“Ping-Pong Diplomacy”:
The Historic Opening of Sino-American Relations during the Nixon Administration

Erik Bao
Senior Division
Paper
In 1970, relations between the United States and China were characterized by derisive propaganda, trade embargos, and mounting tension over international issues. In the ensuing forty years, the two countries developed into the two largest economies in the world, and the Sino-American liaison came to be described as the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century. The “ping-pong” diplomacy during the Nixon presidency encompassed the pivotal series of diplomatic events that successfully prompted an about-face in Sino-American politics as well as ripple effects spanning across the globe. Indeed, the resulting historic opening of relations between the United States and China carried enormously powerful overtones for the futures of both countries that persist to the present day.

It would be impossible to appreciate the significance of the ping-pong diplomacy without first understanding the decades of hostility between China and the United States that preceded it. After the shocking 1949 Communist Revolution in China, the United States refused to recognize the Communist People’s Republic and instead deemed the nationalist Republic of China (Taiwan) as the sole legitimate government of China. This pivotal point of discrepancy would be the primary dividing force up to and through the Nixon talks. In 1950, the United States withdrew all official personnel from China; no US official would return to China on a permanent basis until May of 1973.¹ Even then, tensions continued to grow. As a consequence of China’s direct involvement in the Korean War, the US government imposed a complete trade embargo with the People’s Republic of China and banned travel by Americans to China.² In 1964, President
Johnson proclaimed, “So long as the communist Chinese pursue conflict and preach violence, there can be and will be no easing of relationships…”

The relationship between the Soviet Union and China must also be analyzed because it is closely intertwined with China’s subsequent diplomacy with the United States. Ideological harmony between the two countries first began to dissipate in the latter half of the 1950s and later degraded to open hostility in the 1960s. Mao’s socialism centered on the countryside peasants rather than the Soviet tradition of the proletariat. Consequently, China and the Soviet Union believed in two different roads to socialism. Sino-Soviet tensions culminated in 1968 with the Brezhnev Doctrine, which proclaimed that Moscow held the right to bring any backsliding Communist state to heel by military force. As Henry Kissinger (Appendix 1), the National Security adviser to President Nixon, commented, “No Communist leader was then challenging Moscow’s doctrinal preeminence more rigorously than Mao. If the Brezhnev Doctrine […] had any obvious application, it was to Mao’s China.” Thus, China was seeking to defend against the Soviet threat along its borders, while the US was trying to unsettle Moscow enough to make Soviet leaders more interested in détente with the United States. These two diplomatic elements went perfectly hand-in-hand with a potential Sino-American pact.

Another motivating factor for the opening of Sino-American relations stemmed from the long-exhausted United States involvement in the Vietnam War. Nixon and Kissinger saw a visit to China as not only transforming relations with Peking but also “creating a diversion from Vietnam in this country for a while”. With the United States stuck in a bloody, drawn-out war that was experiencing mounting opposition nationwide, there was a hunger for a big foreign policy gain in the White House. In addition, Nixon hoped that communication with China would soften the Chinese to the idea of helping Hanoi come to acceptable peace treaty terms.
Finally, once the People’s Republic joined the security council of the United Nations, the US government decided it simply could not ignore the growing international presence of China any longer. In an address to the nation, Nixon aptly declared, “There can be no stable peace and enduring peace without the participation of the People’s Republic of China and its 750 million people.” Thus, the series of events leading up to the initial talks between the US and China were not from one, but rather a multitude of stimuli. On September 17, 1968, the US State Department sent a letter to the Chinese proposing a resumption of the virtually moribund ambassadorial-level talks. To the amazement of the US, the Chinese accepted.

Gradually, the two countries began to make cautious footsteps toward one another. In the summer of 1970, Kissinger instructed ambassador Vernon Walters in Paris to pass word to the Chinese embassy that the United States was prepared to hold secret talks. The flirtation continued on the public media stage. In response to Nixon’s September, 1970 interview in Time, when he said he wanted to visit China someday, Mao responded in a similar interview to Edgar Snow of Life, saying that he “would be happy to talk to him, either as a tourist or a president.”

