GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM IN EDUCATION

EDITED BY DAVID COULBY AND EVIE ZAMBETA
What is the role of education in developing global knowledge and culture?

What is its relationship with the new knowledge economy?

Is there scope for resistance to globalization or nationalism?

The volume deals with two major and apparently opposing forces within education and society: globalization and nationalism.

Globalization is often considered in economic terms—of continued growth of international trade and a concentration of wealth in corporate hands—yet it also encompasses technological, political and cultural change. The World Yearbook of Education 2005 explores the role of the education sector in our globalized knowledge economy, and considers the political implications of this in terms of monopolarity and the cultural consequences of homogenization and Americanization.

The other strand of this study—nationalism—remains a persistent force within education and society in all parts of the world, and this volume examines the extent to which it can fuel conflict at all levels through prejudice and intolerance. Concentrating on the epistemological consequences of nationalism, leading international thinkers examine the extent to which it is reflected in the curricula of schools and universities around the world.

Finally, the complex relationship between globalization and nationalism is explored, and contributors analyse the part that educational institutions and practices play in forming both agendas. A wide range of perspectives are employed, including post-colonial discourse, classical economics and sociological theory.

Nationalism and globalization are both ongoing processes, and this volume makes a case for the central role of education in both—through its potential to influence change and to act as a benevolent force in shaping a global community.

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GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM IN EDUCATION
Edited by David Coulby and Evie Zambeta
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Series editors’ introduction

This volume on *Globalization and Nationalism in Education* follows on from last year’s *Yearbook on Digital Technology, Communities & Education*. Like that volume, it addresses rapidly changing technical and social phenomena and assesses their impact on education. More than that volume, but like many of its predecessors, this book brings together a huge social process with its associated theorizing and places them alongside developments in schools and universities as they become more aspects of production than consumption. The authors have to handle the shifting perspective from global economic and political forces to curricular and organizational changes in institutions.

The volume, like others in the series, draws on a wealth of different national perspectives. This is important not only in providing analyses of different institutional contexts, but also in drawing on differences in the ways in which globalization and its impact on education is being perceived and theorized in different states.

An important theme of the book is the trend towards the globalization of knowledge. This is manifested in many ways, the most evident perhaps being the shift to English as the first foreign language throughout the world. The authors also draw attention to the globalization of medical diagnosis of special educational needs and to the globalization of the notion of the superiority of European civilization and its origins in Classical Greece. Asked on one occasion what he thought of European civilization, Gandhi replied that he thought it would be a good idea.

The volume introduces authors who will play a significant part in the future of the *World Yearbooks of Education*. Jenny Ozga, Terri Seddon and Evie Zambeta will be taking on roles as Series Editors and Editors in the future. We wish them well.

David Coulby and Crispin Jones
Bath, 2004
Introduction

Trends in globalization
David Coulby and Evie Zambeta

This volume deals with two major and apparently opposing forces within education and society, globalization and nationalism.

Globalization is seen in primarily economic terms with the increase in international trade and the concentration of wealth into corporate hands. The political implications of this in terms of monopolarity and the cultural consequences in terms of homogenization and Americanization are also examined. Educational institutions themselves are part of this process of globalization because of their central role in the development of the knowledge economy (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). Chapter 9 analyses the social and epistemological consequences of the emergence of the knowledge economy for teaching and education. Chapter 8 analyses the global homogenization of the categories of special educational needs and the idealization of the policy of inclusion.

Nationalism remains a persistent force within education and society in all parts of the world (as explored in Chapters 3, 4 and 13). The volume recognizes the extent to which this fuels conflict at all levels through racism, religious conflict, prejudice against refugees and ultimately warfare. It concentrates on the epistemological consequences of nationalism as this is reflected in the curricula of schools and universities.

The volume attempts to explore the conflict between these two forces of globalization and nationalism. It also seeks to develop theoretical positions within which educational institutions and practices can be understood to participate in both the forces and the conflict. It does this within the understanding of post-colonial discourse theory (see Chapters 13 and 14) as well as more classical economic and sociological positions. Education itself is becoming globalized and is an essential component of the wider process. The volume, therefore, examines the technologies and knowledge characteristics which underpin this process.

A core example which the volume uses in terms of a globalized epistemology and consequent curricular impact is that of Greece. The activities, achievements and modes of organization of fourth-century Athens have had an astonishing impact on what is perceived to be knowledge, government and beauty in large parts of the world. The volume examines this achievement in detail (in Chapters 10 and 11) as a colonial construct in the case of Greece itself, and then Europe and the wider world. The fabrication of Greece presents a potent example of the globalization of history, ethics, politics and culture.

