PRESIDENCY RESEARCH

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REPORTS FROM THE PRESIDENT

1) Status Report: The Proposal for a PRG Prize for "Best Paper" at the Annual APSA Convention

At our September meeting, Michael Genovese made a proposal that the PRG award a prize for "the best paper in the field of Presidential/Executive Politics presented at the annual meeting" of the APSA. The prize would not be awarded in a given year if a panel judged that no paper was good enough. The purpose of the award was to honor good scholarship.

After some discussion, the question was deferred for resolution at the 1989 meeting. I asked all PRG officers, council members and members at large to give me their views in writing.

To date I have received eleven responses, mostly from PRG officers and council. Seven favor the idea, two oppose and two are lukewarm. Those who said yes think it important to recognize good work. Some see it as a way to improve the quality of research, for example, to make it more "theoretical" or to bring non-presidential scholars into the field. Those opposed see it as a lot of time consuming effort devoted to a small number of papers, few of which are excellent. Two see it as a lot of effort for a good cause but feel that good papers will be awarded with publication in any case.

This is hardly a straw poll. Please write me if you have decided views so that I might report the diversity of judgments to the PRG at our fall meeting.

We will discuss the issue at the meeting and vote. If the vote is favorable to the idea, my successor will presumably appoint a committee to administer the first award in 1991.
2) Call for Papers: Incorporating Recent Research into Presidency Course Syllabi

Sheilah Mann, who is the editor of The Political Science Teacher, which is published by the APSA, would like to publish an essay on recent research findings and publications in presidency research. The essay should suggest how recent research could be adopted into course syllabi and assignments. It should be about ten pages in length.

If you save copies of The Teacher, you might want to look at a recent example of this kind of essay on "Politics and the Life Sciences" by Somit and Peterson. Sheilah suggested that as a model.

I am not sure that our field has experienced a flash flood of fresh approaches to research and teaching. But if you have a belief about fresh approaches to theory, research and teaching on the presidency, your ideas would be welcome.

Please send an outline of what might go into such an essay to me, and I will pass the proposals along to Sheilah.

To contact Erwin Hargrove on either of these issues, send comments to:

Erwin C. Hargrove
FRS President
Box 1714 Sta. B
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37235

BOOK OF ESSAYS HONORS JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS

This past September, 150 friends of James MacGregor Burns gathered in Washington to celebrate Burns’ 70th birthday. A surprise (to him) was unveiled at the gathering. Entitled Essays in Honor of James MacGregor Burns, the book was published by Prentice-Hall and edited by historian Michael R. Beschloss and political scientist Thomas E. Cronin.
Essays included in the book are authored by Hedrick Smith, Richard B. Morris, Thomas E. Cronin, Michael R. Beschloss, Otis L. Graham, Jr., James David Barber, Benjamin R. Barber, Donald L. Robinson, Kay Levinson, J.W. Peltason, Philippa Strum, and Barbara Kellerman.


A notable development in the contemporary study of the presidency is the increased attention being paid to the White House Office. Numerous approaches have emerged that greatly enrich scholarship. This essay seeks to summarize these efforts, offer a centative evaluation of the current state of scholarship, and chart one path for future research.

Approaches to White House Organization: An Initial Inventory

For political scientists, focusing on the White House staff is a relatively new undertaking. Early efforts (e.g., Cronin & Greenberg, 1969) stressed the personal approaches of individual presidents, an emphasis that persisted as the calamitous administrations of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon riveted attention on the White House. Critics insisted that the staff had gotten out of control; no longer servants, the “palace guard” threatened to become masters, insulating presidents rather than enhancing their capacities (e.g., Cronin, 1975; Reedy, 1970).

By the mid-1970s, scholars began to express these ideas in more coherent theoretical terms. Johnson (1974) and Haas (1976) produced substantially parallel analyses of the differences in White House organization evident under presidents since FDR. The resulting
personal-contingency view argued that presidents tend to adapt the White House staff to their own management styles and preferences.

Yet, more institutional approaches to White House staffing also began to emerge. A good deal of the work on staff organization advances structural prescriptions designed for all White Houses. A notable instance of such pure structural prescription is the debate over whether the White House functions better under a strong chief of staff (e.g., Burke, 1928; Heineman, 1989; Kornell & Popkin, 1986; Patterson, 1988; Pfiffner, 1987) or in more of a spokes-of-the-wheel configuration (e.g., Neustadt, 1960, ch. 7).

Other work focuses on the development and the variation in staff structures. Most notably, Kessel (1975, 1983, 1984) identified and measured four informal structures -- issue, communication, influence, and organizational structures. We (Walcott & Hult, 1987; see also Hult & Walcott, 1990) have tried to sketch a range of possible formal and informal staff structures that move beyond simple hierarchy.

Yet, the distinction between "personal" and "institutional" emphases breaks down rather quickly; both sorts of factors seem important. Increasingly highlighted is the interplay between qualities and characteristics of presidents and the demands confronting the presidency as an institution. Even here, several variants can be identified.

Pika (1988), for instance, examines the interaction between presidential "management style" and as organizational variable, the cohesion of the White House staff. Similarly, Kessel (1983, 1984) found that the extent of shared values among the staff reflected presidential
priorities and influenced the nature of staff structures (particularly issue, communication, and influence structures).

Other scholars pursue what might be called a problem-contingency approach. For Moe (1985) and Kernell (1989), the operative individual-level variable is not management style but strategy. Strategies reflect presidential efforts to adjust to the demands and expectations of the larger political system. Staff structures both reflect these external forces and strategic adaptations and constrain presidential strategies.

Our own efforts (e.g., Walcott & Hult, 1987) also focus on White House responses to the degree of goal and technical uncertainty and controversy in the larger environment and to internal White House dynamics. This work, however, assumes a more reactive president and staff than do Moe and Kernell. The view also devotes more attention to the lower levels of the White House staff, to the diversity of possible structures, and to policy as well as political demands.

Thus, several diverse and increasingly more theoretically explicit approaches to understanding the White House staff can be identified. None, however, is fully satisfactory. In what follows, we outline what we see as the major outstanding issues in the study of White House organization and point to possible directions for future work.

Continuing Issues

Our first concern is one that faces presidency scholars in general: how to identify and untangle "personal" and "institutional" factors. As we have already noted, neither in isolation produces a very satisfying view of the White House staff. Yet, both at least point to useful variables. The bigger problem is that scholars use the terms
inconsistently to refer to a large number of dimensions. "Personal" factors, for example, may include presidential personality, skills, management style, political strategies, administrative strategies (e.g., coordinating staff work), and policy preferences. "Institutional" variables are even more diverse, encompassing, for instance, structures and political dynamics within the White House, the influence of other political actors (Congress, executive branch agencies, state and local officials, interest groups, leaders of other countries), public expectations, and national and global social, economic, and political conditions.