Meanwhile, amidst Sino-US advances in politics, a masterpiece of diplomacy unfolded on the most unlikely stage. There was no expectation for a breakthrough in US-China relations to occur from either side at the April, 1971 World Table Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan. In fact, Chinese players were instructed not to initiate a greeting or conversation when encountering American delegates. But sometimes, chance has a keener eye for diplomacy than hard-nosed politicians. One afternoon following a match, US ping-pong player Glenn Cowan missed his team bus and instead hitched a ride with the Chinese to a nearby sight-seeing event. Chinese player Zhang Zedong initiated a conversation with Cowan, and afterwards the two exchanged souvenirs (Appendix 2).
When Chairman Mao read about the incident, he surprisingly complimented the Chinese player: “Zhang Zedong is not only a good ping-pong player, but also a diplomat. He is quite politically sensitive.”\(^\text{14}\) Two days later, Mao seized the opportunity by inviting the US team to tour China on April 10, 1971. When President Nixon learned of this, his reaction was equally pleasant: “I was as surprised as I was pleased by this news. I had never expected that the China initiative would come to fruition in the form of a ping-pong team.”\(^\text{15}\)

The table tennis players who visited China were amazed by the warm Chinese hospitality. On the first day, the team was welcomed by Premier Zhou Enlai in the Great Hall of the People. One of Zhou’s first lines toward the Americans attested to the momentous occasion: “You have opened a new chapter in the relations of the American and Chinese people.”\(^\text{16}\) Later that day, 18,000 people gathered in Beijing’s indoor stadium to watch an exhibition table tennis match between the two teams.\(^\text{17}\) Though the United States players suffered a brutal defeat to the Chinese table tennis team, the exhibition match was insignificant compared to the greater outcomes of the US trip, which succeeded to serve as a catalyst paving the way for future visits by Kissinger and Nixon.

In June, 1971, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai invited a US envoy to China to discuss the Taiwan question and the Sino-Soviet dispute. When Kissinger received this long-sought message, he presented it to Nixon. “This,” Kissinger said, “is the most important communication that has come to an American president since the end of World War II.”\(^\text{18}\) The National Security Council jumped at the opportunity, and Nixon scheduled Henry Kissinger to make the first visit to the Beijing capital on July 9, 1971.\(^\text{19}\) The most important goal for Kissinger was to set a future meeting date between Mao and Nixon.\(^\text{20}\) In Nixon’s autobiography, the president recalls, “Because of the need for secrecy, […] we agreed on a single codeword – Eureka – which he
would use if the presidential trip had been arranged.” On July 11, two days after the meeting, Kissinger sent the President a one-word cable: “Eureka”.21

Nixon’s trip to China would prove to be a historic event. The stakes were extremely high: on February 19, 1972, Kissinger reminded White House aides, “Everything we are doing with Moscow” and to “end the Vietnam War” hinged on the China trip.22 The visit lasted from February 21-28, with Kissinger accompanying the president.23 On the day of arrival, a Kodak moment occurred between Nixon and Mao. In Nixon’s memoirs, he recalls with clarity: “The transcript of the conversation did not capture the most moving moment, when [Mao] reached out his hand, and I reached out mine, and he held it for about a minute” (Appendix 3).24 During the ensuing talks, there was a serious exchange of views on Sino-US relations and international affairs mixed with cordial dinners and sightseeing tours (Appendix 4). The two sides took the chance to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues that had been left untouched for the past twenty-two years.25

The resulting document procured from the talks during Nixon’s visit was titled the Shanghai Communiqué. This historic diplomatic document outlined the mutual goals of both countries and their views on several issues. First, the communiqué expressed the “mutual desire between China and the US for further exchange in science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism.” They also agreed “to facilitate the progressive development of trade between each other.”26 Secondly, both condemned hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region by any country.27 This tacit warning, as described by Nixon, “subtly but unmistakably made it clear that we both would oppose efforts by the USSR or any other major power to dominate Asia.”28 Finally, the communiqué addressed the positions of China and the United States on the political status of Taiwan, stating it was “the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between
China and the United States. The Chinese firmly maintained that “Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland”, and that “China wanted the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan.” Conversely, the United States stance was far more equivocal. The Communiqué read, “[The] United States did not challenge the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China.” The United States acknowledged the presence of one unified China, but did not specify which governing body it recognized. Termed by Kissinger as “constructive ambiguity”, this awkward diplomatic position resulted from US hopes to both continue its tenured support for the Nationalist-led Taiwan and foster new relations with the Communist People’s Republic. Indeed, the statement procured from Kissinger’s ambiguity was the only viable middle road to be taken by the United States. At the conclusion of the historic China summit, Nixon proclaimed the famous words, “In the years ahead, we will build a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility which have divided us in the past. We have been here a week. This was the week that changed the world.”

