The Ghibelline Globalists of the Techno-Structure:
ON THE CURRENT DESTINIES OF EMPIRE AND CHURCH

For the past fifty years, the definitive establishment of the great Asian-American-European federation and its unchallenged domination over scattered leftovers of inassimilable barbarousness, in Oceania or in Central Africa, had accustomed all peoples, presently clustered into provinces, to the bliss of a universal, and thenceforth imperturbable, peace. No fewer than one hundred and fifty years of wars were needed to achieve this marvelous development [...]. Contrary to public proclamations, it wasn't a vast democratic republic that emerged from the aggregation. Such an eruption of pride could not but raise a new throne, the highest, the strongest, the most radiant there ever was.

Gabriel Tarde, Fragment d’histoire future (1896)

Sean Stone’s New World Order (NWO) tells the story of a “Deep State,” of an extraneous apparatus within the American Federation. This foreign entity, which acts in inconspicuous ways, i.e., through extremely exclusive lodges and clubs, appears to be bent on taking over the wholesome strata of America, her exceptional manpower and resources, and harnessing them to a vast design of centralized, planetary domination. This “extraneous body” is typically an oligarchic mindset of unmistakable British make. Professedly “democratic” and “Liberal,” this English drive is, in fact, ferociously elitist and exploitative. To date, it represents the most sophisticated conception of imperial management. Technically, it uses finance and commerce as its consuetudinary instruments of rent- and resource-extraction; politically, it keeps public opinion “in flux” by playing (i.e., scripting) both sides of the electoral spectrum (Left vs. Right) and everything in between with an attentive and solicitous eye to the appetites of the masses; militarily, it exerts control by patrolling, proprietarily, the main sea and air “corridors” of the world; and intellectually, it is ever alert to promote a flurry of “authoritative” charters with which to legitimize its ever-expanding jurisdiction.
The narrative thread of *New World Order* is original in that it details the story of America’s British seduction by following the career of a high priest of higher learning, Harvard doyen William Yandell Elliott (1876-1979), who is credibly credited with the feat of having refashioned, almost ex nihilo and single-handedly, America’s propagandistic bastion after Britain’s imperial image. Throughout the chronicle of Elliott’s lengthy office and indefatigable service, we re-encounter some of the familiar faces of America’s political discourse and their significant filiations: Henry Kissinger, Samuel P. Huntington and his pupil Francis Fukuyama, to name but a few.

*New World Order* recounts how this new Anglo-American brethren, fascinated with the occult and far-reaching ways of Jesuitism (p. 9), sought to cement the budding alliance for the establishment of the great Commonwealth by training and indoctrinating America’s aspiring recruits at Oxford via the Rhodes Scholarship. In Britain, the Americans were introduced to an advanced study of the physics of domination, which, in the pursuit of optimal flexibility, was developed to include organizational forms best suited to pacify labor, as well as novel designs for federalism and religious worship. By such measures, one could expect that workers and people at large could be pacified and their anarchistic instinct somehow comforted, and neutralized thereby, by the statutory incumbency of (“regionalistic” and “pro-labor”) structures purportedly designed to protect them all from the bullying of a central authority (p. 14). No less important in this regard is the role of religion, of credence proper, which, too – like the insubordinate bent – had to be “absorbed” in a league of churches “as part of supranational organizing in the face of burgeoning nationalism” (p. 10). Mentally, therefore, the chief obstacle, the chief notion to negate and thereby erase completely from the range of affective sentiments is that of nation, nationhood, or national belonging. This, then, was going to be a work of psychological effacement to be perpetrated mostly against foreigners, i.e. non Anglo-Saxon subjects. Yet, preliminarily, Americans themselves had to be educated in construing their patriotism as a pillar of the great Commonwealth; they were to see themselves as leaders, *primi inter pares*, of a “flexible family of allied but independent Dominion States, free to pursue their own domestic policies but expected to cooperate with inter-imperial affairs and security” (p. 11). As a variation on the self-same theme, Julian Huxley, e.g., reiterated in 1941 this basic directive clearly enough:

> Looked at from another angle, we may contrast Hitler’s plan for a New Order (however badly it has now gone astray) with the type of New Order which we would hope to see established [...]. Any New Order we could think of establishing [...] should be based
politically, so far as possible, on the principle which we have de-
veloped to such an extent in the British Commonwealth; namely,
of free and equal units, co-operating on the basis of consent and of
agreement on common values (though some more centralized control
will be needed in Europe than in the British Commonwealth).²

A first, partial attempt to extend the British model to a supranational
body came, after WWI, with the League of Nations in 1919, which was the
precursor, in some fashion, of the Organization of the United Nations. As
experimental forerunners of the NWO, neither the League nor the U.N. re-
ally “worked,” however, and Sean Stone shows how eventually it appeared
to Britain’s international policy-makers far more fitting to re-think the One-
World project by transferring and applying its (organizational) designs to
an American board of imperial action under Britain’s strategic guidance
and tutelage. It was more consequent to do so for “there already existed [in
America] an Anglo-Saxon ruling class which shared ‘a common language
and sentimental and racial ties’” with London’s elites (p. 24).

As far as the propagandistic effort was concerned, much intellectual
activity was condignly devoted to giving formal, discursive, “authorita-
tive” expression to this plan. The first three chapters of New World Order
discuss the work of several “panels and committees” of Anglophile intel-
lectuals that were set up in America for the purpose. Of these intellectual
“productions,” the one that intrigues me the most, for it is very poorly
known, and that will afford me the point of attack for this essay, is the 1949
draft for a World Constitution. As told in the book, this project was bless-
ed by Thomas Mann and jointly penned by University of Chicago Pres-
ident Robert M. Hutchins (1899-1977), Lewis Mumford (1895-1990)
and Giuseppe Antonio Borgese (1882-1952). Except for Mann, the other
three are now virtually obliterated, especially Borgese, who could not even
stake a residual claim to (minor) fame through his marriage (the second)
to Mann’s daughter Elizabeth. More than a visionary force for pedagogy
(his was nominated President of the University of Chicago at only twen-
ty-nine), Hutchins seemed to have been mostly an organizer. Mumford,
an American Knight of the British Empire (1943), was once the celebrous
poetic adversary of “authoritarian, system-centered technology,”³ and he
seemed to have been recruited in this particular team as the token “anar-
chical romantic,” tasked, that is, with commending the pastoral delights of
regionalist autonomy versus the noxious encroachments of national(-ist)
and technocratic centralization. As for Borgese, it is said that the World
Constitution was essentially his; he, for his part, appeared on this peculiar
stage in 1938 as the token (Italian) anti-Fascist man-of-letters, critic, and
publicist. This group, variously flanked by other collaborators throughout
the years of the gestation (1938-1947), gave life to the so-called “Com-
mittee on Europe.” The objective of this Committee was, pedagogically, to destroy, to “balkanize” (p. 31), again, the notion of nationhood in the name of loftier bonds, such as universal brotherly love. According to the thesis of New World Order, the end-goal was thus to draw up a constitution for the world, which was but a discursive cover for the imposition, with American muscle, of the British system on the entire planet. In this sense, the post-1945 Pax Americana should have served as the exordium to a palingenetic pax humana and pax universalis, and, accordingly, the United States was to function as the grand incubator of the One World archetype in the key of British oligarchism (pp. 29-35). In keeping with the suggestions of a cosmic reverie, the Americans would “carry on” as the legitimate heirs of the (still very much alive) British, who, in turn, had made it sufficiently manifest that their Commonwealth was the legitimate, modern-day heir of Rome’s Imperium (p. 32). The Committee’s output culminated in Borgese’s Preliminary Draft for a World Constitution (1949), which will be succinctly reviewed hereafter.

Obiter dictum, what is chillingly manifest behind the universalist verbiage of all such pioneering endeavors, is how intimately such writers, as well as their latter-day epigones, have been committed to a general acquiescence in the ways of unbounded violence in order to see their pet-project of One World Government come to life, some day. It is disquieting – and this is an essential theme to which we will return in the conclusive segment of this Afterword – to read these men who lyrically professed at every turn their unshakable allegiance to the highest values of human cooperation and goodness, and yet who wove their abstractions, in more or less conscious deceit, fully confident and satisfied that the devastating fire of the war would have cleared the terrain for a glorious, promising, and irreversibly peaceable rebirth (p. 31).

In the end, propaganda-wise, we come to learn that Borgese’s World Constitution turned out to be a fiasco: it completely failed to capture the public eye; and to this day it has scarcely left a trace in the records. Possibly the “Committee on Europe” had misread the mood of the masses; or, possibly, despite its undeniably outdated fixtures, the Draft was ahead of its time, especially considering that when it was released, in 1949, the “game” was “stuck” in that grand charade of American “freedom” vs. Soviet “collectivism”: in other words, there might not have been congruous space in the collective imagination of the West for the vision of a World Republic at a time when the elites were too consumed in bisecting everything for the sake of keeping power. But now that the game is “unstuck,” now that Russia appears to be an enemy for real, the pining architects of the New World Order could be thinking that they might have a pretty good shot after all. It is one of the several merits of Sean’s New World Or-
der that it also dredges up to the surface forgotten artifacts which hide a variety of critical clues for understanding our epoch.

Speaking, then, of de-territorialized empires, when the last vestiges of Eurasian recalcitrance will have been swept away (China is still an unknown, though from the present geopolitical vista, she may be safely expected, in time, to join the western Alliance), the only remaining “force” on earth that Britain’s extended Commonwealth will be facing (off) is the Holy See.

In the pages that follow, I will take Borgese’s anti-Fascist credentials, specifically the anti-Fascist tract he composed “in exile” in the late thirties, as a stepping-stone to a discussion of the relationship between Empire and Church; the discussion owes its relevance to the fact that the Catholic Church, throughout the late and crucial interval of the One-World oligarchic rally recounted in *New World Order*, has not proven herself a leading protagonist so much as she has shown, rather, that the chief players of the (geopolitical) game – essentially Britain and America – are still at a spiritual/organizational stage at which they do not seem fully capable of reckoning without her. This introductory on Borgese leads into a discussion divided into three segments: the first is a reprise of the classic question of the relationship between secular and spiritual power (Vico and Dante), and especially of its elaboration by so-called “Conservative Revolutionaries,” i.e., Fascist/monarchist thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, Julius Evola, and Charles Maurras – which elaboration is, in my view, the most incisive for the problem at hand. It is the most incisive not only for its shameless yet rigorous appreciation of power’s violent and cynical anatomy, but also because it foreshadows the late pragmatic approach of American Neoconservatives to dealing with the Catholic Church. The thesis here is that America’s Neoconservatives are behaving like the imperial potentates of the middle ages, who sought to co-opt the Church as their charitable and spiritual annex (so-called “Ghibelline” strategy), all the while, the Church, on the other hand, pushed in the opposite direction, endeavoring by subtle means of mimesis and religious/educational indoctrination to gain indirect control of a pious nation’s institutions, including the army, and turn them to her own hegemonic advantage (so-called “Guelph” strategy).

A dramatic illustration of this tension is recounted in the third section, which retraces the geo-strategic course navigated by the Vatican in the first half of the twentieth century, between Fascism and Nazism. That story is here retold to explain how the Church came, after WWII, to play a defining role in the developmental beginnings of the NWO by virtue of her privileged association with the United States, and to appraise the legacy of this cumulative experience in the context of the transition from
the Cold War to the present juncture, at which time the Roman central of Catholicism is studying how best to position herself vis-à-vis the proliferating structure of Anglo-America’s One-World machine.

Finally, Ernst Jünger’s 1934 essay On Pain will provide the socio-existential key for deciphering the nature of the particular and ongoing transformation of our “system,” which is concomitantly characterized by oligarchic consolidation and pervasive mechanization. One may designate the entire apparatus as the “Techno-Structure.” The Techno-Structure has arisen as the institutional foundation of the NWO. The final contention of this Afterword is that America’s Techno-structure has presently deployed its two partisan halves in a carefully choreographed offensive against the Vatican. On one front, the “fanatical atheists” of the Democratic Left work to disaggregate “progressives” from “conservatives” by forcing them to take adversarial sides on issues of sex management. On the other, the “die-hard Christians” of the Republican Right are attempting to amalgamate by osmosis the Vatican and its flock of one plus billion souls by appealing to the patriotic conservatism of a majority of Catholic leaders (both laymen and clergymen). The conclusive impression is that the two incumbent “parties” of the Techno-Structure are equally imperialist, i.e. “Globalist,” and that by cooperating to de-potentiate/absorb the Church for the greater glory of Anglo-America’s One-World Commonwealth, both of them (not just the Neocons) are de facto retracing the steps of the Ghibellines of old – i.e. of that medieval faction of imperialist zealots who propounded the Emperor’s spiritual superiority over that of the Pope.

