Introduction

Criminology has for some time undergone an identity and an efficacy crisis. It has come up short in providing convincing answers to central questions of crime causation. Hall’s provocative book provides a grand tour of the many shortcomings in the field. It is a highly engaging book that critically reviews many contemporary approaches in criminology, from the conservative, to the liberal, postmodernist, cultural, and other critical criminological perspectives. Its stated goal (p.3) is “not to produce novelty, nor indeed closure, but an initial theoretical framework with at least some degree of explanatory power.” Hall’s main contribution in his astute polemic is to raise focused, critical debate in theorizing in criminology. All, quite on target. However, I doubt it will have any major impact on entrenched theorists who will protect their ontologically based turf. Nor, for those so inclined, does he set out to provide immediate, alternative conceptual possibilities as more productive practices in historically situated political economy, although much is implicit in the sharp polemic. Along the same direction, it is highly critical, yet few guidelines are offered for a transpraxis. Much, however, to the credit of Hall’s impeccable polemical skills remains implicit or embryonic as possible bases for a redevelopment in critical criminology. The following essay will be a select commentary on some of his key points.
Embracing the Challenge of Internal Critique

A significant contribution is Hall’s weaving together a mosaic that integrates critical analysis at various “levels,” stretching from the micro- to the macro- and incorporating component of the intervening levels. This stimulates open-minded theorists to rethink often assumed connections and possible developments. His theme, echoing Marx, that we are becoming more and more our own gravediggers, certainly is demanding more systemic analysis. He does provided specificity, particularly in his use of Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real and its vicissitudes, manifest, quite poignantly (drawing from the Theodor Adorno1) in times of extreme threats, distress, insecurity, fear, and anxiety, in primordial responses for self-preservation. He traces a primordial “radical evil” “that has its roots in the core of university subjectivity” (p.151), and hence the often neglected need of an operative superego (p.153). If ends are sort in this book, advocated is that “the principle of universalist ethics and politics should find its way into criminological theory ... with a firm rejection of liberal-postmodernism and risk theory” (p.15).

His first critical discussion concerns constructing an alternative definition of crime which can then become the basis of more acceptable understanding from which further theorizing can take place. Favorably citing, for starters, Hillyard et al’s (2004) notion of “zeomology,” he moves on to recognize the critiques that followed, particularly that a “founding ethical concept has not been achieved” (p.16). He follows this direction by way of critical comments by Yar (2012), in embracing Axel Honneth’s (1996; see also 2007) Hegelian-based notion of recognition (i.e., mutual recognition, love, rights, esteem)2 as a key component of a reformulated notion of harm. However, needed, Hall argues in this formulation, is framing in political economy and historical change. Hall stresses that this direction will not be productively aided by liberal-postmodernists and risk theorists (p.246).3

It is unfortunate that he links liberalism and the affirmative postmodernist endeavors, and so too a Hegelian-based ontology. As to the latter, we (Milošanovie, 2013a, 2013b, 2014) have recently embarked on developing an alternative ontologically-based perspective, a process-informational paradigm in contrast to a classical-materialist based ontology within which his work and much of contemporary criminology is embedded. Ontologically bound to the latter, it limits our understanding of object, space, time, causation, information, language, and an agent as a processor of information. Over the years, Newtonian principles have been embraced, solidified, and reified through continuous unexamined employment in the social sciences and remain the core underlying assumptions, or ontologies that drive contemporary theorizing. Risk theory for example, has a clear foundation on these principles. So too positivism. An alternative paradigm built ground up from the ontological percepts of quantum and holographic theory would lead to a rebuilding of criminology at its foundational level. Critical criminology is no exception. We are witnessing a more process-oriented perspective in cultural criminology (Ferrell et al, 2008), and in Jock Young’s late work, The Criminological Imagination (2011). But cultural criminology must also begin to more seriously look at the definitive findings of quantum and holographic theory and incorporate these more fundamental ontologies. Arguably, doing quantum holographic analysis is not a postmodern framework, but suggests a fundamental reorientation of conventional, critical, and postmodern work in the direction of more fully incorporating precepts from an alternative science that have been resisted in the social sciences. Hall’s call to “ditch” postmodernism (p.250)