The volume concludes by recognizing nationalism and indeed colonialism as ongoing processes. It assesses the importance of educational institutions within a globalized economy. It recognizes the importance of education in generating change at the level of the individual consciousness and asks how far this provides any agency for resistance against the two forces which the book has discussed.
As has been noted, globalization is a primarily economic phenomenon which is largely facilitated by encompassing changes in technology. Globalization also has, however, political and cultural aspects. These aspects are obviously interrelated, so the headings used below are offered as a mode of discussion rather than an explanatory typology. This chapter discusses these trends in turn and concludes with an introduction to anti-globalization movements and thinking. Though in this analysis globalization is by no means treated as an uncontested concept, it is nevertheless considered as a set of overwhelming processes that are being witnessed in contemporary societies.

Economic trends

One set of arguments that identify a pattern of economic globalization concern the absolute increase in world trade. Goods, capital, people and ideas are seen to be moving in greater quantities and with greater speed between ever expanding areas of the globe. In fact the empirical basis of this contention has been contested with economic historians pointing to the belle époque period before the First World War as a time of even greater economic integration than that of the early twenty-first century (Held and McGrew, 2000b; Held and McGrew, 2002; Hobsbawm, 1962, 1987, 1994).

While on one hand globalization is perceived as an enhancement of global interdependence, there is much scepticism as to the extent to which this phenomenon is now more evident than it used to be in the belle époque period at the end of the nineteenth century, when the big empires were giving way to the so-called nation-states. There is a substantial literature however arguing that ‘globalisation is a myth’ (such as in Held and McGrew, 2002b), while the real political agenda is that of a creation of a global market which enhances capitalism and generates Americanization and neoliberal policy. This argument suggests that the phenomenon which is now perceived as globalization is a continuity in the development of capitalist relations rather than a genuinely new stage of capitalism. Despite this scepticism, there is less ambiguity with regard to the fact that we are witnessing a process of growing linkage between different national economies and societies. For those who see the historical argument as inadequate to explain the present, globalization is not a synonym for imperialism. While imperialism has been considered as a political, geographical and economic expansion that led to internationalization, globalization affects the whole range of human activity, within and beyond the boundaries of the nation-state (Kotzias, 2003).

The present internationalization of the economy and the market is, however, qualitatively different from that of the belle époque. Indeed the major patterns of world trade are not currently represented by increased movement across all states of the globe but rather by enhanced trade between the triadic economic powers of Japan, the USA and the European Union (EU) (Photopoulos, 2002). Furthermore, those opposed to globalization emphasize that its benefits have largely accrued to the triad states. Although a few states have managed to leap in the post-First World War period to the status of more economically developed countries (MEDCs)—Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia and Thailand—the actual gap between the richest and poorest people in the world has actually increased steadily during this period. If globalization is happening it is resulting in an enhancement of global economic
inequality. Many states have seen their relative and absolute economic status decline in the period of globalization: Zimbabwe, Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Romania and Bulgaria. At the same time the numbers of people living in absolute poverty have reduced in the last quarter of a century due primarily to the growing prosperity of India and China with their vast populations (Wolf, 2003).

There are two trends which less disputably point towards a shift to economic globalization: first, the movement towards an international organization of production, distribution and consumption; and, second, the increasing importance of economic and trade-related issues in international affairs. Classic examples of the globalization of production, distribution and consumption are training shoes or cars. But the process may be seen also in the generation of less tangible assets such as films, non-governmental organization (NGOs) or university Masters’ programmes. A car may be designed in the UK, with its machine tools and assembly production units designed and built in Germany, and its actual assembly taking place in São Paulo or Shenzhen. An advertising and marketing strategy is then put together in New York featuring a Russian model or Brazilian footballer to support the car’s ultimate distribution in the EU and North America. A specialist Master’s programme in the application of information and communication technology (ICT) to geophysics may be developed jointly by two universities in the UK and the USA. In fact the target student group for this programme is mainly outside both these countries. It sets up an international pattern of recruitment especially from South Asian countries. A few years down the track it has introductory (pre-Masters’) courses in place in institutions in Thailand, China and Indonesia. One of these actually then becomes a centre for the main programme, sending its lecturers to the UK and USA universities on Ph.D. programmes. At this point the degree course has become both a global venture and a significant element in world trade.