G.A. BORGENSE AND THE “ENGLISH-SPEAKING IDEA”

No present Catholicism is sufficiently Catholic, no universalism sufficiently universal, to join in spirit the divided nations and make possible our imperative goal: One World.

Lewis Mumford, The Conduct of Life

When the document became available in 1949, Piero Calamandrei, one of Italy’s most respected jurists, and an associate of Borgese, presented A Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution to the Italian public as a most worthy endeavor for two orders of reasons. The first, as Calamandrei saw it, was the absence, in this World Constitution, of a deus ex machina; the second lay in its preemptive, deterring arrangements, which he thought were just the sort of jurisprudential dispositions required to uphold a new world community born under the disquieting sign (and,
thenceforward, the perennial menace) of nuclear devastation. But Calamandrei was being untruthful by half. He knew the first statement to be patently false, for a deus ex machina there clearly was – Anglo-America’s victorious condominium; and he thought fit to qualify the second point, by venting the preoccupation, by apophasis as it were, that “some peoples,” in order to ban nuclear bombs altogether and thereupon inaugurate the aeon of peace, might be tempted, verily, to implement the World Federation by bombing all recalcitrants into submission. In partisan fashion, Calamandrei might have been alluding to the Soviets, but in any case it is easy to see by a straightforward attribution of the evil where it properly belongs – in/to “us” westerners, who have fathered the bombs in the first place – that the admonishment was issuing straight from the western core of the Techno-Structure. And such a foreboding also brings home to us the meaning of the most recent shift in international affairs, during which the United States has been busy drafting a raft of highly confidential “trans-global” commercial compacts wherewith to render the vassals ever more resource-dependent on the imperial center, while adding relentlessly to its stockpile of nuclear ammunition.

Borgese’s world charter features, to a fault, all the token staples of the One-World gospel. To begin, all iniquity and war are blamed on national rivalry. Therefore, the era of nationhood, it is proclaimed, must come to an end. In view of this goal, the American model is to serve as the constitutional blueprint; the World Federation is thereupon entitled to wield a monopoly of violence to repel violence within the confines of the law; and, logically, the Federation is to have its World (central) Bank.

The globe itself will be divided into nine regions: 1) there will be Europe on one side, and, neatly separated from it, Russia, on the other (the Mackinder clause, as ever); 2) Russia, for her part, will be the core of Eurasia, whereas 3) North America will be called Atlantis. 4) There will be (sub-Saharan) Africa, and 5) Afrasia, which will comprise North-Africa and the Near East. 6) India will be its own province. 7) China, Korea and Japan, and the sum of their respective archipelagoes will form Asia Major, while 8) Indo-China, Indonesia and the Pacific will make up Austrasia. 9) The western hemisphere, south of Atlantis will be named Columbia. (Pakistan has the option of merging either with India or Afrasia). Britain and her Commonwealth – here is another revealing gem – may choose to be counted either with Europe or with Atlantis.

A World Assembly will be garnered from the representatives of these nine regions, and the delegates of the Assembly will, in turn, elect a World President, who will find his/her alter-ego in a World Tribune. The function of the “Tribune” is to defend the natural and civil rights of single individuals and groups against the negligence and the eventual abuses of
(any of the departments of) the World Government. In its defining outlines, the plan is not without a splash of postmodernism: to round off the institutional architecture, a special House will be devoted to the representation and safeguard of minorities and local autonomy (viz. the token “lifestyle anarchism” of the Universalists).

All weaponry is to be surrendered to the Federal Republic of the World. The control of the Republic’s armed forces is thereby entrusted to a House of the Custodians of the Peace, who, along with the auxiliary support of the General Staff and a special-purpose “Institute of Technology,” will act under the World President in the guise of Protector of the Peace. Finally (article 39), the chief bodies of the World Government may grant the President extraordinary powers, locally or internationally, to face a State of Emergency. One simply has to wonder, in this hyper-global setup, what the “State of Emergency” could possibly be.\(^5\)

All of this evokes pop scenarios à la *Star Wars* and *The Hunger Games*.

What, then, of Borgese the artist? Leonardo Sciascia, possibly Italy’s finest political novelist, thought Borgese, his fellow Sicilian, a “heretic” and “one of the greatest protagonists” of Italian culture in the first half of the twentieth century. Not without a tinct of provincial pride, and mostly to vindicate the name and honor of his compatriot, whom Italy has thoroughly – and to Sciascia, shamefully – forgotten, Sciascia praises the World Constitution to the skies, and acknowledges, moreover, Borgese’s anti-Fascist opus, *Goliath, the March of Fascism* as “one of the most rigorous, intelligent, enlightening, and passionately exact books ever written on, and against, Italian Fascism.” Sadly, Sciascia observes, *Goliath* attracted no attention outside the United States.\(^6\)

Borgese was no heretic. A second-rate writer/thinker at best, he nonetheless had an extraordinarily lofty opinion of his penmanship, erudition, and sophistication, the sum of which, somehow, had managed to propel him early on into a variety of top-level journalistic, scholarly, and academic positions (including a university chair in German literature). Sciascia recalls, admiringly, how Borgese was one of the dozen or so Italian academics that, in 1931, refused to swear the oath of allegiance to the Fascist regime and had, therefore, to go into voluntary exile in the United States, where he became a citizen, and whence he would return only after the war. For Sciascia, Borgese’s name has been expunged from Italy’s literary record in a fit of retaliatory envy by all those intellectual gatekeepers who had stayed behind and timorously compromised with Fascism, and who thus felt insufferably shamed by Borgese’s heroism and integrity. Be that as it may, Borgese’s exile was a golden exile, to be sure, for very few Italians, let alone Italian academics, could, at the time, rely, and at the highest
level, on the full support of America’s intelligence réseau [network], and, thereby, seamlessly land a job, freshly ejected out of Mussolini’s Italy, at the University of Chicago. Such, indeed, were/are the perks of being an apparatchik of the Anglophile intelligentsia.

Atrociously written (in English), Goliath is an unbearably prolix and pompous tome full of uninsightful bombast (it is scarcely credible and, indeed, there is no evidence whatsoever, that it achieved any success in the United States either). Conceived with a view to tracing the roots of the post-WWI debacle that had begot Fascism and its brigandish leader Mussolini, the work is stacked in the fashion of an Italian epic in prose from the middle-ages to 1937. A brief examination of the book will only serve here to extract therefrom the elements pertinent to the next step of our discussion, which is that of contrasting the “religious” afflatus of the “One-Worlders” with that of the Catholic Church and seeing, in extreme synthesis, how the two have “cohabited” for the past century.

In Goliath, Borgese broaches the theme of spiritual vs. temporal power in traditional fashion, i.e., by citing Dante, whose *Divine Comedy* he describes as a labyrinth hosting “not one but two Minotours: the twin superstitions of the Roman Empire and of Catholic mythology.” Thus, the starting point is typically that of the Liberal, free-thinking (atheistic) Democrat, who auspicates a “peaceful and progressive world-federation,” graced by “a rational religion, disentangled from all mythological” animism. In this light, the assessment of Italy’s weakness is the standard, Anglo-Saxon one: because Italy has remained blindly wedded to barbarous superstitions, she could not but make poor political choices, such as allying herself “unnaturally” with Prussia and the Habsburg Empire, i.e. the German-speaking enemy (in the Triple Alliance of 1882). And even after the Great War, i.e., after having betrayed the Central Powers (in May 1915 by joining the conflict on the side of Britain), the Italians still failed to understand the “genius” of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and his League of Nations – which League, however, ended up effecting little because, most unfortunately, says Borgese, America herself and Russia were not part of it. 7 Be all that as it might have been, out of this postwar morass and the regrettable failures of the epoch, in some inexplicable and twisted fashion, Fascism came into being:

...The mind of the nation is crazed: Fascism remains what it is: an outburst of emotionalism and pseudo-intellectualism, thoroughly irrational in its nature. [It is] nothing else than the conditioned reflex of another resurgent pseudo-classicism and the political gesture of a second pseudo-Catholic Counter-Reformation [...]. It had been born in Italy of the perversity of a few and the stupidity of many, without any imperative, economic or social necessity of any sort.
The characterization of Mussolini is just as inane:

There had never been socialism and there never was nationalism in him. There was consistently the anarchist.\(^9\)

At last, on February 11, 1929, after three years of intense negotiations, the Church and the Fascist regime signed the famous Concordat, the “Lateran Pacts,” whereby, in exchange for confessional, financial, and territorial concessions, the Vatican granted Italian Fascism sacral recognition, so to speak; Mussolini had been in power for nearly seven years, and Italy’s dictator since 1925. For Borgese, the Church and Fascist Italy were on this occasion “driven mad by a necromantic obsession, by the impossible desire of resurrecting what was dead.” From Borgese’s standpoint, the incongruence, of course, was that, since Italy had been a political irrelevance for at least five centuries, the Catholic sacral investiture that was thus being bestowed upon Mussolini’s Italy by Pope Pius XI in 1929 could be considered “effective only as long as it remained subconscious or, in other words, only as long as Catholicism kept on believing itself identical with Christianity and Universality.” Which, in the Anglophile sentiment of Borgese, it most definitely was not: he saw the (hegemonic velleities of the) Church entirely out of sync with the times; to him, history, instead, held in store other, far more enticing plans, which could be divined from a different interpretation of the 1929 Concordat. In other words, Borgese and his fellow One-Worlders were hoping that Roman Fascism and Roman Catholicism would fuse their destinies in “a second Counter-Reformation” and eventually, through some military misstep, come to suffer, together, so crushing a defeat as to allow, through their joint demise, the emergence of “a human religion [of love] including the permanent elements of Christianity and embracing all cultivated races and all superior creeds.”\(^{10}\) A universalist creed, in other words, for which God would be “the faint glimmer of a design fully to emerge, a rationality still to be achieved, a justice still to be established, a love still to be fulfilled” (L. Mumford).\(^{11}\)

In the final analysis, for Borgese, Mumford and their brethren, the glory and the sacrality of universality belongs to the British Commonwealth alone.

Goliath’s epilogue, written in January 1937, makes it clear that Borgese was not so deep into the princes’ secret as to have been given intelligence of Britain’s true strategy toward Nazism (Italian Fascism being quasi-irrelevant in the big picture). In a gush of servile flattery (not unmixed with a dash of smugness), he anxiously put down what he, like the totality of his contemporaries, mistook for a lamentable state of “unpreparedness” in the face of German re-armament and re-militarization to “the angelical-
ness of the Anglo-American mind.” Because “the English and Anglo-Saxon mind is averse [to the idea of all-round villainy], and is thus kindly inclined,” toadies Borgese, it often runs the risk of losing touch entirely “with radical evil,” and is thus liable to responding and protecting itself inadequately “if the hour of a supreme challenge strikes.” Then came the admonishment: “What havoc the nationalistic tumor was making of the disturbed organisms in continental Europe, [Englishmen and Americans] were far even from imagining” – though he, Borgese, knew. Yet he did not despair, sensing, anyway, that, when the clash would come, victory would be on his masters’ side; England would win, and the League would be resurrected, greater and mightier than ever; that much was understood:

[England’s] movable steadfastness in trying evolutionary courses in India; her craftsmanship in meeting depression, devaluation, unemployment, together with her early successes in reviving prosperity and cheer; her aloofness from both revolutionary mania and involutionary shirt-sleeved pestilence […]: all these and several others were and seemed admirable performances, setting a model of some sort for a confederate world to come […].

**Guelphs vs. Ghibellines**

[The] conception [of “State religion”] can be realized in forms other than that of a “national” church properly speaking. Of this we have a most striking example in such a regime as the Napoleonic “Concordat,” which transformed priests into civil servants – a true monstrosity.

René Guénon, *Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power,*

It is not easy to conceive the way in which a consecration could confer a new legitimacy to new men, who move in the world created by technique and the machine, a world which is by and large de-humanized and spiritually devastated, yet also imbued with elemental force.

Julius Evola, “L’idea organica e la crisi del tempo”

This segment is devoted to a summary exposition of the nature of the tension between secular and religious power, from a few of its classic formulations to the interwar treatment of the issue by so-called “Traditionalist” thinkers. This sets the intellectual background against which is presently unfolding the match between the Anglo-American forces of Globalization and the millennial incumbency of the Roman Catholic
Church. It still appears that the differences that array the ones versus the other bear the traits of the ancient rivalry between papal authority and imperial sovereignty. And to understand, for instance, what motivates the strong interest manifested by the U.S. Republican party, since the days of Ronald Reagan, for the establishment of a privileged rapport between the American Nation and Roman Catholicism (dating from the mid-1980s), the terms and institutional roots of this particular match need to be reviewed. The so-called Neoconservative rassemblement [great coalition], which owed its flamboyant ascendancy to the presidency of George Bush Jr. (2000-2008) and which is a direct outgrowth of Reagan’s Neo-Liberal swerve, is presently one of the keenest U.S. interlocutors of the Vatican. And it appears that, intimately, the strategy of the Neocons is, for all intents and purposes, virtually identical to that of all imperialist factions, which, throughout the ages, have striven to bend the Holy See into the ancillary role of a mere consecratory office of the imperial executive.

