerations play a very important role in national development. They serve as the engines of economic growth, the main markets for domestic and imported goods, the primary locus of political and administrative power, the disseminators of modernizing information, and the mediators of cultural influences. City-regions, therefore, are important, not because they are supplanting the nation-state but precisely because they play such a crucial role in the development of the nation-state. It is because of this nation-building role of city-regions that their planning and governance deserve the closest attention of scholars.³

Most of the recent literature on urban governance has been mainly focused on how the city-region may be managed effectively and efficiently. This is probably due to the fact that many studies have been conducted in technologically advanced countries where the main concern is provision of urban services. In most developing countries, however, city-regions are usually seen in terms of their national roles. Top political officials in megacities like Beijing, Jakarta, Manila, and Seoul are big national actors. The issues they deal with are not purely local ones. Their role in urban governance, therefore, is of great significance because the performance of the city-region heavily influences the development of the nation-state.

Urban governance is defined here more broadly than the concept of local government that has received a lot of attention in recent years in studies of metropolitan reforms and decentralization schemes. It goes beyond the field of urban management, which focuses primarily on the effective execution of formally adopted governmental policies and programs in order to achieve service delivery goals. As proposed by Patricia McCarney, Mohamed Halfani, and Alfredo Rodriguez, urban governance refers to “the relationship between civil society and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed.”⁴ Thus, urban governance thinking has shifted away from the state-centered perspective and it now encompasses activities by community-based associations, non-governmental organizations, civic groups, and other members of civil society that in the past had been considered outside the policy process realm.

Even as urban governance is considered in a wider perspective to include civil society activities, however, its main focus is still the exercise of power – what Harold Lasswell has called “politics” as being made
Urban Governance: Some Lessons Learned

up of “who gets what, when, how.”5 This is especially important when considering that, in most countries, the great bulk of resources and the most active political groupings are found in city-regions. Because of the dominant roles played by big cities on the national scene, the contest for political power at the city or metropolitan level cannot be confined within the urbanized boundaries.

Under this broadened concept of urban governance, the following political actions are included: articulation of a common vision of the good life by political leaders and the polity; inclusion of citizens, interest groups, and stakeholders in the electoral, policy-making, and administrative processes, which requires that those who govern are responsive to the wishes and demands of citizens and various groups; formulation, adoption, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of governmental programs and projects, which requires accountability of those who govern to their constituents within a system of laws, rules, regulations, and standards; mobilization of resources to pursue the developmental vision and achieve good outcomes; and finally, institutionalized resolution of differences and conflicts without resorting to physical violence.6

As far as the developmental vision of the city is concerned, good governance seeks to achieve more than just the welfare and comfort of citizens through the provision of much-needed urban services. If all the requisites of good governance were achieved, the result would be an economically productive city, a socially liveable city, a safe city, an actively tolerant city, a humane and caring city, and a sustainable city from an ecological, economic, and social perspective. The governance process in the city would be inclusive, guaranteeing the rights of every citizen to participate in public decision making, especially in the choice of leaders through open and freely contested elections unmarred by coercion, bribery, cheating, intimidation, vote buying, or other corrupt practices. It would be responsive, ensuring that those who govern are keenly attuned to what the citizens need and want. Officials and administrators would also be accountable to the public, not just for the effective and efficient performance of their tasks and compliance with legal requirements but for their own lifestyles and moral values as reflected in their individual modes of behavior.

That area of urban governance focused on the formulation, adoption, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of public programs, including the efficient mobilization of public resources, is generally seen
as the province of good urban management. In these largely technocratic and procedural activities, the need for professional knowledge and expertise is of great significance. However, good urban outcomes lie way beyond the achievements of good urban management. The lessons that can be learned in good urban governance can be found more in the complex political processes where the activities of local governments interact more closely with those of interest groups, political factions, community organizations, and civil society activists.

The literature on urban governance has focused on a number of areas where good outcomes and lessons learned have been highlighted. For purposes of this chapter, however, specific examples are given in only a limited number of areas as follows: (a) the promise and pitfalls of decentralization; (b) the search for regional governance systems; (c) the usefulness of comprehensive and strategic area-wide planning; and (d) tapping the democratic potentials of civil society. The lessons learned are analyzed in the context of case studies researched by the author. As such, it may not be possible to generalize too broadly from the case studies as the governance outcomes cited are grounded in the specific realities of the case situations.

**THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF DECENTRALIZATION**

In many countries, decentralization programs have been launched through constitutional enactments, statutes, executive orders, and administrative reforms. With the active encouragement of multilateral and bilateral development agencies, international financial institutions, philanthropic aid donors, and civil society advocates, central governments have been encouraged to extend autonomy to local government units and to devolve more authority and responsibility to such units. In some cases, decentralization, in the hope that it fosters and enhances the attainment of democratization, has been used as a “conditionality” by international donors before they provide foreign aid or technical assistance.

Decentralization movements have been particularly popular in formerly colonial countries where governments had traditionally relied on central government powers to impose public order, collect taxes, build infrastructure, or conduct monopolistic enterprises. Even after the collapse of colonial governments, local national leaders have tended to continue central dominance, justifying hegemony as a prerequisite of rehabilitation
or nation building. Quite a number of so-called decentralization schemes, therefore, have actually taken the form of “administrative decentralization” rather than true “devolution of power” to local government units. In some cases, national officials have often been more reluctant to give up powers than the foreign colonial masters that they had replaced.

The democratic ideal of decentralized local governance is rooted in the liberal democratic traditions of North America and Western Europe (somewhat romantically idealized in the New England Town Meeting). With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the apparent adoption by China, Vietnam, and other formerly socialist countries of capitalist ways, the liberal democratic form of governance has become the global development model of choice. There are some indications, however, that in a number of instances, the adoption of this model has been carried out without careful consideration of the political culture prevailing in a country. For example, how applicable is the democratic belief in the inalienable rights of the individual in a culture in which a person’s responsibility to the group, the family, the clan, or the community is paramount? Is there room for so-called “Asian values” that see the responsibility of the individual to the collective as more important?

As the model of liberal democracy embedded in local autonomy and decentralization has been promoted in many developing countries, quite a number of governments have found some creative ways of supposedly granting decentralization and then actually thwarting its intentions. For example, a recent constitutional reform in Taiwan proudly proclaimed the launching of a decentralization program at the village and township levels. At the same time, however, the constitutional reform emasculated the powers of provincial governments by requiring that governors, who used to be democratically elected, should now be appointed by the central government.7

The recent implementation of the 1998 laws mandating local elections in China’s villages is another case that shows how the powers of central government can be enhanced by an alleged decentralization program. With the technical assistance of the Jimmy Carter Center in Atlanta and the encouragement of a number of American NGOs, village elections were held in China in early November 2001. Village elections were held in the hope that they would help weed out corruption and make local officials more accountable and responsive to local demands. It was also
hoped that “as experience is gained with democracy at the bottom, similar elections will be required at the far more significant levels of the township…and gradually move up the ladder to provincial and national levels.”

If past reform movements in China are to serve as guides, it does not look like this “bottom up” approach to democratization hoped for by liberal democrats will catch on in the near future. Even as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had supported the holding of village-level elections, it had ruled that election of officials at the township, prefecture, and higher levels would not be allowed. As headlined by the New York Times, “Chinese Villagers Vote, But Its Party Rules.”

The practice of decentralizing authority to village-level governments has been carried out for some time by many governments that have found it convenient to devolve responsibility and power to the weakest governmental units. During the 1960s, for example, the Philippine government passed the Barrio Council Law that gave local autonomy to the village (now called the barangay). The law declared the village as the basic unit of governance so people could directly participate in “grassroots democracy.” Village officials from barrio captain to council members in charge of security, livelihood, health, education, and so on, were directly elected by the people. Enumerated powers were granted to the barrio councils to enable them to raise local funds. Councils were given responsibility for a number of local functions (maintenance of feeder roads, repairing the village schoolhouse, distributing relief goods during emergencies, helping in identifying individuals who were allowed to register to vote, etc.). However, despite being given the authority to raise funds through levies, fees, and fines, council officials found that the village economy was so poor that they did not have a tax base to speak of. Attempting to collect money from their neighbors was also a most onerous task. Since positions in the barrio council carried no compensation, it soon became apparent that taking on local leadership roles was more of a burden than a benefit. Most important of all, the Barrio Council Law failed because it decentralized power to the local unit least able to exercise those powers.

In a number of instances, the decentralization of powers to local government units had actually been used by central governments as an excuse for abandoning their responsibility for local development. During the 1980s and 1990s, the United Nations made popular the concepts of
“empowerment” and “enablement” of the urban poor. It was argued in the development literature that the government was not a good producer and provider of urban services. Solving urban problems, therefore, could be better effected if the government shifted to the role of an enabler—by encouraging the efforts of people themselves, actively supported by NGOs and other civil society groups, to solve their own problems. In 1995, the Urban Management Programme of the United Nations observed, however, that “Some governments experiencing acute economic and financial crises see decentralization as a means of dumping their responsibilities for the management, regularization and servicing of illegal settlements on to local governments …[but] they are not given the resources to discharge their duties.”

The main lesson learned from the cases noted above is that decentralizing authority and power to local government units does not necessarily result in positive development. In some countries, central government authorities may actually pursue policies that allow them to have their cake and eat it too— they can claim to be pursuing liberal democracy by decentralizing powers to the smallest local government units but their actions actually strengthen their powers by emasculating provincial, metropolitan, and municipal units. In fact, one author has observed that “The problems central governments tend to transfer to local authorities are the problems that they cannot solve.”

Another lesson learned from the mixed results of decentralization programs is the need to decentralize authority and power to the level of local government that has the necessary human, financial, organizational, and institutional resources to effectively deal with those problems. This “mismatch” of direct functional responsibility over urban functions on the one hand and the lack of financial authority and capability on the other has been noted by Richard Stren and other authors in the case of African countries.

In other parts of the world, especially in Asia, there has been an observed reluctance on the part of central governments to establish metropolitan or regional governance structures. In view of the rapid growth of metropolitan areas and megaurban regions, the need for area-wide approaches of planning and governance in these areas is most obvious. Unfortunately, in both developing and more developed countries, the problems of megaurban regions have not been given adequate attention up
to now. There are very few examples of government reforms that establish planning and management structures that encompass whole city-regions.

All over the world, and in North America in particular, the commitment to local autonomy and decentralization also works against the establishment of higher tiers of local governance at the metropolitan level. This is very difficult to understand in the light of the recognition that local government fragmentation makes the efficient delivery of area-wide urban services extremely difficult. Experience has also shown that decentralization does not necessarily make local governments more representative. Patricia McCarney, in fact, has observed that “decentralization does not automatically instil a system of local government which is accountable and responsive to the needs and demands of the local citizens.”

Is it possible, then, that the commitment to local autonomy and decentralization is more deeply rooted in ideological belief than actual assessment of what works or does not work in local governance? In this regard, the continuing use in the Greater Boston area of small town meetings to manage local affairs is most interesting. At present, the forty-nine local units in the Greater Boston area are mostly run by direct or representative town meetings, with, here and there, a mayor-council or a manager-council form of government also functioning. There is no official development plan or strategy for the whole Boston metropolitan area, leaving things pretty much to the initiatives of the state or the federal government. True, massive external resources, such as those being sunk into the “Big Dig” infrastructure project are rejuvenating the inner city, and the suburban small towns beyond the I-495 ring road are flourishing. However, the belt of older suburban communities within the famed Route 128 ring road are suffering the double disadvantage of diminishing tax bases and exurban population flight. At the same time, the demand on the aging infrastructure for urban services is also increasing.