This process was previously seen as a ‘new international division of labour’ (Frobel et al., 1988); however, Castells has argued that it is not a straightforward process of exporting simple manufacturing functions to less economically developed countries (LEDCs) (Castells, 1989, 1996, 1997, 1998). Rather, particular areas within MEDCs and LEDCs take on functions of design, capitalization, manufacture and distribution without any particular hierarchy. That is not to assert that some regions and states are not richer than others: Nagoya, Munich and southern California represent remarkable concentrations of wealth. But elements of impoverishment are to be found in these areas too. Those regions in both LEDCs and MEDCs which are excluded from this process of the advanced division of labour experience high levels of economic marginalization and impoverishment: this applies as much to the rust belt of the USA as to rural western China.

To turn to the second issue of the increased importance of trade-related issues in international affairs, this has obviously been consolidated by the completion of the Uruguay round and the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 (Wilkinson, 2002). Impoverishment and debt have led many LEDCs to seek assistance from the World Bank. This has often been conditional upon the adoption of structural adjustment policies which have entailed the reduction of public spending on areas such as health and education and the privatization of nationally owned facilities such as power, telephones or water distribution (Hertz, 2001). While this has given countries such as Kenya or the Philippines an appearance of enhanced capitalism, it has actually served to
increase both inequality and actual impoverishment in these states. The effects of globalization in such states has been radically to transform both local economic conditions and also the nature of domestic politics. In the triad states the impact of trade on international relations has involved the exacerbation of trade disputes and their referral to the WTO. Thus between the EU and the USA there are currently major disputes concerning agricultural subsidies, steel subsidies, genetically modified foods, which the EU refuses to import, and hormone-fed beef which again the EU will not touch. So far these disputes have led not only to WTO arbitration but also to the threatened imposition of trade bans on luxury imports from the EU by the USA. The possibility of serious trade wars between the triad states is emerging. The WTO sought to incorporate yet another tranche of economic activity within its reach (Kelk and Worth, 2002), but at the Cancun meeting in 2003 these proposals were rejected and indeed the future of the whole Doha round was thrown into jeopardy. The crucial grouping of China, Brazil and India may suggest the beginning of organized international resistance to Western (triad) enforced globalization.

There is, of course, a sense in which actual trade wars are already happening. Recent events in Iraq have served to put the control of the world’s second biggest oilfield in the hands of the USA and the UK. While this may not have been motivated by short-term gain, medium-term control of this resource was surely the main reason for intervention (Rampton and Stauber, 2003; Ritter and Pitt, 2002; Traynor, 2003). Similarly, military intervention by the USA in Panama and Columbia has been intended to control the trade of the second most valuable global commodity, illegal drugs.

The broadening in the unequal distribution of power and wealth and the monopolarity which characterizes the processes of globalization lead to much scepticism with regard to its actual meaning. It is argued that the economic policy which is adopted in most of the states worldwide is in fact a neoliberal political agenda rather than an irresistible imperative of globalization. The attack on public services at an international level is interpreted as an ideological position and not as an inevitable choice (Negreponti-Delivanis, 2001; Vergopoulos, 1999). These policies are usually legitimised on the basis of the widely recognized need to raise the economy’s potential for competitiveness on a global scale. However, for the opponents of the neoliberal agenda, the policy which underpins the competitiveness of the economy mainly serves the end of capital accumulation while it undermines the position of labour.

As a few commodities become crucial to economic success, developments in technology mean that knowledge is becoming an increasingly important element both in world trade and in economic power (Burton-Jones, 1999; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2001; Neef, 1998; Stewart, 1997; Thurow, 1999; Witchit Srisa-an, 2000). A country’s position in the global competitive economic environment is largely dependent on its capacity to develop a growth strategy that allows it to participate in the international arena through highly specialized products whose share in global trade increases. It should be noted, however, that despite the ongoing process of de-industrialization since the 1970s, 57 per cent of global economic transactions still represents industrial products. Car manufacturing may not be a knowledge-intensive activity any more, compared to nanotechnology for instance, but cars continue to be desirable consumer goods in the global market. Nevertheless, certain countries, such as Singapore or Finland, have managed to change their place in the global economy and become more competitive...
through investment in the knowledge base of their economy and the production of highly 
specialized new technology. In this technology, automation system design and global 
marketing, for instance, are emerging as more significant elements within the knowledge 
economy than the simple bulk manufacture of products such as cars.

The first list of important knowledge areas for trade is relatively obvious:

• ICT technology and programmes;
• pharmaceuticals;
• military technology;
• aerospace;
• materials technology and nanotechnology;
• genetic engineering.

A second list of at least equally important knowledge processes and creations may be less 
evident:

• international legal services (almost exclusively based on the eastern seaboard of the 
  USA) (Gabel and Bruner, 2003);
• fashion and design (one of the UK’s most economically significant exports to Japan);
• music;
• television, film and computer games;
• marketing and advertising;
• university level education (Davis, 2003).