In La scienza nuova (The New Science), one of the politological gems of the 18th century, Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico claims that political society, everywhere, “began with religion.” When men are wild, wild with war, religion is the only means to bring them to abide by the laws, and this explains, long ago, the pervasive presence of priests and religious officers in the armed assemblies of the elders where justice was administered. As the nature of peoples, in time, shed its crudity, the political regime mutated accordingly: when the collective mien turned “severe,” men congregated in “aristocratic republics.” These republics “of optimates,” were extremely loath to engage in war lest habituation to it should sharpen the rebellious aggressiveness of the plebs: fear of plebeian mutiny thus brought the optimates to create “orders” where political business could be transacted, “in secret,” away from the scrutiny of the servitude: it is in this context that the expression “arcana imperii” came into usage. As men are inclined to escape subjection, desiring equality, they may succeed in changing aristocratic into “democratic republics” (repubbliche popolari). In the degraded, “oligarchic,” phase of this transition, it so happens that democratic leaders (i potenti) manage to bend the public counsel to their own, private ends, and the masses, for their private utility, surrender their freedom to the leaders’ ambition, thereupon sundering into parties, engaging in sedition and civil strife, and, through cross-border slaughter, bringing on, eventually, the death of their own nations. The mayhem resulting from this stage of “tyrannous anarchy,” which is the extreme debauchment of democratic governments, eventually compels men to seek protection and soothing redress in the legality of the monarchy.16

Thus, we seem to have, in shifting combinations, three forces in a constant state of play: the regimentation of religion for keeping in check our
feral drive, the monarchical bent, which reawakens with a vengeance after the fire, and our progressive, anarchistic instinct.

It is, then, no accident that in many ancient political formations, the monarch was concomitantly high priest and emperor; he was the pontifex, the “bridge-builder” between the sacred and the worldly, between the spiritual and the secular. In the case of Christianity, the unity was maintained in the special bipartite arrangement of the respublica christiana, which rested on the spiritual See of the Pope (sacerdotium) and on the throne of the Emperor (imperium). For Carl Schmitt, the fluid that assured the continuity of the Christian Empire was the diffuse perception that such an empire stood as Christendom’s “defender” (Aufhalter) i.e., as that organized authority possessing deterrent, awesome force against the coming onslaught of the Anti-Christ. This medieval unity of imperium and sacerdotium – a western creation – never implied the accumulation of all power in the hands of a single man: the assumption of the imperial title was not the exclusive privilege of Germanic kings; other Christian monarchs had been equally consecrated, and the mandates for crusading missions they were concomitantly vouchsafed – for the “legitimate” acquisition of additional territory – did not negate, but rather reinforced the unity of the respublica christiana on the basis of assured localizations and legal force. In the 13th century this unity broke down: ever since the Germanic kings established a dynastic authority, and conflated thereby the imperial title in the dynastic line of inheritance, this power ceased to be wielded as that peculiar sovereign and superadded “upgrade” which select warrior-kings were vested with so as to exercise the guardianship and perform their “aufhaltend,” duty. From then on, having lost its deterring sheen, “Empire” was downgraded to “Caesarism,” “imperialism,” i.e. mere (absolute) power.17

The medieval terms “Guelphs” and “Ghibellines” refer to Florentine factions, which respectively took their Italianized names after the Bavarian house of Welf and the Swabian estate of Waiblingen. The feud between these two elites over matters of succession began as a German affair pitting monarchy against nobility, which eventually elicited papal interference. But it was not until the reign of Frederick Barbarossa of Hohenstaufen, Holy Roman Emperor and Lord of Waiblingen (1122-1190), that the factional dispute came to reflect an all-out confrontation between the rival claims of spiritual superiority opposing the Germanic Emperor to the Roman Pope (the above-mentioned 13th century “breakdown”). The repercussion in Italian, particularly Tuscan, politics of so profound and far-reaching an antagonism occasioned the two labels: the Guelphs sided with the Papacy, the Ghibellines, with the Empire.

The first, most famous Ghibelline was, of course, Dante, who, in his positively underwhelming De Monarchia, tries to get to the bottom of the
question of whether the authority of the monarch (the emperor) is directly dependent on God or on a vicar or minister of God, such as the pope, the successor of Peter. Through a sequence of shaky syllogisms, Dante ends up contending that the Church is to be nothing more than a charitable organization. The Church, he states, is to perform exclusively as the administrator (dispensator) of gifted riches “on behalf of the Church herself and Christ’s poor.” In this bearing, it appears that Dante’s line runs chiefly on the prejudice that a practice may be rated superior to another simply because the one predates the other: because, historically, imperial power had been in full bloom (Imperium habuit totam suam virtutem) long before the Church appeared to radiate hers, the Empire, so Dante infers, may claim primacy. Yet, even granting that precedence is sufficient grounds for primacy, this is still not enough to convince one that the pope should confine himself to prayers and alms-giving if nothing guarantees that an irresponsible emperor irresponsibly elected will not lay waste to Christendom at large. And setting out in the finale to make his point stronger, Dante trips in yet another inconsistency that pulverizes the entire effort. Mankind, he avers, can (work on itself to) overcome its built-in greed only in a state of peace, the establishment of which the Prince alone can guarantee; i.e., only the emperor, as the world’s steward (curator), can bring about this “earthly paradise.” For this to happen, says Dante in the conclusion, let this earthly “curator” show some reverence to the vicar of Peter so that, “illuminated by the light of paternal grace, [the emperor] may more mightily irradiate the orb of the earth, over which he has been appointed by Him alone, who is the governor of all things spiritual and temporal.” The confutative objection is immediate: if the emperor has indeed been appointed by God, why should he bother to demand the papal chrism? Yet if, for some archaic yet unavoidable “tradition,” the emperor must bow to papal authority so that the world may click into gear, then why can’t the pope, who evidently knows no worse, dispense with imperial bureaucracy altogether, and dispatch the job himself as a full-fledged pontifex once again? As we shall see, such was exactly the thinking of Pius XI, the pope who sealed the Fascist Concordat of 1929.

Julius Evola and the Politology of (Fascist) “Traditionalism”

Between those days, of the Guelphs and Ghibellines, and today, there arose the Age of the Machine; the world was transformed. And with it came the modern centralized State. To so-called “Conservative Revolutionaries” or “traditionalists,” whom (with a fair degree of approximation) one may cluster under the heading of “Fascists,” the national State originated in a
movement that brought the royalty to centralize and “to absorb in itself the powers that [belonged] collectively to all the nobility.” To effect this goal, the royalty entered “into a struggle with the nobility and [worked] relentlessly toward the destruction of the very feudal system from which it had itself issued.” Critical in this connection was “the support of the third-estate” (the bourgeoisie), which, in the caste structure of Hinduism, “corresponds to the Vaishyas (thus were modern nations born).”

As known, during the momentary socio-political debacle unleashed by the aftermath of WWI, there emerged in Continental Europe (especially in Germany, Italy, and France) a reactionary current which saw (or deluded itself into seeing) in the chasms opened by the war an opportunity to defy the Age of the Machine and the reviled State erected thereon by turning back the clock to a mythical restoration of the traditional imperium. Part of this speculative activity came alive in the march of Nazi-Fascism. Though these thinkers – all of them associated in one form or another with esoteric initiation – might have had different ideas on the form by which the high-sacerdotal class ought to be related to that of the kingly warriors, they all seemed to subscribe to the saying of the Bhagavad-Gita that “Whatsoever the superior person does, that is followed by others. What he demonstrates by action, that, people follow”; they moreover believed that Modernity was a monstrous/titanic age of usurpation, which had, in Hindu terminology, delegitimized the noble classes of the warriors and priests – the Kshatryas and Brahmans – and, as was cited, propitiated in their sovereign stead the ignoble triumph of the Vaishyas and of the Sudras; that is to say, of the “merchant-class,” on the one hand (with Liberalism), and of the unsightly toiling masses, on the other (with Socialism and Communism).

In Italy, the most notorious personage that gave full-bodied expression to this peculiar reactionary current was the Sicilian Julius Evola (1898-1974), “a weird sort of intellectual and Fascist.” In the thirties, Evola did encounter Mussolini, whom he tried, in vain, to charm; he was not a Party member and his writings had no impact on the discourse of the regime, nor, on the other hand, did he impress the Nazi intelligentsia either, which, according to a dossier of the SS, spurned his doctrine as that of a “Roman reactionary.”

Evola had fancied himself the bard of (Italian/Fascist) Ghibellinism, by which he did not intend that modern attitude against the intrusion of the Church in the affairs of the secular State – which is also very much the modern Democratic stance; Ghibellinism to him was rather the hostile and uncompromising opposition to Church and Catholicism “on the basis of an imperial claim to an equally sacred and transcendent form of authority” – Dante’s position, in short. René Guénon, another “tra-
ditionalist” and one of the important names of European esotericism, thought that the central political challenge of modernity was to identify the proper consecration for the proper secular authority (i.e. what sort of religious body is to anoint what sort of king?), with a view to attempting to re-suture the “traditional unity” of Sword and Sun. Unlike Guénon, Evola was exclusively preoccupied, instead, with identifying “the second coming” of the Emperor, whose restoration would, of itself, have organically spawned the proper sacerdotal caste.²⁴

According to this vision, the proximate danger, then, is the popes’ “Guelphism,” i.e. the Church’s ungodly presumption that she can manage worldly things better than a God-sent Emperor: “at her height,” writes Evola, “and in flagrant contradiction to her evangelical premises, [the Church] attempted to usurp the Empire’s rights; thus arose the theocratic vision of Guelphism.”²⁵ Evola intimates that it would be far more fitting for the Church to operate as a sort of Ministry of (spiritual) Health, as she did, in fact – and successfully so, in his view – under the Byzantine Empire. When the Guelph revolution exploded, in the 13th century, the Church came into her own by challenging royal incumbents; tactically, she schemed to divest politics of any spiritual connotation (i.e. pushing the vision that sovereignty is merely a “natural right”) so that she could inveigle States into serving her as her secular (militarized) arm – as her “divisions,” in short.²⁶

At an even deeper level, for the Ghibellines, the ultimate insidiousness of Catholicism lies in its anarchistic core. It is thus to hide her occult nature, that, purportedly, the Church has traditionally resorted to presenting a façade of “mediocrity, compromise, ritualistic aestheticism, and prudence,” which has enabled her to develop a formidable capacity for adaptation and absorption within a highly hierarchized yet externally impersonal structure. “The preaching of Christ,” Evola contends, “was never aimed at constituting a new form of associative life or even a new religion. Such a preaching was at heart anarchistic, anti-social, defeatist, and subversively hostile to any rational order of things.” Therefore, in order to restrain its insubordinate animus, and to begin to fashion itself as a viable organization, Catholicism has had to “incorporate the popular customs of the pagan world, to round off the more extreme and anti-political facets of its primitive complexion, and to avoid with colorless circumspection the logical conclusions of Protestantism [on the irrefragable impossibility of free-will] and mystical delirium.” In the final analysis, the secret recipe of Christianity’s success is its exclusive, quasi-monopolistic rapport with the “mass of cosmopolitan desperadoes.”²⁷ Thus, from the moment it structured and militarized itself in hierarchical form, not only did Christianity betray its hallowed principle of peaceable equality but it also became ipso
facto a rival of the Empire; as such, since there can only be one source of power, the Church must be either supplanted, defeated, and hollowed out, or at the very least subordinated, subjugated and absorbed.28

This labor of absorption may be facilitated by finessing Catholicism’s “amphibious” and “virile” sensibilities; in other words, the Emperor may move to co-opt the Pope by appealing to Catholicism’s most warrior-like and least compassionate traits, such as the Church’s “crusading”29 and “imperialistic” proclivities – viz. her partiality to the acquisition, other than souls, of territory and riches – on the one hand, and the highly politicized undertow of her vast missionary mobilization, on the other. 30 However, depending on the historical juncture at which they find themselves, there might be enemies of the Church for whom time is too short to attempt so daunting and so difficult a ruse with a player as consummate as the Roman Curia. Superstitiously, these partisans might have a better chance simply to wish the Church ill, hoping she would somehow commit a fatal blunder. It is curious, then, to notice how the same sort of anti-Roman hostility drawn from opposite ends of the political spectrum – which is but the byproduct of the same demented fight for world power – ends up leading two starkly different (Sicilian) types, such as Evola and Borgese, to formulate the same wishful scenario – Evola nearly a decade before Borgese – in nearly identical terms. In his youthful Imperial Paganism of 1928, Evola prophesied:

Fascism faces two choices: either to recognize in the Church the bearer of an anti-nationalist and anti-Fascist universalism […], or to wait and see whether the Church will take the anti-Christian step she has heretofore never dared to take: namely, to identify with Fascism, proclaim Italians the chosen people, and lead them on in a march for world conquest. Of course, the Church knows all too well how such a solution would assuredly lead to the complete collapse of the Church and of Italy herself. So all the more reason to wish that, one day, the “paladins of the Catholic tradition” will succeed in dragging the Church precisely into this sort of adventure – as long, that is, as Fascism does not awake to the reality and bring itself, in preparation of the true Counter-Reform and pagan restoration, to declare the absolute incompatibility between imperialism and Catholicism.31

The Anglo-American Vaishyas

One of this “traditionalist” nostalgia would have had reason to emerge had there not been afoot, in the cataclysmic aftermath of WWI, a very singular movement of spiritual revulsion against the consolidation of the “new structure,” which was evidently “speaking” with the new dynamic idiom of Anglo-America. From the outset, and with militant ve-
hemence, the Fascists took a snottily jaundiced view of Anglo-America’s ‘imperialism.’ They thought the latter a squalid “hypertrophy” of olden kingdoms and a vulgarian “leveling” of all excellence, which culminated in “monstrous banking and industrial trusts.” The Anglo-Americans’ love of gold, devotion to capital, and enslavement to the machine made their Commonwealth a horrid parody of true *imperium*: to Traditionalists, these new aspiring world-rulers that enslaved others chiefly by economic means were nothing but “commercial imperialists,” Caesarist traffickers, having no honor, and thus deserving no respect, no awe. They were the laughable nouveaux riches and phony aristocrats of Empire.32 Without “spiritual élan,” censored Evola, “there can never be anything but an imperialist creature of brute violence or a mechanical, soulless, administrative superstructure”: “traditionally,” he continues, “it is unthinkable to define an empire exclusively in terms of the expance of its overseas dominions and of its domination over, inferior, colored races.”33 A power aggregation of this sort, devoid as it completely is of sacral power, must then resort to the staged worship of “modern nationalism,” which is an artificial ritualism wholly dependent on the manipulation and suggestibleness of the masses. These masses are fed “myths that are intended to galvanize them with fancies of imperialist primacy.”

Verily, to Evola, Britain’s oligarchic new world order is but the culmination of this modern drift: when true aristocratic values decay and the amorphous “mass” takes the upper hand, *nations disappear to be replaced by great supranational aggregates, in the sign of a pseudo-Caesarism,” i.e., of personal and centralized power unblessed by a condign consecration (“devoid of chrism”).34 As conveyed by the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, Evola deemed Anglo-America’s oligarchical elites executive material unworthy of consecration. He observes, in this connection, that a “President” may at best be “greeted”; yet it is inconceivable that he can ever be worshipped, or feared like a Pharaoh; the warrior or the samurai may rightfully give his life for his liege; yet how would anyone pledge to offer his life “for the President!” without making a grotesque mockery of the ultimate sacrifice? One wonders, therefore, if America’s mystique of Old Glory was not constructed precisely to sidestep this liturgical faux pas.

Extreme “super-organization, centralization and rationalization,” such as contradistinguish the social and technical make-up of the modern and hyper-modern epoch are for Evola manifest symptoms of “the terminal, crepuscular phases of a given cycle of civilization.” At this juncture, regimes morph into totalitarian structures characterized by a tightly organized and **flattening** central which towers over a “formless mass.”35 Already in the late 1920s, bearing Germany’s recent rout vividly in mind, Evola knew that a military conflict against Anglo-America’s imperialist, fear-
some aberration was simply unthinkable; the Allies’ powers of (industrial/martial) mobilization were simply insuperable. “To crush the enemy,” he obscurely suggested, “one ought, instead, to unleash against him the very mechanical forces he himself has conjured up in the first place so as to see to it that he self-destructs.”36

THE “PIOUS” NATIONALISM OF THE ACTION FRANÇAISE: U.S. NEOCONSERVATISM AVANT LA LETTRE

Evola’s “Ghibelline” viewpoint is here discussed not only because it yields a fairly accurate and transparent exposition of the self-same vision that informs the contemporary politics of America’s Neoconservative movement, but also because its critique of modernity evidences the weaknesses of Neoconservatism itself. Though Neocons would obviously dismiss Evola’s quixotic glance at the past glories of China’s, Persia’s, or Japan’s empires as the anachronistic raving of a crackpot, and a politically repulsive one at that (the vanquished dross of history), the fact nonetheless remains that they, as a movement, strive to uphold a wishfully sacral idea of the American Nation, whose ongoing implementation represents for all intents and purposes a cohesive and organized endeavor to erect a copy of traditional Empire in hyper-modern U.S. idiosyncratic form. And, indeed, being creatures of hyper-modernity, Neocons are challenged by the very constraints adumbrated by Evola, namely the absence of spiritual wonderment in the modern age and America’s (unlike Britain’s) utter lack of a royal/priestly tradition. Like Evola, the Neocons deride the Gospels, yet unlike Evola, who once thought that Italians and Germans possessed sufficient imperial pedigree to dispense with papal support altogether, the Neocon Ghibellines sufficiently appreciate both the influence and the grandeur of the Church as to make the capture/absorption of Rome a priority. The capture would afford the Techno-Empire the allegiance of an extra billion people, and the sacral cachet of the Roman pageantry would invest their structure with a semblance of potestas [power/authority], i.e. of sovereign majesty, which is apparently believed to be of great importance in further impressing and galvanizing the patriotic masses for the last stretch of “just wars” before the onset of “eternal peace.”

In this sense, an exemplary precursor of sorts of the Neoconservative movement was the experiment of the Action Française (AF), the late Right-wing formation of France’s Third Republic led by writer, publicist, and political activist Charles Maurras (1868-1952). The AF saw its heyday in the first three decades of the twentieth century. The movement, staunchly royalist, chauvinistic, pro-Fascist, acrimoniously anti-German, and ardently pro-Catholic eventually dissolved in France’s political morass of the 1930s
under the centrifugal pull of its various components, not least of which was its extremist, anti-Semitic fringe (the AF was never in power). Evola acknowledged how he shared Maurras’s view on Christianity.37 And it was precisely Pius XI’s condemnation of the movement in December 1926 that most weakened it, in fact. The story is interesting because, in a way, the nature of the advances the AF made to the Church gave the game away: it blew the lid off the gearbox of this whole Ghibelline/Guelph tug-of-war between Pontifical expansionism and Totalitarian opportunism.

Maurras had been too candid; too naïve: he had overtly professed his atheism, while essentially lauding Catholicism, on the other hand, for “preserving and perfecting” the ideas that were dear to him and his movement, namely “order, tradition, discipline, hierarchy, authority, continuity, unity, labor, family, and guild socialism […].” Even more forthrightly, he had extolled Catholicism’s cult for self-immolation because such “an exaltation of sacrifice,” as he put it, had steeled Catholics into the best and most motivated of soldiers. Yet the functional masterpiece of the Church – wrote Maurras, spewing out far more than was tactfully acceptable – was to have tamed and “subjected the ‘Christian sentiment,’ which is aboriginally anarchistic and turbulent,” to the (imperial) discipline she had inherited from the Roman empire.38

The idea of God can also degenerate into anarchism. Too often does the individual, in open revolt against the general interest and the institutions of society (homeland, social milieu, city, family), surrender to this drift, typically by necessity or for fear of loneliness and destitution; yet if there took root in a mind so anarchically disposed the sentiment that it may establish a direct connection with God almighty, [such a mind] will be inclined to obey God more than men […].39

Maurras thus identified Christianity with “a spiritual drift of mystical anarchy,” a spirit that spreads like venom, the toxins of which only the Church knows how to neutralize. “The idea of God,” he averred is a “politically dangerous” one and the social chaos it would ordinarily prompt is averted only thanks to the regimenting action of a “tutelary institution.” On the greater plane, the Church has been able to immunize civilization against “this revolutionary mysticism,” which result implies, in the end, that “neither God nor Christ lives in the Church,” and that, for Maurras, was a felicitous state of affairs. It thus follows that, in a rigorously royalist conception of power, the Church can only aspire to being an “auxiliary body” of the Crown, though certainly one of the most important, if not the most important.

Needless to say, this sort of clumsy frankness – issuing to boot from a party not even in the ruling coalition – was, to the Church, an irritation of the first degree: the censure was total. The rotund suggestion of “aux-
Afterword

...When [Pope Pius XI] went on to say, “Rome is mine,” the [Fascist] ambassador could not contain himself.

“Rome,” he sputtered, “is the capital of Italy, home of his Majesty the King and the government.”

“Rome,” replied the Pontiff, “is my diocese.”

“Certainly,” agreed the ambassador, “in matters of religion – ”

“Yes,” the pope interrupted, “all the rest is just a matter of keeping the streets clean” [November 1929].

David I. Kertzer, The Pope and Mussolini 43

“As far as the Papacy is concerned, let us be clear: the Vatican represents 400 million men scattered all over the world; an intelligent policy should see to it that this colossal force be harnessed to one’s expansionist drive. I am, today, entirely foreign to any religion, but politics is politics. Nobody can assail [...] this spiritual sovereignty.”

– Benito Mussolini, November 1921 44
Joseph Stalin is said to have once exclaimed: “The Pope! How many divisions has he got?” 45 Whereby the Georgian, voicing conventional wisdom, implied that the Holy See, having no guns, could under no conditions be considered a full-bodied player on the grand chessboard. Of course, Stalin was wrong, not because the power of prayer outguns the world’s guns – alas, it does not – but because the Papacy, by entering into tight alliances with secular States by way of special compacts – the “concordats” – might achieve such a symbiotic entente with these States’ ruling elites on matters of domestic and especially foreign policy as to become factually, when its influence is extraordinarily strong, the spiritual handler of a (client) nation’s armies. Such, indeed, is the intended design of the Holy See’s “Guelph” strategy of indirect appropriation of a sovereign State’s “divisions” for the launching of “crusades.” And, from the evidence presented by French historian Annie Lacroix-Riz in Le Vatican, l’Europe et le Reich (2010), 46 which seems incontrovertible, it appears that such a strategy was deliberately and steadfastly pursued by Pius XI and his successor Pius XII from the 1920s through the salient phases of the Second World War. This story is here sketched out as an eloquent illustration of the conceptual frame woven thus far and as a “parallel” thread, on the politics of religion, to the narrative line of New World Order.

This story begins in 1870, when the young Kingdom of Italy annexed what had been theretofore the Pontifical State, which stretched over a large swath of land in central Italy. The papacy, then, was at its nadir: the former Pontifical territory was spoliated into quasi-nonexistence and the pope, claiming to be taken hostage by the anti-clerical godlessness of the new State, withdrew from public view to await better times. Meanwhile, the “Guelph” jewel of the old pontifical miter, the Habsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary, remained unshakably loyal to Rome, providing it, along with France, the Netherlands, and Bavaria, with the best part of its financial sustenance. Concurrently, America, with the ever-attentive imperial brokerage of Britain, set out on a manifest spiritual conquest of the world, reaching beyond the Atlantic. Prospects seemed to improve for the papacy when in 1882 Italy, which found her footing as a fully-dependent commercial colony of Germany, joined the latter and Austria in the so-called Triple Alliance (“La Triplice”). It seemed, then, as though the Central Powers were on the verge of recreating a “Catholic space” in Mittel-Europa not unlike the area once covered by the Holy Roman Empire, which the incumbent pope, Leo XIII, would have assuredly blessed. But in May 1915, under Benedict XV, the Italians, bribed by the British with promises of miserable colonial concessions and territorial annexations at the expense of Austria (transacted with the “Treaty of London”), betrayed the Triplice to side with the Allies, who tasked her precisely with
besieging and breaking through the southern flank of the Central Powers, that is, through Austria herself, the “Catholic State” par excellence. For this “Free-Masonic” infamy, the Vatican vowed never to forgive the Italian Statesmen behind the Patto di Londra and swore bitter revenge on them.47 But in November 1918 the Central Powers collapsed and, with them, Rome’s dream of the Holy Middle-European Kingdom. The dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire and the fall of her Austrian paladin came as a shocking and devastating blow to Rome. Tethered to the Allies, Italy “won,” of course, but at so colossal and unaffordable a cost, both human (half-a-million dead) and financial, that she literally unraveled at the end of the war, precipitating into three years of socio-political chaos – the three years it took to put Mussolini in charge (1919-1922). Interestingly, at the postwar conferences of Versailles and Trianon (1919-1920), which were designed to redraw the map of vanquished Mittel-Europa, Austria suffered a far greater dismemberment than Germany: the message to the ultimate recipient was clear. By virtually annihilating the Church’s chief supply of vicarious secular might, the “problem of Rome” from the victors’ perspective could have been considered done and over with. The only mainstay of Vatican foreign policy that survived the epochal transformation of WWI – one that was going to have fateful consequences – was hatred for Russia, which the Church saw as an obstacle to the reunion of the Eastern Churches with the Holy See.48