As for the democratic tradition that supposedly thrives in small-scale grassroots democracy, it was observed that during the November 2001 local elections in the Greater Boston area, less than 35 percent of the registered voters actually cast their ballots. This was somewhat better than the previous election when only 25 percent of registered voters actually voted, but it is still a very poor indicator of civil duty and popular participation in local affairs in this supposed cradle of liberty and democracy in America.
The literature on urban governance is rich with case studies on how metropolitan or regional governance reforms have effectively dealt with problems arising from local government fragmentation. Examples such as Metro Toronto (1954), Dade County (1957), Nashville (1962), Minneapolis-St. Paul (1967), and Indianapolis (1969) have shown the efficiencies that can be achieved by amalgamating local units into higher tier structures of area-wide planning and governance. Despite the relative success of these reforms, however, local autonomy and decentralization continue to be pushed by their advocates.

A combination of national level political trends (as in the dismantling of the Greater London Council under the Thatcher government) and the renewed powers of local officials after the collapse of dictatorial rule (as in the reduction of powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority after Corazon Aquino replaced Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines) have caused metropolitan governance reforms to zig and zag. In recent years, perhaps in recognition of the fact that worsening megaurban problems call for drastic solutions, there seems to be a trend toward stronger metropolitan and regional government structures in both more developed and less developed countries.

Interestingly, most initiatives to amalgamate or federate local government units into metropolitan or regional structures have been taken by provincial, state, or central governments rather than by voluntary action of local government units. In many instances, the motivation for metropolitan or regional governance seems to be the perceived need for better management of urban services. The creation of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, the Metro Manila Development Authority, the national capital district of Jakarta Raya, or the federal district of Mexico was in recognition of the fact that urban sprawl had to be controlled, chaotic transportation had to be coordinated, the financing of area-wide services required a wider and stronger tax base, and the growing threat of environmental pollution required concerted area-wide action. Although there were some misgivings about the danger that creating a higher tier of governance would reduce local autonomy or hinder the process of political participation, the worsening urban problems and the need to effectively solve them have encouraged higher-level governments to launch metropolitan or regional reforms.
Another reason for metropolitan or regional governance reform has been the recognition of the important role of urban areas in national development. If city-regions, in fact, are to serve as the engines of economic growth, then they have to be more efficiently managed. This was certainly the motivation of the Chinese government when it decided to consolidate the various local government units in the Shanghai-centered region into one municipality. At the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1992, it was decided that Shanghai would be the “head of the dragon” that would lead the development of the whole Yangtze River delta and of China into the twenty-first century. Under the scheme, Shanghai was to become the economic, financial, and trading center of the whole country. The jurisdiction of Shanghai Municipality was expanded to 6,340 km² and a unified governance structure was set up. Placed under this unified governance structure were the central city of Shanghai, the ten urban districts within the central city, the four suburban districts, and the six suburban counties that made up the whole territory.

As one of three Chinese cities under the direct jurisdiction of the central government, Shanghai enjoyed tremendous support from the authorities in Beijing. The central government delegated to Shanghai officials the authority to identify, appraise, approve, finance, and execute very large projects (up to $30 million). The Chinese Constitution was even revised to allow local officials to sell land or lease it for long periods to foreign investors. Officials were given powers to deal with loss-ridden state enterprises, giving them the direct authority to hire and fire officials and breaking the “iron rice bowl” of workers. They were even allowed to declare some enterprises bankrupt and to close or privatize those enterprises as they deemed fit. Shanghai officials were authorized to reorganize the banking system to generate new resources for very large infrastructure projects, such as those required in the Pudong New Area. They were allowed to borrow funds from local and international sources, with the sovereign guarantee of the central government.

The unification of authority and power in the Shanghai Municipality has been one of the main reasons for the rapid development of the city and the region. Key infrastructure projects, such as a new international airport in Pudong, new bridges across the Huangpu River, a tunnel, and an expanded subway system, have been built. In 1996, a ten-year program of
port development was approved, designed to construct a 100 km deep-water embankment along the Huangpu that would allow Shanghai to challenge Hong Kong as China’s international container port. Although the administrative jurisdiction of Shanghai Municipality is confined to the metropolitan area, the city has taken the leadership in the formulation of a regional development plan for the whole Yangtze River delta that encompasses the cities of Nanjing, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi, and surrounding counties, an area that contains nearly three hundred million people.

Supporters of liberal democracy might fear that the concentration of so much power in a unified structure such as Shanghai Municipality might result in arbitrary action. Some observers of the Shanghai case have noted, however, that there are a number of factors that serve as countervailing forces to prevent this. First, there is the so-called “bureaucratic bargaining approach,” in which officials enter into negotiations and strike mutually advantageous bargains in order to find optimal solutions to questions of turf, authority, and power. In reality, bureaucratic decision-making in Shanghai is not a hierarchical process where orders are given from the top and those at the bottom follow. Top officials leading individual powerful agencies have their own power bases, and in order to avoid all-or-nothing contests, they tend to negotiate and bargain to achieve what they want. Since no one official has all the power in the system (not even the mayor), bureaucratic bargaining has to be carried out endlessly in order to achieve common goals.

Another mechanism used to temper arbitrary power is the so-called “clientelist approach,” in which top officials in Shanghai use their personal influence and connections (what the Chinese call guanzì) to full advantage. In this regard, the fact that two former mayors of Shanghai are in key power positions in Beijing (President Zhang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji) is very significant. In the endless bureaucratic bargaining process among top Shanghai officials, the access of any one of them to these influential actors is an important asset in the performance of their duties.

What the Shanghai case shows, therefore, is the fact that meaningful participation in the political process is not confined to formal governance structures and processes, such as periodic elections, competing political parties, referenda, recall, official advisory bodies, and other mechanisms common in so-called democratic systems. Every political culture has its ways of resolving political conflict and it usually evolves
certain “rules of the game” that make decision making possible without resorting to violent means.

A key issue in China in the near future is to see how certain governance structures such as Communist Party cells, work units, neighborhood committees, veterans groups, women’s federations, youth organizations, peasants and workers assemblies, and so on, can be used as participatory mechanisms in urban governance. Under the old socialist system, these structures functioned quite efficiently as channels of information and as mobilization mechanisms. It would be interesting to see what roles these structures will play as China pursues democratic processes with Chinese characteristics.

In North America, another case of amalgamation of local government units can be seen in the creation of the New City of Toronto. On January 1, 1998, the regional municipality of Metro Toronto was joined with the surrounding constituencies of East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, Toronto City, and York to create the New City. The amalgamation reduced the number of elected officials in the New City from 106 to 58. A mayor, deputy mayor, and fifty-six councillors were elected. The amalgamation resulted in a 30 percent cut in the number of senior administrative positions—1,400 positions were simply eliminated. The metropolitan and municipal bureaucratic structures were streamlined by creating four administrative “clusters” (public works and emergency preparedness; urban planning; economic development, culture, and tourism; and community and neighborhood services). The number of collective agreements in force was reduced from fifty-five to only seven contracts.14

The study on which the amalgamation of the New City of Toronto was based cited a number of advantages expected from the reform. First, the study argued that the amalgamation would reduce the squabbling between the Regional Municipality of Metro Toronto and its adjoining municipalities as decision-makers from these units would be placed under one body. Second, the amalgamation was expected to lower taxes in the region as a whole because it would standardize tax rates and assessment and collection procedures. Third, the amalgamation would reduce red tape and achieve administrative efficiency while the massive bureaucracies that used to exist under the old system would be streamlined. Fourth, the reform would save a lot of money because of the reduced staff and improvement in governmental processes. Finally, it was hoped that the
amalgamation would enhance democracy by making key officials directly elective and by simplifying the issues related to regional governance.

The major objections to amalgamation in the New City came from the municipalities, especially from local officials who were going to be displaced from their positions. Strong objections were also raised by civil society groups who feared that the creation of such a huge bureaucracy like the New City would limit citizen access to local officials (it was estimated that, under the reorganization, there would be 85,000 persons represented by two councillors elected per ward under the new scheme). Jane Jacobs, for one, a virtual icon in Toronto politics, campaigned against the amalgamation because she feared that it would destroy the “neighborhood character” of Toronto’s communities. The thousands of civil servants who would lose their jobs after amalgamation also lobbied mightily against the reform.

Initial evaluations of what has been achieved in the New City of Toronto have been quite positive. The monetary savings from amalgamation, originally estimated at around $865 million over three years, were more realistically set at about $150 million; but to tax-paying citizens, these were still substantial. The profile of the New City officials, especially that of the mayor, was considerably enhanced. People’s interest in city politics actually became more pronounced, perhaps because the long debates on amalgamation made a lot more information available to the public. The percentage of registered people that actually voted went up from 35.2 percent in 1996 to 48.6 percent. A public opinion poll in 1999 found that 39 percent of the respondents were happy with the amalgamation, 28 percent were not, and 27 percent had no opinion.

A major accomplishment of amalgamation was the formulation and adoption of an overall development strategy for not just the New City but the whole Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Where the regional municipality and the adjoining municipalities used to formulate and adopt their own urban development plans, agreement had been reached on an area-wide strategy. An interesting feature of the development strategy is the increasingly noted view that even after the expansion of the GTA’s boundaries, the whole governance structure was still “under-bounded.” A considerable part of the economic growth in the Toronto-centered region is occurring outside the official GTA boundaries. Some services, such as solid waste disposal, for example, appear to require a wider area of operation. Area-
wide services, such as public transportation and effective management of air, water, and soil pollution, call for a wider territory. Even as New City of Toronto begins to manage area-wide development, therefore, there are already some suggestions that a much larger structure covering a wider territory may be needed to effectively deal with regional problems.

The main lessons learned from the cases of Shanghai and the New City of Toronto are quite instructive. First, area-wide governance structures are needed to effectively deal with the rapid growth of megaurban regions. Second, adequate authority and power has to be vested in a regional governance structure that has the economic, human, organizational, and institutional resources to actually deal with the larger problems of a megaurban region. Third, the efficiencies achieved through amalgamation of fragmented local government units effectively enhance the economic and social development of the whole region because it cuts down waste arising from duplication of functions and lack of coordination among conflicting units. Finally, the fear that larger metropolitan or regional structures will reduce people’s participation and encourage arbitrary bureaucratic rule is not well founded. There are various means (aside from elections, representative councils, referenda, or recall) by which interest articulation, aggregation, and mobilization can be achieved in an urban polity. Direct participatory democracy does not depend on human scale any more, especially in the light of the information revolution.

**STRATEGIC AREA-WIDE PLANNING**

Despite known advantages, it is not easy to amalgamate local government units into regional governance structures (a review of international experience shows that the cases of New City of Toronto and Shanghai Municipality are more the exception than the rule). One approach that has been found to enhance better governance in rapidly expanding megaurban regions is comprehensive and strategic area-wide planning. This approach may not achieve the more direct efficiency and effectiveness arising from unified regional governance; however, where the political situation makes it possible, it can improve region-wide development. Two cases that highlight this are the Jabotabek regional plan in Indonesia and the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) regional structure in Canada.
The Jabotabek region is made up of seven administrative units: the capital city of Jakarta proper, the municipalities of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi, and the kabupaten (regencies) that are also called Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi. The region has a population in excess of 17 million. In addition, the Bandung Metropolitan Area, with a population of 5.7 million, is also considered an integral part of the Jabotabek region because, although it is located some 200 km away, the urban sprawl of the two urban agglomerations have practically become joined into one territory. In recent years, uncontrolled urban sprawl in both megacities have created Indonesia’s most densely populated megaurban region.15

Although the powers of the Indonesian central government are strong, the efficient governance of the country’s national capital has been hampered by the countervailing powers of local government units within the region. Since the country became independent, the central government has been trying to expand the territory of the national capital administration by absorbing a number of adjacent local units belonging to the Province of West Java in a capital district structure named Jakarta Raya. As Indonesia, because of the oil boom, achieved rapid economic growth, however, the uncontrolled proliferation of industries, manufacturing concerns, and housing projects in the national capital region demanded better coordination. In 1981, the Indonesian government attempted to effect better coordinated development in the Jakarta-centered region by formulating and adopting the Jabotabek plan.