The development of the knowledge economy is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2; at this 
point it is only necessary to note that the capacity for knowledge generation and 
utilization may be as economically significant to a state or region (Silicon Valley, 
Cambridge University and Science Park) as a major manufacturing capacity or extractive 
capacity.

The final point to emphasize in terms of economic trends (and indeed to cultural 
trends) is that the process is not only one way from MEDCs to LEDCs. The Bangalore 
region of India is already an important site for the development of specialist software and 
other ICT services as well as relocated call centres serving the UK. Taiwan has more 
sophisticated chip production facilities than any state in the EU. Cairo and Mumbai, as 
well as Hollywood and London, are important sites in the production and distribution of 
film and television (Crane et al., 2002). The development of the network society allows 
the emergence of a new hierarchy not only between states, but also between urban 
environments and clever regions that do not always belong to the triad states (Chalaris, 
2003). Parts of New Delhi, Rio and Lagos can be competitive partners in this new social 
geography of difference. China’s economic emergence, symbolized by its joining the 
WTO in 2002, is resulting in the focusing of design, manufacture and distribution in 
centres such as Shanghai, Shenzen and Hong Kong. This economic potential is related to 
the fact that China has achieved a massive growth rate within the last decade which is 
also depicted in the explosion of the numbers of Chinese students who attend highly 
ranked universities around the world (Negreponti-Delivanis, 2001).
Technological trends

Technological trends concern principally developments in ICT and transportation. These trends and their associated characteristics are dealt with in Chapter 1. In some ways it is the developments in technology that have facilitated the economic trends outlined above. It was innovations in ICT that enabled electronic financial transactions to be made, thereby allowing trading in shares, currencies, commodities, futures and other more complex products to take place at lightning speed across the globe. The establishment of three major exchanges in New York, London and Tokyo means that these massive flows of capital are carried on on a twenty-four-hour basis. Further developments have allowed the international outsourcing of functions as various as design, call centres, accountancy, publishing, and undergraduate and postgraduate study.

Developments in transportation have been apparently less dramatic in the final third of the twentieth century. Three important trends need to be identified as they are influential on the economic and cultural changes outlined above: first, the current and incipient expansion of air travel; second, the selective but substantial investment in high speed trains; and, third, the reduction in the price of sea freight. Air travel has become available more widely and cheaply. There is a current expansion in the size and number of airports as well as the general lengthening of runways needed to accommodate the new, huge Airbus. For all the virtual exchanges of communication represented by ICT developments, there is also an increase in the number and frequency and, to a lesser extent, distance of people moving. These movements represent more than myopic tourism; they are also the entrepreneurs of the global economy keeping in contact with their market, suppliers, agent and partners as well as the students and other knowledge entrepreneurs seeking a profit by moving information and skills from one site to another. High-speed trains offer the possibility of moving many more people almost equally as fast as jet travel and directly from city centre to city centre. The large investment they represent is perhaps a predictor of the future growth areas of the global economy. In the past this was certainly the case of the Shinkansen running down the east coast of Honshu from Tokyo, through Osaka to Hiroshima. Recent high-speed links include those from Hamburg to Berlin, from Shanghai to Pudong and from the Channel Tunnel to Marseilles. The Japanese experimental maglev train has reached 361 miles per hour in trials. Third, and finally, containers and bulk shipping have led to a substantial reduction in the cost of sea freight. Thus, a bottle of Australian or Chilean wine can now be bought in English supermarkets for the price of its French competitor. All these three technological developments have unprecedented effects and potential in the transformation of the basis of the economy and the mode of human transactions.

Political trends

For many exponents of globalization theory, the major impact of globalization has been in the weakening of the state itself. Many transnational corporations (TNCs) now have a larger annual income than many states. The list of the world’s largest economies shows,
not unexpectedly, the USA, Japan, Germany, the UK and France as the first five. China is already sixth and rising. At number 21, though, the organization is not a state but a company, ExxonMobil, just ahead of Turkey at 22. Then follows Wal-Mart, then Austria. A country such as Portugal comes in at number 48, well behind Ford, BP and Toyota (Gabel and Bruner, 2003).