In retrospect, several important consequences resulted from the diplomacy between the United States and China in the early 1970s. Taiwan was devastated and convinced of a huge United States sellout. Though the communiqué did not explicitly have the United States support the People’s Republic governing both Taiwan and China, the greater likelihood that Beijing rather than Taipei would control “one China” made the Nationalists unhappy with the document. Likewise, China was disgruntled with America’s continued military support of Taiwan. The political status of Taiwan was a diplomatic obstacle that the two sides failed to reach a consensus on during the 1972 talks. To this day, Sino-American tensions persist over this question. However, this was a necessary failure in order for the other aspects of the 1972 communiqué – including economic, immigration, and international relations – to fall through.
A second major disappointment from the US standpoint regarding the ping-pong diplomacy was its failure to persuade China to negotiate peace talks in Vietnam. Nixon’s diplomatic efforts resulted in no concrete promises by the Chinese on the war. Two weeks before the February 21 meeting date, Nixon and Kissinger had made an attempt to arrange a meeting with the North Vietnamese negotiator on Chinese soil during the Nixon visit. Chinese officials frostily rejected this request. Zhou Enlai plainly stated to the Americans, “As long as you are continuing your Vietnamization policy, and as long as they continue fighting, we can do nothing but continue to support them.” Nixon recalled, “In [Zhou’s] opinion, the later we withdrew from Vietnam, the more difficult and unsatisfactory the withdrawal would be for us. He knew the tenacity of the North Vietnamese.” Thus, Nixon quickly came to recognize that his opening of China would not bring about one of his original goals: help for a negotiated peace settlement in Vietnam.

Despite setbacks in the Vietnam and Taiwanese theatres, ping-pong diplomacy succeeded in forcing the Soviet Union to adopt a far more accommodating frame of mind. The opening of Sino-American relations pressured Moscow to impede a possible joint agreement aimed against Russia, thus largely tempering Soviet tension with China and instigating a major step toward the US proposal of détente. Sure enough, just two months after the China visit, Nixon’s trip to Moscow in May, 1972 resulted in the first ever nuclear arms limitations agreement (SALT I treaty) between the two powerhouse countries of the Cold War. Evidently, the ping-pong diplomacy held far more outreaching effects than within the confines of China and the United States alone.

Perhaps the most significant consequence of China’s opening, and the outcome that ultimately makes the “ping-pong diplomacy” a long-term success, was the birth of China’s giant
economy. The opening of liaison offices in the spring of 1973 would prove to be instrumental in restoring trade, facilitating diplomatic machinery, and increasing channels of communication. Less than a decade after ping-pong diplomacy, China began to introduce aspects of a capitalist economic system; its economy showed average growth rates of 10% each year afterwards. Up to this day, the extent of the ties between the Chinese and US economies is staggering: as of 2010, China was the largest foreign exporter in the world, with a full 20% of its exports shipped to the United States. China was also the largest foreign owner of US treasuries. Kissinger, in comparing China before and after the ping-pong diplomacy, stated: “The latter-day bustling cities, numbing traffic jams, and an emergent consumer society were inconceivable in the days when China was a world unto itself of stagnating industry, drab agricultural communes, and a vast population garbed in standard uniform.”

Richard Nixon’s foreign policy in China was nicknamed the “ping-pong” diplomacy for two reasons. The literal sense of the term ping-pong diplomacy – the visit by the US table tennis team – served as just one cog in the wheel that eventually led to the normalization between the United States and China. But from a figurative perspective, just like the political situation at hand, the sport of ping-pong focused on delicate skill. Its onomatopoeic name implied an interplay of initiative and response. In every sense, it served as an apt metaphor for the relations between Washington and Peking during the Nixon era. Through this ping-pong diplomacy, Nixon effectively ended two decades of China-US isolation and cut through one of the great knots of international politics in the twentieth century.
Figure 1: President Nixon conferred with Henry A. Kissinger in 1972, after the presidential adviser returned from secret negotiations in Paris. Kissinger served as Nixon’s right-hand man in foreign policy in the 1970s. From “How Not to End Another President’s War” by The New York Times.
Appendix II