The Jabotabek plan seeks to control development by encouraging concentration of economic and social activities in a number of designated urban nodes in the municipalities and districts of Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi. These nodes of concentrated development are linked together by a network of toll roads that have also served to open up formerly rural areas between the urban centers. Concentrated development was encouraged through the adoption of zoning ordinances that fostered the establishment of housing estates, industrial sites, manufacturing enclaves, and high-tech special economic zones. Complementing these development areas were suburban centers for shopping, entertainment, and leisure.

Although the Jabotabek plan was never formally adopted by the local governments and does not have the force of law, it has, after two decades, actually influenced the development of Indonesia’s capital region. For one
thing, it has helped to limit the population growth of the city of Jakarta (about 1.5 million people have moved from Jakarta proper to the neighboring municipalities and districts of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi). The growth nodes have also attracted millions of migrants from other parts of Java and Indonesia (almost 70 percent of laborers in Bekasi, for example, were found to have migrated from other parts of Java).

Another positive development that could be traced to the plan was the rapid rate of housing development in selected parts of the region. A notable aspect of this development was the active role of the private business sector that capitalized and managed manufacturing, industrial, and housing development. The Indonesian government even privatized the operation of toll roads, the electric distribution system, and the water system in Jabotabek. The housing estates and the toll roads helped to spark rapid development within the whole region, at least until the economic collapse in the 1970s came and toppled the Suharto regime.

Not all the provisions of the Jabotabek plan have been positively implemented, however. First, the desired direction of development in the region did not fully conform with the objectives of the plan. The plan had proposed limited growth in the northern parts of the city-region because the forested areas in that zone served as the aquifer recharge area. Despite the enactment of presidential decrees limiting development in this northern zone, urban construction rapidly occurred, thereby endangering the area’s water supply. Also, although the plan envisioned that urban development should occur only in designated “counter magnets,” many small villages and towns that were not so designated actually grew rapidly, putting tremendous pressures on the environment.

Second, the rapid pace of development in Jabotabek has gobbled up some of the richest agricultural lands in Java which were lost to housing estates, manufacturing and industrial uses, and infrastructure projects. Between 1980 and 1989, some 15,900 ha of rice fields were converted to urban use in the region. Four-fifths of the industrial development and 70 percent of housing sites were taken from former wet and dry rice cultivation areas. In direct violation of presidential decrees, some manufacturing concerns were even located in former irrigated rice fields.16

Third, rapid urban development has exerted heavy pressures on the region’s environment. Water extraction from ground sources has caused seepage of salt water into the aquifer where the municipal water supply is
drawn from. The massive generation of grey water and other wastes has polluted Jakarta’s main rivers and streams. The water situation in Jabotabek has become so serious that by the year 2005, it is expected that the three major reservoirs will not have sufficient supply to meet all needs. The situation in the region is made worse by the rapid destruction of the forested upland areas around Bogor, Puncak, and Cianjur, which threatens to reduce the supply of water for the region even more.

The main lesson from Jabotabek, then, is that although the use of a comprehensive development plan can create some positive influence on the pace and direction of development in a city-region, quite a bit of slippage can occur if there is no area-wide governance mechanism to authoritatively coordinate development. The seven administrative and political units in Jabotabek could not effectively act together to achieve the objectives of the plan. In fact, the local units were in direct competition with each other for extracting resources from the central government and attracting local and foreign investors within their territories. Central government agencies and special function authorities were also not able to pursue coordinated actions despite the clear objectives indicated in the plan. Engrossed in protecting their bureaucratic turf and led by officials who often engaged in rent-seeking activities, these agencies were not able to rise above their petty concerns to actually implement the provisions of the plan.

It is clear from the Jabotabek experience that some advantages can be achieved in the formulation and adoption of a region-wide comprehensive plan. Certainly, the Jabotabek plan, despite the problems noted above, has exerted some influence on the development of the Jakarta-centered region in Indonesia. It may be said, however, that more positive achievements could have been possible if a unified regional governance mechanism similar to the one used in Shanghai could have been created in Jabotabek. Comprehensive development ideas may provide the “authority of ideas” that can influence development but, in the long run, the actual grant of direct authority and resources to a region is needed for more effective development.

Another example of how comprehensive strategic planning can serve to influence development in a region is the case of the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD). The lower mainland of British Columbia is inhabited by about 1.9 million people, with about 67 per-
cent of the region’s population in the city of Vancouver and the adjacent municipalities of Burnaby, New Westminster, North Vancouver City, North Vancouver District, West Vancouver, and Richmond. Ecologically, the GVRD is part of a much wider region referred to as Cascadia, which stretches all the way from Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, in the United States to Vancouver, British Columbia, in Canada.17

Essentially, there are four levels of government in the Greater Vancouver region. First, there is the Canadian federal government, with jurisdiction over some economic development initiatives, fiscal policy, immigration, and security. Second, there is the British Columbia provincial government, which, under the Canadian federal system, wields most of the authority and power over local affairs. Third, there is the GVRD, a regional government structure with jurisdiction over land use planning, transportation, parks and open spaces, water and sewerage, and solid waste disposal. Finally, there are the cities and districts that look after purely local functions such as fire protection, police, local schools, and so on.

In 1996, a Greater Vancouver regional plan was adopted by the British Columbia provincial government. The main provisions of this “Liveable Region Development Plan for 2021” were as follows: enhance more dense development in the “central metropolitan region” composed of Vancouver City and the municipalities and districts; develop “regional town centers” in seven surrounding areas that would concentrate development in such nodes; develop a mass transport system that would link the central metropolitan region and the regional town centers using a less polluting rail-based system; and preserve at least two-thirds of the regional land base as a “green zone” by protecting watershed areas, designating ecologically sensitive zones where no development will be allowed, conserving agricultural land by creating agricultural land reserves, and designating one-half of all developable land as “green space.”

The formulation of the Liveable Region Plan was carried out with the active participation of stakeholders in the Greater Vancouver area. Formal consultations were made with community groups, nongovernmental organizations, First Nations groups, the private business sector, and other civil society stakeholders. Thus, the growth strategy that was formulated represented the ideas of citizens and interest groups rather than just the planning agencies.
In implementing the Liveable Region Plan, the GVRD has had to
strike a delicate balance between attempting to achieve efficient service
delivery through regional action and participative decision-making by
consultations with the cities and districts within the region. Mayors and
representatives of the local government units are represented on the
GVRD board where they carefully watch decisions to ensure that the
units they represent are fully consulted on all key issues. In practice, local
participation has made for vigorous and, sometimes, tumultuous board
meetings when deliberations are focused on touchy issues like transport
routes, the location of large projects, levying of fees and charges, where to
dispose of municipal wastes, and so on. Considerable delays have occurred
when controversial issues have been included on the board’s agenda. In
general, however, most issues are settled after considerable debate.

A major lesson from the Vancouver experience is that it is very impor-
tant to use the participatory process in the formulation and adoption of a
comprehensive regional plan. In this particular case, the willingness of the
BC provincial government to listen to local officials when discussing local
issues has been of primary importance. The GVRD planning board has
also engaged in participatory planning by holding public hearings,
sponsoring seminars and workshops, and meeting with special interest
groups concerned with specific issues.

An important point worth noting in the case of the GVRD is the fact
that the regional body has jurisdiction over key area-wide functions such
as transportation, parks and open spaces, water and sewerage, and solid
waste disposal (in addition to land use planning). Although the GVRD is
not a unified governance structure like Shanghai or New City of Toronto,
the agency’s jurisdiction over these key areas gives it the authority and
power to coordinate area-wide action. Because these key areas are the
main shapers of the comprehensive plan and they are within the jurisdic-
tion of the GVRD, the plan is able to shape and influence developments
in the whole region.

At present, officials in the GVRD are closely monitoring develop-
ments in Toronto, Montreal, Edmonton, Ottawa, and other Canadian
cities where decisions creating unified regional governance structures have
been made. In the past, Vancouver has prided itself on having developed a
balanced structure of participative and effective region-wide planning and
implementation. However, with rapid development, regional authorities
are asking if stronger powers are needed by the GVRD to effectively coordinate actions in the region. There is a growing view among some officials that the fragmentation of local government units in Greater Vancouver is contributing to delays and inefficiency and there are moves to strengthen the authority of GVRD over more region-wide functions, such as the setting up of a regional transit system, the imposition of developmental levies, and the implementation of more stringent environmental regulations. The progress of these deliberations is worth following up.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND URBAN GOVERNANCE

One of the most important developments in urban governance in recent years has been the emergence of civil society as a significant political force. Formally, civil society refers to that “realm of collective public action that lies between the private sphere and the state.”\(^{18}\) In the Philippines, it was sometimes referred to as the “cause-oriented movement,” the “people power movement,” or the “urban mass movement” that sought the institution of democratic rule and the pursuance of a range of economic and social reforms to uplift the conditions of the poor and underprivileged.\(^{19}\)

Using the criteria for good governance advocated by Friedmann, it is readily apparent that civil society can play a very important role in reaching development objectives. The mobilizing effect of civil society is a definite instrument in achieving the criterion of *inclusiveness* as an element of good governance (involving the right of citizens to directly get involved in the selection of leaders through elections and in the formulation of policies and programs that directly or indirectly affect their lives). Similarly, the criterion of *responsiveness* is enhanced by civil society that actively demands that governmental officials heed their expressed interests. *Public accountability* is also demanded by civil society groups as they help people monitor the actions of officials in the day-to-day execution of their administrative tasks, often with the aid of the mass media and militant activists. *Inspired political leadership* is facilitated by information campaigns and active participation in elections. Finally, *non-violent conflict management* is also enhanced by civil society through its emphasis on dialogue with political leaders and its insistence on the civil and harmonious conduct of governance.\(^{20}\)
In the Philippines, a strong ideological commitment to liberal democracy and “people power” has seen the flowering of civil society, represented by almost fifty-eight thousand nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), people’s organizations (POs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) that are officially registered as legal entities with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Most of these civil society groups were formed during the dictatorship regime of President Ferdinand Marcos; they led the opposition that eventually toppled the dictator in 1986. Since then, these groups have been credited with the impeachment, arrest, and incarceration of former President Joseph Estrada for plunder, graft and corruption, perjury, and culpable violation of the Philippine Constitution. Although many civil society groups initially supported Estrada when he ran for president in 1998, they have now actively campaigned for his conviction on the serious charges against him.

The political importance of civil society in the Philippines has been recognized in the 1987 Philippine Constitution that has the following provisions: the state shall encourage nongovernmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the general welfare of the nation (Article II, Section 23); the state shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means (Article XIII, Section 15); and the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision making shall not be abridged (Article XIII, Section 16).

Translated into actual civil society activities, the constitutional provisions noted above have taken the form of participation in the electoral process; participation in legislation and policy formulation; advocacy and lobbying for specific interests on issues affecting the public good; participation in program and project implementation, including financing and management; and monitoring and evaluation of governmental programs and projects, particularly in attempting to curb graft and corruption.