The power of the TNCs originates from their existence in the market place rather than in geographical space. The boundaries and jurisdiction of the state are no longer determinants of the practices of these massive corporations. With their ability to mobilize vast resources, and their wide technological and knowledge capacity, they are able to be innovative and act at a speed and scale far beyond most states and at a rate the world has never seen before (Gabel and Bruner, 2003). Indeed, this is one of the crucial differences between the belle époque and the present time. The major issue is not whether the number of the TNCs increases, which of course is happening (in 1914 there were 3,000 multinational corporations (MNCs), whereas in 2000 there were 63,000), but the power they exercise. In the 1990s the 500 top-listed MNCs had under their control 70 per cent of global trade, 80 per cent of total foreign investment and 30 per cent of the global GDP (Photopoulos, 2002). At the same time inequality is increasing both within and between states.

Many states have had to surrender elements of their domestic policy when they seek financial assistance from the World Bank. Smaller states desperate for foreign direct investment will establish tax-free trade zones, offer subsidies or long tax holidays to potential investors and often turn a blind eye to illegal labour exploitation practices and pollutive and degenerative environmental misuse (Klein, 2001, 2002). Indeed this competition to attract the investment of large TNCs is by no means confined to small, economically weak states: competition between the states of the EU for new investment in manufacturing, such as Japanese or US car plants, or in large cultural/recreative facilities, such as Euro Disney, can be vigorous and long-lasting. Some theorists have gone as far as to describe ‘Captive states’ (in this case the UK) (Monbiot, 2001), where political power is no longer held by formal governments responsible to the electorate.

The role of the state, in the context of globalization, is contested. While there is strong evidence that international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the WTO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have the power directly to intervene and control the growth strategies of some states, at the same time the state remains the mediating institution of political control. Nevertheless, the power of states could be perceived as being hollowed out in significant ways. Global governance is considered as ‘multilayered’ (Held and McGrew, 2002b) because it is constituted by and through a complexity of several agents and distinct governing mechanisms which operate at different levels:

• the suprastate (such as the United Nations (UN) system, the OECD, the World Bank or the IMF);
• the regional, such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern Common Market in Latin America (MERCOSUR), The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see next paragraph for details);
• the transnational (i.e. the TNCs or the anti-globalization movement);
• the sub-state (such as local government or corporate interests); in some contexts the sub-state is of high visibility as the power of nationalism provokes division in Spain,
Belgium, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Russia (Chechnya), Iraq, Indonesia (East Timor) and the United Kingdom.

The parallel function and interconnection of these different layers of governance act as major constraints which are sandwiching the state. Global governance, however, develops a variable geometry in which the regulatory capacities of certain agencies or the relative power of certain states vary significantly. While Kenya or Latvia are highly vulnerable to the impacts of global institutions, China is highly resistant and the USA, as the single hyperpower, virtually invulnerable. The role of the latter, in particular, is of vital importance in the shaping of the international economic and political order, a role that has been performed either by the USA’s paralysing absence or enthusiastic involvement in certain procedures. The WTO, for example, owes its creation to post-Second World War efforts to develop a liberal compromise for managing the global economy, an attempt that has been indisputably steered by the USA (Wilkinson, 2002).

The emerging system of global governance is thus characterized by spheres of authority with compliance-generating capacities (Rosenau, 2002). During the past decades, and especially after the end of the Cold War, there has been an immense reconfiguration of power and authority that has led to a new complex mode of governing. Domestic policies usually involve negotiation between the state and diverse agencies of both a public and private nature located within and beyond the state. In this process the state becomes the steering mechanism which facilitates globalization. It should be noted, however, that the state may have a strategic role but not necessarily the dominant one (Held and McGrew, 2002b). While national government, however, derives legitimacy through constitutional frameworks and representation systems, global governance lacks accountability. (For further analysis of the complexities of global governance see Chapter 5.) Questions of legitimacy, such as who rules, in whose benefit, by what mechanisms, and for what purposes, are of crucial importance and feed public discontent regarding politics. Global politics, for instance, seem to be more energetic with regard to performing what has been defined as humanitarian or anti-terrorist wars than combating hunger, poverty, Aids or global warming (Pogge, 2001). Furthermore, there is much scepticism regarding whether global, regional, national or local rules should prevail as the regulatory principles. To what extent corporations, local or national governments are eligible to decide on waste or water resources management, pollution regulations or public health issues remains disputed. The extent to which global governance can be legitimized on principles that claim universal validity is a problematic issue (Charalambis, 1998).