Figure 2: A gift from Zhuang to Cowan helped lead to a U.S.-China exhibition in Beijing and the end of 22 years of Chinese isolation from the West. From China Pictorial Supplement by the International Table Tennis Federation.
Appendix III

Figure 3: Chairman Mao and President Nixon exchange a historic handshake, a gesture of cordiality that had been absent for two decades. From “When Nixon Met Mao” by Time Magazine.
Appendix IV:

Figure 4: President Nixon and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, left, in Shanghai at the end of Nixon’s visit. From “Nixon and Mao” by *The New York Times*. 
Endnotes


2. Ibid., 4.


4. Holdridge, 12.

5. Ibid., 23.


14. Mao Zedong, quoted in Hong, 437.


18. Dallek, 333.

20. Liu, Zhenkun, personal interview, 10 April 2011.


30. Ibid., 285.

31. Ibid.

32. Lilley, 164-165.


34. Dallek, 333.

35. Tyler, 143.


38. Mann, 39.


40. Dallek, 293.


43. Buss, 87.


Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources


John Holdridge was an American Foreign Service officer and diplomat who participated alongside Henry Kissinger in the secret talks with Premier Zhou Enlai. He travelled with Kissinger in the secret trip of July, 1971 and was involved in the CIA cover-up. Thus, his book provided an insider’s account on the normalization of US-China relations. The book was very helpful in describing the meetings between Kissinger and Zhou.


This is the autobiography of Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser. Kissinger was actually the leading figure in the first two visits to China, and in his memoirs he writes about the relations between the two sides leading up to Nixon’s opening as well as his personal experiences during the trips. This was also extremely useful as a source of quotes and information.


Dr. Kwan works as a professor at the University of Cincinnati. He received a PhD from Stanford University and specializes in modern Chinese history. I met with him on campus, and asked him questions about the impact of Nixon’s diplomacy in China on economics today. He was helpful in providing statistics and ties between the US and Chinese that reflected the significance of the Chinese economy in the present day.


This document features Jan Carol Berris, the Vice President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, interviewing Beijing Review reporter Chen Wen about her experience during the US table tennis team’s visit to China. It was used to provide a broad overview of the events that occurred during the visit and how it changed citizen life in China. It provided shallow generalizations, and did not go very in-depth.


James Lilley participated in Richard Nixon’s opening to China as the CIA’s first station chief in Peking. At the time, Lilley was the country’s leading intelligence officer in China. He also served as the intelligence officer in the US liaison office in Beijing. Lilley’s book on the history of Sino-American diplomacy provided an insider’s account
for me. Since he served in the CIA, this source was helpful in researching about a perspective separate from the National Security Council, which was where Kissinger worked.

Liu, Zhenkun. Personal Interview. 10 April 2011.

I interviewed my grandfather, who was forty years old and living in Xi An, China at the time of the ping pong diplomacy. He talked about the impact of the American visit on the general population in China. He recalls that Chinese news broadcasters specifically instructed Chinese citizens to treat all visiting Americans with respect. Although Zhenkun did not personally meet any Americans, his information was still very helpful in describing the national home front of China during the historic event.


This document is the autobiography of Richard Nixon. The memoirs of Richard Nixon contain his personal commentary on all the events during the Sino-American diplomacy as well as many diary entries that he wrote at the time of the events. The memoirs were extremely helpful because they provided lots of information that were unavailable anywhere else, and it was a great source of quotes from Nixon.


This document was a 12-page, extensive news article documenting in detail the events of the US table tennis team’s tour of China. It was very helpful because it described everything that the team did from the start of the trip to the finish on a day-to-day basis.


This is the exact text of the official Shanghai Communique that was issued at the conclusion of Nixon’s China visit. This document outlines the viewpoints of the United States and China on several important issues, as well as their mutual desires for normalization in the future. This primary source was helpful in examining the outcome of Nixon’s visit.


This was a transcript of a statement by Nixon on United States-China relations to the nation. In this address, Nixon emphasizes the need to acknowledge China’s presence on the world stage, and several quotes were taken from this article in my paper.

This document was a brief news article from Time magazine, published in 1971, just days after the US table tennis team visited Beijing. Two of the journalists who accompanied the team on the trip described the Chinese people that they saw. Their descriptions voiced surprise at the warm hospitality from the Chinese citizens and the clean and efficient system of Chinese society. A more extensive article would have been preferred, but the information in this article was helpful for learning the initial reactions by the Americans toward the Chinese.