This explosion of possibly relevant factors suggests, first, the importance of decomposing complex concepts like "personal" and "institutional" into more unidimensional notions. More importantly, it underscores the need for more careful and systematic discussion of the independent variables relevant to understanding the White House staff (cf. Pika, forthcoming). Our recent effort to explain the dynamics of White House press operations (Hult & Walcott, 1989) is perhaps a step in this direction. It uses several environmental, presidential strategic, and White House organizational variables to account for specialization in the press office, institutionalization of a variety of media-related tasks, the decline in status of the press office, and the ongoing competition over turf in the general area of "communications."

The enormous number of independent variables, however, may well be an embarrassment of riches. For even less clear and agreed upon is what these variables can be used to explain. A variety of possible dependent variables can be spotted in the more self-consciously theoretical treatments of the staff. Kornell (1989), for instance, traces the
"development" of the modern White House. In practice, he focuses on
the growth in the number of employees on the staff and the
multiplication of specialized units. Yet, it is unclear what about
these outcomes is to be examined -- the existence of particular
functions, the expansion in the range of tasks, or certain
organizational arrangements.

Our work (Walcott & Hult, 1987) has suffered from similar
problems. We identify several dependent variables: differentiation
(i.e., the proliferation of specialized policy-relevant operations),
the nature of prevailing governance mechanisms (which specify who
participates in decisions and how decisions are made), and the
distribution of power in the White House. Although these may be worthy
objects of explanation, they are not integrated into a coherent
theoretical framework.

Pika (1988) takes a different approach, seeking to explain
"performance." "Performance" has four dimensions: volume of demands on
the president, quality of decisions, political responsiveness, and
response time. He uses these categories to evaluate the consequences of
alternative presidential "styles." Although reasonable, the selection
of dependent variables seems ad hoc; nor do they provide an exhaustive
list of the factors relevant to presidential performance. Similarly,
Kessel (1983, 1984) sets forth four operational dimensions, but their
links to an underlying theory are not established.

In general, much of the work on the development or evolution of
the White House staff seems driven by the need to apply a particular set
of conceptualizations. The question underlying analysis becomes more
"What will these independent variables explain?" rather than "what needs to be explained?"

Problems multiply when one examines prescription as well as explanation. Despite the recent outpouring of scholarly work on the White House staff, few prescriptions are grounded in theory or systematic empirical investigation (cf. Pika, forthcoming). More often, advice seems to flow from semi-informal observation of recent administrations and the testimony of those who have served in the White House (e.g., Kornell & Popkin, 1986; Pfiffner, 1987, ch. 2).

Why have theoretical and empirical analyses not been more influential? In part, this reflects the lack of emphasis and agreement on dependent variables; there is no very coherent set of ideas on which to draw. In addition, theoretical efforts have not often been informed by or linked to systematic empirical investigation, complicating efforts to develop a strong foundation for prescription (an exception is Kessel, 1983, 1986). Pika, and Walcott and Hult, for example, do little more than provide illustrations for their conceptualizations, though their ongoing empirical studies may yet produce more useful results.

This weak empirical basis reflects the fact that available knowledge about the White House is rather limited. The tendency to focus only on the upper, more visible levels of the staff has left scholars largely ignorant of the diversity and dynamics at lower levels (but see, e.g., Hert, 1987; Patterson, 1988). To be sure, most descriptions of particular presidencies discuss the almost numbing numbers of permanent and ad hoc structures that presidents rely upon (see, e.g., Campbell, 1986; Redford & McCulley, 1986). Less clear are exactly how and why such structures develop, how they are linked with
each other, and how appropriate they are to the situations for which they are used. Few prescriptions can emerge when structural alternatives tend to be analyzed at the level of the staff as a whole (e.g., collegial versus competitive versus formalistic “forms” of staff organization). Similarly, the emphasis on recent administrations without clear justification as to why only they are relevant limits the sorts of lessons that might be learned. More generally, neither theory nor available data provide much insight into what presidents might be able to manipulate in order to achieve given goals.

Furthermore, the criteria with which scholars evaluate the White House staff reduce both the prescriptive and the explanatory power of such analyses. Staff structures -- which are likely to be among the few variables that chief executives can manipulate -- are understood primarily in terms of the division of labor and relationships of control, much as they were over fifty years ago in the Brownlow Report (1937). Kernell's essay on White House management (1986) provides the best-explicated recent version of this view. Casting presidents and their staffs in a principal-agent relationship and emphasizing coordination and control of staff activities draws attention to some undeniably important concerns. Desires for policy coherence and effectiveness and for democratic accountability highlight the significance of presidential control. Yet, this underplays the substance of what presidents and their aids do. Presidents do more than control their staffs; they also use them to cope with the complexity, ambiguity, and controversy inherent in national politics and policy making. Neither “coordination” nor “management,” as Kernell (1986) uses those terms, adequately taps many White House dynamics; the
search for orienting values and policy goals; the struggles to assess possible ways of meeting objectives amid time pressures, competing advocates, and unsatisfactory or unavailable data; or the efforts to carve out spheres of authority within which presidents can act.

Emphasizing more "political" strategies, as Hec (1985) does, avoids many of these problems. Yet, the role of structural manipulation is not made completely clear, and relatively specific policy relevant prescriptions are mostly lacking.

Next Steps

It is relatively easy, of course, to point to deficiencies in current work on the White House staff. As in much research on the presidency, more attention needs to be paid to theoretical development, normative clarification and justification, and systematic empirical investigation, and to linking these endeavors. Considerably more demanding is to chart specific directions for future research.

Our own current work represents one such path; we summarize it here for illustrative purposes. Its conceptual underpinnings are drawn from organization theory and public administration (see Hult & Walcott, 1990). We begin with a view of organizations as politics, which stresses organizational efforts to search for and articulate goals, to explore various means for attaining them, to deal with ambiguity and conflict as integral parts of these decision processes, and to strive throughout to generate legitimacy and commitment. Organizations typically seek to develop standardized ways for handling these tasks; the resulting decision-taking routines are what we call "governance structures." For any class or type of decision, they specify who is
entitled or required to participate, how the participants may interact, and what constitutes a "decision."

These notions seem applicable to the White House staff. Presidents and their staffs repeatedly face decision settings characterized by complexity, ambiguity, and controversy, which arise from sources both in and out of the White House. Varying patterns for coping with such situations constitute the divergent formal and informal structures (e.g., the television office, issues lunches) one sees in contemporary White Houses.

These ideas enable us to move beyond the question of controlling the White House Office, instead emphasizing the political structuring of the staff and explicitly incorporating environmental variables. They also direct attention to lower levels of the White House. Governance structures evidently are a significant focus of analysis not only because they have received relatively little sustained attention, but also because they represent key strategic opportunities for and constraints on presidents.