Civil society groups have been most active in Philippine elections with the purpose of keeping the electoral process open, free, and clean. Foremost among the civil society groups is the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), which at every election conducts massive information campaigns to encourage people to register and to get out and vote. Namfrel, with the cooperation of private business, community groups,
and the mass media, has taken the lead in organizing “Operation Quick Count,” designed to accelerate the counting of ballots in order to prevent cheating and fraudulent practices that seek to change voting results during the counting process. Although there have been some charges by politicians that Namfrel itself had favored civil society candidates, the general public seems to give the organization a lot of credibility.

In 1998, the constitutional provision on “sectoral representation” in the legislature and in the policy-making arms of city and municipal governments was implemented. This constitutional mandate was also incorporated in the Local Government Code, which provided that NGOs, CBOs, and POs be included in the formal structures of local governance. The code urged the inclusion of civil society representatives not just in law-making but in all aspects of governance, including management of development projects. The code also instructed local governments to allocate funds from their budgets to support the activities of civil society groups.

In the 2001 elections, the implementation of the law on sectoral representation became very confused and controversial. The definition of what was a “sectoral” or “civil society” group was quite vague. A number of organizations, including branches of political parties, professional associations, labor unions, and radical antigovernment groups ran candidates in local elections. The Supreme Court of the Philippines eventually had to intervene and define what a sectoral group was. A number of political party branches, professional associations, and business groups were disqualified. The bulk of sectoral representatives whose election was upheld came mainly from nationalist and activist groups that had strong ideological positions on policy issues.

Philippine civil society groups have been very active in advocating and lobbying for various special interests. The environmental groups, for example, have been mainly responsible for the passage of the Clear Air Act that provided for sanctions against environmental polluters. They have also worked for the passage of the Philippine Mining Act that provided for stiff fines and more precise regulations governing the mining industry as well as provisions that upheld the rights of indigenous people to protect lands held sacred by them.

Women-led NGOs such as ABANSE/Pinay (“Onward the Filipina”), GABRIELA, and MARIAS have been actively involved in the passage of legislation against sexual harassment in the workplace, for the granting of
benefits and privileges to women workers, and for the passage of legislation related to reproductive health. Labor groups have also lobbied for the passage and implementation of regulations protecting the rights of workers. Associations of small traders and retailers have waged public relations campaigns encouraging people to patronize their businesses and buy Philippine products.

Government agencies have found it useful to enter into partnerships with civil society groups in managing specific programs. For example, the Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing Authority has been mainly managed by NGOs and CBOs that organize the urban poor into housing cooperatives. The civil society organizers train community leaders in project management and work closely with them in the formulation and implementation of community development plans. Two outstanding Philippine NGOs, the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), have entered into management contracts with the government to manage and co-finance projects even in urban slums.

Under management contracts or on their own, many Philippine NGOs monitor and evaluate governmental programs and projects. The Social Action Center of Ateneo de Manila University conducts community-level research that monitors the implementation of the government’s housing program. Militant organizations like Mine Watch and the Organization of Indigenous Peoples also monitor the activities of government in relation to awarding mining concessions and the implementation of governmental rules and regulations related to environmental pollution.

A very important concern of civil society groups in the Philippines and elsewhere is graft and corruption. This issue is most important in large urban areas because the execution of very large infrastructure projects that involve huge sums of money usually involves graft. Research carried out by civil society groups have pointed to the complex cultural basis of graft and corruption. It has revealed that a number of variables, such as the kinship system, the tradition of gift giving, and the very low salaries of government officials in developing countries, are closely associated with corruption.21

In Hong Kong, civil society groups, in close cooperation with the private business sector, have actively campaigned against corruption in city government. An agency meriting the government’s special attention has been the police department, where cases ranging from fixing of traffic
tickets to more serious crimes related to drugs and smuggling have been exposed. Research on corruption in Hong Kong has highlighted the cultural context of corrupt practices. The studies found that one of the main reasons for corruption was the overly cumbersome process of decision making in city affairs. The study concluded that “if the bureaucratic procedures require too many steps or if there is always a long waiting list, clients will not mind paying ‘speed money’.” Bureaucratic corruption was found to be closely associated with such processes as the allocation of housing units, the construction of infrastructure, and the granting of licenses and permits by the police department.22

Studies of corruption in Hong Kong have focused on the importance of certain measures designed to effectively identify and define corrupt acts, the establishment of independent bodies to control corruption, the passage of laws providing for certainty of punishment for corrupt officials, and the mobilization of private business and civil society against graft. In particular, the organization of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which was placed under the jurisdiction of the governor of Hong Kong, was a very crucial tool in the territory’s fight against corruption. So effective has ICAC been in weeding out corruption, that it has become a model of how urban governments can effectively solve this pernicious problem.

In the Philippines, a significant role has been played by the mass media in monitoring and evaluating governmental policies and programs. Of particular interest is the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) that conducts research, investigations, and exposés of governmental activities. The PCIJ’s detailed and amply documented reports on corruption in the Estrada administration have been the main documents used in the trial of the former president and were largely responsible for turning public opinion against him.23

Despite the many positive accomplishments of civil society groups in the Philippines and other countries, a number of questions have been raised about their role in governance. One commonly observed fact is that civil society groups are often mostly drawn from upper and middle classes, which have higher educational levels and literacy and have greater access to the mass media. In the case of the ouster of former President Estrada in the Philippines, the question has been raised whether this was truly a manifestation of “people power” or the thwarting of the people’s popular
will by an alliance between elitist civil society groups and the military. After all, supporters of Estrada argued, the former president was elected by more than ten million votes in the 1998 elections. Was it right that he was ousted from power by the mass action of less than half a million people in Metro Manila who, with the support of the military, kicked the former president from the presidential palace? Was the ouster of Estrada a manifestation of “direct democracy” or was it an “elitist coup” by a group of self-appointed guardians of the public good?

In many countries there is a widespread belief that civil society promotes democracy because it questions the status quo, engages government officials in discussions of public issues, disseminates information, and mobilizes support from various groups to work for or against specific policies, and makes its views clearly heard on various controversies. It is widely believed that civil society activism protects the public against the abuses of selfish interests. However, what is to prevent civil society groups from abusing their powers? When civil society activism itself becomes the problem, who is going to protect the public against its protectors?

CONCLUSION

A brief review of several lessons that have been learned about urban governance in recent years is given below:

Decentralization.

Decentralization, which has become a popular policy in many developing countries, also has a number of shortcomings. The main problem has been the tendency of central governments to decentralize authority and power to the smallest local government units that do not have the financial, human, organizational, or institutional resources to actually achieve development goals. Developing democracy at the grassroots does not automatically ensure that democratic practices will work themselves up governmental levels. Sometimes, so-called decentralization programs may actually result in higher centralization of powers because they make the smallest local government units more dependent on the center and they weaken intermediate or higher level units by taking powers away from them.

To effectively and efficiently deal with urban problems, decentralization needs to be extended to the appropriate level of government. This means
that authority to make independent decisions should be vested in govern-
nance structures that have the needed resources. In most countries, this
means decentralizing authority and power at the level of the metropolitan
area or the city-region rather than to fragmented local government units.

*Area-wide governance.*
Unified governance structures that encompass whole city-regions have
achieved effectiveness and efficiency in delivery of urban services. At the
same time, the fear that such area-wide governance structures would
diminish people's participation in democratic decision-making has not
actually materialized. On the contrary, the active discussion of city-wide
issues through efficient electronic communication and the mass media has
tended to create greater interest in urban affairs and has generated higher
levels of participation in public affairs.

*Comprehensive planning.*
Comprehensive strategic planning that encompasses the whole city-region
can help to guide important public decisions. Plan formulation is particular-
ly effective when it involves all relevant stakeholders. Well-conceived devel-
opment plans and strategies can help autonomous local governments in their
efforts to develop policies and programs that achieve the general welfare.

*Urban management.*
The formal adoption of comprehensive plans and their implementation
through feasible programs is a key element in area-wide urban develop-
ment. Aside from the importance of streamlined urban management struc-
tures, the private business sector has to be given a key role in urban
management because it can achieve efficiency in the delivery of urban
services. In some countries, basic urban services such as water purification
and distribution, public transit, and electricity production and distribution
have been managed by private enterprise. The private sector has also been
an active ally of civil society groups in carrying out programs designed to
make city or municipal government more responsive and accountable.

*Civil society.*
The growing importance of civil society in urban governance has been
felt in areas such as the conducting of fair, open, and honest elections,
more participatory modes of policy formulation, effective program implementation, and the monitoring and evaluation of public programs. However, civil society may also create problems because of its confrontational, critical, and sometimes overly ideological stand on issues. Some civil society groups can cause delays and paralyze governmental programs by their inflexible stands. When civil society groups become openly partisan while claiming to speak for the general welfare, who is going to sort out what they really stand for?

A key issue involving civil society in urban governance is the need to “scale up” civil society efforts in order to make them more effective. Local-level and community-based efforts, especially those by POs and CBOs, are effective only up to a certain point. Institutional arrangements, therefore, have to be evolved to deal with problems at the community, municipal, city, regional, and national levels. Adequate devolution of authority and power to the correct level is a key factor in successful urban governance.

**Graft and corruption.**
Urban governance has to deal with the issue of graft and corruption. Specifically, the cultural aspects of corruption need to be more clearly understood in order to find more effective ways of dealing with it. Important lessons, such as the creation of special anticorruption agencies, the certainty of punishment for corrupt public officials, and the key role played by civil society and the mass media in exposing and controlling corruption need to be known and disseminated more widely to assist many local governments confronted with this problem.

**Globalization and urban governance.**
The effective and efficient governance of city-regions is of great significance at this stage of world development not because global cities are starting to supplant nation-states as major influences on the economic, political, and social spheres but because city-regions play such an important role in nation building. Improving the performance of regional governance structures is important because it optimizes the developmental role of urban centers in development. The rapid expansion of global city-regions calls for the institutionalization of urban governance processes at the appropriate levels where the human, financial, and organizational resources are found.
NOTES


9 José V. Abueva, Focus on the Barrio: the Story Behind the Birth of the Philippine Community Development Program Under President Ramon Magsaysay (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1959).


Urban Governance: Some Lessons Learned


14 New City of Toronto, One Island, One City (Summary Report of the Amalgamation of Local Units in the New City of Toronto). Available on the GTA Website.


Decentralization and other reforms in finance and democracy reshaped the system of incentives at the local level and set the stage for a new model of governance in most of Latin America. These changes were put in place almost by accident during the course of decentralization and democratization, a process I have called “the quiet revolution.” Of course, this new model of governance has not taken hold everywhere. Worse still, in many cities, old practices of clientelism and corruption have crept (back) into local government, threatening to poison the gains produced by the experience with decentralization over the past fifteen years. To consolidate these reforms, a more systemic approach is needed to help national and local governments buttress gains and foster capacity strengthening at the local level.

The purpose of this chapter is to harvest some of the broader, systemic lessons of the Latin American experience and convert these lessons into policy recommendations for nations and development assistance agencies. Cities are clearly emerging into a new era of development where they can and must play a stronger role to sustain and advance national growth. But decentralization reforms in the past have not prepared them for these new roles of strategizing, forming alliances, becoming more efficient, and delivering goods and services that people and businesses need to grow. In short, decentralization has much to teach about the problems of urban governance. The grand experiment of decentralization has provided many lessons. We shall review these in two stages. First, we shall look briefly at some lessons that have emerged from the Latin American experience over the past fifteen years. Then, we shall turn to the question of
how the good practices of leading cities can be sustained and promoted in order to consolidate and expand improvements in professionalism, participation, fiscal management, and services on behalf of city residents. Many of the lessons from Latin America’s recent past may have relevance to the agenda of decentralization in other nations.