The emergence of international (sometimes called regional) organizations is a trend which apparently serves to weaken the role of the state. The EU is obviously the most developed of these. It now encompasses not only a barrier-free trade and labour area but, for most of its members, a single currency, the euro. The adoption of the European Declaration of Human Rights as binding legislation in all 25 countries has resulted in a further level of subordination of individual states as European legislation now takes precedence over domestic law in all countries for many areas of policy. A parallel economic regional organization, NAFTA, comprising Canada, the USA and Mexico, is gathering influence and importance. There are discussions being held to expand it into the whole of the American continent. This development is being vigorously resisted by local (and, not least, anti-globalization) groups in many states of South America, such as Brazil.
and Venezuela. A parallel organization (ASEAN) has emerged in Southeast Asia. As these regional groups both expand to include new states and strengthen and deepen their internal regulation, then the authority of individual states is inevitably diminished.

The implications of this for democratic government are nowhere more stark than in the EU, where democratic deficit has led to national opposition, in countries as varied as Ireland and Sweden, and general voting apathy (Banchoff and Smith, 1999; Christiansen et al., 2001; Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; Siedentop, 2000). Furthermore, the dominant ideas of flexibility in the labour market and workfare, as well as the deregulation strategies in social policy, associated with both the EU and NAFTA are greeted with scepticism on the part of those social groups who see social rights as an integral part of citizenship and of the European social heritage. Social policy in particular is considered as a foundation stone of cohesion in the European social space. (For a detailed discussion of the reconstruction of social policy within the European space see Chapter 7.) While the average quality of living in the EU countries is improving, at the same time there is an increase in those social groups who are threatened by social exclusion. Moreover, there are serious discrepancies among the EU countries with regard to the level of welfare provision and public spending on social policy (Korres and Tsombanoglou, 2003). Exponents of European integration argue that a different vision of welfare presupposes the reconsideration of the representation mechanisms with regard to the different social groups (Ananiadi, 2003). Existing discrepancies however, in terms of both power and wealth, will become even wider following the European enlargement. Under the fourth EU Support Framework, some of the till recently lagging regions will find themselves being considered as rich enough in comparison with the new member states. European integration is presented in the EU political discourse as a highly desirable and uncontested political goal. It nevertheless presupposes a vast redistribution of resources and an immense commitment on the part of the richest states and peoples of Europe, a process which cannot be accomplished through a top-down mode of governance. While EU integration is presented as a quite optimistic goal, democratic deficit emerges as a harsh political reality. (For further discussion of the EU and its role in education, see Chapter 6.)

Another political trend has been the reduction in interstate war in the final third of the twentieth century. This has been accompanied by the ending of the Cold War and a reduction in superpower conflict (Reynolds, 2001). This has been replaced by internal conflicts, insurrections, repressions and civil wars (Zaire, Rwanda, Sudan, Chechnya, Northern Ireland, Tibet, East Timor, Kashmir and Yugoslavia). One of the major factors fuelling these internal conflicts has been the resurgence of nationalism. Indeed this has emerged as one of the most potent forces in contemporary politics even where it has not resulted in open warfare. Nationalism can be a driving force of the state even when other values are ostensibly advocated, as with communism in China, Islam in Indonesia or democratic pluralism in Turkey. Of course one person’s freedom-fighting independence movement (in Aceh, Palestine or Georgia) is another person’s terrorist trying to break down the stability and control of the central state (Anderson, 1983; Appadurai, 1990; Reynolds, 2001). Since the attacks on the New York World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington in 2001 the control of the definition of terrorism has become one of the crucial political powers. To be able to legitimate one’s enemies as terrorists, especially within the terminology and accompanying power distribution of the USA, is to
provide a state with crucial support in the (often brutal) suppression of internal opposition (e.g. Chechnya and Palestine).

Indeed, the most important political trend at the beginning of the twenty-first century has been the emergence of the USA as a single and unchallengeable hyperpower. No other state can summon a fraction of the military might of the USA in terms of either advanced technology, annual expenditure or global reach. Despite chauvinistic posturing from France, Germany and Belgium, the EU will be in no position to challenge this power in the foreseeable future. Indeed one component in the monopolar position of the USA is its network of military and economic alliances which embrace states as different as Turkey, the UK and Japan. Among the remarkable features of the 2003 Iraq War were not only the ease and speed with which it was won by the USA with the assistance of only one major ally, but the inability of the international community to organize any effective resistance to the invasion. At the regional level the Arab states were split by their variable alliances with the USA. At the international level the UN proved utterly ineffective in the face of determined hyperpower resolution.

This impacts on economic globalization to the extent that the process is seen as being beneficial mainly to the USA and to the TNCs based there (Stiglitz, 2002). The World Bank is largely controlled by the USA and it is clear that decisions that have impoverished LEDCs have also served to benefit American TNCs. The WTO is also increasingly being brought under the control of American corporate interests so that domestic political decisions can be challenged where they seem to endanger the accumulation of TNC profit. The US government itself usurps its monopolar position to ignore international treaties such as those on environmental protection and child labour. It uses its economic strength to wage unequal trade wars against countries such as Iraq, Libya and Cuba. As will become apparent in the next section, there is a case that globalization is actually only code for Americanization.