The ultimate concern of our analysis is with presidential performance, however. Of course, as we have seen, this is an extraordinarily complex notion. At this point, we examine performance in the context of White House decision-making. Decision-making may be evaluated by the extent of its incorporation of relevant information and ability to reach closure (its "bureaucratic rationality"), its representation of concerned parties, its accountability to elected officials and citizens, and its legitimacy (see Hult & Walcott, 1990, ch. 5).
In order to explain and assess decision-making, we look at a variety of variables. Governance structures channel decision-making and are currently a primary object of our attention. Analytical variables such as prevailing levels of uncertainty about and controversy over policy goals and technologies tap preferences in and out of the White House and help shape decision processes and outcomes. The activities of external actors, presidential strategies, and politicking among White House staffers are relevant as well. In this framework, governance structures become both independent and dependent variables, reflecting and influencing, for example, perceptions of uncertainty and conflict, and presidential strategies. In addition, because certain structures appear more appropriate in particular decision situations (they enhance, e.g., the representativeness and accountability of decision-making), analysis of governance structures contributes to the assessment of presidential performance.

Clearly, this is just a beginning. The major variables need to be defined more concretely and their hypothesized links elaborated. The determinants and dynamics of presidential performance, in particular, need continued attention.

In part, we expect this theoretical development to benefit from ongoing empirical work, an examination of the organizational evolution of the White House staff from Hoover through the Reagan administrations. Exploration of presidential speechwriting, for example, reveals that, over time, specialized speechwriting units located several levels down in the White House hierarchy emerged. This evidently reflected presidents' increasing tendencies to pursue "public" strategies in response to a changing environment, more general
functional differentiation in the White House, and the difficulties of coordinating and assigning responsibility for writing tasks (Hilt & Walcott, 1988). That speechwriting has been delegated to a hierarchically controlled unit that often has received little substantive guidance for addressing controversial and ambiguous policy issues also points to possible limitations on presidential performance. Presidential input into writing has declined even as the importance of public statements evidently has risen. The sorts of negotiation and deliberation over policy issues that occurred in earlier, more collaborative writing groups also has been lost, with potential consequences for the thoroughness, representativeness, accountability, and legitimacy of the decision processes and outcomes.

Rather clearly, such a focus on governance structures will mean relatively little if these structures are insignificant in shaping White House decision-making. We have begun to stake out a position in the ongoing debate. Structure is a relevant (though not necessarily the most important) variable. It often does, but should not always, reflect presidential personality or management preferences. It frequently does and often should vary with decision setting.

Despite its frequent repetition, the plea for further empirical work and theoretical development is a very real one for those who study the White House staff. Such an effort seems to us to be important. As presidential responsibilities multiply amid growing institutional fragmentation, clamoring constituencies, and pressing policy problems, presidents more than ever need help. Enhanced organizational capacity in the White House might provide some of that assistance.
Brownlow Committee (President's Committee on Administrative Management). 


THE 1988-89 TRANSITION: PRESIDENT BUSH TAKES OVER
James P. Pfiffner
George Mason University

In the latter part of the 20th century we have been celebrating a number of bicentennials of the creation of the United States: the Declaration of Independence, the writing of the Constitution, the convocation of the Congress, and the inauguration of the President. But in some important ways our most important bicentennial will not occur until the 21st century. While the essence of large scale democracy is the choosing of our governmental leaders, that is only meaningful if alternative leaders can replace those in power. That is why there is an important bicentennial of our country is in 2001, the bicentennial of the first party turnover transition: from the Federalists to Thomas Jefferson and the anti-federalists.

While the electoral and policy aspects of changing presidential administrations have been given due attention over our history, the administrative aspects of transitions have only recently been given detailed attention. It was in 1966 that Brookings published Laurin Henry's definitive account of the party turnover transitions from Taft-Wilson (1912-13) to Truman-Eisenhower (1952-53). David Stanley's Changing Administrations came out in 1965 and dealt with transitions in six departments in the 1961 and 1964 transitions.¹ Other than these two

scholarly efforts, only occasional articles in professional journals dealt systematically with presidential transitions for the next two decades. The quantity of scholarship on presidential transition reflected the attitude of new administrations coming to office. The election was the main focus. It was assumed that once in office the organization of the presidency and the governance of the nation would flow naturally from the values laid out in the campaign and the personality of the president.

With the systematic preparations of the Carter campaign and the impressive policy victories that the new Reagan administration was able to win in the early months of his presidency, scholars began to pay attention to the importance of the early months of a presidency. Preparation of some sort was necessary to take advantage of the narrow window of opportunity at the beginning of each new administration. ²

With a new appreciation for the importance of the early months in office, scholars, think tanks, and policy advocates began preparations early for the certain transition of the Presidency in 1988-89. Advice

for the new administration was prepared by a number of organizations
that hoped to affect the substance as well as the process of
governance. Thus there was no shortage of advice for the new Bush
administration when it took office in 1989. This advice was
systematically surveyed by Bush friend and advisor, Chase Untermeyer,
during the summer and fall of 1988 when he read much of what was
available on transitions and called on the major organizations preparing
transition studies.

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3 See National Academy of Public Administration, "The Executive
Presidency: Federal Management for the 1990s" (Washington: 1988); United
States General Accounting Office, "Transition Series," (Washington,
1988); Charles L. Heatherly and Burton Yale Pines, eds., Mandate for
Leadership III: Policy Strategies for the 1990s (Washington: Heritage
Foundation, 1989); Mark Green and Mark Pinsky, eds., America's
Transition: Blueprint for the 1990s (New York: Democracy Project Inc.,
1989); American Agenda, Report to the Forty-First President of the
United States of America (Washington: 1988); John H. Trattner and the
Center for Excellence in Government, The Prune Book, The 100 Toughest
Management and Policy-Making Jobs in Washington (Lanham, MD: Madison
Books, 1988); National Commission on the Public Service, Leadership For
America: Rebuilding the Public Service (The Volcker Commission)
(Washington: 1989); Task Force Reports to the Commission were published
in a separate volume. For a review of many of these studies see
Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, "Advice for a New Administration: A Review
His preparations were of very low visibility, with Untermyer adopting an "aw shucks" attitude whenever asked by reporters about his preparations, particularly with respect to personnel. He claimed that he was storing unsolicited resumes in the box in which his turkey was delivered for his last Thanksgiving dinner. It is doubtful, however, that his preparations were as minimal as he wanted people to believe. There existed too much of a consensus that the early months of a new administration were crucial for there to be a casual approach to transition planning, even for a vice president in office.

Whatever the planning that went into the preparations of the two candidates for the presidency, the experience of the bloated Reagan transition bureaucracy in 1980-81 was enough to ensure that the transition organization of 1988-89 would be considerably smaller in size. The Bush transition teams in departments and agencies were low-level contact points rather than the policy oriented and personnel channels that the Carter and Reagan transition teams were.

If Dukakis had won, the transition teams would have been considerably smaller than the Reagan teams: 2 to 3 people, rather than the 10 to 20 people of 1981. Their function would have been to show the flag of the new administration, to play a watchdog role on the behavior of the outgoing administration, to act as an information conduit to transition headquarters, and to form a staff nucleus for the new secretary designate. Conscious efforts would have been made to present a contrast with the 1980-81 transition teams. Dukakis’s transition teams would have been under strict instructions not to try to influence foreign governments or U.S. government policy.4
During the election campaign President Reagan gave Vice President Bush unprecedented help in easing the hoped-for transition. Reagan campaigned long and hard for Bush, traveling many thousands of miles and visiting key states, in contrast to the lukewarm support of Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson for their Vice Presidents. The Vice President was invited to all important White House meetings, including the meeting in New York with Soviet Premier Gorbachev. Last year cabinet changes were molded to fit Bush priorities: Attorney General Meese resigned, Secretaries of Education, Treasury, and Justice were appointed that were acceptable to Bush and whom he would keep on in his administration.