All of the lessons from the quiet revolution run counter to the conventional policy wisdom about decentralization, not only in Latin America but in many other regions as well. Institutions like the World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank in Washington promulgate policies that emphasize greater regulatory powers by central governments over the subnational system in the interests of maintaining fiscal stability. But political and institutional actions are needed to strengthen the system of incentives put into place by the quiet revolution. These actions should lead to shared responsibilities and a more important role for cities, not just to greater control and suppression of innovation that is often the case at present. Clearly more effective regulations are needed, but excessive central government controls can smother the embers of innovation and renewal that were produced in the quiet revolution. Furthermore, major changes in the external environment—changes in the conduct of international business and finance, and changes in the assumptions on the part of city leaders about their own role in their nations’ fortunes—mean that a broader approach is needed, one more suited to the emerging environment for cities in international business. This chapter will outline the directions of this new approach and summarize the lessons for cities and nations now facing decentralization in a globalized environment.

**Lessons from the Quiet Revolution**

What can we learn from the Latin American experience that might be of use in the future to consolidate and strengthen local government? A review of decentralization problems and issues in the quiet revolution provides a large harvest of lessons. Issues of power sharing, fiscal reform, and participation in governance that has occupied so much of city policy in Latin America are similar to the agenda before cities and nations.

*Political Power Sharing in Stages*

More caution and selective devolution of power sharing may be advisable
to sharpen those powers already devolved and to deepen the devolution to a lower tier of government. In the Latin American experience, the instruments of power were handed over before local governments were ready. Decentralization laws and administrative reforms in most countries have treated all municipalities alike, irrespective of size, experience and installed capacity. At the outset of decentralization reforms, municipalities the size of megacities were mixed indiscriminately with tiny hamlets. Gigantic discrepancies are evident in capacity of different cities and towns to conduct the basic functions of choice making, revenue raising, and service delivery. An important lesson from the quiet revolution is that governments should discriminate not just by size, but by readiness to undertake the new burdens of local autonomy. Central governments might do well to set performance standards by which local governments can demonstrate graduation before assigning them increased levels of responsibility. Many standards have been suggested in the leading cities of the quiet revolution, for instance the degree of public participation in choice making, internal mechanisms of accountability and control, generation of own-source revenues, and progress in strengthening institutional capacity. All of these are areas in which local readiness can be tested. Another option might be to classify cities by readiness for devolution, based on their size and administrative capability. The process of handing over decision making and spending powers could be staged, taking cohorts of cities and towns in successive phases, so that nations could better manage the devolution of power to the wide range of capacity typically found among local authorities.

**Irresponsible Borrowing**

Irresponsible borrowing and excessive spending by national and many local authorities were key factors half a century ago when a swing toward centralization set the stage for the quiet revolution at the end of the century. According to some accounts, governments fearful of irresponsible spending by cities and towns may be ready for another swing back to more centralized control, at least in fiscal matters. William Dillinger and Steven Webb have traced the course of uncontrolled borrowing in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico and suggest that stronger administrative and fiscal controls were advisable in the earlier stages of decentralization in Latin America. Restrictions on borrowing can help
to maintain fiscal balance at the local level—in Latin America as in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe—but restrictions should not shortcut the opportunity nor smother the creative energies of cities that show promise to achieve credit worthiness. Colombia and the Philippines have both devised systems to complement financial market forces by rationing credit to subnational governments based on categories of municipal capacity. Yet, it does little good to set rationing systems in place only to have central governments break a fiscal accord by irresponsible spending of their own, as Colombia did in 1996 and Argentina more recently.

**Devolving Functions and Finance**

Most central governments shared revenues with local governments faster than they spelled out local spending responsibilities. This practice might have contributed to excesses in spending, but it also consecrated power-sharing arrangements and made local governments real partners in national systems of government. We might speculate that, in the long run, this “finance first” strategy might prove to be wiser than the rational dictum of “finance should follow function” often espoused by international financial assistance agencies like the World Bank. Ready access to shared finances breathed real life into the new spending powers given to local governments. Newly decentralizing governments might wish to look for more controlled, more measured ways to achieve a similar “buy in” from local governments. For example, governments that can meet eligibility criteria like those suggested earlier, or those in the upper tiers of size, responsibility, and capacity, might be rewarded with greater discretionary income from transfers, as a step in the transition to full devolution.

**Cities Kept Off Balance**

The laws on revenue sharing, particularly in Latin America, have also not been implemented fully, and uncertain size and timing of revenue sharing keeps local governments off balance in financial terms. In many countries, local governments are given shared revenues, usually for help with capital investment. But most local governments cannot predict the amounts they will receive from period to period in what is supposed to be automatic revenue sharing. First, most governments have at least three, some as many as twelve, variables that are a part of the revenue-sharing formulas used to calculate the distribution of shares. The problems of calculation
are exacerbated by uncertainty and sometimes macroeconomic shifts that affect the base upon which revenue sharing is calculated, usually the total amount of public revenues to central governments. The upshot is that just when local governments are expected to do more long-term thinking for capital investment purposes, they are subjected to short-term variations in the income needed to finance the largest public works. Nations and development assistance agencies should work to make income flows as predictable as possible, especially for capital investment purposes.

**Metropole and Municipality**

One of the curious features of virtually all national legislation on local government enacted during the quiet revolution is that as municipalities were strengthened by legal and regulatory frameworks, whereas amalgams of municipalities, particularly metropolitan areas, were weakened, at least in relative terms. Legislation in nearly every country recognizes, and authorizes, local governments to join together when and where it is mutually convenient. But in fact little attention was given to the complications of intermunicipal arrangements to solve common problems in metropolitan areas. Instead, governments and international assistance agencies were focused on the day-to-day policy and implementation problems of making decentralization work. Yet, cities in Latin America of over a half million in population numbered more than forty in 1995. Around the globe, cities of this size will reach the five hundred mark early in this century. Virtually all cities this size are metropolitan—that is, they cover more than one municipal jurisdiction. Increasingly, cities are looking even further than administrative jurisdictional boundaries, into the resource hinterlands that support (and interact with) urban growth, searching for strategic positions to compete with cities elsewhere in the country and around the globe.  

**Innovation and Leadership**

Local leaders have emerged from political and electoral reforms to produce myriad innovations in governance. These parallel—and even exceed—the breadth of change espoused in the “reinvention of government” in the United States. For instance, scores of mayors invented or borrowed ideas for new, more effective ways to mobilize local finance, to foster institutional change, and to encourage popular participation in local
Many mechanisms can encourage innovation, ranging from basic tools of planning to more sophisticated incubation of ideas, leadership, and education of the public. But few governments pay attention to the many sources of renewal lying dormant among their cities and towns.

**Contract of Governance**

The most striking of these innovations is the reconstruction of a “contract of governance” between elected officials and voter-taxpayers. In this reconstruction, the contract of governance has been renewed and reinvigorated by voter-taxpayers who have shown willingness to allow local, elected leaders to take actions on their behalf in areas of public life in which the same voters show much less trust in national officials. In cities all across the region, voter-taxpayers have generally agreed to new tax burdens when elected officials can demonstrate through concrete improvements that tax revenues are at work in visible and verifiable ways. The essence of this governance innovation is fiscal decision making through participatory democracy at the lowest level. Engineering this change could not have been accomplished without the quiet revolution. But it can be encouraged and started by allowing local governments in newly decentralizing states to take part in the dynamic process of laying plans and spending money to implement change on a small scale in carefully selected places. Mechanisms of control and staging will need to be tailored in each institutional setting to discourage or control irresponsible spending. Implementing local spending will require careful accounting of the cultural factors that determine the nature of government and pace of change. Yet, the value of spending first is in the process of taking part in governance, in generating the pride and enthusiasm this can bring to see palpable change. This process can be started with small steps by inviting citizens to participate in the shaping of priorities, identification of solutions, and implementation of projects at the neighborhood or block scale.

**Local Government Reform**

For decades, central governments have been coaxed and wheedled by agencies like the IMF and the World Bank to reform the public sector in order to restore growth. These efforts have met with mixed success. The quiet revolution suggests that the arena for the next stage of reforms in the
Latin American region has shifted to the local level, where new models of governance are being invented. These models are marked by innovation in the governance contract, by widespread participation, and by new forms of accountability in spending. But can local reform be undertaken faster in transition and newly urbanizing countries where distrust with governance characterized many generations? There remains an important empirical question in many countries about the sequencing of reform and about the extent to which local governments can play a role in national affairs.

**Democracy Building**

International lending and technical assistance organizations need not be only followers in the process of decentralization, as they were in Latin America. International organizations of financial and technical assistance are learning how to play a stronger role in the area of public choice making, the arena of political action that lay at the heart of the quiet revolution. International agencies are learning that they can be effective in structuring public choice, through elections, public education, and stronger analysis of options and tradeoffs. They are also learning that assistance in these areas need not be tainted by partisan political concerns of agencies and analysts.

**Horizontal Associations**

Events have shown that local governments are participating in rapid and productive decentralization of information and formation of associations, a phenomenon perhaps more rapid than the political and fiscal decentralization of decisions and spending power. Associations of local governments have swept across the continent. Many countries now have more than one association, some for political reasons (competing political parties, as in Mexico), others for technical reasons (such as associations of city managers, as opposed to associations of municipalities). Many national associations have developed high quality web sites and interactive, web-based information systems, such as Munitel in Chile, that serve as extremely effective devices for sharing information and exchanging experiences. Further, associations have begun to exert collective force in regional amalgams under the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), as in Fundación Latinoamericana de Ciudades, Municipios y Asociaciones (FLACMA) and Federación de
Municipios des Istmo Centroamericano (FEMICA) in Central America. These “natural” networks are the most obvious route by which to leverage the relatively small national and international assistance being offered to local governments for capacity strengthening.

**Sharing Lessons**

Political leaders in Latin America drew inspiration from Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as from each other, in charting out the shifts in power that have led to a quiet revolution. In a similar way, newly decentralizing countries will have much to learn from Latin America as well as from each other. The strategy is to focus on a few and spread the message widely, giving more emphasis to spreading the word and demonstrating support for good performers while implying a threat of withholding support unless local governments show good behavior. Latin American ministers of finance had few formalized channels and virtually no systematic way to share lessons of reform and change. A fresh focus on leadership and the mechanisms of learning by local authorities—much of it done efficiently through associations—is one way by which the speed of learning might be increased. Authorities in the new vanguard of decentralizing nations would be well served to exchange ideas with their counterparts in other countries. International lending and technical assistance organizations could play a very useful role by organizing a system of learning for local and national authorities in the lessons and good practices in decentralization.

**Looking to Future Stages of Reform**

Contextual factors are decisive in how much or little of this experience is transferable to future stages of reform, and indeed, to other countries. The scope of these considerations stretches beyond this chapter, but two or three of the more important contextual factors can be named. In the first place, past experience with government, i.e., the traditions of exercising power and delivering local services, influence the environment of governance. Ideas such as a “governance contract” and “fiscal bargain” will not be recognizable to citizens or policymakers in most countries. But local leaders, elected and community alike, recognize the power of control over spending and the value of fitting infrastructure and services to local needs. Reform can begin by focusing on small-scale works in
neighborhoods where citizens have an important role to play in partnership with their local government. These common grounds are the starting place for decentralized democratic government.