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1 A leading thinker of the Frankfurt school whose theorists integrated Freud and Marx in social commentary.
2 See also critical but productive debate between Fraser and Honneth (2006). Fraser (p. 3) argues that recognition must be paired with redistribution, positing the “two categories as co-fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of justice.” A redistribution component (p. 7) “seek[s] a more just distribution of resources and wealth.”
3 Hall’s (pp. 162, 250) critique that postmodernism, amongst others, is tantamount to “the functional ideologies of advance capitalism” and should be ditched is, in my view, more in the spirit of provocation, a call for postmodernists to better recognize the complexities in the relations between discourse, for example, and political economic institutions and structures, and a viable subject that is not merely mechanically responding, but has the capacity to actively and creatively engage in struggles for alternatives. His critique (p. 150), ostensibly directed to postmodernists, that “the subject is no illusion, and neither is it simply a work of art and self-becoming,” falls short of appreciating the full extent of an affirmative postmodernist approach. Consulting the work of Deleuze and Guattari and their developers, such as Holland (2009, 2011), Hardt (1993), and Hardt and Negri (2001, 2005, 2009) shows clear indications that a subject can indeed be a “work of art and self-becoming” in its active and creative responses to injustices. In this ontology, things are always in process, always possible to be otherwise, an endless process of becoming.
is premature, and even citing the “Sokal awakening” as its presumed contributory demise, overlooks substantial concepts that have not been seriously considered in mainstream criminology including a good part of critical criminology. Such concepts as nonlinearity, sensitivity to initial conditions, iteration, disproportional effects, singularities, catastrophes, the effects of language that tends to speak the subject, discursive regimes (e.g., law) that limit social constructions of reality further dispossessing subaltern before the court and limiting alternative storytelling4 that could be the basis of more indigenous “data” for criminologists, and attractors beyond point and cyclical, to include torus and strange attractors – all have not been seriously considered by mainstream and critical criminology, and many to a great degree by Hall. Perhaps this is more an indicator of the refusal of mainstream criminology to break out of its shackles. Hall’s work is no exception. Indeed, contra Hall, criminology must go even further as an “importer discipline,” seek even further guidance from various disciplines, which he already suggests, despite his admonition, by his inclusion of discussion on neurology, biology, psychoanalysis, and psychology.

Contra Hall (p. 184), criminology cannot start to “construct its own theoretical accounts of the relationships between the individual, the social, culture, politics and economy,” we argue, instead, these reconstructions can’t take place without cross-disciplinary engagement and incorporation. It is in many ways a contributory apologia for maintaining the classical-materialist paradigm. Classical philosophers weren’t around when quantum and holographic theory, for example, was developed, with the exception of Henri Bergson’s highly influential text, Matter and Memory written in 1896 that in many ways anticipated key components of both quantum and holography theory. Thus Hall’s (p.184) insistence that “the theoretical wings of both criminology and sociology must join forces to construct new ontological syntheses and adjust their research programmes according to the need to use both inductive and deductive methods to gather evidence for new ideas” is, nevertheless, narrowly situating the field in old premises, assumptions, ontologies of classical-materialist thought. It’s time to shed our umbilical cords. Go where no theorist has gone before!

Let’s consider for example his critique of current and even suggested alternative notions of harm. He cites our work (Henry and Milovanovic, 1996) and the offered constitutive definition of harm as falling short of answering key questions, including the question of an ethics. Our revised work (Milovanovic and Henry, 2001), not consulted by Hall, provides for a number of dimensions of harm in contrast to change: (1) does the entity perceive it as a loss?, (2) is the person or entity free to object to the exercise of power imposing reduction or restriction?, (3) whether they are free to resist it, (4) whether their resistance has efficacy in prevention of the reduction? 5 All this is contrasted with “change” where a high premium on collaborative, conscious effort transpires by “all of those affected are able to define their own future, and particularly their own level of risk, and not have this imposed by others” (p. 167). Admittedly, this is a first, or better, second approximation and much further work can and should be done. For example, perception of loss can be problematized, so too degrees of each. We further identify two general forms of harms: harms of reduction, and harms of repression. They are harms “because they diminish a person’s or group’s position, or they deny them the opportunity to attain a position they desire, a position that does not deny another from attaining her or his or their own position” (ibid.). Offenders (“excessive investors in harm”) are those who invest in the power to dominate without the recipients being provided a viable opportunity to question and take action against the imposition.