### Cultural trends

A case can be made that there is a developing trend towards the global homogenization of culture. Films and television products are increasingly important as aspects of culture. They are watched for longer periods by more people in more countries. While the diversified production in this area has been noted, and to this could be added the international popularity of, for instance, Brazilian soap operas, increasingly the production and distribution is centring on the USA and particularly southern California. Because American television programmes such as Friends are distributed globally, they can be sold in any one country at an apparently cheap rate. Thus, it is much more economic for a television station in Latvia or Paraguay to purchase American programmes and either add dubbing or subtitles than it is to produce indigenous programming in the local language/s (Crane et al., 2002). Because of the interconnected references between television and film programming and their links to fast food, books, toys, computer games, music and other merchanting, the popularity of one programme or product can be used to enhance that of another.

A similar case can be made with regard to food consumption, one of the most important of cultural practices. Chinese cities, for instance, are replete with outlets for
American fast food: McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut. It is remarkable that a country such as China with its rich, varied and historical cuisine should have been colonized by outlets for expensive, fatty trash. The spread of Coke as the family drink of choice in countries like Japan repeats the same regrettable trend. Indeed, the global spread of these products has led commentators to write about the McDonaldization of society (Ritzer, 1993).

Cultural and economic activity, as the examples above show, are not readily separable. Fast food and fizzy drink franchises, television programmes and films, pop music, books (about half the global total of which are published in one city, London) and magazines, design and other cultural products form important and increasing components of the international export trade (Lash and Urry, 1994). Overwhelmingly these products originate in the USA. These products themselves lend glamour to other more durable exports from fashion goods to armaments. McDonald’s features a Hollywood movie as part of its international marketing campaign. The movie features particular youth fashions as well as music. Branding of products can be mutually reinforcing through a range of cultural activities and associated advertising tie-ins.

Some commentators have characterized this international movement and choice of cultural products and activities as postmodernity, a condition within which the individual selects her/his individual culture from the infinite multiplicity which is globally on offer (Arnonowitz and Giroux, 1991; Coulby and Jones, 1995; Usher and Edwards, 1994). The wider cultural implications of this are explored in Chapter 14. At this stage it is only necessary to note that education at all levels is deeply implicated here (Burbules and Torres, 2000; Green, 2002; Kazamias, 2003; Kress, 1996; Stromquist and Monkman, 2000). The curricula of schools and universities are also a cultural selection: the question arises as to the extent to which these are or should be influenced either by the processes of globalization or the solipsism of individual preference. Of course a pre-eminent issue here is the increasing prevalence of the English language, reflected not least in school and university curricula. This is a major concern of many of the chapters in this volume. English has become a compulsory subject in almost all education systems. Given the dominance of the English language in the internet, media, journals and books, global trade and business, it is quite possible that people will tend not to learn any foreign language other than English. Accordingly they tend to use even their own language less in highly specialized or academic contexts, a condition which might result in substantial linguistic and cultural impoverishment, especially with regard to the less spoken languages of the world. (For a full discussion of language issues in the context of globalization, including the prospects of language extinction, see Chapter 12.) English linguistic dominance is sometimes presented as endangering the global cultural heritage or the tradition of certain cultures. On the other hand some of the less spoken languages, for example Greek, which has no direct connection with any other language, present an impressive resistance, as its recent creativity in poetry and literature shows (SECE, 2003).

This example shows that, despite the appearance of Americanization, as mentioned in the section above, cultural movement is far from a oneway street. Even in the example of food, it is clear that gastronomic trends move from East to West as well as from West to East. Indian restaurants are ubiquitous in the UK, even in quite small towns, and are gradually appearing across the EU. Chinese restaurants are even more widely spread. Up-
market Japanese restaurants are also achieving popularity in some areas of the EU and the USA. Chinese and Hong Kong films have broken into Western distribution networks as yet unpenetrated by Mumbai and Cairo. Immigration, either that of the cosmopolitan elites, or that of economic immigrants, brings with it greater fusion in food, fashion, music and culture in general. Immigration challenges both nationalism and the Americanization of culture since it develops the dynamics of identity and acts as a major facilitating factor towards hybridity (Hall et al., 1992). Although the United States occupies a primary position, this is hardly the same in cultural terms as it is in political. The developing trend is characterized more by cultural exchange, fusion and hybridity than cultural domination (Bhabha, 1990; Bhabha, 1996; Young, 1990; Young, 1995). (Chapter 13 shows that, in some cases, globalization may facilitate the renegotiation of the concept of nationhood itself, to acknowledge oppressed or long-silenced identities and cultures.) However, the fact that the English language dominates in most of the global exchanges has dramatic impact on the type of the hybrid produced. Furthermore, English, as well as education of course, has become the key that allows access to the network society and global culture.