Past experience with governance is an important contextual factor in the so-called transition economies. Many former centrally planned economies are in transition away from central planning toward market-based democracies. The move away from the central state involves the shedding of political ideology and way of life much starker than any seen in the Latin American experience. Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Hungary, and Vietnam are decentralizing as they move to market economies, and each has found a way to begin recasting the idea of governance.

In Vietnam, for example, national and local officials began the “Doi Moi” reform process in 1993. Reforms were intended to liberalize the economy and make it more subject to market forces. But even before the Asian economic crisis of 1997, these reforms were out of sync with the processes of urban development in Vietnam, particularly in the largest cities. As liberalization of trade is deepened and state-owned enterprises convert to private, market-oriented principles of operation, private sector investors are breaking free from national constraints only to be hampered by city bureaucracies still operating under obsolete regulations, such as having to pay unauthorized fees and charges in order to do business. Many regulations originate with national policy or administrative requirements. Administrative regulations and political controls make local governments sluggish and penalize them in comparison to their competitors in the region. Thus, the transition to free-market economy is difficult to separate from the logic of cities acting as more sovereign players in a decentralized system of government. Nevertheless, the basic functions of local government—identifying need, setting priorities, delivering services at the local level—are the basic entry points for reform.

In still other countries, decentralization policies are being promulgated after the initial waves of globalization, liberalization of trade, reduction of the effectiveness of national boundaries, the onset of a perception of vulnerability. Unlike Latin America, where decentralization was launched before most of these effects took hold, most of the countries in Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union have additional policy complexity introduced with the opening of trade and the rise of cities in international arenas. To the extent that cities start with weak institutional capacity,
globalization will make the stakes of decentralization much greater. Responsibility for economic development, trade, and infrastructure needed for local development may be harder to leave to cities.

**CONCLUSION: BANKING ON THE FUTURE**

In key areas of development—fiscal responsibility, efficiency, good governance, and economic development—the leading cities of Latin America have demonstrated a systematic response to new incentives generated during decentralization. The quiet revolution is essentially a change in the extent and impact of participation in government at the local level. The conventional wisdom of policy and practice in managing urban and municipal development is constrained in many ways and may be blocking important sources of growth.

For one thing, conventional approaches are constrained in the way local governance is conceived by national (and many international) authorities because local governments have not yet reached the status of fully responsible partners in national systems of governance. In the past, local governments had been kept weak because it was in the interest of the central government to maintain strong controls. Now, with decentralization, it is in the nations’ interest to strengthen local governments. Nations need to exercise restraint, but they must also offer encouragement and incentives, and to build in a discipline that only the public can effect if it is actively engaged in affairs. Coping with these tensions in Latin America has been a struggle that has ebbed and flowed, where gains in the local arena have been achieved only with increased risks to national fiscal stability.

Decentralization has swung the strategic balance of power decisively away from the center, but the direction and force of this pendular movement is now in question. We have seen some evidence suggesting that the new energies and new approaches of leading local governments may only be temporary. In effect, for most of the 1990s, the quiet revolution was marked by a tonic effect that might now recede with time as the see-saw battle of fiscal federalism swings back toward the center. Renewed commitment to reform and local government renewal may be needed to sustain strong participatory democracy and participatory social programs at the local level.
Part of the tension in the region is caused by an intergovernmental impasse. To go further with decentralization means that municipal voter-taxpayers and national governments must trust local officials to succeed in their duties. The impasse arises, because for the most part, national governments have not given local governments either the political space or the financial resources to discharge new functions, even when they have shown promise to do so. If anything, more reticence is being shown by governments in newly decentralizing nations.

To break this impasse, the system of governance—national and local governments and their electorates—must reach a new level of mutual trust. Local governments must be encouraged, and allowed, to manage their affairs. This autonomy must be buttressed by a partnership with central authorities. Creating these assurances can be achieved in many ways, for instance, by improving choice making, managerial skills, professional capacity, and by strengthening political and economic incentives among office holders. These items are among the highest priority issues on the agenda of decentralization in the region. The present conditions—short terms of political office, fluctuating revenues, restrictions on spending—may succeed in limiting fiscal mischief, but they also propel the revolving door of municipal leadership and personnel.

New overtures in international lending and technical assistance organizations are beginning to direct more attention to issues of urban and municipal development. The World Bank’s Strategy for Urban Development and Local Governance and the Cities Alliance are two institutional overtures that seek to achieve a coherent effort among donor institutions and to focus attention on cities. However, much remains to be done with partner institutions in client countries in order to make efforts like these effective.

NOTES

1 This is largely drawn from Tim Campbell, The Quiet Revolution: The Rise of Cities and Popular Participation in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, in press), based on the experiences with decentralization and the rise of popular participation in Latin America from 1983 to 1995.

2 Ibid.


8 T. Campbell and Harald Fuhr, Leadership and Innovation and Risk-Taking in Local Governments of Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, in press).

9 This term draws on ideas of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to describe the implicit agreement between the state and its subjects in which powers are voluntarily given over to elected leaders to act on behalf of voters and taxpayers.

For the past two centuries, Barcelona has essentially been an industrial city. Spain’s first steam industry was established there in 1832; its first railway line in 1848; its leading textile center was there, as well as its most active port; and it had the largest working-class population. So much so, that for many years the city’s image was directly related to industrial activity as well as to the social conflicts entailed by its development: “Spain’s factory,” the “city of bombs,” the “rose of fire.”

In 1970, a resident of Poblenou—the most industrial neighborhood in this “Catalan Manchester,” cradle of the proletariat and anarchist movement—would have had a very hard time believing that, in a mere thirty years, the biggest factories (Titan, Motor Ibérica, la Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima) would completely disappear and the area would be a tourist, residential, and cultural district. And yet, this is exactly what has happened. In the last quarter century, Barcelona has undergone a radical transformation: its economic base, its social and physical structure, its people’s habits, and even its image have experienced a decisive and, in general terms, positive change.

The object of this paper is to provide some data and observations on the nature of these changes and their relationship to the public policies that have been applied in the city. Barcelona now constitutes a metropolitan reality subject to intense transformation dynamics through which the city tends to incorporate ever more space, disperse its activities and population over this growing area, and functionally and socially differentiate its various areas. This transformation has been accompanied by a structural change in the economic base and a sharp increase in
mean income levels derived from the leap in the metropolitan scale and improved access to services.

However, these transformations are also accompanied by important challenges that can put environmental sustainability, functional efficacy, and the city’s social cohesion at risk. To counter this there has been an attempt to develop a set of policies that tends toward safeguarding competitiveness, functionality, and the central city’s quality of life through an urbanization model characterized by density, complexity, and social cohesion. The reasonable success achieved by these policies makes the case of Barcelona interesting for a general reflection on urban policies and governance in large contemporary cities.

**The Barcelona Metropolitan Region: Basic Data**

The administrative metropolitan area of Barcelona is 3,235 km\(^2\), slightly over 10 percent of the territory of the Catalan region. The metropolitan area’s GNP of 86,400 million euros, represents 69 percent of total Catalan GNP and 13.4 percent of total Spanish GNP, according to estimates available for 2001. Likewise, Barcelona province absorbs 25.6 percent of Spanish imports and generates 22.3 percent of exports.

The total population of metropolitan Barcelona, which grew continuously in the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, has remained about stable since 1981. In 1996, according to data from the last available census, it reached 4,228,047 inhabitants, or 69.4 percent of the Catalan population. This population finds itself unequally spread out, such that in the scarce 100 km\(^2\) of the Barcelona municipality there are 1.5 million residents; in approximately thirty surrounding municipalities (over 378 km\(^2\)), another 1.3 million; and, in the remaining 2,759 km\(^2\) of the metropolitan area, there is another 1.4 million. Thus, one fourth of the Catalan population finds itself in 1 percent of the territory of Catalonia, almost half in 2 percent, and approximately three fourths in 10 percent.\(^1\)

The metropolitan area’s urban structure is rich and complex since, along with the central city, it includes an ensemble of medium sized cities of between thirty thousand and two hundred thousand inhabitants, some of which have important industrial and commercial traditions (Mataró, Granollers, Sabadell, Terrassa, Vilanova, Vilafranca), others which are
emerging residential and tertiary centers (Sant Cugat, Mollet, Cerdanyola, Sitges, Calella).

THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN TRANSFORMATION

The Barcelona metropolitan area is currently going through an accelerated process of change. Three characteristic tendencies of this transformation greatly correspond with the transformation dynamics of most large cities on the Iberian Peninsula and in Western Europe: dispersion—after a process long characterized by concentration, both population and activities now disperse across the metropolitan area; extension—simultaneous with urban sprawl across the area, there tends to be an expansion in order to integrate an increasingly large area within the metropolitan boundaries; and specialization—this dispersed and expanding city also tends toward the functional and social specialization of each of its areas.2

Dispersion: Population Sprawl and Economic Activities

The spatial structure of the metropolitan region today is the fruit of a long process of concentration of both the population and its activities within the Catalan region. Throughout the agricultural and commercial revolution of the 1700s, the industrialization of the 1800s, and the modernization of the first three quarters of the 1900s, this process brought population from remote areas of Catalonia and even from other regions of Spain to concentrate along the coastline and, specifically, in the plain of Barcelona. The products of this process of concentration in Barcelona are both the inequalities in the distribution of the population (referred to above) as well as an extremely high density (fifteen thousand inhabitants per km²), for which it is hard to find parallels in other European cities.3

This process of concentration reached its zenith in 1981, when Barcelona attained its highest demographic density in history (1,752,627 inhabitants). Since then it has shown a certain decentralizing and dispersing ripple that has been affecting the entire metropolitan area. Thus, in the last twenty years, the city of Barcelona has lost close to two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants and has gone from containing 40 percent of the metropolitan population to 35 percent. Meanwhile, the first metropolitan ring remains stable, from a demographic point of view (both in absolute as well as in relative terms), and the second is growing.
rapidly. This decentralization, with net losses of population in the metropolitan center, also affects the municipalities conurbated to Barcelona (like l’Hospitalet, Badalona, and Santa Coloma, each of which has experienced population loss). This phenomenon is not unique, since it also affects a large number of other Spanish metropolitan areas (Madrid, Valencia, and Bilbao have all experienced net population losses in their central municipality in the last intercensus period).

The configuration of the metropolitan space has passed from being narrowly conditioned by interregional migrations associated with work (prior to 1975) to depending, above all, on intermetropolitan migrations associated with housing. This phenomenon is not simple decentralization, but rather a real process of dispersion of population and activities throughout the space—a process through which practically all of the nuclei with highest population and density (independent of their placement) are tending to lose relative weight and, in many cases, population in absolute terms to other more dispersed and less densely populated locations.

Demographic dispersion also corresponds with the growing dispersion of metropolitan economic activities and services. In the past twenty years, the city’s economy has lived through a pronounced structural adjustment—the step from an industrial-based economy to an increasingly tertiary one, as well as expanded flexibility in the productive process (which has affected both the mean size of businesses, as well as the organization of productive processes and labor regulations). Thus, from the spatial point of view, this double process of adjustment has been complemented by a noticeable tendency toward decentralization of population and jobs over the area.