We are, however, with Hall (p. 245), in arguing the failure of criminological theory in explaining “why liberal-capitalist life constitutes and reproduces throughout its social structure conspicuous and influential subjectivities [“excessive investors in harm”] that reject solidarity for a form of competitive individualism, one which is willing to risk harm to others as it furthers its own interests.” Hall addresses this by reinvesting in a Hegelian driven master-slave dialectic, integrating the work of Adorno (1973) and the notion of a primordial “radical evil,” Freud’s death drive, and Lacan’s Real, in arguing (p.154) that manifest harm “is a product of capitalism’s imperfect attempt to produce and restrain the anti-subject in a manner that allows it to co-exist in

4 Critical race theory and feminist analysis have, however, provided much engaging work in this area, although the advocated notion of alternative “storytelling” could be augmented by more extensive inclusions of the structuring properties of discursive regimes themselves. Critical race theorists continue to have an uneasy alliance with postmodernist concepts (See Delgado and Stefancic, 2012). Postmodernist feminists have shown how identities are embedded in discursive regimes reflecting Lacan’s “law of the father.” Outstanding still is Spivak’s (1994) question of how the subaltern may genuinely speak.

5 The constitutive definition has multiple possible applications. See, for example, the emerging field of green criminology, and especially Halsey’s (2006) Deleuze-Guattari driven approach in studying environmental harms.
tension with the superficially civilized subject, a tension that retains the anti-subject as an active force in the lower register of functionality.” Apparently, basic drives, some of which are latent but ready for mobilization in times of “extreme threats or disruption” (p.154) provide for the possibility of the emergence of an anti-subject for the “superficially civilized subject” (ibid.). Liberal theory, he continues, denies the efficacy of the Real, and hence this primordial source of harm. Apparently, too, for Hall, shifting discussions to language (the Symbolic Order in Lacan) for many postmodernist, disregards the effects of the Real. He does seem to support a balance of the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary Orders as in Lacan, but in a political economy that provides fundamental recognition and love (rather than perverted consumer capitalism’s offering of objects of desire that build on a primordially lacking subject). This is a necessary condition for less manifest eruptions of the “radical evil” within the subject. Of particular relevance are forms of othering (p.160) that evolve.⁶

Agreed, that discourse analysis must be situated in political economy, being sensitive to its historical emerging institutions and structural configurations.⁷ And agreed, there is still much from Jacques Lacan that is relevant in the development of a bona fide statement of agency. However, Hall’s model is primordially based on a Hegelian notion of lack and the dialectics of the master-slave. Lacan’s model, too, is driven by a desire mobilized reflecting lack, or engendered lack by consumer capitalism. Freud, on the other hand, was driven more by Nietzsche, particularly in his notion of the dialectics between Eros and Thanatos, although a model still predominantly predicated on homeostatic principles. Here, libidinal energy is mobilized as a formative resource. The work of many postmodernists have embraced this more positive form of energy. Deleuze and Guattari, for example, drawing from Nietzsche have offered the dialectic of the active and reactive forces and that we must always be vigilant about the emergence of reactionary forces (see also Patton, 2000).

Returning to the development of a constitutive definition of harm, of course Hall would appropriately question the given ethical principle on which it is based. In more recent work (Miloanovic, 2013a, 2014) – drawing from several theorists including Marx, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, Patton, Fraser, and May –, a distributive justice ethics was proposed as a first approximation (Miloanovic, 2014: 198): “From each according to [her]/his abilities, to each, according to [her]/his needs”⁸ and desires; to and from each the active promotion of the power to effect and power to be affected; tempered, as much as possible, by the promotion of differences and antirepresentationalism, and subject to genealogical evaluations of forces.” This responds to the critique that much of postmodernist thought lacks a normative basis for an ethical reconstruction. It is also a provocation for further critical discussion and development. There are others.