It is now ascertained that Fascism was a political creation that had been, to a large extent, groomed and maneuvered by Free-Masonry not only to break Italy’s postwar impasse with an authoritarian solution49 but also to forestall the upsurge of a Catholic mass-party – the partito popolare – whose progressive ardor seemed to have repulsed the Vatican as well. Crucial in this regard was the international network of the Lodges, which enabled the Massoni to win the approval of the operation by their American brethren50 in the U.S. Government.51 Since the turn of the century, Italian Free-Masonry had been the spiritual engine of so-called “radical nationalism,” an odd current of chauvinistic and bellicose yearning that preconized, god-only-knows upon which techno-military bases, a spiritual renascence for Italy and Italians through (stylized) violence, a carnivalesque throwback to Romanitas, and novel imperial incursions. Fascism was very much a product of this conjuration.52

The Lateran Pacts of 1929 between the two Romes were a marriage of convenience. Orphaned of Austria as Italy was of Germany, internationally semi-clandestine and hurting for cash, the Holy See needed a new temporal legitimization, something to jumpstart it with, and was evidently prepared to pay a good (political) price for it. Mussolini’s Italy was likewise in dire need of secular acceptance, and, indeed, a “consecration”
with a “reinstated” papacy would have conferred upon Fascism a not in-
considerable gloss to a player so unsubstantial, so insecure, and with such
a tenuous hold on geopolitical reality. That the Church had ulterior mo-
tives there is no doubt: the plan to resume the prewar strategy of Guelph
expansion was foremost in her mind and it clearly could not advance un-
less Versailles’s (anti-German territorial) clauses were definitely scrapped.
Because Austria seemed disfigured beyond repair, even though the old
Hapsburg Empire could perhaps have been partially and painstakingly re-
pieced together, a concordat at a time, the ready-made “divisions” to
bet on were most assuredly Germany’s. Hence the privileged and abso-
lutely central role that this country would occupy in the foreign policy of
the Vatican from the days immediately after the Great War through, as we
shall see, the winter of 1941. Italy was merely a stepping-stone; she count-
ed for little in the larger picture.

Elected in February 1922, Pius XI (Achille Ratti), also known as the
“Pope of the Jesuits” and the “Pope of the Azione Cattolica” immediately
set out to lay the groundwork for the relaunch of a Guelph “politics aimed
at the defense and conquest of the ‘Reign of Christ.’” The vast and tightly
articulated network of the Azione Cattolica (AC), i.e., the lay education-
al organization under the Vatican’s bishopric, was used by the Church as
the “domestic weapon” in the host country to establish ground traction
and build thereon. Unsurprisingly the static that would flicker between
the Church and Fascism on the one hand (1931), and Nazism on the
other (1937), originated in the lower depths of this crucial fight for the
mind of youth. What came to be ratified in Rome in February 1929 was
in essence an alliance between two retrograde hierarchies sealed on the
(superstitious) devoutness of Italy’s peasant masses in the name of anti-
modernism; it was called “Clerico-Fascism.” And it was no accident
that the Church, as she began to rally, had come to compromise with one
of the very few, and very weak monarchies of the old kind that had sur-
vived the disfiguring fire of the Great War. The Lateran Pacts afforded the
Church “temporal invisible power” to pursue her conquest of the “Reign
of Christ,” and, no less importantly, they mightily replenished the coffers
of the Vatican (with Italian money, as compensation for the expropria-
tions of 1870) at a time when, after having lost one traditional supplier
after another, Rome had come to rely exclusively on American donations,
which, however, were not sufficient. Catholicism was proclaimed State re-
ligion and the Azione Cattolica was granted special status, which shielded
it from thorough fascistization. All in all, it was an armed truce. Politically,
as is well known, Mussolini had been born a fanatically unbelieving
and anti-clerical Socialist; merely five months after the Concordat, in a
speech, he had sent a Ghibelline warning to the Vatican:
We should be proud that Italy is the only European nation which contains the headquarters of a world religion. The religion was born in Palestine but became Catholic in Rome. If it had stayed in Palestine, then in all probability it would have shared the fate of the many sects, like the Essenes or the Therapeutae, which vanished without a trace.53

The death penalty was reintroduced in 1930 but the Vatican did not flinch. The Clerico-Fascist alliance had to hold for the time being.54 Meanwhile Germany had to be nurtured and blandished; the ideal envoy for the mission was Monsignor Eugenio Pacelli, the future Pope Pius XII (1939-1958), who had taken his decisive assignment in the affair first as apostolic nuncio (ambassador) to Bavaria in 1917 and subsequently as nuncio to the German Reich three years later, before becoming Cardinal Secretary of State in February 1930 and, finally, pope in March 1939. In the structure of Pacelli’s strategy, the 1924 Concordat with Bavaria represented a first important step – a step which France read as a warning that she had better reconcile herself to the inevitability of the Anschluss (Germany’s reunification with Austria) and with the Vatican’s uncompromising determination to work, on Germany’s behalf, toward abolishing the frontiers drawn at Versailles.55 The virulent polemic initiated as a result by Maurras’s vehemently anti-German Action Française revolved precisely around the (plausible) suspicion that the Vatican was scheming with Germany’s Catholics to create, with each successive Land-concordat, a swelling Clerico-Nationalist majority wherewith to abolish the Weimar Constitution, which forbade Germany from undersigning a national concordat with the Vatican, and therewith midwife a new sort of monarchy. “Have Ghibellines been so rare in the Throne of Peter? Rome has been never arraigned,” railed the Maurrassiens, “let alone taken to task, for this sort of Ghibellinism which we call pro-Germanism.”56 As early as 1923, Pius XI is said to have confided to the Belgian ambassador how, “despite their recent past as bitter enemies,” he wished that France, Belgium, and Germany would form an alliance to stop the advance of Communism, which he indefatigably described as the chief ill of the times. By 1930, the Secretary of State’s (Pacelli’s) aversion to France and predilection for Germany had become, among diplomats, a commonplace.57

Concomitantly, the Holy See, in a two-track type of strategizing, sagaciously cultivated its crucial relationship with the United States, especially in anticipation of what it envisioned as the forthcoming, epochal “crusade” against Soviet Russia. Rome’s rapport with America appeared to have been largely conducted in terms of gold and geopolitical discourse. Most notable, for the latter, was the inauguration, in November 1919, of the School
of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, which was bound to evolve into America's most prestigious academy for International Relations. Originally, this was, wholly, a Jesuit production entrusted by the head of the order, Wlodimir Ledochowski (1866-1942) to the ardently patriotic soldier of Jesus, the American Edmund A. Walsh (1885-1956). Walsh was eventually sent to Russia in 1922 by his Vatican handlers who, after the suppression by the Bolsheviks of the Orthodox Church's monopoly over belief, were hoping “for a potential Catholic revival in Russia, where they had formerly been excluded. Indeed, Russia's small Catholic community had actually welcomed the overthrow of the Romanovs.” Walsh's mission to Soviet Russia was a failure, however; the Vatican legation was withdrawn in November 1923. This signaled “the end of the Holy See's attempts at rapprochement with the Soviet government, [and] marked a shift toward 'absolute polarity and mutual repulsion'.

Although in 1926, the Jesuit oriental scholar Michel d'Herbigny was consecrated a bishop in Berlin by Archbishop Pacelli and sent to Russia, where he secretly ordained bishops, d'Herbigny [too] was expelled and the new bishops were imprisoned as soon as the Soviets discovered the nature of his mission, bringing Vatican-Soviet relations to a standstill.” None the worse for disappointment, the inexhaustible Fr. Walsh, S.J., nevertheless soldiered on, confident in “his self-imposed role as anticommunist watchdog.” At Georgetown – as well as in a multitude of other American academies, such as the War College – he preached, with a scholarly diction and around the clock, to civilian and military audiences (Dwight D. Eisenhower amongst them in 1928) against the blasphemous abominations of Soviet Russia. And speaking in 1924 of his experience in relief work, Walsh predicted that a “distinct Papal Relief organization of world-wide scope and similar in function to the Red Cross [would] be among the permanent agencies working for the success of mankind”:58 this was glimpsing into the future of Caritas (presently the Vatican's charitable strong-arm), which, expected like a bashful handmaiden to clean up the oligarchs’ (strife-inducing) filth, stands, quite obviously, as that (subdued) institutionalization of Catholicism most appealing to One-Worlders.

Gold-wise the relationship between the Holy See and the United States had been an essential one since the green days of Italian Fascism, as we have seen. Starting in the early to mid-1920s, the invested patrimony of the Vatican would expand into a veritable financial empire which extended from the European portfolios of Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Britain, and Switzerland to faraway stakes in Latin America, and whose key terminus was in Wall Street – or, rather, in the investment banking trust of the J.P Morgan Company, to be specific. The Church's financial holding company was purportedly created in two stages: from
1929 to 1933, following the Lateran Accords, and from 1939 to 1945, on the lucrative coattails of WWII. Counseled by the financiers of the Morgan Bank, the Holy See gained access, e.g., to the trust of Anaconda Copper and to Iraq’s oil wells. These and a plethora of other ventures ended up being so fabulously remunerative for Rome that “Pius XI would confer upon both Jack and Tom Lamont [of J.P. Morgan Company] the Grand Cross of Saint Gregory the Great.” The “alacrity” that the House of Morgan also displayed in helping Mussolini stabilize the Lira in 1926 and in doing good business with Fascism in general (with Washington’s blessings, quite naturally) was very much linked to this USA-Vatican entente.

No less importantly, from the mid-1920s through the Great Depression, the Catholic Church of America, which was America’s wealthiest private real estate owner, and the second holder, after the U.S. government, of all property broadly defined, began sharing that wealth with Rome, under the consenting and the enthusiastic gaze of America’s private Catholic donors (such as Joe Kennedy, the Knights of Columbus, etc.). The hyper-active conveyor of this (Ghibelline) cascade of dollars upon the Holy See was originally Monsignor, and later Cardinal, Francis Spellman (1889-1967). Already in 1924, “recognizing the growing importance of the Church in the United States, Pius XI had doubled the number of American cardinals.”

By the early 1930s, things were so set that the Vatican could placidly contemplate the possibility of forging a “Catholic Alliance stretching from Lisbon to Budapest, with its center in Rome” that “might shut out Communism […] and constitute a new force of balance and social order in Europe.” Much has been (tendentiously) written of the affinity presumably shared by Church and Fascism, and later Nazism, for authoritarian and anti-Semitic sentiment, with the intent of arguing that it was allegedly through the occult mediation of the paradigmatic bearers within the Church of such heinous prejudices – i.e., the Society of Jesus (“the Jesuits”) – that the Clerico-Fascist alliance of 1929 and the Nazi Concordat of 1933 came into being. But that is not so. To claim that “Fascism had made any doctrinal inroads among these soldiers of Loyola” is to misjudge the situation entirely, for what was at work in those days was the line concerted by a House of experienced, and cynical, tacticians (the Curia) determined on seeing their Guelph Empire through. This meant composing with local dictators, of course, which was not without its difficulties (and mortal sins), in fact, for, in 1931, the Fascist regime and the Holy See came to lock horns, again, on the sensitive issue of the Azione Cattolica’s (AC) allowable radius of political interference – with particular regard, this time around, to trade-union activism. The perennial grinding tension between the two Romes gave way to another crisis, and the crisis
degenerated into the customary scenes all across Italy of Fascist *squadristi* (punitive posses of Black-Shirts) assaulting and vandalizing various local branches of the AC and beating the activists. The Pope responded in June 1931 by resorting to the standard Vatican tactic of the plaintive encyclical – in this instance, “*Non abbiamo bisogno*” (“We Do not Need”: “...How many acts of brutality and of violence there have been, even to the striking of blows and the drawing of blood!”), which was designed to arouse the ecumenical opprobrium of the world’s faithful against a reviled persecutor, i.e., the Fascists.