In effect, available data show that although Barcelona still maintains a significant relative weight in total employment (in 1996 it had 659,786 of the 1,525,090 jobs in the metropolitan region), it is losing positions rapidly. Between 1975 and 1996, the city went from holding 56.2 percent of the jobs in the Barcelona metropolitan region to 43.3 percent (while the first ring remained stable in relative terms—23.7 percent in 1975 and 23.5 percent in 1996, the second grew from 20.1 percent to 33.2 percent). The latest data from the Metropolitan Survey for the year 2000 project that if this tendency continued, Barcelona today would have hardly more than 40 percent, while the second ring would reach over 35 percent.
Extension: Urban Area Expansion

The second characteristic of the evolution of this metropolis is its spatial expansion. In effect, at the same time that its population and its activities are dispersing over the territory, the metropolitan region is expanding more and more in order to integrate the increasingly growing space into its network of daily functions.

Thus, if the scope of metropolitan Barcelona is defined by conventional Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area criteria, the area that can be considered metropolitan went from 62 municipalities and 1,010 km² in 1981 to 216 municipalities and 4,597 km² in 1996. In this way, the strictly metropolitan area surpasses its own administrative boundaries in terms of planning (163 municipalities) and decidedly penetrates toward the interior of Catalonia and the provinces of Girona and Tarragona. The introduction (by 2004) of high-speed trains between Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona (cities situated in a radius of 100-150 km from Barcelona) may have additional effects on these expansive dynamics.

Specialization: Functional and Social

These tendencies of dispersion and expansion are also accompanied by the growing specialization of each municipality, each neighborhood, in the metropolitan whole. Thus, even though demographic, occupational, and service dispersion over the metropolitan area has tended to reduce differences between the center and the metropolitan rings (even in terms of income, as we will see below), the growing integration has encouraged the specialization of each municipality in functional terms. In this way, residence, commerce, industry, and leisure activities tend to become increasingly disperse within the metropolitan space.

This specialization is also followed by a greater segregation in social terms. As mentioned above, metropolitan migrations directly affect the housing market. That is, residential mobility is induced and regulated, to a great extent, by the capacity of individuals and families to compete in the land and housing market. This market displays two very important rigidities: (1) according to data from the Metropolitan Survey 2000, 84.6 percent of the metropolitan population is made up of families that own the dwellings they are living in, which leaves the rental market in a very secondary position; and (2) the stock and production of subsidized housing is very small in comparison to other European countries—only...
1 of every 25 housing units produced in Catalonia in 2000 had some form of official subsidies.\textsuperscript{9}

The economic effort necessary to acquire housing is very high (up to 7.8 times the annual disposable family income in the case of new housing in Barcelona), and it has increased noticeably in recent years in spite of the reduction in interest rates. In this context, the difference in price between the central city and the metropolitan rings (prices in the city are 1.4 times higher than in the first ring and 1.8 times higher than in the second) is a remarkable stimulus for the selection and departure of those who are able to afford housing in the metropolitan rings but not in the central city (that is, sectors of the population that are mostly young and whose education and income levels are above the mean). Price differences within each of the peripheral rings act in the same way in the regulation of population movements.\textsuperscript{10}

**THE BENEFITS OF METROPOLITANIZATION**

In Barcelona, as in many other European metropolises, current economic and social transformations entail a process of metropolitanization that is radically altering the form, the function, and the cohesion of urban spaces. This transformation can lead to some striking positive consequences.

**Increase in mean income.**

The process of metropolitanization (with the unification of the labor market, the structural change of the economy, and the emergence of new sectors) has been, at once, cause and consequence of the economic growth experienced in Catalonia and in Spain in recent years. Economic growth has been faster, in mean terms, than the rest of the European Union, and has permitted Catalonia’s per-capita income, which in 1986 was still 86 percent of the EU’s, to reach 100 percent by 2000.

**Metropolitan Growth.**

The city’s growth from 2.5 to 4.3 million inhabitants effectively integrated in the labor and consumer markets has given Barcelona a critical mass that puts it in a much better position to attract private investments, services, business headquarters, and investments in public works. Barcelona consti-
tutes the sixth largest metropolitan region of Europe, surpassed only by London, Paris, the Ruhr, the Randstad, and Madrid.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{The relative balance of income levels.}
There has also been a certain convergence among income levels in the city and in the metropolitan rings: the mean income level of the first metropolitan ring that, in 1989, was equivalent to 77.1 percent of the central city’s, had reached 85.3 percent in 1999. In the same period, the second ring went from 79.8 percent to 96.8 percent with respect to the mean income level of Barcelona.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{THE CHALLENGES OF URBAN TRANSFORMATION}

It is undeniable that these advantages have been accompanied by important problems. Thus today, the city, and the metropolitan area as a whole, must face challenges of an environmental, functional, and social nature.

\textbf{The Environmental Problem}
The most outstanding problem in terms of the environment is land consumption, which has increased exponentially: in 1882, only 1,763 of the 323,000 ha incorporated in the metropolitan region of Barcelona were urbanized; this rose to 21,482 ha in 1972, and 45,036 ha in 1992.\textsuperscript{13} The pace of transformation is now close to 1000 ha per year, that is, approximately 3 ha per day. The implications of this are many: a liability for future development and public interest; isolation and sacrifice of spaces of natural beauty; urbanization of land with outstanding agricultural value; loss of landscape values; and impermeabilization and artificial landscaping of large amounts of land, with the corresponding increase in natural risks, such as flooding. Furthermore, urban sprawl translates into increased energy use, greater difficulty in collecting and treating waste, a higher rate of water consumption per inhabitant, and health problems.

\textbf{Functional Risks}
Expansion of the metropolitan area, coupled with urban dispersion, has also entailed an explosion in the mobility needs of citizens and businesses. In this expanding urban area, citizens now use space more extensively;
functions that used to be restricted to a smaller area—residence, work, shopping, enjoying leisure time—are now carried out over an increasingly larger space. This is clearly seen in the evolution of the municipalities’ capacity of self-contention (that is, their capacity to retain the mobility that is generated within their own boundaries). Thus, in the 310 municipalities in the province of Barcelona, those retaining less than 50 percent of their labor mobility have gone from 102 in 1986, to 151 in 1991, to 208 in 1996.14

In this way, in four of every five municipalities of the Barcelona metropolitan region, at least half of those who work do so outside of their own municipality; the mean rate of self-contention dropped from 67.6 percent to 55 percent between 1986 and 1996. Data from the Metropolitan Survey 2000 show a new drop of 7 percentile points between 1995 and 2000.15

This growing need for mobility has entailed an extraordinary increase in the demand for road infrastructure and public transportation. However, since investment in the latter is much less, there has been a radical move in favor of journeys taken in private vehicles. In the city of Barcelona and in consideration of the displacements associated with the city’s growth, however, public transportation is still strong, accounting for slightly over one-third of journeys taken.

This situation is the result of policies (public and private) that have given priority to investments in the road network to the detriment of public transportation. But it is also a consequence of the way land occupation has taken place in recent years. Thus, according to data from the planning agency Barcelona Regional, 44 percent of compact residential land is within the area of direct influence (500 meters) of a station, whereas only 6 percent of dispersed residential land and 11 percent of industrial land enjoy this situation.16 Thus, in the last few years sprawl has entailed that a higher percentage of the population and economic activities are now established in low accessibility areas.

The new patterns in land occupation, along with scarce investment in public transportation, are leading to problems in metropolitan mobility, which are expressed in traffic congestion, increased commuting time (affecting mostly low-income groups and, within each household, women, children, and the elderly), growth of pollution and accidents, and increased energy consumption per worker and per place of work.
Social Segregation

The housing market acts as a powerful motor for social separation, in particular, for the emigration of medium-income groups from the central city toward the metropolitan rings. This could lead to polarization of the city, in the sense that it could become a place inhabited only by the very rich or the very poor. Fortunately, statistical evidence contradicts this hypothesis. As explained above, differences between the central city and the metropolitan rings, in terms of mean incomes, have tended to diminish over the last fifteen years. Furthermore, in the central city, the ratio between the first and last population decile in terms of mean income has decreased from 15 to 1 in 1985 to 10.5 to 1 in 2000. Similarly, total income distribution, both in the central city as well as in the metropolitan rings, has tended to become more equitable (as analysis based on the calculation of Gini indexes shows). This positive evolution of the differences in income has to be attributed, in good measure, to the introduction in Spain of the basic welfare state (noncontributive pensions, unemployment coverage, universalization of health care) and to urban policies (see below).

In any case, these advances do not in any way deny either the persistence of important inequalities (the first quintile of the population receives 40 percent of total incomes, while the last receives only 7.3 percent), nor the existence, and even the aggravation, of very problematic situations for certain groups and in certain areas. Among these are deteriorated central areas and housing estates built in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as some areas of marginal urbanization, where the sectors with the lowest earning power and the new non-European immigrants tend to concentrate.

Urban Policies and the Issue of Governance

Barcelona, which has traditionally been characterized by physical compactness, complexity of uses, and the coexistence of very diverse social groups, is becoming more dispersed, more specialized, and potentially more segregated. This transformation presents opportunities and challenges for the future of the central city and its area. The challenges are particularly important for the central city that, left to itself (that is, without regulation of any sort over market forces), could become increasingly inefficient in functional terms, unsustainable in environmental terms, and inequitable in social terms. In order to face these challenges, the
municipal government has defended the model of a compact, complex, and integrated city, understanding compactness, complexity, and cohesion as essential prerequisites for efficiency, sustainability, and equality. The unrestrained sprawl, the dispersed city, is not a city; at most it is an urbanization in which those elements that make contemporary urban life attractive and desirable—invention, richness of uses, capacity to compensate for inequalities—are anything but present.

New policies of renewal and defense of the central city will have to face the challenge of creating a vision and the instruments to implement it. There are four basic fronts to this action:

**Integration in the network.**
In a world in constant flux, the city must be sufficiently attractive to act as a connection between the logic of a global order and that of the local order. This implies assuring its accessibility to the exterior, its capacity for innovation, and the diversity and coexistence in its interior of people of heterogeneous origins and expectations. Access to the exterior, innovative capacity, and internal diversity are the keys for firmly founding the city as a node in the global urban system.

**The articulation of the metropolis.**
A compact city is in a better position than others to face these challenges. But it would be a mistake, when defending the compact city, to deny metropolitanization or to try to base metropolitan development on the potential of only one urban center. In that case, the pressure on the central city would be so intense that it would translate—through prices—into new segregation and exclusion processes. What should be pursued is a metropolis articulated by a number of cities integrated into a network; a polynodal metropolis—a city made up of cities.

**Innovation with roots.**
Urban renovation must be able to combine transformation with memory, creation with inheritance, and progress with equity. All of this, in the central city, requires urban policies that establish cultural projects as a motor and as catalyst, defend and strengthen public spaces, search for the connection between historical substrata and new types of activities, avoid forced population shifts and the formation of ghettos, give priority to
rehabilitation over demolition, link land uses to accessibility, and regulate traffic. In a nutshell, the future of the central city depends on its ability to create, stimulate, and maintain activities in innovative and emerging sectors, without losing its roots.

**The centrality of politics.**

In order to advance toward this urban configuration there must be values and collective projects capable of conditioning and contradicting market forces whenever necessary. This requires attention to the central role of politics in the construction of urban space. To “go with the flow” is not to govern. To govern means to make something happen that would not occur without decision and collective will. This does not mean being slaves to old plans, to fixed schemes. Any urban policy that remains fixed quickly becomes obsolete. Thus, the defense and stimulation of urban renovation must include flexible planning that is more engaged in the process of construction of the city than in following some image-objective; administrative and strategic planning that is capable of considering the decisive options for economic and social transformation, along with the physical content; and participatory planning, which includes electronic interaction, simulation exercises, and citizen input—planning, in short, that inscribes sustainability, efficacy, and equity as essential objectives.