Talks were opened up with the Palestine Liberation Organization, saving Bush from facing a very tough policy choice early in his administration. Resignations were requested from all Reagan political appointees to save the new President from being the one to deliver the bad news.

The easy parts of the Bush transition were: he had President Reagan's help, loyal Republican appointees held leadership positions in the executive branch, and there were no great changes in policy to pursue. The hard part was a mirror of the easy side. He could not be seen to be rejecting his predecessor, yet he had to establish his own administration. He could not throw out loyal Republicans too roughly, yet he had to make his own appointments. He could not change policy directions too sharply, yet he had to set a direction for his own Presidency.

4 Interview with a Dukakis transition advisor, Fall 1988.
White House Staff and Cabinet

One of the first things a president-elect must do is establish a White House staff to help him set up his administration. Bush's initial White House staff was experienced (24 of 29 had previous White House experience) and professional, though not of high previous public visibility. The number of high level positions was cut, with only 14 staffers having the title of "Assistant to the President," in contrast to 22 in the Reagan White House. Pay levels were also lower than in the Reagan administration.

A consensus among presidents and scholars has formed that the contemporary presidency needs a chief of staff. No president since Johnson has left the White House without one. The role can be that of a strong chief (Adams, Haldeman, Regan) or as a "neutral broker" (Cheney, Watson, James Baker).

There was no hesitation on the part of president-elect Bush about the need for a chief of staff. His choice, John Sununu, was the governor of New Hampshire and played an important role in George Bush's primary victory in that crucial state. It soon became clear that Sununu would adopt the "strong" approach to the chief of staff position, as had his predecessor as governor of New Hampshire, Sherman Adams.


Bush took 65 days to designate his cabinet, which was composed of competent, experienced people with cumulatively more than a century of experience with previous administrations. In the first meeting of his cabinet President-elect Bush said that he would tell them to "think big" and "challenge the system." "I want them to be frank; I want them to fight hard for their position. And then when I make the call, I'd like to have the feeling that they'd be able to support the president." In dealing with the Hill, he said: "We're going to have some fights with Congress, but we're not going to approach it as though we're dealing with the enemy...."

Bush intended to continue the cabinet council system of the second Reagan term, with three councils: Economic Policy, chaired by Treasury Secretary Brady; Domestic Policy, chaired by Attorney General Thornburgh; and National Security, chaired by the President's advisor for national security, Brent Scowcroft. Whether the cabinet council system would be used as the primary policy development apparatus in the Bush administration was not clear in the early months of 1989.

Personnel

The fact that the transition to a Bush administration was a "friendly takeover" was a mixed blessing to personnel recruiter Chase Untermeyer. On the one hand, there was no rush, as there would be with


a party turnover transition, to ensure that the opposition political party was out of office as soon as possible. Those people who chose to remain in policy making positions were loyal Republicans who were in no way a threat to Bush priorities. On the other hand, since they were loyal Republicans, and many had campaigned for George Bush, many hoped and expected to stay on into a Bush administration. After all, they had high level experience, and most were clearly qualified for the positions that they held. The major criterion for all new Presidents is their appointments is loyalty, but loyalty comes in many guises: partisan, personal, ideological. The definition of Bush loyalty was personal loyalty to Bush over many years. The loyalty criterion was enforced by the "Scrub Group" of high level Bush loyalists during the transition and early weeks of the administration. They wanted to ensure adequate consideration of longtime friends of the president for administration positions.9

But the Bush administration's emphasis on personal loyalty was mitigated with a heavy dose of respect for competence. Untermeyer told the story of a past mayor of Houston who spent most of his first term in office appointing his friends to positions, and because of their incompetence, had to spend most of his second term getting rid of them.10 Bush's cabinet appointments were widely praised for their experience and competence, and some pointed out the irony of Bush's


campaign rhetoric that the election was about ideology rather than competence.

The Bush personnel operation was not obsessed with narrow definitions of loyalty or White House control of all administration appointments as was the Reagan administration. The administration decided to give a significant amount of leeway to Cabinet secretaries to choose, in consultation with the Office of Presidential Personnel, their own management teams at the sub-Cabinet level. The argument for this approach is that Cabinet secretaries are likely to be motivated to recruit qualified people and they ought to be able to have their own management teams to run their departments.

Dealing with Congress

After a bitter campaign George Bush got off to a surprisingly cordial relationship with the Congress by making appropriate gestures of courtesy and receiving proffered statements of bi-partisan support by the congressional leadership. Having himself served in the House, Bush


had many friends in both chambers and on both sides of the aisle, an asset of no small value in congressional relations. But the early positive attitudes and good relations were interrupted by the fight over the nomination of John Tower. The battle took on a life of its own and dominated the early months of the Bush administration.

The crucial decision on the part of the administration was to let the issue escalate from the fitness of John Tower to be Secretary of Defense to the credibility of the President. The Democratic opposition to Tower was based on allegations about his drinking habits, his relations with various women, and his earning of hundreds of thousands of dollars from defense industry companies shortly after he left his position of U.S. arms control negotiator in Geneva. The Republicans argued that many of the allegations were not proved and that the ones that were conceded were not disqualifying. They further argued that a new president ought to be able to name his cabinet without being second-guessed by the Senate.

The issue was then shifted from the allegations against Tower to presidential prerogatives and Bush's ability to stand up to Congress. When the administration lost the battle, the damage to the president was much greater than it would have been if Tower had been persuaded to request that his nomination be withdrawn earlier in the battle. In retrospect, the administration probably made a mistake in choosing the Tower nomination for the president's first major fight with the Democratic Congress.

Luckily, Bush was able to recover and put the bitter fight behind him by the quick nomination of Richard Cheney, who had the respect of most members of Congress on both sides of the aisle. There was even
some speculation that Cheney was Bush's first choice for Secretary all along, but he chose Tower out of political obligation for the campaigning Tower had done for Bush in Texas.

In March of 1989 Bush and Secretary of State Baker achieved a significant compromise with the Democratic Congress on an issue that had been a bitter bone of contention during the eight years of the Reagan administration. Baker was able to forge a compromise with the Congress in which the United States would supply $50 billion in non-military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua until November of 1989. The aid would continue beyond November only with the affirmative agreement of four key committee chairs and the Congressional leadership who had to be satisfied that the aid was indeed being used for non-military purposes.

Although some argued that the agreement ceded too much to the Congress, the alternative was aid that extended through November, after which the administration could come back to Congress with a new request for legislation. So the Bush administration was able to demonstrate its ability to deal with the Democrats despite the bruising fight over the Tower nomination. But the real test of the administration's ability to deal with the Congress, and the willingness of both political parties to face up to the tough issues confronting the nation was the formulation of the budget and deficit reduction.