But the Blackshirts’ powers of harassment were presently too intense for Pius, who found himself forced to withdraw the troops of the AC from any sort of political engagement. Thus reined in, Rome’s “White paladins” were asked to stand down and wait in silence (“*attendismo*”) for brighter days (which would only come with the regime’s fall in 1943). “Peace” was made, and Pius XI went on blessing Italy’s horrid and brutally dissipative invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 – in the hope, that is, that Italian victory would present a new chance for Jesuit missionaries” – and Fascism’s (dismally ineffectual) intervention in Spain, the following year, in support of Francisco Franco’s conservative counter-revolution.64

But, politically speaking, Fascist Italy was, again, a *quantité négligeable*, which, aside from a half-earnest craving for more African dirt, possessed no foreign policy whatsoever.65 In the scope of the Vatican’s Guelph ambition, Germany’s divisions, more than anything, mattered. As known, the pressure that Pacelli, as Secretary of State, brought to bear on Germany’s Catholics was decisive in undermining the executive of von Schleicher – known as the “Red General” for his socialistic leanings and long-time association with Russia – and thereby in favoring the accession to the Chancellorship in January 1933 of Adolf Hitler, the most fanatically anti-Bolshevik agitator available on the foredoomed stage of Weimar.66 The Concordat with Nazism was ratified in July 1933, and, unfailingly, the pivot of the entire “confrontation” between two factions not-so-secretly bent on using one another (as it customarily is between Guelphs and Ghibellines) consisted of the agreement on *education*. In this regard, Hitler had already made his agenda (à la Maurras) perfectly transparent in a conversation with the representatives of Germany’s bishops three months before the ratification: “We need soldiers, devout soldiers. Devout soldiers are the most precious because they risk everything. Thus we will keep confessional schools so as to raise believers.” No less revealingly, there were in this Concordat “spectacular secret clauses,” as well, hinting at an eventual spiritual *conquista* by Catholicism of the Slav world (especially of the Ukraine), with the explicit understanding that such an evangelizing deployment would have occurred in the wake of a German
onslaught against the Soviet arch-enemy in the East. News of this secret appendix was immediately leaked by the Poles in Paris and Moscow, and became common knowledge despite the Vatican's démentis.67

With remarkable parallelism to the Italian situation, and as manifest proof of Rome's not-so-hidden stubbornness in pursuing her very own goals, the Holy See, via the activity of the Azione Cattolica's German extension, ran afoul of the swastika immediately. Like the Fascists three years before, the Nazis had likewise to sic their Brown-clad thugs on Germany's Catholic Youth and as the struggle, a fierce one, showed no sign of abatement on either side, the Nazis escalated by leveling at the Catholics a series of scandal-mongering broadsides in 1934. They started, first, by exposing with fanfare, and very efficaciously, several sensationally grotesque cases of fiscal fraud and embezzlement that featured pious little nuns laden with cash, concealed under their robes, restlessly shuttling like mules between Italy and Germany; and subsequently – after the break-down of a patched-up truce in 1936 – the offensive was sustained by hitting the Church hardest where she was most ignominiously weak: sex. In March 1937, Pius XI had, for his part, fomented the Church's "guerrilla warfare" against the Reich by firing, six years after the clash with Mussolini's Blackshirts, another plaintive encyclical – Mit brennenden Sorge ("With Burning Anxiety")."... The Church cannot wait to deplore the devastation of its altars, the destruction of its temples, if an education, hostile to Christ... "). Pioneering the tactic that the U.S. Neoconservatives via the Boston Globe would adopt in January 2002 to discredit publicly and thus silence the Church in the run-up to the War on Terror, Goebbels and his Ministry of Propaganda counter-attacked, far more efficaciously, again, by unleashing packs of reporters tasked with the failsafe assignment of unearthing from Catholicism's clerical underground lurid stories of homosexuality, molestations, pedophilia, and sacristies and seminaries turned into bordellos. Searingly blasted by Goebbels's inquisitorial vituperations ("the horrifying rot" of "these monsters!..."), the Holy See, again, retreated and capitulated humiliatingly by agreeing to the dissolution of all Catholic Youth Organizations in Germany. There followed the pacification of 1937-1938.

Meanwhile, accompanied by the Vatican's legendary "fund manager," Bernardino Nogara, Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli traveled to America to talk money in November 1937. Ever cautious and keen on upholding their (strictly Guelph) policy of the "two irons in the fire" – i.e. one iron in Europe, or better, Germany, the other (steadily) in America – the Romans entrusted the omnipresent and financially omnipotent House of Morgan with $3.5 million of their money, which was invested in T-bills. When Germany marched into Poland in September 1939, Pacelli, who was, since March, Pope Pius XII, did not condemn the invasion. Polish
Catholics felt stabbed in the back thrice; the nomination of two German apostolic administrators in the occupied areas was bitterly understood as Rome’s *de facto* recognition of the Nazi conquest. It must have been that Pacelli had kept his silence in the hope that France and Britain, whose solemn pledge to succor “poor Poland” had become the (tabooed) joke of the day, would come to better judgment, negotiate with Germany and, at long last, regroup against Soviet Russia. The “good news” was finally delivered in March 1940, when Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop personally assured the Pope that Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Russia, was forthcoming; Pacelli is said to have received the information with satisfaction.

One historiographic account situates roughly at this juncture (December 1939) the participation of Pius XII in a plot, organized by dissident circles of the *Reichswehr*, to assassinate, or at the very least to remove Hitler from power. That the plot failed because Britain refused to endorse the coup and to offer any negotiatory guarantees in case of success, seems entirely logical, considering that Britain was determined to see this conflict through to the devastating end of Germany herself; that the pope took part in it is also plausible, though not because he sought thereby to end the conflict, but rather on account of his fear that the impending invasion of France, on which Hitler was hell-bent, as well as a confrontation with Britain, might have diverted precious resources away from what Rome obsessively saw as the common “Red Peril” in the East.

Be that as it may, when the armistice with France was signed in June 1940 and there opened a dizzying vista of “total victory,” “the Roman Curia,” writes Annie Lacroix-Riz, “lost all sense of measure.” In the Pope’s Christmas address of 1940 and in the (unsigned) editorial of the Vatican’s main organ, the *Osservatore Romano*, of March 12th 1941, there then appeared deeply ambiguous, allusive, and de-contextualized references to a Catholic “novus ordo” (new world order) presided by a “fighting pope” (“Il Papa è un combattente”).

In April 1941, just two months prior to Germany’s fateful penetration of Belarus, Pius XII, methodical and Guelph to a fault, summoned Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, the Vatican’s foremost Orientalist, and the Father General of the Jesuits, Wlodimir Ledochowski to discuss, in strict adherence to the “secret clauses” of the Reich Concordat, concrete solutions for “re-Christianizing” the USSR. In doing so, not to outrage the patriotic and Orthodox sensibilities of the Russian people, Pacelli cautioned against any action that might convey the impression that there was an obvious connection between Barbarossa and the dispatch of Catholic priests in the occupied zones. Yet not even four months after the launch of the anti-Soviet “crusade,” i.e. by late October 1941 and long before Stalin-
Afterword

grad, the Vatican was informed by trusted sources at the highest level that the Axis Powers had already irremediably lost the war.\textsuperscript{72} Thenceforth, the extrication of the Holy Roman Church from this devilish mess became the unquestionable priority. Had it not been for America, i.e., had it not been for the savvy cultivation of the strategy of the “two irons in the fire,” the hexing of Evola and Borgese might have come true; and it is indeed difficult to imagine what would have befallen the Church had she wagered exclusively on Germany (and Italy).

Clearly, Rome had \textit{completely} underestimated Britain. By misunderstanding that the latter was the absolutely central player and producer of both World Wars and of everything related to their preparation, including, in my view, the Bolshevik “Revolution”; and by having, in truth, utterly deceived herself into thinking that Communism’s giant, truculent \textit{bogusness} was a cosmic manifestation of “evil,” the Church came rather close this one time to the brink of the precipice. Pacelli had thoroughly failed to intuit that Soviet Russia had been, from the outset, not ever “the enemy,” but rather the secretly allied, and gargantuan, foil in East – only \textit{propagandistically} hostile to the West – that was going to enable the British and America’s Anglophiles to quash “Germany resurgent,” which had been the source of all their geopolitical nightmares. It was not by coincidence that the United States established diplomatic relations with the USSR four days after Hitler’s plebiscitary acclamation on November 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1933. Of course, the trouble in all this was that, conditioned by a mental cast of eras gone by, Popes Ratti and Pacelli had precisely visualized “Germany resurgent” as their Guelph battering ram into the “new century” – a century the insidiousness of which they appeared not to have fully fathomed.

But Rome had hedged her bets and predisposed the American-padded fallback option at least since the fall of 1939, at which time, President Roosevelt, looking far ahead, and already entertaining vivid dreams of Ghibelline greatness for his country, had thought, after Dante’s fashion, of offering Pius XII the role of charitable \textit{“dispensator”} and “reverential” Father in the postwar stabilization of Europe. The Reverential Father was going to need money, which the United States would provide, far more abundantly than any other power, by drawing it, at first, chiefly from FDR’s “secret funds.”

To this effect, the intermediary offices of Archbishop Spellman, Pacelli’s long-time intimate, were given an additional boost and the former CFO of U.S. Steel, the \textit{richissime} and Italy-loving Protestant Myron C. Taylor was sent in December 1939 to the Papal court as FDR’s personal representative. Owing to the alertness of this former admirer of Mussolini’s “public works,” the Vatican was further able to secure in
May 1940 the fiduciary access to New York’s banking grid, and to the managing offices of the Federal Reserve Bank, which, being thereupon given custody of a considerable amount of Vatican gold shipped from Europe, obliged, for the duration of the war, to settle the international payments of the Holy See.

When it finally dawned on her, in late 1941, what sort of grand scenario had been in the cards all along, Rome hurriedly lent Washington a hand in re-scripting the epilogue of the war’s act, and proceeded thereon to lay the foundations and principles of the post-1945 “new” anti-Soviet Alliance. For this second act (the “Cold War”), making do with whatever props the stage afforded, the Holy See recycled Italy’s whole kit and caboodle: the Clerico-Fascist bureaucracy, staffed to a significant extent with her “White” paladins, was transferred wholesale into Italy’s new Republic (the “Demo-Christian” apparatus), and the Mafia was eagerly re-awakened to assist logistically in the landing of U.S. troops in Sicily in July 1943.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Italian-American sinew – which could boast of a number of key personalities, such as Amedeo Giannini, the founder of Bank of America – was threaded into the bulging mass of this reinforced US-Vatican Anti-Communist amalgam, with further effusion of money, conveyed to the Throne of St. Peter as enthusiastically as ever by the ubiquitous Cardinal Spellman, who would rise to become the quintessential, hyper-bellicist stars-and-stripes crusader of the Cold War. The rhetorical terms of this new Ghibelline “consecration” found a pithy instance in the letter that FDR’s successor, Harry “Give ‘em Hell” Truman, addressed to Pius XII on August 6th, 1947. “Your Holiness,” intoned the techno-knight of Hiroshima, “this is a Christian Nation […] I desire to do everything in my power to support and to contribute to a concert of all the forces striving for a moral world.”

In fine, in addressing the controversy of the papacy’s responsibility in the Jewish persecution, Annie Lacroix-Riz contends that Pius knew everything and did nothing, directly or indirectly, to prevent the holocaust. To this one can add that the Allies – who certainly were no less informed of the killings than Pius XII, and who, unlike Pacelli, were on top of the game and had direct control of their own divisions – were even more culpable for not stopping the slaughter when they could have easily done so. The truth is that they were tactically focused on standing pat for as long as it took – in fact, three whole years of undisturbed German campaigning (and butchery) in the East (from June 1941 to June 1944) – to see the Nazis routed before it was safe to close in on them from the West, and at long last raze Germany to the ground. But by then it was too late. The Jews had been nobody’s concern but the Nazis’.
The Pain of Techno-Fascism

[The new spirit that has, for over a century, shaped our landscape], encroaches upon human resources as well: it exploits weaknesses and hardens the areas of resistance. We are for the time being in a condition in which we may still reckon the loss; we still sense the annulment of values, the flattening and simplification of the world. Yet newer generations are growing up already, wholly foreign to all the ancient traditions we were born with, and it gives an odd feeling to observe these young ones, many of whom will live to see the year 2000. It is likely that by then the last residues of the modern [...] era will have entirely vanished.