The city of quality is not one that tries to deny its conflicts—and reach equality in such an unreal way—but rather one that is able to administer these contradictions through democratic processes and collective action.

**The role of emerging sectors: three examples**

Three examples are offered below of the way in which urban renovation policies that are trying to put these values into practice have been applied in the city of Barcelona. Because of their magnitude, they have implications for all aspects of the lives of citizens; because of their characteristics, each one has, respectively, a special impact on compactness, complexity of uses, and the city’s social cohesion—that is, each one of the values they are meant to preserve.

**Tourist/Cultural Activities and New Leisure Centers**

Although Catalonia, particularly the coastal areas of the Costa Brava and
the Costa Dorada, has been one of the main tourist destinations of the Mediterranean, Barcelona had remained relatively outside major tourist flows. It was visited mostly for business, and in particular for conferences; fair organization is one of its traditional occupations.

This changed radically after the celebration of the Olympic Games in 1992. They were a colossal promotion for the city and allowed it to project an image based greatly on its cultural and architectural charm; they also attracted public and private investment in the city, which had very noticeable effects in the area of infrastructure and facilities (including the carrying out of a “Hotel Plan” under which the city went from 118 establishments and 18,569 beds in 1990 to 148 establishments and 25,055 beds in 1992, and 187 establishments and 31,338 beds in 2000). Simultaneously, there has also been a sharp increase in demand—from 3.8 million overnight stays in 1990 to more than 7.7 million in 2000, doubling in one decade. The reasons for these visits have also changed: at the beginning of the 1990s, business was the purpose of more than 50 percent of total visits; in 2000, this dropped to 36.7 percent, while tourism reached 43.9 percent.\textsuperscript{19}

This increase in exterior demand is complemented by a noticeable increase in domestic demand. A substantial part of the population of the Barcelona metropolitan region considers that it enjoys a lot of free time. Among the adult population, leisure time activities that are “frequently” practiced are going to the beach (42.2 percent), to the movies (19.9 percent), to restaurants (16 percent), and to museums and exhibitions (8.6 percent).\textsuperscript{20} Urban policies have tried to associate the emergence of this demand with the creation of new centers for leisure activities within the city. These centers have also been used as instruments to rehabilitate some areas and invigorate others. On the whole, the city has bet on tourism and urban cultural and leisure activities, in contrast to the land consumption and landscape banalization entailed by tourist development of the coast.

Several important new centers of cultural and leisure time consumption have been created:

\textit{The Ciutat Vella cultural axis.}

The Barcelona Museum of Contemporary Art, the Barcelona Center of Contemporary Culture, the Cultural Resources Center, the renovated National Library, and the headquarters of the Superior Committee on
Scientific Research - i.e. some of the main cultural facilities of the city and of Catalonia - have been placed in the middle of a historical part of the city, and in the heart of a neighborhood with intense deterioration problems.

**The waterfront.**

Close to five kilometers of urban coastal front have been recovered and adapted for swimming and leisure activities, with the construction of a seaside promenade, the Olympic Port, and the establishment of numerous restaurants and bars. This opening of the city to the sea, one of the main legacies of Olympic planning, has radically changed the city’s tourism offer (it can now also offer sun and beach as products) and the leisure habits of its inhabitants (the seaside front has turned into many people’s favorite beach: 27.2 percent of people who go to the beach state this one as their main destination).

**Port Vell.**

The inner harbor of Barcelona, adjacent to the city’s historical center, has also been recovered for citizen use, with the removal of the barriers that used to prevent front-line access to the sea and the construction of walkways that allow access to the old piers. Here, the Maremagnum center has been established, fully dedicated to leisure time activities, with a shopping mall (with stores, bars, and restaurants), the new aquarium, a movie theater complex, and an IMAX cinema.

**New urban shopping centers.**

To prevent commercial activities from moving to the surrounding metropolitan areas, traditional commercial spaces have been renovated and remodelled, giving them a new image and promotion (Barnacentre, commercial axis of Sant Andreu, Creu Coberta). In addition, installing big shopping malls exclusively in the metropolitan rings, alongside major traffic arteries, has been avoided, and there has been an attempt to anchor such centers in the interior of the central city (Illa Diagonal, la Maquinista, Glòries, Heron, Diagonal Mar), by building on vacant lots.

**The 22@ Program and New Productive Activities**

Another intervention that translates into a clear will to defend the values of compactness and complexity in urban development is the 22@ pro-
gram in the Poblenou area, a district that has traditionally been the city’s eastern industrial center. In this area there has been a modification of the General Metropolitan Plan (passed on July 27th 2000) to allow for the establishment of new activities and mixed use. Thus, the old industrial zoning has been transformed into a new category, known as 22@, to attract activities linked to emerging sectors (software production, telecommunications, multimedia, press, data processing and electronic commerce, artistic activity, and research and education centers).

It is hoped these new uses will generate over one hundred thousand new jobs, which could be combined with residential use of the same area. This is thus an attempt to attract productive activities, in both industry and service, to the city center and establish them in one area in which, by breaking the former rigid zoning schemes, they find themselves mixed in with residences and centers of artistic production, education, and investigation.

The area affected by the 22@ classification is 198.3 ha. The transformation of 1,159,626 m² of industrial land is foreseen, with a total potential of approximately 3,500,000 m² of new construction (excluding equipment). The 4,614 homes that currently exist on industrial land will be integrated into the planning regulations and an additional 3,500 new ones will be built. About 75,000 m² will be given over to green zones, and 145,000 m² will be destined for new facilities. This program’s real estate potential, in 2001 values, is 7,813.2 million euros.22

Urban Renewal and Forum 2004
The interventions examined above are mostly related to compactness and complexity; Forum 2004 has an added strong social aspect: an explicit will to affect the city’s social cohesion.

The Besòs riverfront area—the administrative limit between Barcelona and the neighboring municipality of Sant Adrià del Besòs—constitutes a real compendium of urban problems: the presence of large energy and environmental infrastructures (a water treatment plant, five power stations, a waste incineration plant); the mouth of a river—the Besòs, highly contaminated; extensive road infrastructure (the Diagonal—unfinished; the Cinturón del Litoral); and mass housing projects from the 1960s and 1970s, with obvious social problems (la Mina, Sant Ramon de Penyafort, la Catalana).
The magnitude and diversity of these problems has led to the design of a very complex program, which combines the creation of several specific projects and the organization of an important international event called the “Universal Forum of Cultures, Barcelona 2004.” It is scheduled for summer 2004, and has received the recognition and support of UNESCO. The Forum hopes to become a new type of global event: there will be debates and discussions on many topics of common interest, a thematic World Festival of the Arts, and exhibitions on human diversity and its history. The event is to be an expression of the creativity of all peoples and a political gathering of global dimensions with imaginative forms of participation, centered on one of the main challenges of the twenty-first century: the dialogue between cultures.23

On the urban intervention side, the plan—which affects a total of 184 ha, practically adjacent to the 22@ district—includes the construction of a platform that will become the new seaside front of the area, with beaches, a promenade, and an urban park, and to which part of the city’s zoo will be moved; the construction of a new port next to the mouth of the Besòs, with capacity for about two thousand boats; the construction of the Forum’s installations, with a central building, a large plaza, and a plain that will cover the purifying plant and, in part, the road axis of the Cinturón del Litoral; the restructuring of the neighborhood of la Mina, and the sectors of Llull-Taulat and la Catalana (with the participation of the European Union’s URBAN program); the reorganization of waste treatment and energy production infrastructures; and the establishment of major facilities, among which will be the Palace of Congress of Catalonia and a new university campus, partially dedicated to biomedical scientific investigation.

The operation’s success is unpredictable. It is, though, a new attempt, in which Barcelona will try to combine economic innovation, urban renovation, and social cohesion; that is, face some of the main challenges of the city’s future.

NOTES

1 For population and economic data on Barcelona, see Barcelona Economia, quarterly published by the Municipality of Barcelona (www.publicacions.bcn.es/bcneco), and the statistics provided by the Catalan Institute of Statistics (www.idescat.es).
2 Oriol Nello, Cataluña, ciudad de ciudades (Lleida, Milenio, 2002), 159.


4 Mancomunitat de Municipis de l’Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona, Dinàmiques territorials a l’àrea i regió de Barcelona (Barcelona, Mancomunitat de Municipis de l’Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona, 336 English text included).


7 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats (Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001), 71.


9 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001), 71.

10 Oriol Nel·lo, Cataluña, ciudad de ciudades (Lleida: Milenio, 2002), 159.


12 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)


15 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

16 Barcelona Regional, Criteris per al planejament metropolità de Barcelona (Barcelona: Barcelona Regional, 2001, multicopied).

17 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)
Urban Dynamics, Public Policies, and Governance in Barcelona


19 Barcelona economia, various issues.

20 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

21 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Enquesta de la regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats (Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, 2001, 71 pp.)

22 Ajuntament de Barcelona, Districte 22@ (Barcelona, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2001). See, as well, the web site www.bcn.es/22@bcn

23 The official web site of the Forum is www.barcelona.2004.org
Agenda: Understanding Urban Governance
Woodrow Wilson Center Comparative Urban Studies Project
December 10-11, 2001

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10

9:30 a.m. Opening Remarks
Joseph S. Tulchin, Woodrow Wilson Center

10:00 a.m. SUSTAINABLE CITIES
“Local Governance and the Development of Associational Life”
Richard Stren, University of Toronto

Discussants:
Judith Tendler, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ananya Roy, University of California at Berkeley

Chair:
Kraig Baier, U.S. Agency for International Development

12:00 p.m. Buffet Lunch

1:00 p.m. HEALTH AND HABITAT
“Health and Urban Governance”
María Elena Ducci, Catholic University, Chile

Discussants:
Carolyn Stephens, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
Walter G. Flores, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine

Chair:
Joseph S. Tulchin, Woodrow Wilson Center
Appendix

3:00 p.m. Coffee Break

3:15 p.m. **URBANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE**

“Urbanization and Environmental Change”
Ellen Brennan-Galvin, *Woodrow Wilson Center*

**Discussants:**
Peter Rogers, *Harvard University*
Mark Montgomery, *Population Council*

**Chair:**
Joseph S. Tulchin, *Woodrow Wilson Center*

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11

10:00 a.m. **A NEW GOVERNANCE AGENDA?**

“Urban Governance: Some Lessons Learned”
Aprodicio A. Laquian, *Woodrow Wilson Center*

**Discussants:**
Tim Campbell, *World Bank Institute*
Oriol Nello, *Autonomous University of Barcelona*

**Chair:**
Richard Stren, *University of Toronto*

12:00 p.m. **Closing Remarks**

Joseph S. Tulchin, *Woodrow Wilson Center*

12:30 p.m. **Adjournment**
Part III: Case studies – urban sustainability

Sustainability in housing complex revitalization: “Machi-zukuri” utilizing a scenario-based approach, Mitsuo Takada
Landscape planning and local governance to deliver sustainable development, Hisako Koura
Environmental governance of dwellings of a small-scale community along a historical alley in Kyoto City, Sachiko Morishige
Effects of mobility management on promoting the use of community buses managed by civic collaboration, Nobuhiko Matsumura
Public transport provided by local dwellers for maintaining their daily life, Hiroto Inoi
Towards sustainability... Through extensive and specific case studies this book comprehensively takes on governance sustainability in rural and urban areas. What is the prospect for sustainability of democratic local governance in countries confronted by a serious lack of governability? To what extent can the local level address health issues and change the determinants of health?


Chapter 6 Governance and Health in an Urban Setting: Key Factors and Challenges for Latin American Cities Walter G. Flores.