**Hitting the Ground Running**

By March of 1989 complaints began to be made publicly that the administration did not seem to have any momentum, grand design, new direction, or as George Bush put it, "the vision thing." This was in part because the administration had become bogged down in the Tower
battle with Congress and in part because there were no major new initiatives that were seen by the administration as the major priorities of the Bush presidency.

The real question of whether the Bush administration was squandering its window of opportunity was: was there any burning policy agenda that President Bush wanted to accomplish during his presidency? The administration seemed to have no overriding goals to accomplish. The president wanted a kinder and gentler America, he wanted to make some environmental and educational improvements, he wanted to make some progress in the war on drugs, but there was no single issue of overriding importance.

Thus it was hard to fault the Bush administration for not taking advantage of its early window of opportunity unless there were some crisis facing the country that the administration failed to address. Insofar as there was an economic crisis that might have been mitigated by a serious reduction in the federal deficit, one could fault President Bush for squandering his opportunity to make serious headway in deficit reduction.

But our judgement of the Bush transition must await future developments. If the budget deficit is eliminated merely through economic growth with no new taxes, if our savings rate increases, if the economy grows in productivity, and if the trade deficit is reduced; he can claim that no forceful leadership was needed to deal with the budget in 1989. But if the budget deficit persists and leads to further economic problems, then we can say the Bush administration did not take advantage of its window of opportunity to confront the budget deficit issue in a serious way early in his administration.
Hofstra University's seventh Presidential conference focused on America's 38th President, Gerald R. Ford. Entitled, "Restoring the Presidency," the conference took place April 6-8, 1989 and attracted a wide array of scholars and notables from the Ford era. It was also the first Presidential conference at Hofstra to include an address from a former President.

The opening ceremonies included addresses from Conference Director, Dr. Bernard Firestone, University President James M. Shuart, Donald Rumsfeld, and Hugh Sidey, contributing editor of Time. Rumsfeld, who was also Ford's Chief of Staff, characterized Ford as a man of "decency, strength, and humor." He cited as Ford's chief legacy the peaceful transition from Nixon to Ford in a time of general public distrust and disillusionment. Sidey added that although the press initially evaluated Ford's Presidency negatively, further analysis shows that Ford was, in fact, judged with undue harshness.

The first panel, entitled, "Assuming the Presidency," dealt largely with the transition from the Nixon to the Ford Presidencies. Stephen E. Ambrose presented a paper describing the Nixon-Ford relationship, in which he pointed to the fact that Ford was neither Nixon's first choice for the Vice-Presidency nor a close and trusted friend of Nixon's. Stanley I. Kutler presented a paper entitled
"Clearing the Rubble: The Nixon Pardon," which made the point that the pardon cost Ford much popular support. The discussants included Benton L. Becker, lead counsel for Ford in his confirmation proceedings for the Vice-Presidency; Philip W. Buchen, counsel to the President; Robert T. Hartmann, Vice President Ford's Chief of Staff and member of the President's Cabinet; Jerry H. Jones, special assistant to the President and director of the White House Personnel Office; and Bob Woodward, assistant managing editor of the *Washington Post*.

"The Rockefeller Vice Presidency" dealt with the significance of the Rockefeller Vice Presidency and the Vice Presidency in general. Gerald Benjamin presented a paper entitled "Gerald Ford, Nelson Rockefeller and the Emergence of the Administrative Vice Presidency," which argued that both Ford and Rockefeller received what they did not want: the Presidency and the Vice Presidency respectively. Michael Nelson, in "Nelson Rockefeller and the American Vice Presidency," recounted the key events of the Rockefeller Vice Presidency. The panel of discussants also included James M. Cannon, a longtime assistant to both Governor and Vice President Rockefeller; Richard L. Dunham, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission; Joseph E. Persico, chief speech writer for the Governor and the Vice President; Richard M. Rosenbaum, former Chairman of the New York Republican State Committee, and Peter J. Wallison, special assistant to the Governor and the Vice President.

The panel entitled "Reforming the CIA" discussed the performance of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees, formed in response to widespread disclosures of CIA abuses. Frank Swift, Jr., in his paper "Seeking a Piece of the Action: Congress and Its Intelligence
Investigation of 1975-1976," provided a background on CIA activities prior to the Ford Administration and evaluated the Congressional investigations, with an emphasis on the leadership of Congressman Lucien Nedzi. The panel of discussants included David W. Bell, Executive Director of the Rockefeller Commission, who noted that the most important function for oversight committees was to balance the issues of civil liberties and national security; William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence under Nixon and Ford, who argued that the reports of CIA abuses were sensationalized and that this hurt the agency; Rep. Lucien Nedzi, former Chairman of the House oversight committee, who took issue with Senate's account of his Committee's performance; Michael Rounl-Duval, President Ford's special counsel, who told how press releases of CIA abuse enabled Ford to alter the agency and bring it under his control; James A. Wilderotter, President Ford's associate counsel, who saw the Democratic led committees as being motivated by partisan concerns; and Bob Woodward, author of *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987,* who noted that the committees were unsuccessful in bringing about necessary changes in the CIA.

The panel entitled "The Middle East" focused on the Ford Administration's effort to solve the conflict between Egypt and Israel through step-by-step diplomacy. Gideon Doron presented a paper entitled "The Ford Administration and the Middle East: From Crisis to Stability," in which he argued that Sinai II was the most significant foreign policy achievement of Ford's tenure and paved the way for Camp David. The discussants included James P. Anderson, former national security correspondent for Group W Broadcasting, who highlighted the role of the press during the negotiations; former Egyptian Ambassador
Ashraf Ghobal, who evaluated the performance of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and contrasted Egypt's quest for long-term peace with Israel's quest for short-term benefits; Will B. Quandt, a member of Nixon's and Ford's National Security Council, who questioned the benefits gained in the peace process and criticized Kissinger's willingness to place American prestige on the line for the sake of an agreement; and Charles W. Robinson, former Deputy Secretary of State, who cast a more favorable light on the Administration's Middle East policy.

The panel entitled "Staff Management" focused on how the Ford Administration attempted to prevent the abuses of authority that plagued the Nixon Presidency. David C. Lawrence presented a paper entitled "Restoring the Chief-of-Staff: The Ford Years," in which he analyzed the "Deputy System" which was adopted by Ford to assure continuity between staffers and their potential successors. Patricia D. Witherspoon, in her paper "In the Shadow of Watergate: The Flow of Information in Gerald Ford's White House," examined what she termed a "balance of openness and control" in the information system employed by the Ford Administration. John A. Malta presented a paper entitled "Campaigning for Public Support: Communications Structures in the Ford White House," in which he emphasized the role of the Office of Communications in Ford's effort to separate himself as much as possible from that of his predecessor. The discussants included Jerry H. Jones, former director of the White House Personnel Office; Donald H., Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense and Ford Chief-of-Staff, who emphasized that the "Staff System" still depended on the President's final decisions; and Lester Tanzer, former managing editor of U.S. News
World Report, who underlined the importance of Ford's personality in determining the authority delegated to the Chief-of-Staff and the method in which information was received.