Ernst Jünger, On Pain (1934)77

The “Fascist” analysis of modern power, and of its relation to the management of devout belief, is, despite its manifest bias, suggestive. It undoubtedly fails, however, in one crucial aspect, and that is in its contention that modern-day, Anglo-American imperialism is but a vulgar and artificial surrogate of the ancient, “sacred and spiritual” Imperium. To have claimed, as Evola and others did, that modern power-structures are but the expression of petty mercantile and crassly pecuniary interests was itself a presumptuous snobbery which obscures the fact that, though its aesthetics might feel repulsive to a soul more or less imbued with essences of the past, the Age of the Machine does, in fact, carry considerable spiritual weight. It is the manifestation of a spiritual force of a different nature. The Nazi-Fascists lost the war, and they could not have lost it worse than they did. Their utter spiritual rout also stemmed from their crazed conceit of being the bearers of the “noble and sovereign” Way, when, truly, no Fascist bard could really tell what a return to “sovereignty” in the twentieth century might have actually signified, or prove convincingly that such a revival of sovereignty, possible as it might have been, would have been conducive to a moral plane in every way “superior” to that afforded by the modern Age of the Machine. The Fascists were “out of the world,” in a way; they might have grasped that the United States had at its disposal unprecedented powers of military devastation, but they surprisingly failed to construe Anglo-America’s manifest combination of commercial and financial hegemony, astounding powers of technological annihilation, and territorial expansion as a full-blown and novel incorporation of imperial sovereignty in its own right. Mussolini’s geo-political appreciation of the United States, which he thought “uninterested in the evolution of the modern world, and thus a strategic player of minor importance,”78 offers patent evidence of his spiritual unintelligence. Hitler was more perceptive
than the Italian, but not much, convinced as he was in 1940 that, though one could clearly see that America had a ravenous appetite for imperial expansion, she would not become “a problem” for world peace until 1970 or 1980.79

Thus, before drawing conclusions from this whole exposition, there remains to dwell for a moment on the central notion of “the Machine.” What is it really? And what propitiated its advent? Is it merely, as we have been taught, the fruit of a market-driven desire for saving labor, i.e., one of the benevolent faces of “progress”? Or, is it, following anti-modernism’s conflict theory, the chief instrument by which a “centralizing and totalitarian collectivity” constrains and constricts refractory individuals, i.e., an evil “Matrix”?80

Or what if, on a deeper and different level (from these discursive commonplaces), our intolleration for physical pain was instead the true gauge of our technological fitness? In other words, what if humanity, having sensed it was about to be engulfed in an epochal transformation, and dreading the laceration that this shift would have wrought on its flesh, “reacted” collectively with an organized motion to segregate the forthcoming sufferance, and that the result of this segregative movement is what we call “technology”?

This insight is that of another “Fascist,” the famous warrior/writer Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), a virtuoso and visionary once attuned to the deeper esoteric currents of Nazism, who developed it into an unconventional interpretation of the Age of the Machine in his 1934 essay On Pain. Jünger’s point of departure in the 1920s is the standard Fascist one, namely the languorous yearning for the ancient “chivalry” (Ritterlichkeit) and its knights, all creatures of a heroic and magical world, which are found to be deplorably deprived of breathing room in the era of mobilized masses and “technique.” Very much bound to the mystique of blood and soil, Jünger was, clearly, enamored of his national cradle. And having passionately fought in the Great War, he was also keenly aware of and profoundly perturbed by the unrelenting siege the Universalist spirit had been laying to his homeland. For young pro-Fascist nationalists like him, “the supranational powers,” – i.e. Jewry, Free-Masonry, High-Finance, and the “Church’s pursuit of power for the mere sake of power, which is customarily referred to as Jesuitism” – had coalesced into a conspiratorial nebula organically hostile to the aboriginal “will to fashion a community through blood-ties,” which is nationhood. “Nations,” wrote Jünger, “are cores of organic bonds of a higher substance; an internationalist aggregation [Gruppierung], on the other hand, is merely an instrumental abstraction which is concocted, behind the scenes, by an American brain.” To him, when the time for settling scores would have come and native blood
would have been given thereby occasion “to speak,” the unreal constructs of these “internationalist” conceptualizations would have collapsed like houses of cards.81 Interestingly, seeming to fear her most, Jünger stung the Church with relish (he would convert to Catholicism at the age of 101, two years before his death), and, again, like Borgese and Evola, wished her ill with yet another Neoconservative/Ghibelline curse: 82

We believe the Free-Masonry of Blood to be stronger and more fearsome than all the Lodges of the world. Which is to say that one may inflict upon Jesuitism the most damage by letting devout Catholics endorse the collaboration between nationalism and Catholicism.83

But, upon maturer reflection, Jünger found modernity’s greatest insidiousness in the objectification of the body, that is to say, in modern society’s transformative drive to separate pain from life. Whereas heroic societies sought to assimilate pain – either through (asceticism’s) mortification of the flesh or knightly discipline – modern ones, which believe there is only body and no soul, strive instead to isolate, confine, bottle up the pain, as it were, away from the space of workday activity. They shove it “to the margins” (nach den Rändern). The (socio-existential) retribution in all this is that, thus compressed and away from sight, pain, when it strikes back, hits us all with extraordinarily magnified violence. Clearly, the more compressed and the more occulted the “bottling,” the more brutal and cruel the explosion when the pain is inevitably released, “with arrears” as it were – according to patterns more or less predictable, depending on the phenomenon, viz. wars, crime waves, natural disasters, epidemics, etc. There is a price to pay for this segregation, regardless. And here comes into play the pivotal role of technology, i.e., the very means by which the bottling up of pain is systematically effected in ways that are indeed ever more sophisticated, ever more “advanced”: the classic culminant instance of this progression is the atom bomb, of course. All of which has conversely engendered a whole set of social practices designed to exorcise the fear of the modern discharge of pain such as a particular use of the uniform, whose functionality is not just that of making, through “absorption,” gashes and fatal wounds more palatable to our gaze, but also that of effacing the individual’s gender, thus creating a “third sex.”

Modern masses, too, are treated like objects that have come to be husbanded through new “disciplining structures,” and shepherded by the new police apparatuses into areas where they are directed to acclaim their leaders. To separate pain from life, humanity has taught itself various manners of creating spaces in which pain may be taken to be an illusion, and this has led
to those notorious instances of de-sensitization whereby we receive news, and watch images of hecatombs, drone strikes, and any other sort of mass annihilation without any trace of emotion, yet may faint at the sight of our torn flesh. For Jünger, the indifferent “silence” with which we greet the news of a plane crash is far more cruel and abstract than the frenzied cheers that punctuate the (sacrificial) slaying of bulls in “southern arenas.” Rhetorically, the sinister underside of this new, monstrous ethos is that modernity’s worship of technology is just as poignantly an ode to mayhem and to the self-righteous impunity of detonating nuclear devices, and killing everything in sight for miles, should it be “expeditious” to do so.

Hyper-modern man is meaner and crueler. And he now lives in what one may call the Techno-Structure, an apparatus combining high organizational efficiency with total moral blindness. The Techno-Structure appears to be driven by an icy will to entomologize society, i.e. of turning us into genderless and “virtuous” “ants” and “the global village” into a centralized cluster of mechanized anthills. The era of the Techno-Structure is an “era of transition” whose “new orders” (neue Ordnungen) have yet to appear, and, it is understandable, Jünger remarks, “why in an epoch so instrumental, the State is not acknowledged as the all-encompassing institution, but rather as a totem of sorts,” and why technique and ethos have surprisingly become synonymous.” The tract ends on a spectral note. The gestation of this titanic monstrosity is what lies in the future of our species and there is no point resisting it; the chivalrous heart, therefore, cannot but embrace this destiny, hoping to survive and witness the dawn, as Evola put it, of the “pagan restoration.”

It thus follows that, practically speaking, the individual has no choice but to partake in the rearmament, either because he discerns in the latter a preparation to the downfall, or because he believes he recognizes, upon those hills where crosses have rotten away and palaces decayed, that inquietude that usually forebodes the advent of a new lordship [neue Feldherrenzeichen].

But this “new lordship”: is it not the very technocratic and internationalist imperium that eventually brought about the “downfall” of the Nationalist “blood” – that native blood which miscarried so catastrophically when it had a chance to “speak” and scores were finally settled in WWII?

On Pain is a prophetic piece. We are living through the transition; verily, the year 2000 (actually, 2001) was a momentous divide; and we can indeed reckon some of the loss and intuit the shape of “new orders” to come – or that are doing their utmost to emerge. What America is presently manning is, truly, in seminal form, the Techno-Structure. It is an
imperial bastion alright, and there would be no reason to suppose that its topmost technocratic cadre is not just as competent and (spiritually) dedicated as the knightly orders that administered the kingly estates of yore. And like the latter, America’s new Techno-fascism is equally endowed with spiritual force, but of a different sort, as Jünger’s essay sought to convey. It is an enormous force, which chiefly speaks through mechanized organization, and, in affirming itself, it indeed samples, synthesizes, and regurgitates “the old” within a process of ever-advancing, highly dynamic innovation that standardizes, flattens, and centralizes everything.

Morphologically, the transitional nature of our time is highlighted by the fact that the Anglo-American Commonwealth still presents itself as a hybrid compound. The Commonwealth comprises two nominally separate sovereign bodies, yet America pursues a foreign, imperial policy that has been, from the outset, Britain’s. Britain, for her part, evidently favors for herself a low-profile in the muscular theatrics of power, though via finance and intelligence she is still very much at the console. Constitutionally, on the other hand, Britain can fuse with America – through language, culture, and Puritanical business-worship – only up to a point because traditionally, she already thrives in a self-contained nucleus of Crown, (Anglican) Church, and Sword. America has neither Church nor Crown, though her irrepressible imperial appetency makes her crave both institutions all the more acutely. For the time being, therefore, the problem appears to have been composed in the following fashion: 1) Britain is presented to the masses as little more than America’s loyal “partner”; 2) America denies her imperial nature and concurrently diverts the violent energy she restlessly secretes to a nationalist cult of “the flag”; and 3) considering that, at bottom, the Anglo-American “system” wishes to suppress all traditional religions and replace them, in the long-run, with a “universal” creed along the lines of “the Religion of Man,” it presently endorses a two-pronged strategy. The informal church of the Religion of Man is already populous, immensely so: it is, as known, a product of modernity’s disillusionment and pathological consumerism, and it presently encompasses a majority of westerners, many of them “fallen-away Christians,” who have come to worship above and beyond all, not so much their rationality as their psyche, i.e. their power of self-awareness, which, in conjunction with rational cogitation, they mistake for the source of their putative compassion, soberness and “overall decency,” as well as the source of their alleged meditative capacity to become “one with the cosmos.” The informal church of the Religion of Man is also very much the church of Leftism, of the Democratic, (postmodern) Left, politically speaking. The system’s two-pronged strategy is to continue to encourage this triumphant form of mass agnosticism, which coincides with the New-Ageish devotion pre-
conized by Borgese, Mumford and all One-Worlders, while proceeding, on the other hand, to attract, in Ghibelline fashion, the more “traditional” flocks – above all, Catholicism’s – with a view to incorporate them, slowly but surely, into the “structure,” within which, ultimately, all spiritual afflatus is to be extinguished, as if dealing, in point of fact, with “ants” in an anthill. For the system, “all that is required of the good Christian is chastity and a modicum of charity in immediate personal relations.” In the Soviet imperium, which was but a conspicuously inefficient prototype of Techno-Structure, the problem vis-à-vis Catholicism, in provinces such as Poland, was posited in the exact same terms:

The rulers tolerate [“patriotic”] Catholics as a temporary and necessary evil, reasoning that the stage has not yet arrived at which one can utterly wipe out religion, and that it is better to deal with accommodating bigots than with refractory ones [...]. The masses in highly industrialized countries like England, the United States, or France are largely de-Christianized. Technology, and the way of life it produces, undermines Christianity far more effectively than do violent measures [i.e. by raising man, not as a “child of God,” but as a purely social creature]. The core of the problem is to avoid galvanizing the forces of Christianity by some careless misstep. It would be an unforgivable carelessness, for example, to close the churches suddenly and prohibit all religious practice. Instead one should try to split the Church in two. Part of the clergy must be compromised as reactionaries and “foreign agents” – a rather easy task, given the utterly conservative mentality of many priests. The other part must be bound to the State as closely as the Orthodox Church is in Russia, so that it becomes a tool of the government. A completely submissive Church – one that may on occasion collaborate with the security police – loses authority in the eyes of the pious. Such a Church can be preserved for decades, until the moment when it dies a natural death due to a lack of adherents.

The above passage, written in 1950 under Communism, describes fairly accurately the (Ghibelline) strategy presently pursued by America’s Techno-Structure in relation to Catholicism. This is bound to be an articulated and long-term strategy for it will take time to “digest” that massive cohort of believers whose creedal custom “consists essentially in the cultivation of an intimate emotional relationship between the worshipper and a personal God or other divine being.” In other words, this devotional custom teaches the believer to invoke a tutelary “spirit,” something like a guardian angel, as he persuades himself that he is instead in direct contact with the One. This “emotional method, which is used by the majority of Christians” is known in India as “bhakti-marga, the path of devotional
faith, as opposed to *karma-marga*, the path of duties or works, and *jña-na-marga*, the path of knowledge.*

The Catholic Church is possibly the foremost administrator of *bhakti-marga*. With regard to the spiritual welfare of religious feeling at large, this sort of devotion, while edifying in certain respects, may be problematic because this “tendency to speak of as many gods as there are human beings on the earth” may lead to a generalized state of affairs whereby “the most absolute polytheism” can hide behind “the mask of monotheism.”