The ubiquity of English and the homogenization of international culture are one side of the coin. A postmodern plurality of cultures can lead to wider internationalization and tolerance. Where populations experience a diversity of culture in terms of art, music and writing as well as food and films, this can result in cosmopolitan tolerance and inclusion as well as in the less positive reinforcement of small nationalisms and racism. This polarization between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is perhaps the extreme choice with which globalization confronts societies, not least their education systems.

**Anti-globalization**

This refers here not to those theorists who do not accept that the process of globalization is actually occurring, but rather to those activists and writers who acknowledge that it is happening and are doing what they can to oppose and resist it (Bruno and Karliner, 2002; Klein, 2002; Photopoulos, 2002; Wilkinson and Hughes, 2002). The first thing to be said about this trend is that it in no way represents a systematic movement. Indeed, an antipathy to system, grand narratives and global solutions is one of the few things that its various proponents have in common. In some ways the anti-globalizationists represent a congruence of small-scale issue groups:

- eco-protesters or those concerned with access to pure water;
- those seeking rights for small nations or for exploited rural or tribal people;
- those seeking a reduction in global inequality and poverty, sometimes focusing on children’s health, prostitution or the treatment of HIV/AIDS;
- those opposed to the injustices imposed by particular brands such as Nike, Esso or Nestlé;
- those pursuing better rights and pay for workers both in the MEDCs and in the maquiladoras;
- those opposed to the particular institutions of global capitalism: the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, NAFTA and the EU;
those concerned that the politics of a particular state or even of the UN itself are being corrupted or incorporated by corporate interest.

It is these groups who first came to the world’s attention in 1999 with the protests on the streets of Seattle and later, in 2001, to violent, indeed murderous, state opposition in Genoa.

Although a motley collection of groups, the nature of the protest does actually constitute a coherent critique of globalization. Corporations are recognized as having more power than many states with dire consequences in terms of labour conditions (poverty, health, child labour, attacks on trade unions) and environmental degradation. Corporations are not responsible in any one state and capital is footloose and mobile. The consequence of this is that states increasingly seek to attract corporations rather than to control them. They are engaged in a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of offering tax incentives and control of the workforce and above all low pay (Stiglitz, 2002). Corporations have undue influence on the media and reportage in many states, not least the USA where large conglomerates often include newspaper and media outlets. Rupert Murdoch has a deal with China which facilitates his bland news channels plus the insipid CNN, while banning the BBC. One corporation thus maintains a control over the information access of 1.2 billion people. International organizations—especially the WTO, but increasingly the UN itself—are dominated by corporate interests and can overthrow the decisions of democratically elected governments (Hertz, 2001). Democratic institutions have become marginalized both by TNCs and by regional governments such as the EU. Involved in these protests is a strong anti-Americanism (and perhaps anti-UK and anti-EU feeling). American foreign policy in the previous century is seen as being dominated by the interests of (American) capitalism, not by the spread of democracy.

Notice that activism is an essential part of this perspective, as democratic institutions are seen to be failing. This is sometimes linked to falling turnouts at local, national and international (EU) elections. For these protesters and their theorists, protest is the only remaining form of participation in national and international decision-making. These protests focus on meetings of the rich countries at the OECD, on the annual May Day workers’ gatherings and on local opposition to the expansion of motorways, airport or (US) military facilities. Although often closely coordinated via email and the internet and controlled via cellular phones at the time of the protest, this does not imply any overall organizational structure. The structure is itself web-like and postmodern with many different organizations each with their own nodes in loose interconnectivity one with another. The only overarching organizations are the World Social Forum and the European Social Forum, annual gatherings of activists, which are characterized by the multiplicity of their agenda.

This chapter has introduced the theme of globalization and used examples from education to demonstrate the relevance of this theme to the World Yearbook. It is on education that succeeding chapters more explicitly focus. Chapter 3 introduces the theme of nationalism and shows how this is linked to and in contradiction with globalization. Chapter 4 explores the issue of nationalism in depth in the case of Japan and its education system and wider culture. The volume thus examines the complex issue of to what extent educational institutions and systems are agents or victims of the process of globalization and the power of nationalism.
References


Introduction