Responding to the critique of lack of normativity, we only cite two works as suggestive in overcoming this polemic. Fraser’s (1997, 2000) three-part criteria for a transformative rather than a merely liberal affirmative ethics includes: (1) recognition (affirmative forms recognizing harms of reductions and repression; transformative forms recognizing institutional, cultural and symbolic exclusionary practices of harms of reductions and repression), (2) redistribution (affirmative forms recognizing merely compensatory forms; transformative forms recognizing institutional, macro-level forms of diminishment), and (3) representation (affirmative forms recognizing increasing possibilities of expression of voice; transformative recognizing societal-wide distribution of opportunities to express voice). This is in accord with the thrust of a “genealogical analysis of forces” suggested by Patton (2000: 59-67), building on the work of Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari (1987). Here contrary to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic whereby the slave (read proletariat) is reduced to reacting and negating, the focus shifts to an (genealogical) evaluation of values in terms of active and reactive forces. Reactive forces are those that tend to produce harms of reduction and repression. Active forces are those which empower and produce change, mutation, transformation. It is the activation of a “will to power,” read not to dominate, but to activate internal and external possibilities and becomings. Genealogical analysis⁹ would determine which are more predominant. Evaluation is always cognizant of unintended effects of

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⁶ Here, the late works of Jock Young’s (2011) on forms of othering that have developed in late modernity are quite supportive, whereby the other is reduced to an object allowing both liberal and conservative attributions of deficiency, evil, a “less-than.” This can also be integrated with our notion of the Other in Schema QD below.

⁷ Hall’s critique could attempt to engage, for example, Lacan’s (1991) notion of the four structured discourses within which we find ourselves in embodying desire and in constructing reality. In this sense, the vicissitudes of the Real are channeled into forms of sublimated expression by particular forms of discourses. No need to dismiss discourse analysis so tersely, but, for sure, integrating it with the shaping forces of political economy.

⁸ This integrated part is Marx’s needs/abilities principle, much cited in the literature, which, we are arguing, cannot be a stand-alone in an ethical principle.

⁹ Genealogical analysis is derived from Nietzsche and Foucault. For a clear and accessible explication, see May (1994: 89-119)
otherwise well-intended reformers or policies. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 52-56, 508-510) have also provided a four-part model by which we could evaluate forms of deterritorialization and reterritorialization (Milovanovic, 2014: 200). This is but a short-winded response to Hall’s terse critique of their work leading to “negative liberty” (p.10). In this schema, a social scientist conducts a genealogical analysis to determine which form of assemblages predominate, which reside in incipient stages of development, which offer the greater possibilities of becoming, both individual and social. Ethics would then build on a “permanent revolution” (Holland, 1999), a form by which market economies are not based on power differentials but on the possibilities enhanced by released energy; or an “affirmative nomadology” (Holland, 2011), which is based more on a improve jazz metaphor of social organization and mutual becomings. In short, a more comprehensive ethical dimension can be further developed out of these first approximations and further integrations of a process-informational paradigm.

Hall also brings up the issue of agency, or the lack of it in much of criminological theorizing. Chapter 8 is entitled, with, I suppose, baggage intended, “The Transcendental Materialist Subject.” He (p.185) emphatically states “we cannot deny our existence as biological beings.” He dismisses the idea that we are but spoken subjects in discursive systems, as well as entirely autonomous decision-makers (ibid.). Nor are we imprisoned in neural structurations as with biocriminologists. He does embrace components of Freud, Adorno, Klein, Jones, Adler, Lacan, Zizek, and Sullivan (curious, given his admonition of criminology being an importer discipline). Be that as it may, his sophisticated analysis of Lacan’s Real; Sullivan’s good-me, bad-me, not-me; Stein’s (2007) analysis of the origins of violence; and also less so the work of Fromm – all indicate the existence of a profound insecurity and malaise engendered in late modernity. He (p.209) does reluctantly suggest “in the strict materialist sense subjectivity might well be an illusion, but it is an illusion that shapes the individual’s cognition, comportment and sensibilities down to the tumultuous neurology of the material being.” And thus for Hall (ibid.), “even though the self is something that exists only by the force of its own belief, it finds its way down to the material dimension as a formative and reproductive influence.” He concludes his chapter by a call for the development of understandings of “new subjectivities.”