The panel entitled "Humor and the Presidency" considered the effectiveness of humor in projecting for a President a favorable public image. Arthur P. Dudden presented his paper "Not a Lincoln but a Ford: The Humor of Those Times," which highlighted President Ford's self-deprecating style of humor. Discussants included Tony Auth, editorial cartoonist for The Philadelphia Inquirer, who focused upon our most recent Presidents and their perceived shortcomings; Gerald Gardner, author of many works examining humor and the Presidency, who concentrated his discussion on the tactical power of humor; Lawrence E. Mintz, an American Studies professor at the University of Maryland, who noted that humor serves as a coping mechanism which allows Americans to accept certain transgressions of their leaders; and Don Penny, Ford's Assistant for Communications, who described his role as "comic director" for Ford.

The panel entitled "Energy and Environment Policy" discussed the effects of the international oil crisis on U.S. energy policy throughout the 1970's. Frank J. Pinto, in his paper "International Energy Issues During the Ford Administration," argued that politics, not shortages in oil, were the cause of long gas lines in the U.S. Mark C. Jankus, on behalf of Alfred A. Marcus and himself, presented a paper entitled "The Automobile Emissions Debate During Ford: The Role of Scientific Knowledge," in which he argued that the standards set for automobile emissions were impossible to achieve due to the technology of the time. The discussants included Frank C. Zarb, former Assistant to Ford for
Energy Affairs; Glenn R. Schleede, former Associate Director for Energy and Science, White House Domestic Council; Congressman John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee; and Paul MacAvoy, former member of the Council of Economic Advisers.

The panel entitled, "President, Congress and Public Opinion", discussed both the importance of public opinion to President Ford and executive-legislative relations by focusing primarily on Ford's use of the Presidential veto. David Sternlicht, in his paper "Presidential Strategies for Influencing Public Opinion," analyzed a President's public-relations devices, chief among them: direct contact with the American people, domination of the media, and utilization of key public opinion leaders. Samuel B. Hoff presented a paper entitled "Presidential Success in the Veto Process: The Legislative Record of Gerald R. Ford," in which he argued that President Ford successfully used the veto power as a bargaining tool with the opposition-dominated Congress. Discussants included Ambassador Max L. Friedersdorf, Ford's Assistant for Legislative Affairs, who stated that the veto was Ford's only alternative at the time; Senator Birch Bayh, who reflected on Congress' responsive attitude to Ford as compared to Nixon; and Congressman Norman F. Lent, who described the veto as the President's ultimate tool in influencing policy.

stated that Ford, whose advisers disagreed strongly with one another, did not have time to develop an economic plan. David J. Smyth, on behalf of Susan K. Washburn and Paul Dua, presented a paper entitled "Misery and President Ford: Macroeconomic and Presidential Popularity," in which he cited polls demonstrating that Ford's unpopularity was caused by the nation's economic situation. Discussants included James M. Cannon, Ford's Assistant for Domestic Affairs, who claimed Ford succeeded in turning the economy around; James T. Lynn, Ford's Director of the Office of Management and Budget, who gave examples of various accomplishments of the Ford Administration; Ambassador Arnold Saltzman, who spoke of a lack of mechanisms at the government's disposal to provide alternatives to solve future economic problems; Paul H. O'Neill, Deputy of OMB, who stated that Ford made his own decisions and was not unduly influenced by his advisors; and Roger B. Porter, Executive Secretary of the President's Economic Policy Board, who stated that a President should impose a framework of principles on policy and that Ford succeeded in doing so.

The panel entitled "The Administration of Justice and Judicial Appointments" discussed the reasons behind the appointments of Eude Levi for Attorney General and John Paul Stevens for Supreme Court Justice. Nancy V. Baker presented a paper entitled "Rebuilding Confidence: Ford's Choice of Attorney General," in which she concluded that Levi was chosen on the basis of what she termed "the Neutral Model," a model based on competence, not ideology. Howard Ball, in his paper "Confronting Institutional Schizophrenia: The Effort to De-Politicize the U.S. Department of Justice, 1974-1976," described Levi as an ethical, exemplary person who restored order to the department.
David M. O'Brien presented his paper "The Politics of Professionalism: President Gerald R. Ford's Appointment of Justice John Paul Stevens," in which he stated that Stevens was appointed on a professional, non-partisan basis. The panel of discussants included Eric M. Friedman, Hofstra Law School professor, who claimed that Stevens has become more liberal since he was first appointed, and Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Ford's Deputy Attorney General, who applauded Ford's choices and explained how Ford refused to allow anyone to exert political pressure upon the Justice Department.

President Ford in his address, entitled "Reflections: Looking Back at the Ford Presidency," said that while he does not spend time "agonizing over the past", he is extremely proud of his administration and what he accomplished during his brief 895-day tenure in office. Ford said that most Americans today do not remember just how difficult and divisive the circumstances were in August of 1974. The Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal had combined to badly damage the public's faith in constitutional government.

President Ford then took the opportunity to review what he felt were his administration's greatest achievements: controlling inflation and lowering unemployment and interest rates. In addition, Ford noted that by skillfully wielding his veto power over what he termed "excessive spending bills," he managed to save the taxpayers $10 billion.

Ford also recalled his loss of the 1976 election. He took pains to point out that the election was the closest since Kennedy-Nixon in 1960 and that it hinged on only a few thousand votes cast in two states.
Ford included his remarks by recounting the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, as well as the Bicentennial celebrations of July 1976. These events, he said, were the lowest and highest points, respectively, of his term in office. Ultimately, Ford said, he restored public confidence in the presidency and turned the nation over to President Carter is far better shape than he found it in August 1974.

The panel entitled "Dealing With the Soviet Union." Involved around the failure of detente and the subsequent deterioration in U.S./Soviet relations during the Ford Administration. Robert D. Schulzinger presented a paper entitled "The Decline of Detente " in which he argued that detente failed because of flaws inherent in the policy from the beginning. Earl Conteh-Morgas, on behalf of Festus Ubboja Ohaegbula, presented their paper entitled "Testing Detente: The Ford Administration and the Angolan Conflict," in which they criticized American policy-makers' failure to separate U.S. global ideology from regional reality. Lawrence J. Korb, in his paper "Gerald R. Ford and the Defense Budget: A Look Ahead of his Time," praised the Ford Administration for its increase in defense spending. The discussants included Donald H. Rumsfeld, who agreed with Korb's analysis and declared that it is the President's responsibility to provide for the defense of the country; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former Counsellor in the State Department, who disagreed with Conteh-Morgan's thesis, arguing that he wrongfully indicted the Ford Administration for an ethnocentric policy of global intervention without regard to potential ramifications; and Vladislav M. Zuck, Senior Research Fellow at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who criticized the papers presented for their failure to
recognize the lessons to be learned from the conflicts with the Soviets during that period.