From the Nixon Virtual Library online, I was able to listen to actual recordings of Nixon regarding his trip to China. The recordings provided me with an aspect of research that the transcripts, quotations, and descriptions could not: the tone of Nixon’s voice. I found it very helpful to listen to the enthusiasm and inflection of Nixon’s voice when discussing Chinese foreign policy at various stages of the diplomacy.

**Secondary Sources**


This is a short book that goes over the history from the rise of China’s Communist party to its condition in the early 1970s. Since the book was published in 1974, it was not useful in providing information regarding the long-term impact of Nixon’s diplomacy. However, it provided insight as to the theories and feelings toward the diplomacy in the immediate years following the event. In this sense, it almost served as a primary source, as it was written by authors who were living and experiencing the event as it unfolded.


This book centers on the specific relationship between Richard Nixon and his adviser, Henry Kissinger, during his presidency. This book benefited me by shedding light on the tacit competition that the two held during the Sino-American diplomacy to try and take the most credit for themselves.

This article investigates the role of ordinary individuals, both Chinese and American, in the formulation, implementation and promotion of Ping Pong diplomacy. It was helpful because it went very in-depth in information regarding the media’s impact on the diplomacy as well as the table tennis team’s reaction.


This book focuses on Kissinger’s policies during 1973, a pivotal year in the country’s postwar history. I used this source for its in-depth information on the two trips Kissinger made to Beijing prior to Nixon’s visit. It was helpful in the details of the logistics of the trip.


This is an extensive biography of Henry Kissinger, detailing his life starting from childhood. Since it covered such a broad array of topics, Kissinger’s role in China was only a brief section.


This was a radio interview on National Public Radio featuring Margaret MacMillan, the author of *Nixon and Mao*. In the interview, MacMillan gave a brief overview of the Sino-American diplomacy. The interview was not very in-depth.


This book focuses on the people and diplomacy that shaped relations between the United States and China from Nixon to Clinton. The most useful asset of this book was that it contained the text of several hand-written notes by Nixon at the time of his visits. These were not found anywhere else and they helped me understand the thought process of Nixon.


This is a brief book review article about the book *Nixon and Mao*, written by Margaret Macmillan. At the beginning of the article, there was an overview of the topic, along with some useful quotes. It was helpful in providing some quotes by Nixon.


This source is a book that investigates the history of six US presidents and their relations with China. I used this source solely for its information on Nixon and China. I found the
source to be very informative and it was very helpful in describing the background and consequences to Nixon’s foreign policy in China.
Ping-pong diplomacy, what was important about ping-pong diplomacy Ping-pong diplomacy Chinese:乒乓外交 PĀ̂ng pēng wö into refers to the exchange of table tennis ping-pong players between the United States and People's Republic of China PRC in the early 1970s. The event marked a thaw in Sino-American relations that paved the way to a visit to Beijing by President Richard Nixon.

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1 History
2 Nixon attending a ping-pong exhibition in Beijing
3 Main article: 1972 Nixon visit to China
5 Mathews, Jay "The Strange Tale of American Attempts to Leap the Wall of China" The New York Times, 18 April 1971. the ping-pong diplomacy in American foreign policy. iıöe study allowed to. determine reasons for the need to employ sport in order to establish closer relations between two hostile actors of international relations. necessary to shortly present historical context of the Sino-American relations. iıöe were deeply influenced by the civil war in China between the communists led by Mao Tse-Tung (Mâo Zèdùng) and the nationalist Kuomintang’s government led by Chi Ping-Pong Diplomacy Richard Nixon’s Presidential Decision to Enact Sino-American Relations. David Kain January 1, 2013 AP Government Period Eight. The term ping-pong diplomacy itself is derived from the odd circumstance in which a Sino-American diplomatic relationship was formed during President Richard Nixon’s term in office. The true significance of Nixon’s Chinese diplomacy cannot be fully appreciated without first comprehending the decades of Chinese-American hostility that preceded it. In 1949 a communist revolution took hold in China, and as the Communist People’s Republic of China obtained power the United States refused to recognize the party and instead deemed the nationalist Republic of China (Taiwan) as the sole legitimate government of China.