Hall’s is a welcomed highlighting of the lack of a compelling constituted subject or agent in criminological theorizing. Rational choice theory is just vacuous as to the dynamics of agency, so too abstract empiricism and positivistic approaches. Cultural criminology fairs better, but still lacks a more comprehensive notion of agency. Jacques Lacan’s work still offers the major, in-depth, multi-level notion of an inter- and intra-subjectively constituted subject, a body of knowledge with which a serious scholar of agency must engage and with which to come to terms. A process-informational informed approach would look at the inter- and intra-subjective constructions of agency within evolving political economy. We (Milovanovic, 2013a, 2014) have suggested schema QD, a de-oedipalized Lacanian Schema R, that is not based on a Hegelian-driven ontology of lack. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of production, Bergson’s notion of élan vital, Freud’s notion of the libido, Nietzsche’s notion of a will to power, and Spinoza’s analysis of joyful passions can all be productively integrated within a process-informational paradigm. Hall remains steadfastly committed to Hegel’s (and Lacan’s) ontology of lack. We must get beyond this more classical-materialist approach. For example, our Schema QD is a four-cornered entity, comprising a matrix of interrelations which vary by intensity, frequency, duration, and priority (the latter with apologies to Sutherland’s differential association theory). The key components include: ego, ego-ideal, Other, and generalized community other. These are situated within a

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10 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that entities (“assemblages”) are organized in terms of two intersecting axes: territorialization has to do with how relative stability takes form; deterritorialization suggests that all assemblages are subject to destabilizing forces. It is the mixture of the two that produces particular forms and effects. Each assemblage can be mapped, and is the source of lines of flight molded by its internal logic, or “abstract machine.” We reconceptualize (Milovanovic, 2014) this to mean that all entities are emitters of holographically encoded waves that carry information at the quantum level reflecting an entity’s/assemblage’s makeup, state of being and becoming.

11 Of course, in critique, Lacan’s work is primordially based on the Oedipus, lack engendered by the powerlessness of the infant entering the Symbolic order and its antidotes, objects of desire, and an overall Hegelian-driven notion of lack as the basis of desire. Alternatively, while still embracing much of Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari’s work is based not on Oedipus and a lacking subject, but on production, desire as a positive, affirmative force, and an ever becoming.

12 Placed on a Möbius band, we can identify various relations (including two diagonals) that together constitute a matrix.
societal context of abstract generalized other and offered discursive subject-positions.\textsuperscript{13} It is from an instantiated Schema QD that a distinct signature wave takes form\textsuperscript{14} which traverses the holographic field.\textsuperscript{15}

That is, in the quantum holographic approach information has been alternatively conceptualized as (a) energetically (nonlocally) stored in the form of frequency interference patters (holograms) within the brain, (b) within the external “space” that surrounds us (often referred to as a zero point field, or in-information field), or (c) on mathematically construed boundary surfaces that “surround” locales, niches, encounters, etc.\textsuperscript{16}

Groundbreaking, but marginalized work by Raymond Bradley (2011) and by Steven Robbins (2006, 2012) have attempted to reorient our thinking in terms of quantum holographic principles. Robbins, for example, has shown that the brain is a modulated reconstructive wave that interacts with the holographic space within which we are all immersed. We build on this to show that his “modulated frequency wave” is a unique Schema QD matrix signature wave, encoded with all information of the person, that both produces and is a product of its varies interactions with a political economically organized field. In this view, we leave a trace within everything with which we interact, and that with which we interact leaves a trace within our signature wave. We are all profoundly interconnected in the cosmos. There is no intrinsic separation. There is much yet to be done in this direction. It is merely provided as one example of an alternative direction to a classical-materialist orientation.

The importance of providing some notion of a viable agent, amongst others, is to indicate how perception-images are constituted, the basis of which is a social construction of reality and possible action paths. That is,