The panel entitled "The First Lady" centered on the role of Betty Ford in the Ford Administration. Myra G. Gutin presented a paper entitled, "You've Come a Long Way, Mr. President: Betty Ford as First Lady," in which she stressed that Mrs. Ford's approach was to view the press as her ally, to avoid substantive issues, and support the President in leading the nation. Leesa R. Tobin, Archivist of the Ford Library, added that Mrs. Ford left papers which included public mail and information on how the White House handled the press. The list of panelists included Betty Boyd Caroli, author of First Ladies, who credited Mrs. Ford with helping to change the role of the First Lady; and James E. Rosebush, former Chief-of-Staff to Nancy Reagan, who argued that Mrs. Ford confused the job of First Lady because she did not define the scope of action a First Lady should take.

The Ford Presidential Conference Banquet was unique in Hofstra's history of Presidential conferences, for not only did it include an address by Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, it was also the first banquet attended by the President it was examining.

Opening remarks were made by Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY), who applauded Ford for tranquil, solid judgment in chaotic times and for the fact that a remarkable number of today's leaders were tutored in the Ford Administration.

In his address entitled "Gerald R. Ford: A Retrospective," Cheney argued that prior to Ford's tenure Congress had usurped Presidential power in the wake of Watergate. With Ford, the American people found a
"man of honesty and integrity" in whom they could believe. In doing so, Ford was able to restore the respect and the power of the Presidency.

The panel entitled "The Fall of South Vietnam" dealt with the importance of the disintegration and defeat of South Vietnam to the Ford Presidency. In his paper "Power Apprenticeship: Congressman Gerald R. Ford and the Vietnam War, 1964-1973," Jeff Charnley focused on President Ford’s opinions and actions concerning the Vietnam War while he served in Congress and argued that the war "served as Gerald Ford's apprenticeship to Presidential power." Jerrold L. Schecter presented a paper entitled "Final Days: The Political Struggle to End the Vietnam War," in which he illustrated Ford’s "primary concern with restoring the national consensus" during the final period of America’s involvement in Vietnam. Duane Tananbaum, in his paper "Gerald Ford and the War Powers Resolution," claimed that Ford’s "inconsistency on the issue" of the resolution reflected partisan politics rather than logical policy. The discussants included William F. Hammond, author of The U.S. Army in Vietnam: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968, who argued that Ford’s changing positions were a reflection of the workings of the American political system; and Doug Brinkley, Associate Professor of History at Hofstra, who noted that Ford was a "Republican partisan playing Republican politics with Vietnam."

The main focus of the panel "Presidential and Staff Memoirs: The Issues" was on the ramifications of the recent proliferation of memoirs written by former White House insiders. Commentator David A. Horrocks, Supervisory Archivist of the Ford Library, noted the increasingly frequent appearances of "kiss-and-tell" books and raised the issue of Presidential privacy. The panel of discussants included Trevor
Armbrister, Ford’s Research Assistant for A Time to Heal, who recounted the process of researching the book and the often difficult task of eliciting anecdotes from the President; Sheila Rabb Wiedenfeld, former Press Secretary to Betty Ford, who asserted that memoirs of former staffers are necessary and serve to stimulate public debate; Les Walczak, former White House correspondent for Business Week, who commented on the “limited value” of memoirs which, he said, often tend to be “defensive rationalizations of an administration’s policy failures;” and Hedley Donovan, former Editor-in-chief of Time, who noted that there are limits of propriety that should be followed, especially if the President is still in office.

The panel entitled “The Nixon Pardon” examined the possible justifications for and the effects of Ford’s decision to pardon Nixon. Mark J. Rozell, in his paper “In Defense of President Ford’s Pardon of Richard M. Nixon,” cited the unlikelihood of obtaining a fair trial for Nixon. William D. Federson presented a paper entitled “Ford’s Pardon of Nixon: Machiavellian or Magnanimous Leadership,” in which he argued that most of the great Presidents in U.S. history would probably have done what Ford did. Discussants included Philip W. Buchen, who said that he does not believe that the pardon cost Ford the 1976 election because the consequences of not granting the pardon may have been far worse; Jerald F. terHorst, Press Secretary to Ford, who explained that he did not feel that he could defend the pardon and therefore submitted his resignation; Robert T. Hartmann, who defended the legal authority of the President to grant such a pardon; Judge William Hunsicker, former Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, who criticized the timing of the pardon, while agreeing that the pardon was the correct thing to do;
Kings County District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman, former member of the House Judiciary Committee, who described Ford's pardon of Nixon as an "unpardonable pardon;" and Benton L. Becker, who argued that Ford's pardon was not an illegal limitation on the special prosecutor's role.

The panel entitled "The 1976 Election" described the campaigns of both Ford and Jimmy Carter and discussed the strategy of Ford in running for the Republican nomination and in the campaign itself. In her paper "The 1976 Republican nomination: An Examination of the Organizational Dynamic," Robin Kelody argued that the nature of Ford's incumbency and the poor organization of the campaign almost led to Ford's loss of the nomination. Discussants included Howard H. Callaway, Chairman of the Ford Campaign Committee, who discussed the financial limitations, the staff difficulties, and the underestimation of the Reagan challenge which harmed the Ford campaign; Judge Robert P. Griffin, Ford's Convention Floor Manager, who described Ford's convention strategy; F. Clifton White, member of Ford's Executive Convention Committee, who argued that party reforms caused a power shift not from the elite to the masses but from professional politicians to non-professionals; Michael Raoul-Duval, Ford's Special Counsel, who praised Ford for his ability to make and stand by campaign decisions; Bert Lance, campaign advisor to Governor Jimmy Carter, who stated his belief that both candidates ran good campaigns and that the basic decency of both men helped to heal the nation; and Stuart K. Spencer, campaign consultant to Ford, who asserted that Ford lost because of the Nixon pardon and the struggle for the nomination within the Republican party.

The panel entitled "The New York City Fiscal Crisis" discussed the causes and the measures taken to remedy the near bankruptcy of New York.
In his paper "Saving New York: The Ford Administration and the New York City Fiscal Crisis," Charles J. Orlebeke described the role of the Ford Administration in New York's averting bankruptcy. Discussants included Hugh L. Carey, former Governor of New York, who credited Ford with saving the city and discussed the various options available to the state to aid the city in its financial plight; Abraham D. Beame, former Mayor of New York, who outlined the "draconian measures" he employed to deliver the city from bankruptcy; James M. Cannon, Ford's Executive Director of the Domestic Council, who discussed Governor Rockefeller's dealings with the city; James E. Conner, Ford's Secretary to the Cabinet, who claimed that an "Iron Triangle" of politicians, unions, and bankers developed and that the crisis resulted when the bankers pulled out; Ken Auletta, *New York Daily News* columnist, who argued that New York politicians were torn between their own culpability and desire to blame others for the crisis; and Richard Ravitch, former Chairman of the Urban Development Corp., who noted that the state took on certain economic burdens that had formerly been the city's responsibility.