The Techno-Structure, for its part, understands that this persistence of the desire to worship can work to its advantage and therefore sees to it that “the masses continue to tread the path of devotion; but [that] the objects of this *bhakti* [be] no longer saints and a personal God, [but rather] the personified nation or class, and the deified leader.”

At the present time, Empire and Church appear to be engaged in some other variant of their usual arm-wrestling match. As seen, the two have developed a rather intimate, and preferential, sort of symbiosis since the 1940s; they have further cemented their bond by play-acting together, spectacularly, during the Cold War, and, together, in the 1980s, they dropped the curtain on the Soviet circus, which was no longer needed. True, there had been a bloody hiccup in 1969, followed by a nasty decade of terrorism and low-intensity civil strife in Italy, with the Church very much in the eye of that storm, but the enthronement of John Paul II had “normalized” the situation. All in all, one would think that the Vatican is nowadays wholly subdued to America’s Techno-Structure, considering that:

a) the bulk of Vatican funding is American;

b) the bulk of “progressive” Catholics have become entirely subservient to the business ethos of the Liberal mainstream, which finances its parishes and schools – schools that are, by and large, posh, unaffordable establishments catering almost exclusively to the ultra-rich;

c) U.S. Catholic reactionaries have, since 9/11, rallied with ferocious exhilaration to the Neocons’ patriotic and war-mongering promise of a never-ending hyper-modern crusade against Islam(ism); and

d) Catholic “anarchists” – Evola’s, Maurras’s, and pretty much everybody else’s nemesis – very few to begin with, can be said to have been successfully relegated to the appendices of esoteric codices amid unicorns and faeries.

But appearances can be deceptive. For one, it is patent that the Holy See has no liking whatsoever for the War on the Terror and that it did not fall for the Orientalist deceit of the “Clash of Civilizations.” This has been a sig-
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significant disappointment for One-Worlders. Secondly, the Church appears downright opposed to the Techno-Structure’s entomologizing push, and this clash has been fought out, for years now, on the front of sexual, bio-, and family ethics. What the Techno-Structure wishes in this bearing is clear: it is the systematic enforcement of a policy of demographic management that relies on three levers: 1) a discretionary calibration of population growth through a systematized recourse to abortion and careful administration of contraception, in keeping with the overall economic constraints (energy, nutrition, employment) under its direct and centralized supervision; 2) the (progressive) de-differentiation of males and females for the purpose of unisex, standardized employment – limited and controlled (exploitative and mind-deadening, as well) – and the concomitant commitment of the couples’ children to the care of “diverse others,” by which the elite means, in Newspeak, nannies and generic slave-labor from provinces of “inferior technological status” – namely, Hispanics for the U.S., Slavs, East Asians, Filipinos, and Africans for the European block; and 3) migration laws that may guarantee at all times this constant supply of slave-hands from the indigent peripheries of the globe. In sum, the Structure demands: birth control, gender erasure and abolition of the familial nucleus, and a ceaseless supply of slave-hands through unrestricted migratory flows.

Discursively, the system’s extraordinary emphasis on gender theory – and the associated campaign for the “erasure of gender,” not to mention the late flurry of transgender narratives – all of which could have been dismissed as so many episodes of an ongoing surreal psychodrama, acquire a serious, functional significance when one interprets them in light of Jünger’s intuition of the Structure’s need for a “third sex,” with which to operate, in fact, the mechanical beehive: men and women as undifferentiated toilers, breeders, and soldiers all rolled into one. The show is said to be, at first blush, “surreal” because too few have wondered what suddenly brought elites theretofore known to be profoundly racist, misogynistic, elitist, and homophobic to turn overnight into gung-ho partisans and bankrollers of “feminism,” “nativism,” and “LGBT.” The disingenuousness of their discursive flattery of “the different other” is part and parcel of Techno-fascism.

To summarize, the Church has not “bought” the War on Terror, nor has she espoused gender theory and the abolition of the family, of course, but being the latter theme tightly linked to sex and brandished with exceptional vehemence by the postmodern Globalists engaged in the fight, the Church has had “to play the game,” as prelates will tell you in the higher reaches of the Vatican. Via this inquisitorial platform of vetting a person’s, or a group’s, “goodness” chiefly on the basis of their stance on same-sex unions and adoptions, postmodernists aim at sundering Catholicism,
their ploy being to identify among Catholics the healthy, pro-gay grain and separate it from the homophobic chaff. The Church has parried by fielding one of her “brigades,” mostly made up of American Jesuits, in the pro-gay rights camp. And so the game goes on. The area in which Rome has so far completely caved in to the exigencies of the Techno-Structure is that of immigration: incapable of appearing untrue to her charitable self, the Church has lately vigorously championed the cause of all war refugees and migrant workers seeking asylum in Europe and the United States. By doing so, aside from buttressing the Structure’s political economics, the Church has given tacit and significant support to NATO’s unceasing ravage of the Middle-East.

In conclusion, one may make the three following observations. The first is that, in essence, the stance of the One-Worlders is – despite, or rather, because of their lofty language and high-flown ideals of universal brotherhood – possibly the most dangerous and insidious of all conceivable political solutions at this time. Because they affirm, and know to be lying when they do so, that the notion of “nationality” is “a collective utopia” and “a social myth,”94 the perniciousness of which only the New World Order can defuse; because they affirm this, it unequivocally means, given that these propagandists’ political handlers are themselves oligarchs in charge of tangible national realities – viz. those of Britain and America – that this Universalist alliance may only be achieved, against all unresolute nations, through a season of prolonged and devastating wars on a global scale.

Secondly, from an imperialist standpoint, the distinction between Republicans and Democrats appears to have become spurious: both sides have been fully committed to the NWO, and having divided labor, each wagers its half of the offensive in its own fashion. Versus Rome, the Structure has tactically split: as said, the Neocon fringe is tirelessly striving to swallow the traditionalist bastion of the Church by massaging the conservative, plutocratic tier of her faithful, and by appealing to their orthodoxy in point of liturgy and devotional etiquette. The Democrats, for their part, use gender theory and sexual leitmotifs as their weapon of choice in their protracted effort to provoke and embarrass the Church typically by denigrating as patriarchal overbearingness and homophobic hatred any counter-argument she may try to put forth in traditional defense of heterosexuality, marriage, and procreation. What is significant overall is that the work of both factions is perfectly complementary in their joint endeavor to weaken the Church by splitting her in two via the absorption of the conservatives in the overtly imperialist wing of the Structure, on the one hand, and, on the other, via the attempted fragmentation of the progressive body of the U.S. Church into a “postmodern” reticulation
of State-dependent “ethnic” churches (with priests as “quasi-civil servants”), and, preferably an even larger residual of “fallen-away Catholics,” justifiably disgusted by a clergy for the most part unequal to the flock’s expectations and needs. These defectors may be safely expected to drift into the informal church of the Religion of Man. In sum, there is but one faction at work in America’s Techno-Structure: it is made up of stewards committed to the English-speaking idea, who are staunch imperialists: Ghibelline Globalists all of them.

Third and final point: While these imposing bodies, of Guelphs and Ghibellines, are busy playing their games, in view of more terrible conflicts, and more environmental devastation, the rest of us cannot really afford to wait and see what happens. Our “third way,” which clearly acknowledges national difference as a source of creative union among forces from all corners of the world will have to rally, organize itself territorially, study new ways to reform the economy through cooperation, and, hopefully, proceed to confederate this constellation of free-districts in the name of pacifism.

Guido Giacomo Preparata
Rome, 24 June, 2016

(Endnotes)


8. Ibid, 168, 218, 455, 457.

13. Ibid., 438.
31. Evola, *Imperialismo pagano*, 80-81 (“Quindi due sole possibilità, per il fascismo: o riconoscere nella Chiesa un universalismo anti-nazionale e antifascista almeno come quello massonico [...], oppure vedere se la Chiesa osi il passo anticristiano che mai ha osato: identificarsi al fascismo, proclamare il popolo d’Italia il popolo eletto e marciare alla testa di esso per la conquista del mondo. Ma sa bene la Chiesa, quante probabilità vi siano perché questa seconda soluzione conclusa ad un’unica cosa: allo sfacelo della Chiesa e quello dell’Italia stessa. Ragion per cui è da augurarsi che i paladini della “tradizione cattolica” riescano appunto, un giorno, a trascinare la Chiesa in un’avventura di questo genere – se il fascismo non si decide a capire ciò che deve capire, epperò a dichiarare l’assoluta incompatibilità fra imperialismo e cattolicesimo, preparando le forze per la vera controriforma – per la restaurazione pagana”).
32. Ibid, 109; and Federalismo Imperiale, 72, 127.
33. Evola, Federalismo Imperiale, 102,
34. Evola, Europa Una, 12, 13, 29, 39, 40, 48.
35. Evola, Stato organico, 57, 58, 69.
36. Evola, Imperialismo pagano, 120.
37. Ibid., 169.
39. Charles Maurras, Romantisme et Révolution cited in Doncoeur et al., Pourquoi Rome a parlé, 122-123 ("[L’idée de Dieu] peut aussi tourner à l’anarchie. Trop souvent révolté contre les intérêts généraux de l’espèce et des sous-groupements humains (patrie, caste, cité, famille) l’individu ne si soumet, en beaucoup de cas, que par nécessité, horreur de la solitude, crainte du dénûment: mais si, dans cette conscience naturellement anarchique, l’on fait germer le sentiment qu’elle peut nouer des relations directes avec l’Être absolu, infini, tout-puissant, l’idée de ce maître invisible et lointain l’aura vite éloignée du respect qu’elle doit à ses maîtres visibles et prochains: elle aimera mieux obéir à Dieu qu’aux hommes").
40. Doncoeur et al., Pourquoi Rome a parlé, 35, 125, 144, 220.
45. Allegedly, this was said either to French Prime Minister Pierre Laval in 1935 or to Churchill in 1944, or both.
47. Ibid., 17.
61. Lacroix-Riz, Le Vatican, 206-209, 477-482.
63. De Felice, Mussolini: Lo Stato totalitario, 130-134.
65. De Felice, Mussolini, Gli anni del consenso, 340, 373.
68. Ibid., 344, 345, 350-360, 479, 497; and Garaudy, L’Église, 87.
69. Lacroix-Riz, Le Vatican, 504-505.
70. See, e.g., John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope, The Secret History of Pius XII (New York: Viking), 236-238.
71. Osservatore romano, “Due anni di Pontificato, due anni di combattimento,” 12 March 1941.
72. Lacroix-Riz, Le Vatican, 515, 516, 527, 532.
73. McNamara, Catholic Cold War, 144, 147.
74. Lacroix-Riz, Le Vatican, 518-9, 520, 534, 551, 554; and Garaudy, L’Église, 138-139.
83. Ibid., 295 (“Wir halten die Freimauerei des Blutes für starker und furchterbar als alle Lagen der Welt. Wir meinen dass man den Jesuitismus am schwersten schädigt, indem man überzeugte Katholiken für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Nationalismus und Katholizismus sprechen lässt”).
84. Literally, "a cultual magnitude" (eine kultische Größe).
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86. Ibid., 216.
89. Huxley, Ends and Means, 234-235.
91. Huxley, Ends and Means, 244.
93. “Pentagon Ends Ban on Transgender Troops in Military,” Associated Press, June 30, 2016. “Saying it’s the right thing to do, Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced Thursday that transgender people will be allowed to serve openly in the U.S. military, ending one of the last bans on service in the armed forces […]”
94. Mumford, Utopias, 221
After defeating the Ghibellines, the Guelphs divided into two factions: the White Guelphs (Guelfi Bianchi)—Dante’s party, led by Vieri dei Cerchi—and the Black Guelphs (Guelfi Neri), led by Corso Donati. In French, Italian is sometimes nicknamed la langue de Dante. Publishing in the vernacular language marked Dante as one of the first in Roman Catholic Western Europe (among others such as Geoffrey Chaucer and Giovanni Boccaccio) to break free from standards of publishing in only Latin (the language of liturgy, history and scholarship in general, but often also of lyric poetry). Guelf and Ghibelline, Guelf also spelled Guelph, members of two opposing factions in German and Italian politics during the Middle Ages. The split between the Guelfs, who were sympathetic to the papacy, and the Ghibellines, who were sympathetic to the German (Holy Roman) emperors, contributed to chronic strife within the cities of northern Italy in the 13th and 14th centuries. The name Ghibelline was derived from Waiblingen, the name of a castle of the Welfs’ opponents, the Hohenstaufen dukes of Swabia. The rivalry between Welfs and Hohenstaufenfigs figured prominently in German politics after the death of the Holy Roman emperor Henry V in 1125: Lothar II (reigned 1125–37) was a Welf, and his successor as emperor, Conrad III (reigned 1138–52), was a Hohenstaufen.