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\item Briefly, the ego represents a view one has of oneself, ultimately, with Lacan, Illusory, a part of the Imaginary Order; ego-ideal, desirable/likable views of self (Sullivan’s work on the “good me,” “bad me,” and “not me” could be accommodated); Other, as the person, present or imagined through whose eyes one sees oneself; community generalized other as the standard of the community, subgroup, subculture; abstract generalized other as the more macro-level normative order; and discursive subject-position, a concept going beyond a social role to include the discourse and master signifiers which are its supports. In George Herbert Mead’s “taking the role of the other” we can see how the discursive subject-position is a more rigid adaptation than an orientation to the Other. Young’s (2011) discussion of “othering” in late modernity, too, can be accommodated to the possible forms that the Other may take.
\item The inter-relations of the four-cornered QD form a matrix; at any instance from which an instantiated emitting wave is produced holographically encoding this information that spreads in all directions, encountering other emitting waves of entities.
\item Qualia, passions, emotions, and affection-images have been represented by a “disc,” made visible by a “cut of the subject,” represented by a figure-8 cut done on a topologically constructed “cross-cap” (Milovanovic, 2014). These lie at the core of being, always intermingling, effecting and being affected by the various alignments within the Schema QD matrix. See also the work by Deleuze (1989) who argued affection-images are in the body and are often represented non linguistically, by, for example, faciality (arguably, too, by bodily gestures). Three further approaches are significant for possible integration: Penrose and Hameroff’s (2012) work on a quantum consciousness argues that qualia are embedded at the Planck scale, the smallest measurable space in the form of twister space; Norman Denzin (2007), on the other hand, argues that emotions are always emergent in processes of social interaction; Jack Katz (1999) had argued that emotions reside in the body and are a resource that can be activated. It is to the merit of edgework theory (Lyng, 2005) to bring back into discussion the emotionality and passions of the subject. Hall (p.146) references favorably Zizek’s critical view of edgework as “stupid pleasures,” and edgeworkers as “adolescent consumer adventurers.” Perhaps an experience in doing a tandem skydive from 13,000 feet; running with graffiti writers who are trying to avoid arrest; stepping up to the front lines of a demonstration against injustices, faced with a massive display of police presence; or spending a few hours in discussion with a convicted burglar and the emotionality of planning, executing, and reaping the rewards with the local fence and in animated discussion with subsequent fellow burglars would provide testimony to the emotionality of being in the event and the sense of empowerment, be it often momentary, be it “criminal” or not, that materializes. We do, however, recognize O’Malley and Mugford’s (1994) call for a multi-level analysis of differential opportunities to engage in edgework. Feminist analysis has also questioned the gender specific nature of much of this activity. O’Malley’s (2010) more recent work on “risk” clearly demonstrates that some activities of risk-taking by those in power are indeed “beyond incrimination.”
\item By the quantum holographically construed notions of “boundaries” cosmologists envision bounded locations that include an internal “bulk,” the commonly understood happenings in four-dimensional spacetime, surrounded by a boundary surface which encodes all information from the bulk in one less dimension. In one version, we are all merely holographic projections of encoded information on this boundary surface.
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how the quantum wave, representing virtual possibilities, collapses to form particular instantiations, or particle-like entities. Thus the question of how they are shaped in a particular form particularly by axiomatized systems, or logics, engendered by political economies\textsuperscript{17} is central. Classical-materialist concepts just do an injustice as to how perception-images are created. Quantum holographic principles, integrated with the early work of Bergson, for example, provide a basis of developing a more productive understanding as to how these take form.

Hall’s book, unlike cultural criminologist’s work such as in Ferrell et al (2008), leaves the reader with a degree of despair as to potentials for change. It (p. 253) does advocate “revive[ing] some previously deselected ideas,” and does call for integration from Honneth’s work on recognition and “communal love,” and perhaps, implicitly, a revival of the “good-me” and its efficacy. And he emphasizes, in a closing passage (p.256), to be cognizant of “...individuals, who seek ever more inventive ways of separating the self from the social, [for whom] the risk of inflicting some degree of harm on others is always worth taking.”\textsuperscript{18} This, Hall argues, can be envisioned as stemming from a Hegelian form of critique of the master-slave dialectic.

Unfortunately these suggestions don’t go far to provide us with more substantive directions for transformative practices. There has been, for example, much insightful analysis of transformative practices that follows the work of Nietzsche. See for example Holland’s (2011) Deleuzean and Guattarian inspired call for a “nomad citizenship” and an “affirmative nomadology” in tune with notions of contingency, chance, emergence, self-organization, amongst other non “classical” suggestions. He provides many current examples of already existing emerging models in accord with a “free market communism.” See also his early work (1999) that responds to Hall’s call for models that take into consideration libidinal investments within existent political economic constraints. Gibson-Graham (2006), finding the work by Deleuze and Guattari “valuable,” has offered many insights as to alternatives in political economy, already in their incipient and developing stages such as “community economies.” Woolford’s (2009) work, too, has provided many insights for a more transformative justice. Hardt and Negri’s (2005, 2009) Deleuzean-Guattarian driven model, and perhaps an expression of a postmodern Marxism, has provided an alternative to Marx’s class conflict model, and has provided numerous insights as to alternative, more inclusive political economic forms of organization.\textsuperscript{19} Holland, Gibson-Graham, and Hardt and Negri’s work, integrated with the work of Woolford, cultural criminology, particularly Ferrell et al (2008), and a revised quantized constitutive\textsuperscript{20} approach, arguably, are at the center of developing a comprehensive perspective. A quantized version of Lacan’s schema R, in our Schema QD, as well as the works of Bradley and Robbins in quantum holography would certainly situate these possible integrations within an alternative ontological base. All this suggests investment in belief and possibilities for transformation. We cannot resign ourselves to passivity and acceptance of conventionality. Returning to recent work in cultural criminology, for example, the reader feels infused with a sense of hope.