The main focus of the panel "The Ford Image" was the public perception of Ford and how this perception differed from reality. In his paper "A Nice Man Who Worked at the Job: The Dilemma of the Ford Image," J. Robert Greene noted that Ford came across as a decent man who at time appeared to be a victim of his own candor and self-deprecating humor. Discussants included Gaylord Shav, *Newsday* Washington Bureau Chief, who believed that the American people saw a man in the White House who resembled themselves and who had the poise to run the nation; Robert T. Hartmann, who recounted his experiences with Ford and related his favorable impressions of the man; Larry M. Speakes, Ford's Assistant
Press Secretary, who argued that, while Ford was able to create his own image, he was forced to "cut and paste" the Nixon agenda; Jerald terHorst, who explained that the pictures of Ford making his own breakfast were consistent with the nature of the man himself; Tom Brokaw, NBC News Anchorman, who argued that Ford was a victim of national and White House circumstances and his own candor; Martin Schram, National Editor of Washington, who noted that, by and large, Ford had created his own image; Robert Shogan, National Political Correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, who noted that the people, not the President, set the media’s agenda and that a lack of substance brought about Ford’s image; and Clark R. Mollenhoff, former Washington Bureau Chief for the Des Moines Register and Tribune, who argued that the President was a victim of the White House Press Corps.

*contributing to this Conference Report were: Ysa Bazzan, Cory Covert, Krystal Denley, Henry Diaz, Richard Donoghue, Susan Dunlap, Susan Jacobs, Peter Nickulas, Richard Sheeley, Wayne Wink, Jr., Editor, and Professor William F. Levantrosser, Editor.*
III. RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON THE PRESIDENCY

Books


Congressional Information Service Staff. CIS Index to Presidential Executive Orders & Proclamations. Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service Inc.


Aho, C. Michael and Levinson, Marc. "The Economy After Reagan." Foreign Affairs, Winter 1988-89, 18-25. This article outlines the challenges that need to be faced, and the steps that need to be taken by the Bush Administration to restore the balance of the world economy.

Alford, C. Fred. "Mastery and Retreat: Psychological Sources of the Appeal of Ronald Reagan." Political Psychology, December 1988, 571-589. This paper examines the popular appeal of Ronald Reagan by considering the national anxieties he addressed throughout his administration.


Barrett, David M. "The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His Advisors, and the Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War." Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1988-89, 637-663. An article suggesting that Johnson was not a victim of groupthink and that he received and listened to significant advice warning him about sending troops to Vietnam, contrary to two prevalent myths surrounding his actions at that time.

Betz, Herman. "Lincoln and the Constitution: The 'Dictatorship Question' Reconsidered." Congress and the Presidency, Autumn 1988, 147-164. Betz asserts that Lincoln always claimed to be acting within constitutional restraints, and that he justified his actions with legal arguments based on the Constitution and general arguments about the nature of American constitutional government.

Beast, James J. "Who Talked to the President When? A Study of Lyndon B. Johnson." Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1988, 531-545. The people with whom the president surrounds himself, those with whom he speaks regularly, and the impact these interactions had on Lyndon Johnson's choices are the subject of this analysis.


This analysis tests the assumption that party identification remains stable within the period of an election, by looking at the evolution of partisanship over the course of the 1980 election.


Brown’s analysis investigates the mass dynamics of competitive electoral politics with respect to presidential vote during the 1928-1936 realignment period in the United States.


This essay discusses the politics of arms control and the way the Reagan Administration dealt with it.


An analysis of Wilson's personality as seen in his longhand revisions of speeches and correspondence with George Creel.


This article focuses on OMB review of agency rules, a major institutional innovation of the Reagan Administration which established central clearance of administrative rules for the first time.


Crotts and Stewart clarify the findings of two previous studies on the types of models used to evaluate the political economy of the FTC, and suggest it is premature to dispose of Presidential partisanship as a variable for analysis in the future.


The central thesis of Drew's article is that the crucial linkage in the process of shaping the events which may resolve debates between the branches of government, is the ability to set the agenda in the mass media, which in turn develops public consensus.


With the use of simulations based on a multiequation model of federal budgetary outcomes, the authors assess the Reagan Administration's impact on the federal budget during fiscal years 1982-86.


Using 1980 NES panel data, the authors show that candidate selection is the result of preferences for issues, candidate personalities, and party identification.


Roosevelt's dealings with Russia during an intense outburst of hostility towards the Jews in Russia from 1903-1906 are analyzed here.


This article by Larson attempts to assess bias in coverage of the presidents by National Public Radio, in its nightly news program, "All Things Considered."


The author describes the importance of U.S.-Latin American relations, and outlines the goals and priorities the U.S. must pursue in the near future to alleviate the severe problems in Latin America.


An analysis pointing out the problems of operationalizing presidential skill in quantitative research, and a proposal of a new measure to better evaluate the influence of presidential skill in achieving legislative success.


A discussion of the influence of emotional response, particularly positive emotionality, on presidential candidate vote disposition.

Pohllmann, Marcus D. "Constraining Presidents at the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Spring 1989, p.337-346. Pohllmann examines the role played by the general public in the course of foreign policy crises, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. His article also looks at how that role could be strengthened, given the tremendous stake in these decisions.


Rosati, Jerel A. "Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Leaders: Addressing the Controversy Over the Carter Administration." *Political Psychology*, September 1986, 471-505. Rosati attempts to clarify the four conflicting interpretations of the Carter Administration's worldview and its impact on foreign policy throughout the Administration's four years in office.

Rosenwasser, Shirley M. and Seals, Jana. "Attitudes Toward a Hypothetical Male of Female Presidential Candidates-A Research Note." *Political Psychology*, Winter 1986, 591-598. The investigation of the effectiveness of male/female candidates for the presidency and the importance of "masculine"/"feminine" presidential duties are reported in this essay.


Rut, George W. "The Ideological Convergence of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Winter 1989, 139-177. The main purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze the evolution of Woodrow Wilson's political thought.

Sandman submits in this paper, that the candidate who best articulates the visions and values most traditional to American society, will win the presidential election.


In this paper, Sorensen attempts to clarify and resolve the current debate on the issue of the constitutionality of executive prerogative, according to the Federalist Papers.


A brief review of the Primers anti-party doctrine, the theory of party government and presidential leadership that predominated political science until the mid-1950s, and the transformation of the governmental system in the last thirty years.


Sykes explores the relationships among the people, their representatives in Congress and the President as presidents themselves have understood and shaped those relationships.


A discussion of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, its ratification, and its impact on the politicians of the time, including the president.


A discussion of how the Reagan Administration demonstrated remarkable success in promoting the wants of Americans in foreign policy, and a description of key elements for effective foreign policy in the twenty-first century.


This paper investigates the relationship between Democratic presidential incumbency and economic growth in the U.S. in the long run.
TOM LANGSTON
3 QUAKER ROAD
PITTSFORD NY 14534
The ongoing scientific activities of the ISA are decentralised in Research Committees, Working Groups and Thematic Groups, each dealing with a well recognized specialty in sociology. These groups bring together scholars who wish to pursue comparative research on an international basis and they constitute basic networks of scientific research, intellectual debate and professional exchange. Directory of RC/WG/TG Presidents 2018-2022. ISA Vice-President Research Letters. Order by. RC Number Alphabetical order.