\textsuperscript{17} Patton (2000), building on Deleuze and Guattari (1987), has explained how axiomatic systems capture desire and subject it to the dictates of its internal logic.

\textsuperscript{18} This comports with our (Milovanovic and Henry, 2001) notion of an excessive investor in harm.

\textsuperscript{19} Hall (pp.164, 180) insists that talk of class struggle is not dead, and its viability has been given precise visibility and importance since the economic meltdown of 2008 and its differential impact on persons in political economy. This is part of his attempt to “revive some previously deselected ideas” (p. 253). This also puts Hegel’s master-slave dialectic center stage, he argues, in attempts of understanding “good and evil” (p. 180).

We, however, find Hardt and Negri’s (2001, 2005, 2009) perspective more compelling that suggests that late capitalism is composed more of a “multitude” that can be the incipient force from which collective organization and struggle against domination may emerge. We see this, for example, in such movements as Occupy Wall Street and the efficacy of cyber-movements in social struggles around the globe. This is not based on class composition, but represents diversely situated persons all subject to the reductive and repressive forces of political economy, with the exception of the truly well-to-do. So, contra Hall (p.145), a reemergence of class is not “finally burying postmodernism,” but rather showing one facet of the multitude.

\textsuperscript{20} We take notice of Delanda’s (2006) exemplary critique of much of constitutive theory in terms of how change can take place given the mutual constitution theses, and how “parts” and “wholes” are conceptualized. A quantized constitutive approach would revise these notions in terms of the concept of quantum wave equations reflecting entities; the inherent uncertainty in re-imaging and hence the nonlinear co-production due to iteration and disproportional effects, and the opening to change, and transformation; and introduce such things as backward time causation that quantum theory finds clearly in opposition to classical materialist notions of linear time and causation.
empowerment, a sense of agency that makes a difference, and orientations of critical inquiry that do resonate with the needs of the disenfranchised.

However, it is our strong feeling that we are in need of a Kuhnian paradigm shift, away from the classical-materiial orientation toward a more process-informational paradigm. Within the latter the construction, storage and dissemination of information is prioritized, along with process. All is in process, emergent, that does not follow linear logic. The static notions of space, time, causation, and objects must be replaced with a dynamic-process model that sees space and time not as absolute, homogenous, discrete and uniform, but rather as complex, relational, multidimensional; causation not as linear, but responding to sensitivity to initial conditions with disproportional effect upon iteration; and objects as fundamentally fluctuations of energy, vibratory, emitting and absorbing frequency waves embedding holographically encoded information, more quantum wave-like than particle-like, representing potentialities until collapse of the wave function in political economically shaped forms. Here, “objects,” or entities are more like dissipative structures, “smears” or “clouds of possibilities.” The notion of nonlocality and entanglement suggests the primordial interconnectedness of humans and the environment. This model is suggestive of the diverse possibilities that we are. It provides the ontological basis for a reconceptualized model in criminology and of societal structure, and transformative justice practices, one based on the greater possibilities that prevail, possibilities ever limited by current political economies and the axiomatic systems which they generate.

Contra Hall, we embrace the work of Foucault and his notion of how “technologies of the self” mold discursive subject-positions and identities (but yes, the dialectic quality of this technology is missing, for example, experienced in the dialectics of legal struggle whereby activist lawyers unintentionally reify dominant legal principles, experienced, too, in identity politics whereby stasis to otherwise becoming is engendered; and yes, the Real as well as the Imaginary and Symbolic need to be addressed); we embrace the work of Levinas on the infinite duty to the Other, not in terms of calculation which Hall attributes to it, but more in the form of an ethics of care suggested by much feminist thought; we embrace linguistic/semiotic analysis which offers an understanding of the molding forces of rigid discourses and limited, reifying possibilities in the social construction of reality (e.g., Lacan’s four discourses); that rather than lamenting on the “abandonment of the dialectical class struggle” (p. 252), there must be a greater sensitivity to the conditions of late modernity and non “class” struggles (see the work of Hardt and Negri, 2001, 2005; 2009) which suggest new forms of struggle, opposition, and organization: that the demise of incorporating or taking seriously postmodernist theory cannot be solely attributed to the Sokal affair (“after the infamous Soak affair, which demonstrated the fraudulence and vacuity at the heart of postmodernist thinking,..., the term postmodernism has almost dropped out of circulation,” p. 13) – belied, however by Hall’s extensive incorporation of Lacanian thought (at least the Real), perhaps one of the exemplary thinkers to whom Sokal refers --, that, in fact, this reluctance is part of a larger malaise that infects contemporary criminological analysis including much of critical criminology; that indeed criminology must continue and dramatically increase its cross-disciplinary engagement, particularly, as we have argued, to embrace the well-established findings in quantum and holography theory, some of which provides some specification to some of the central ideas of traditional affirmative postmodernist analysis, but much of which is profoundly novel and ready for creative, integrative, and critical synthesis.

With Hall, we indeed need to bring the subject back in; be more cognizant of pacification processes that mold the potentials that we are into object-like (particle-like) entities; work toward more comprehensive understandings of what constitutes harm; address the fundamental question of “why individuals or corporate bodies are willing to risk the infliction of harm on others in order to further their own instrumental or expressive interests” (p.1), that is, why “excessive investors” in domination are instantiated from the many forms of possible expressions that inhere in virtual possibilities; incorporate principles of ethics into the

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21 The concept of nonlocality is a key concept of quantum theory which suggests that information can be spread out rather than existing locally. Entanglement, with much empirical and mathematical support, shows how two entities, even though of considerable distance apart, may still affect each other, even transgressing the speed limit of light. Albert Einstein is often cited with his quip that this was “spooky action at a distance.”

22 Elsewhere for example, we (Milovanovic, 2014) have suggested that the Schema QD signature wave interacts with “affordances” (Gibson, 1979), encoded with information as to possibilities, that have as their source a stabilized hegemonic axiomatic system, in both passively and actively constructing perception-images as the basis of social action. In this view, axiomatic systems can be seen as specifications of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) “points of subjectification,” the basis of shaping the speaking subject. This is not linear, for we recognize backward referral of quantum information in constituting both a particular manifestation of a QD matrix and the instantiations of otherwise wave-like emitting entities in particle-like states we see as the real.
discipline; address the fundamental connection between agency, socio-economic conditions, and forms of harm; incorporate cultural criminologist’s idea of the resisting and creative subject; and, with Hall, face the profound problem that contemporary criminology is at a standstill and must engage in a sober, internal ontological critique.

**Conclusion**

One of the central values of a book in criminology is the degree to which critical, substantive discussion is mobilized. To this end, Hall’s book is an exceptional contribution to critical criminology. It is a highly scholarly work which is hard to put down once one commences to read it. It certainly is a book with which a scholar can productively engage. It challenges us to rethink criminology. It challenges us to provide sharp replies, an invitation which I have accepted, that may disrupt conventional thought and begin to build a more viable critical criminology. As to the subheading’s title, “A New Perspective,” it certainly critiques much of contemporary thinking, although the notion of “perspective” suggests some offered guidelines for a new criminology, an answer to which the book is bare bones. Perhaps out of the ashes, novel critical thought will arise that potentially attains the status of a “new perspective.” This comment on his work, however, suggests that we need to re-examine ontological premises at an even more profound level, willing in the process, to suspend our commitments to classical-materialist thought and engage the new sciences of quantum and holographic theory.

**References**


Crime vs Deviance. Man is a social animal and has been living in societies since the beginning of civilizations. Every society has its own culture made up of social norms and values that ensure peace and order among the people. Compliance to these norms by the people is a feature of a society. However, there have always been people who defy norms and exhibit behavior that is considered deviant or one that departs from the normal. To ensure compliance, there is also a written law to deal with criminal behavior that comes within deviance. However, despite similarities, there are differences betw